French v. The Bank of New York Mellon

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 12-2284
HAROLD FRENCH,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Dyk* and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
Eugene F. Sullivan, III, for appellant.
George R. Schneider, with whom Goodwin Procter LLP, Thomas J.
Pappas, Jennifer T. Beaudet, and Primmer Piper Eggleston & Cramer
PC, were on brief, for appellee.
August 30, 2013
*
Of the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. Harold French borrowed money
from Countrywide Financial ("Countrywide") and secured the loan
with a mortgage on a parcel of land he owned. Having failed to
make payments on his loan, French seeks to enjoin foreclosure by
Countrywide's assignee, Bank of New York Mellon ("BONY"). French
argues that: (1) the description of his property in the mortgage he
signed does not satisfy New Hampshire's statute of frauds; and, (2)
Countrywide's unilateral addition of a more precise legal
description of the property to the copy of the mortgage filed with
the registry of deeds was an act of fraud that should bar
Countrywide's assignee, BONY, from foreclosing. In ruling on a
motion by BONY to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted, the district court rejected both of
French's arguments. We affirm.
I. Background
Because this case comes to us on an appeal of a
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), we "take the complaint's well-pled
(i.e., non-conclusory, non-speculative) facts as true, drawing all
reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor." Schatz v.
Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012).
French signed a promissory note with Countrywide in 2005,
securing the loan with a mortgage on a parcel of land in Warner,
New Hampshire. The mortgage he signed described the property
simply as "74 Route 127, Warner, NH, 03278," its street address.
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The parties left blank a page called "Appendix A - Description of
the Property." After the closing and without French's knowledge,
Countrywide replaced the blank Appendix A with a version containing
a description of the property as follows:
A certain tract of land situated in the Town of Warner,
County of Merrimack, State of New Hampshire, being shown
as Lot 87 of Plan #17458 recorded July 1, 2005 with the
Merrimack County Registry of Deeds.
Excepting therefrom a portion of Lot 87 to be annexed and
become part of Lot 86 containing 37,600 square feet more
or less as shown on said plan.
Being the same premisses conveyed to me by deed of Carol
A. Redus dated January 12, 1999 recorded with the
Merrimack County Registry of Deeds in Book 2139, Page
654.
Importantly, French's complaint does not allege that the
more precise description in the substitute Appendix A fails to
describe precisely the property he agreed to mortgage. Indeed, his
complaint describes the land on which BONY is attempting to
foreclose under the mortgage containing the substitute Appendix A
as "Mr. French's land and residence located at 74 Route 127,
Warner, New Hampshire."1
1
French's counsel claimed for the first time at oral argument
on appeal that the description of the property in substitute
Appendix A is not accurate because it omits an easement over the
mortgaged property of which French purportedly intended to retain
sole ownership. Of course, were that so, the omission would have
been apparent on the face of the mortgage actually signed by
French. In any event, such a belated allegation by counsel is
thrice waived here. Trans-Spec Truck Serv., Inc. v. Caterpillar
Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 321 (1st Cir. 2008) ("Under Rule 12(b)(6), the
district court may properly consider only facts and documents that
are part of or incorporated into the complaint...."); Welch v.
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Countrywide recorded the mortgage containing the
substitute Appendix A with the Merrimack County Register of Deeds.
The recorded mortgage, including the substitute Appendix A, was
subsequently assigned to the Bank of New York Mellon which also
holds the note on French's property. When French was unable to
make payments on the mortgage, BONY began judicial foreclosure
proceedings. French filed suit to enjoin the foreclosure.
In Count I of his amended complaint, French alleged that
the original mortgage was invalid under New Hampshire's statute of
frauds, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 506:1, and that the recorded
mortgage was fraudulent and therefore invalid. Either defect, he
argued, entitled him to an injunction barring BONY from
foreclosing. Counts II and III are derivative of Count I, in that
they allege that a foreclosure relying on an invalid mortgage
violates, respectively, the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p, and its state analog, N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 358-C:1-4. Finally, in Count IV, French challenges the
foreclosure based on an allegation that BONY lacked ownership and
possession of the note. BONY moved to dismiss the complaint and
the district court granted its motion, except as to Count IV.
Ciampa, 542 F.3d 927, 941 n.4 (1st Cir. 2008) (court will not
consider facts not raised below where plaintiff could have brought
them to the district court's attention); Ortiz v. Gaston Cnty.
Dyeing Mach. Co., 277 F.3d 594, 598 (1st Cir. 2002) (failure to
raise an argument in briefing on appeal results in waiver).
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After discovery, the district court granted summary judgement in
BONY's favor on that remaining count. In pressing this appeal from
the final judgment against him, French challenged only the
dismissal of his claims concerning his mortgage.
II. Analysis
If French's allegations are true, Countrywide acted in a
sloppy and cavalier manner. Demonstrating that Countrywide was
either sloppy or cavalier in its record generation, however,
provides insufficient cause for French to prevail. To survive a
motion to dismiss he must show, on de novo review, that he
plausibly pled facts which, if true, state a claim that entitles
him to relief. Mass. Ret. Sys. v. CVS Caremark Corp., 716 F.3d
229, 237 (1st Cir. 2013). In arguing that he has stated such a
claim, French relies on two theories for why BONY's mortgage is
invalid: first, that the mortgage was insufficiently definite to
satisfy the New Hampshire statute of frauds; second, that the
insertion of the substitute Appendix A invalidated or voided the
mortgage held by BONY. We discuss each theory in turn.
A. The New Hampshire Statute of Frauds
The parties agree that mortgages are subject to New
Hampshire's statute of frauds. Under New Hampshire law, "[a]
memorandum is sufficiently definite to satisfy the statute of
frauds if it is 'reasonably certain from the contract itself and
the acts of the parties in performance of it what land was
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intended.'" Jesseman v. Aurelio, 106 N.H. 529, 532 (1965) (quoting
White v. Poole, 74 N.H. 71 (1906)). To enforce a contract for the
sale of land, "[r]easonable certainty" about what land the parties
intended to transact "is all that is demanded and that requirement
is fulfilled if the meaning of the contract, as a whole, is
intelligible to the court." Cunningham v. Singer, 111 N.H. 159,
160 (1971).
In Jesseman, the principal defendant agreed to sell to
the plaintiff a portion of the defendant's land "at the
intersection of Route 11 and 11B...." 106 N.H. at 530. The written
memorandum described the portion in rough and imprecise metes and
bounds (e.g. "approximately 300 feet from the Westerly point near
the beach to an open sand pit...") and was materially incorrect in
some of its estimated measurements. Id. After observing the
imprecision caused by the absence of "designations frequently used
in formal conveyances of real estate," the court found that,
because the writing was nevertheless sufficiently certain as to
what land the parties intended to transfer, parol evidence could
fill in the gaps and resolve the lack of detail and precision in
the original document. Id. at 532-33; see also Cunningham, 111
N.H. at 160.
Similarly, in Gilbert v. Tremblay, 111 A. 314, 315 (N.H.
1920), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that a description
of a property as "234 Union Ave & lot" was sufficiently definite to
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satisfy the statute of frauds where there was only one plot of land
corresponding to that address in the town the parties resided in.
Here, any imprecision in the written description in the document
signed by French and Countrywide is similarly eliminated by
unambiguous and undisputed parol evidence: the substitute Appendix
A, the accuracy of which French does not challenge. In short, the
complaint alleges a written agreement that is, in context, likely
more certain than was the description in either Jesseman or
Gilbert.
The purpose of the New Hampshire's statute of frauds is
to "promote certainty and to protect from frauds and perjuries in
land transactions." Weale v. Mass. Gen. Hous. Corp., 117 N.H. 428,
431 (1977). New Hampshire courts recognize that "a strict
enforcement of the statute can produce frustration on the one hand,
and unethical conduct on the other" and "equitable considerations"
may militate against its application in a particular case. Id.Because the parties agreed before the district court on precisely
what the written description of the property in the document they
signed means, certainty will be promoted by, and equitable
considerations support, enforcing the agreement that both parties
intended to enter into--a mortgage covering the land described
informally as "74 Route 127, Warner, New Hampshire" as detailed
more precisely and accurately in the substitute Appendix A. We
therefore agree with the district court that the written agreement,
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in light of the surrounding circumstances as alleged in the
complaint, was not so imprecise as to be unenforceable under the
New Hampshire statute of frauds.2
B. The Effect of the Insertion of Substitute Appendix A
French also advances several unconvincing theories under
which Countrywide's unilateral substitution of Appendix A for the
original blank version renders the mortgage held by BONY invalid or
void. French first suggests that Countrywide committed fraud by
making this substitution. In so arguing, French fails to explain
how altering a writing in a way that indisputably causes it to
better reflect the intentions of the parties constitutes fraud. In
New Hampshire, "[t]he essence of fraud is a fraudulent
misrepresentation." Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 46
(1987). Fraudulent misrepresentation, in turn, must be "made with
knowledge of its falsity...." Tessier v. Rockefeller, 162 N.H.
324, 332 (2011); Ed Peters Jewelry Co., Inc. v. C & J Jewelry Co.,
Inc., 215 F.3d 182, 191 (1st Cir. 2000) ("The hallmarks of fraud
2
French suggests that holding that the mortgage satisfies the
statute of frauds will create a cloud on the titles of properties
adjoining his. Because this argument is raised for the first time
on appeal and is unsupported by relevant citation we treat it as
waived. Randall v. Laconia, N.H., 679 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2012)
(treating argument as waived because of its "perfunctory treatment"
in appellant's brief and because it was raised for the first time
on appeal). Even if we did consider the argument, French fails to
explain how the use of an address in his mortgage creates a cloud
on other properties' titles where the recorded form of the mortgage
contains an accurate and precise description of the mortgaged
property.
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are misrepresentation or deceit."). Here, in contrast, the
description of the property in the substitute Appendix A was
correct.
French also suggests that allowing BONY to foreclose is
a form of equitable relief to which BONY is not entitled because it
has unclean hands due to its predecessor's unilateral substitution
of Appendix A. His theory that the district court provided
equitable relief relies on the district court's statement that
"even if the final page of the mortgage document is excised, the
description on the document's third page is sufficient to satisfy
the statute of frauds." This, French argues, means the district
court reformed the mortgage. But we read the district court as
using "excised" to mean "ignored," simply saying that even the bare
reference to the street address, and not the surrounding acts of
the parties, was sufficiently precise to avoid the statute of
frauds. Whether that is correct we need not decide.
III. Conclusion
All three counts of French's complaint ultimately rest on
the two theories we have discussed and rejected. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court's ruling.
So ordered.
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