Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 12-1053
CARLOS HERNANDEZ-CUEVAS,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM TAYLOR and STEVEN M. MARTZ,
Defendants, Appellants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Aida M. Delgado-Colón, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Thompson, Stahl, and Lipez,
Circuit Judges.
Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Rosa
E. Rodriguez-Velez, United States Attorney, Barbara L. Herwig, and
Lowell V. Sturgill, Jr. were on brief, for appellants.
Jose F. Quetglas Jordan, with whom Pedro R. Vazquez and the
Quetglas Law Offices were on brief, for appellee.
July 17, 2013
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. This case requires us to decide
for the first time whether an individual who alleges that the
unlawful conduct of law enforcement officers caused him to be held
for three months in pretrial detention without probable cause
states a Fourth Amendment claim actionable through a Bivens suit.1
Often called a "Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution" claim, the
existence and contours of such a claim are the subject of
considerable discord among the Courts of Appeals. After reviewing
the relevant case law, we conclude that an individual's Fourth
Amendment right to be free from seizure but upon probable cause
continues through the pretrial period,2 and that, in certain
circumstances, injured parties can vindicate that right through a
§ 1983 or Bivens action. Furthermore, because we agree with the
district court that Hernandez-Cuevas has pleaded facts which, if
1
A Bivens action is a civil action brought against agents of
the United States, deriving its name from Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388(1971). "This implied cause of action is the federal analog to
§ 1983 suits against state officials." Soto-Torres v. Fraticelli,
654 F.3d 153, 158 (1st Cir. 2011).
2
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
-2-
true, would be sufficient to establish that Taylor and Martz
violated his Fourth Amendment rights, we affirm the denial of
qualified immunity and remand for further proceedings.
I.
A. Factual Background
The following facts are drawn from the complaint and
documents incorporated into the complaint.
In 2004, plaintiff Carlos Hernandez-Cuevas was 40 years
old and living in a rented room in a multi-unit building located at
1655 Santa Ana Street in Carolina, Puerto Rico. Hernandez-Cuevas
is dark-skinned, approximately 5'10" tall, and thin, weighing about
150 pounds.
That same year, a joint federal-Commonwealth task force
consisting of FBI agents and local police officers opened a special
investigation targeting a significant drug and money laundering
conspiracy operating in Carolina. The task force employed at least
two confidential informants, referred to in the complaint as "UI-1"
and "UI-2." Working undercover, UI-1 and UI-2 arranged a meeting
on July 20, 2004 with several members of the money laundering
conspiracy in the parking lot of the Pueblo Supermarket on Route
187 in Carolina, "where a courier acting under the direction of
such co-conspirators was to deliver proceeds of drug sales to UI-
1."
The task force agents set up a surveillance unit to
-3-
observe this transaction. According to a contemporaneous
surveillance report, the agents at the scene saw a white and silver
Mitsubishi Montero with license plate number DMV-656 enter the
parking lot and park next to UI-1's car. The driver of the
Montero, referred to in the complaint as "UNSUB #1," rolled down
his window and spoke with UI-1. Both cars then left the parking
lot.
Some time later, UI-1 returned to the parking lot, this
time tailed by a white Jeep Cherokee with license plate number FDA-
680. Two unknown males were inside the Jeep: the driver, referred
to in the complaint as "UNSUB #2," and a passenger, referred to as
"UNSUB #3." In their surveillance report, the FBI officers at the
scene described UNSUB #3 as a "black male, with black hair, 5 feet
and 7 inches tall, a heavy build, and in his late fifties."
The Jeep pulled up alongside UI-1's car. UNSUB #3 exited
the Jeep and placed two bags containing $321,956 in cash in the
trunk of UI-1's car. UNSUB #3 then returned to the Jeep, which
left the parking lot. FBI agents from the surveillance unit
followed the Jeep, and saw the driver drop UNSUB #3 off on Santa
Ana Street in Carolina. The agents last observed UNSUB #3 walking
toward the "porch area" of the multi-unit building located at 1655
Santa Ana Street, where Hernandez-Cuevas lived.
Nearly a year passed, during which the FBI was unable to
positively identify UNSUB #3. "In a rush to indict someone as
-4-
UNSUB #3," Martz, Taylor, and UI-1 conspired to manufacture
evidence indicating that UNSUB #3 was Hernandez-Cuevas. In
furtherance of their plan, Martz and UI-1 "carried out a tainted
photo identification." On May 25, 2005, Martz e-mailed UI-1
pictures of six individuals, including a photograph of Hernandez-
Cuevas. The following day, U-1 called Martz on the telephone and
identified Hernandez-Cuevas as UNSUB #3, even though Hernandez-
Cuevas's physical appearance –- tall, thin, and 40 years old -- is
strikingly different from the contemporaneous FBI report describing
UNSUB # 3 as "5 feet and 7 inches tall, a heavy build, and in his
late fifties." Despite the discrepancies between Hernandez-
Cuevas's appearance and the original surveillance description of
UNSUB #3, Martz wrote an internal FBI report based on UI-1's
identification concluding that UNSUB #3 was in fact Hernandez-
Cuevas.
Another two years passed without further action in the
case. Finally, on November 21, 2007, Taylor "either knowingly or
in reckless disregard of the truth" included the false
identification of Hernandez-Cuevas as UNSUB #3 in a warrant
affidavit, attesting that on July 20, 2004, Hernandez-Cuevas had
delivered $321,956 in drug proceeds to UI-1.
On the basis of these false statements, a magistrate
judge in Puerto Rico issued a warrant for Hernandez-Cuevas's
arrest. According to the complaint, without Taylor's statements,
-5-
the government would have been unable to establish probable cause
to obtain the warrant. FBI agents arrested Hernandez-Cuevas on
December 3, 2007 and brought him before a magistrate judge the
following day. On December 6, 2007, he appeared again before a
magistrate judge, who ordered him detained without bail pending
trial and transferred him to a federal prison in New Jersey, where
he was incarcerated for nearly three months awaiting further
proceedings. On February 29, 2008, he was released on his own
recognizance following a hearing before a magistrate judge in New
Jersey; on April 18, 2008, the United States Attorney for the
District of New Jersey dismissed the charges against Hernandez-
Cuevas.
Hernandez-Cuevas alleges that he was not in the parking
lot of the Pueblo Supermarket on July 20, 2004, and that he has
never been involved in the drug trade. He also alleges that he has
never "owned, possessed, driven or traveled" in either of the cars
observed by the FBI agents in the parking lot.
B. Procedural Background
Hernandez-Cuevas filed his complaint on March 2, 2009,
alleging that Martz and Taylor's misconduct caused him to be held
in federal custody for three months without probable cause.3 The
3
The original complaint was dismissed without prejudice for
lack of proper service on July 14, 2009 and re-filed on July 28,
2009. The district court determined that under Puerto Rico law,
the original complaint tolled the statute of limitations. See P.R.
Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5303; see also López-González v. Municipality
-6-
defendants first moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint on statute
of limitations grounds, arguing that Puerto Rico's one-year
limitations period had run by the time Hernandez-Cuevas filed his
complaint on March 2, 2009. Under the government's theory, any
Fourth Amendment claim of Hernandez-Cuevas had accrued in December
2007 on the day of his allegedly unlawful arrest. As such, the
Puerto Rico one-year statue of limitations expired in December
2008, several months before Hernandez-Cuevas filed this complaint.
The district court agreed in part with the defendants,
reasoning that if Hernandez-Cuevas had filed his complaint shortly
after his arrest in December 2007, he would have had a
straightforward Fourth Amendment false arrest claim. But because
Hernandez-Cuevas failed to file his complaint until more than a
year after his December 2007 arrest, the district court agreed with
the government that any claim for damages flowing from the arrest
itself was time-barred. See Torres v. Superintendent of Police,
893 F.2d 404, 406 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that "the appropriate
statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim is Puerto Rico's
one-year period governing tort actions"); see also Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384, 390 (2007) (holding that accrual for § 1983 claims is
governed by federal law and a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim
accrues on the date of arrest); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484
of Comerío, 404 F.3d 548, 551-52 (1st Cir. 2005). Defendants do
not challenge that determination on appeal. Accordingly, we treat
this complaint as though it had been filed on March 2, 2009.
-7-
(1994); Calero-Cólon v. Betancourt-Lebron, 68 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st
Cir. 1995) (discussing accrual rules for malicious prosecution and
false arrest claims brought under § 1983).
The court disagreed, however, with the government's
argument that the statute of limitations on all plausible Fourth
Amendment claims had run by the time Hernandez-Cuevas filed his
complaint. Instead, the court agreed with Hernandez-Cuevas that in
addition to allegations that he sustained injuries from the arrest
itself, the complaint alleged that he sustained injuries from the
three months that he was held in federal custody without probable
cause. Concluding that Hernandez-Cuevas was correct that the
closest common law analogy for this claim was malicious
prosecution, the court allowed him to proceed on this claim because
malicious prosecution claims accrued at common law on the day that
the proceedings terminated in plaintiff's favor, see Wallace, 549
U.S. at 390, which in this case occurred on April 18, 2008, less
than a year before Hernandez-Cuevas filed his complaint on March 2,
2009.4
The defendants then filed a second motion to dismiss,
4
A defendant cannot file an interlocutory appeal of a
denial of a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds.
Instead, a defendant must wait until final judgment has entered to
seek appellate review. See Garnier v. Rodríguez, 506 F.3d 22, 25
(1st Cir. 2007) (holding that where officer filed interlocutory
appeal of both denial of qualified immunity and denial of motion to
dismiss on statute of limitations grounds, court of appeals had
jurisdiction only over qualified immunity appeal).
-8-
arguing, inter alia, that Taylor and Martz were entitled to
qualified immunity. The court denied the defendants' motion.
Citing the Supreme Court's opinion in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S.
154 (1978), the court concluded that it had long been clearly
established law that the Fourth Amendment prohibits a police
officer from manufacturing probable cause by knowingly including
false statements in a warrant affidavit.5
Taylor and Martz then filed this interlocutory appeal
challenging the district court's denial of qualified immunity.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal
because a trial court's denial of a federal officer's qualified
immunity defense is a "final decision within the meaning of 28
U.S.C. § 1291." Soto-Torres v. Fraticelli, 654 F.3d 153, 157 (1st
Cir. 2011); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 671-72
(2009); Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2004) ("[M]any of
the benefits of qualified immunity are squandered if the action is
incorrectly allowed to proceed to trial."). Our review is de novo.
5
In his opposition brief, Hernandez-Cuevas argues that Martz
and Taylor have waived their qualified immunity defense because
they did not argue before the district court that they were
entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment malicious
prosecution claim specifically. There is no merit to this
argument. Martz and Taylor asserted the affirmative defense of
qualified immunity in their Answer to Hernandez-Cuevas's complaint
and filed a motion to dismiss arguing that they were entitled to
qualified immunity on Hernandez-Cuevas's claim that they "conspired
to maliciously prosecute" him. Martz and Taylor needed to do
nothing more to preserve their qualified immunity defense.
-9-
See Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.
2011).
In an appeal from a denial of qualified immunity, we
generally proceed through a two-part analysis,6 considering whether
"(1) the facts alleged show the defendants' conduct violated a
constitutional right, and (2) the contours of this right are
'clearly established' under then-existing law so that a reasonable
officer would have known that his conduct was unlawful." Santana
v. Calderón, 342 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2003). In this case,
however, Taylor and Martz have declined to raise any argument about
the 'clearly established' prong, choosing instead to pursue their
argument that Hernandez-Cuevas has failed to state a plausible
Fourth Amendment claim.7 As such, we confine ourselves to
6
Because "[t]he qualified immunity test is identical for
claims pursued under § 1983 and for Bivens-type suits," Martínez-
Rodríguez v. Guevara, 597 F.3d 414, 419 (1st Cir. 2010), we use
case law developed under both types of claims interchangeably.
7
We note that the government's decision to forfeit the
clearly established prong may have been motivated by the reasonable
conclusion that such an argument would be hopeless in any event.
Though the question of whether the Fourth Amendment provides
substantive protection during the pretrial period is a question of
first impression in this circuit, it cannot be seriously argued
that an objectively reasonable officer in Martz and Taylor's
position would have been ignorant of the fact that fabricating
evidence was constitutionally unacceptable. Indeed, we have
previously concluded that it is "self-evident" that "those charged
with upholding the law are prohibited from deliberately fabricating
evidence and framing individuals for crimes they did not commit."
Limone v. Condon, 372 F.3d 39, 44-45 (1st Cir. 2004) (concluding
that "the right not to be framed by law enforcement agents was
clearly established in 1967").
-10-
consideration of the first prong of the analysis, namely, "whether
the facts alleged, viewed in the light most favorable to the
complaining party, show that the officer's conduct violated some
constitutional right." Limone v. Condon, 372 F.3d 39, 44 (1st Cir.
2004).
That inquiry is more complicated than usual. Neither
this circuit nor the Supreme Court has ever explicitly determined
that the Fourth Amendment encompasses a malicious prosecution
claim. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 390 n.2 ("We have never explored
the contours of a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution suit under
§ 1983 . . . ."); Harrington v. City of Nashua, 610 F.3d 24, 30
(1st Cir. 2010) ("It remains an unanswered question whether a
malicious prosecution claim is cognizable under the Fourth
Amendment and section 1983 . . . ."); Moreno-Medina v. Toledo, 458
Fed. App'x 4, 7 (1st Cir. 2012) (unpublished).
Given the unsettled nature of this question, we are
frankly baffled by the government's explicit decision to forego any
argument that the Fourth Amendment does not encompass a malicious
prosecution claim. In its opening brief on appeal, the government
mentions the unsettled nature of this question, but then, without
presenting any argument, decides to proceed, assuming, arguendo,
that the Fourth Amendment encompasses a malicious prosecution
claim.
Despite this omission, it would be an odd exercise on our
-11-
part, under the circumstances of this case, to evaluate the
sufficiency of the pleadings on the assumption that the underlying
right existed. That approach might make sense if we found, as the
government argues, that the pleadings are insufficient, and thereby
brought this case to a close. That appears to be the government's
calculation. However, if we assumed the right existed, found the
pleadings sufficient, and remanded to the district court for
further proceedings, and then determined at a later stage of the
case that the underlying right did not exist, the post-remand
proceedings would have been a waste of judicial resources. Thus,
to avoid such an outcome, we will consider first whether the right
Hernandez-Cuevas seeks to vindicate exists at all before we
determine whether he has pled facts sufficient to establish that a
constitutional violation occurred. Cf. Engel v. Buchan, 710 F.3d
698, 702 (7th Cir. 2013) ("The issue of qualified immunity
necessarily includes the predicate of whether a Bivens remedy is
available in this context at all.").
A. Fourth Amendment Malicious Prosecution Claims
1. Legal Background
There has long been a sense among the courts that the
Constitution provides some protection for individuals who are
targeted for unreasonable, baseless prosecutions, and who, as a
result, are detained without probable cause during the pretrial
period. Though this view seems to be widely shared, the precise
-12-
constitutional source and extent of any protection against this
type of harm are issues on which there has long existed "an
embarrassing diversity of judicial opinion." Albright v. Oliver,
510 U.S. 266, 271 n.4 (1994) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (discussing the variety of judicial approaches to
these claims).
In years past, many courts, including this one,
recognized a substantive or procedural due process right to be free
from malicious prosecution. See, e.g., Torres, 893 F.2d at 409.
Locating the right to be free from unreasonable pretrial detention
in the due process guarantees of the Constitution dovetailed with
our understanding that the rights of an accused following arrest
and arraignment are generally enshrined in the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments.
Nearly two decades ago, however, the Supreme Court's
opinion in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, firmly closed the door
on substantive due process as a vehicle for bringing such claims.
In addition, at least a plurality of the Justices concluded that
procedural due process would likewise rarely, if ever, be an
appropriate vehicle for such claims. See id. at 283-86 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding that any procedural due
process malicious prosecution claim would, in most cases, be
precluded by the Parratt-Hudson doctrine). At the same time,
however, the Court strongly suggested in dicta that the plaintiff
-13-
in Albright would have been more successful if he had sought relief
under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 274 ("The Framers
considered the matter of pretrial deprivations of liberty and
drafted the Fourth Amendment to address it.").
Though confined to dicta, these statements about a Fourth
Amendment right to be free from malicious prosecution resulted in
a sea change in the law. Prior to Albright only a minority of
jurisdictions recognized a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution
claim, but it is now the majority rule. Indeed, each of the eight
Courts of Appeals to directly address in the years since Albright
whether the Fourth Amendment provides protection against pretrial
detention without probable cause has concluded that it does. See,
e.g., Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d 149, 160-61 (2d
Cir. 2010); McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 582 F.3d 447, 461 (3d
Cir. 2009); Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012);
Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc);
Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 310 (6th Cir. 2010); Lassiter v.
City of Bremerton, 556 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2009); Pierce v.
Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004); Grider v. City of
Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1256 (11th Cir. 2010).
Though there is now broad consensus among the circuits
that the Fourth Amendment right to be free from seizure but upon
probable cause extends through the pretrial period, the circuits
are divided over the elements of such a claim. See Pierce, 359
-14-
F.3d at 1287-90 & n.8 (discussing circuit split); Castellano, 352
F.3d at 949-53 (same). The varying approaches adopted by the
different Courts of Appeals can be roughly placed in one of two
groups. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have adopted
a purely constitutional approach, requiring the plaintiff to
demonstrate only a Fourth Amendment violation. The Second, Third,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, on the other hand, have adopted a
blended constitutional/common law approach, requiring the plaintiff
to demonstrate a Fourth Amendment violation and all the elements of
a common law malicious prosecution claim.
Though these two approaches reflect a theoretical divide
between the circuits, the elements of a Fourth Amendment malicious
prosecution claim under either the blended approach or the purely
constitutional approach are largely identical with one caveat. The
plaintiff in a common law malicious prosecution claim must, as the
name implies, demonstrate that the defendant officer acted with
subjective malice.8 A plaintiff alleging a purely constitutional
Fourth Amendment claim, on the other hand, usually need establish
only that his seizure was objectively unreasonable. See Sykes, 625
8
The elements of a common law malicious prosecution claim
vary slightly from state to state, but in general they are: "(1)
the commencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding by the
defendant against the plaintiff; (2) the termination of the
proceeding in favor of the accused; (3) the absence of probable
cause for the criminal proceeding; and (4) actual malice." Calero-
Colón v. Betancourt-Lebron, 68 F.3d 1, at 3 n.5 (1st Cir. 1995);
see also W. Keeton, et al., Prosser & Keeton on Law of Torts § 119,
at 871 (5th ed. 1984).
-15-
F.3d at 310-11 ("[T]he reasonableness of a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment should be analyzed from an objective perspective, which,
even in the context of malicious-prosecution claims, renders
irrelevant the subjective state of mind of the defendant[.]"
(internal quotation marks omitted)). However, as we shall explain,
there may be less to this divide than first appears.
2. Our Approach
Today, we join our sister circuits in concluding that the
Fourth Amendment protection against seizure but upon probable cause
does not end when an arrestee becomes held pursuant to legal
process.9 Though the Fifth and Sixth Amendments generally control
events following the arrest and arraignment of an individual
accused of committing a crime, we are convinced that an individual
does not lose his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable seizure when he becomes detained pursuant to judicial
process. Certainly, in most cases, the neutral magistrate's
9
The moment a defendant becomes held pursuant to legal
process differs depending on whether or not the defendant was
arrested pursuant to a warrant. In a case where an individual is
arrested without a warrant, he is detained without process until,
"for example, he is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on
charges." Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389 (2007). In most
cases, this post-arrest, pre-process period can last only up to 48
hours. See Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56
(1991). Where an individual is arrested pursuant to a judicial
warrant, however, he becomes held pursuant to legal process at the
moment of arrest. See Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46, 54 (1st
Cir. 2001) (noting that in a malicious prosecution action,
"[g]enerally, the offending legal process comes either in the form
of an arrest warrant . . . or a subsequent charging document"); see
also W. Keeton, et al., supra, § 119, at 888.
-16-
determination that probable cause exists for the individual's
arrest is an intervening act that could disrupt any argument that
the defendant officer had caused the continued unlawful seizure.
See Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 50 (1st Cir. 2009)
("We employ common law tort principles when conducting 'inquiries
into causation under § 1983.'" (quoting Gutierrez-Rodriguez v.
Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 561 (1st Cir. 1989))). But, if a
plaintiff can overcome this causation problem and demonstrate that
law enforcement officers were responsible for his continued,
unreasonable pretrial detention, the plaintiff has stated a
constitutional injury that may be vindicated through a § 1983
action. See Evans, 703 F.3d at 647 ("[E]ven where . . . a
prosecutor retains all discretion to seek an indictment, police
officers may have caused the seizure and remain liable to a
wrongfully indicted defendant[.]"). For example, officers may be
liable for unlawful pretrial detention when they have (1) "lied to
or misled the prosecutors"; (2) "failed to disclose exculpatory
evidence"; or (3) "unduly pressured the prosecutor to seek the
indictment." Id. at 647-48; see also Sykes, 625 F.3d at 308-309(requiring plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant officer
"made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute"
(quoting Fox v. Desoto, 489 F.3d 227, 237 (6th Cir. 2007))
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).
This holding harmonizes our law with the law of other
-17-
circuits, and makes explicit what has long been implicit in our
case law. In the past we have held that "some truths are self-
evident. . . . [I]f any concept is fundamental to our American
system of justice, it is that those charged with upholding the law
are prohibited from deliberately fabricating evidence and framing
individuals for crimes they did not commit." Limone, 372 F.3d at
44-45. We now further specify that one constitutional source of
this "self-evident" prohibition against manufactured evidence in
the pretrial detention context is the Fourth Amendment's guarantee
of freedom from seizure but upon probable cause.
As to the elements of such a claim, we join those four
circuits that have adopted a purely constitutional approach,10
holding that a plaintiff may bring a suit under § 1983 (or Bivens)
if he can establish that: "the defendant (1) caused (2) a seizure
of the plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable
10
We acknowledge that our statements in dicta have been
inconsistent, with some cases suggesting we might support a
constitutional approach and others indicating a common law
approach. Indeed, our comments have been so difficult to reconcile
that other courts and commentators have placed us on both sides of
the split. Compare Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 949 (5th
Cir. 2003) (en banc) (discussing circuit split and concluding that
the First Circuit requires showing of all common law elements) and
Jacques L. Schillachi, Note, Unexamined Premises: Toward Doctrinal
Purity in § 1983 Malicious Prosecution Doctrine, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev.
439, 460-61 (2002) (same), with Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257,
261 (4th Cir. 2000) (placing First Circuit among the circuits
requiring something less than a showing of all common law tort
elements), and Joseph G. Yannetti, Note, Who's on First, What's on
Second, and I Don't Know About the Sixth Circuit: A § 1983
Malicious Prosecution Circuit Split that Would Confuse Even Abbott
& Costello, 36 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 513, 517 (2003) (same).
-18-
cause, and (3) criminal proceedings terminated in plaintiff's
favor." Evans, 703 F.3d at 647. The rights guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment are not superseded by the common law, and we see
no principled reason why plaintiffs alleging a constitutional
injury should be entitled to relief only if they can demonstrate
that their claim meets all the elements of a common law claim.
Though we often look to the common law for guidance, it is a
familiar principle that the constitutional tort authorized by
§ 1983 "stands on its own, influenced by the substance, but not
tied to the formal categories and procedures, of the common law."
Albright, 510 U.S. at 277 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also
Castellano, 352 F.3d at 954-55 (discussing how continued uncritical
reliance on pre-Albright case law has led to an impermissible
blending of state tort law and constitutional law).
Though we adopt a purely constitutional rather than a
blended constitutional/common law approach, we believe that the
practical consequences of this choice are less significant than
they initially appear. In fact, in most cases, the showing
required to prove a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim
under a purely constitutional theory will be almost
indistinguishable from that required in the circuits using a
blended constitutional/common law approach to a Fourth Amendment
malicious prosecution claim. Regardless of the approach adopted,
to establish a Fourth Amendment violation involving pretrial
-19-
detention under the Supreme Court's reasoning in Franks v.
Delaware, the plaintiff must demonstrate that –- despite the
magistrate's determination that the evidence presented was, on its
face, sufficient to establish probable cause -- that evidence was,
in fact, constitutionally unacceptable because the officers
formulated evidence essential to the probable cause determination
with a mental state similar to common law malice.
The Supreme Court explained in Franks that to show that
a magistrate's facially valid probable cause determination was
constitutionally unacceptable, the moving party must demonstrate
that the police officer submitted to the magistrate evidence that
was not "believed or appropriately accepted by the [officer] as
true." Franks, 438 U.S. at 165. This was a constitutional
requirement, flowing from the "language of the Warrant Clause
itself, which surely takes the affiant's good faith as its
premise." Id. at 164. The Court thus concluded that in order for
a warrant to satisfy the Fourth Amendment, the magistrate's
probable cause determination must not have relied upon evidence an
officer submitted in bad faith. Id. at 171-72; see Burke v. Town
of Walpole, 405 F.3d 66, 82 (1st Cir. 2005) (reasoning that where
"reckless misstatements or omissions" were included in a warrant
affidavit "a court owes no deference to a magistrate's decision to
issue an arrest warrant"); see also United States v. Ranney, 298
F.3d 74, 78 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that defendants "failed to make
-20-
the requisite . . . showing that absent the false information the
affidavit contained insufficient evidence to support a finding of
probable cause").
Franks, however, did not establish strict liability for
police officers. To show that the evidence presented to the
magistrate was not "truthful" in the Franks sense, "[a]llegations
of [police] negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient."
Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. Rather, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that law enforcement officers made statements in the warrant
affidavit which amounted to "deliberate falsehood or . . . reckless
disregard for the truth," and that those deliberate falsehoods were
necessary to the magistrate's probable cause determination. Id.;
see also Burke, 405 F.3d at 81-82 (applying the Franks standard in
the § 1983 context). This kind of reprehensible behavior seems
indistinguishable from the common law element of malice.11 Indeed,
we suspect that in those jurisdictions requiring an independent
showing of malice, the malice analysis is largely duplicative of
the probable cause analysis, which excludes from that analysis any
statements in the warrant affidavit deliberately false or in
reckless disregard of the truth. See, e.g., Grider, 618 F.3d at
1258-59 (relying on the same allegations concerning a police
11
Common law malice standards vary by jurisdiction and
context, but Black's Law Dictionary defines malice to mean "1. the
intent, without justification or excuse, to commit a wrongful act.
2. Reckless disregard of the law or of a person's legal rights."
Black's Law Dictionary 712 (8th ed. 2004).
-21-
officer fabricating evidence to infer both that the individual was
arrested without probable cause and that the police officer acted
with malice).
Having determined that the Fourth Amendment right to be
free from seizure but upon probable cause extends through the
pretrial period and a plaintiff may bring a suit under § 1983 (or
Bivens) to vindicate that right, we turn now to the complaint at
issue in this appeal and consider whether the facts alleged therein
state a plausible claim that Martz and Taylor violated this right.
B. Hernandez-Cuevas's Complaint
In evaluating the sufficiency of the complaint, our
inquiry focuses "on the reasonableness of the inference of
liability that the plaintiff is asking the court to draw from the
facts alleged in the complaint." Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 13;
see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ("A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged."). To this end, "we first disregard all
conclusory allegations that merely parrot the relevant legal
standard." Young v. Wells Fargo, N.A., No. 12-1405, slip op. at 10
(1st Cir. May 21, 2013). We then consider whether the remaining
allegations "taken as true, . . . state a plausible, not a merely
conceivable, case for relief." Sepúlveda-Villarini v. Dep't of
Educ., 628 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2010). Ultimately, "[t]he
-22-
relevant question . . . in assessing plausibility is not whether
the complaint makes any particular factual allegations but, rather,
whether 'the complaint warrant[s] dismissal because it failed in
toto to render plaintiffs' entitlement to relief plausible.'"
Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir.
2013) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 n.14
(2007)).
Here, despite our admonition that "[t]he complaint should
be read as a whole, not parsed piece by piece to determine whether
each allegation, in isolation, is plausible," Ocasio-Hernández, 640
F.3d at 14 (quoting Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585,
594 (8th Cir. 2009)), the government has done just that, electing
in its appeal to challenge the complaint in a piecemeal fashion.
The government dwells in particular on five allegations in the
complaint, each of which it claims amounts to nothing more than the
sort of "formulaic recitation" that Iqbal requires us to disregard.
These allegations are that: 1) Martz conducted a "tainted" photo
array; 2) Martz included the identification obtained from the photo
array in an internal FBI report; 3) Taylor recklessly or knowingly
included that same identification in a warrant affidavit; 4)
Martz's report and photo identification caused Hernandez-Cuevas to
be arrested and charged; and 5) Taylor and Martz framed Hernandez-
Cuevas because they were "in a rush to indict someone" for the role
UNSUB #3 played in the Carolina conspiracy.
-23-
We are unpersuaded by the government's balkanized
approach. Rather, reviewing the complaint as a whole, we believe
that it was reasonable for the district court to infer from the
cumulative power of the facts alleged in the complaint that Martz
and Taylor caused Heranandez-Cuevas to be detained without probable
cause for three months following his initial appearance before the
magistrate. Cf. Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 15 ("[T]he Supreme
Court has suggested that allegations that would individually lack
the heft to make a claim plausible may suffice to state a claim in
the context of the complaint's other factual allegations." (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)). Specifically, we find that Hernandez-
Cuevas's complaint describes the following narrative.
1. July 2004 Surveillance
In July 2004, an FBI task force surveillance unit
witnessed a black male, short, stocky, and in his late fifties,
transfer $321,956 in drug proceeds to an undercover informant. The
agents tailed this man to Santa Ana Street in Carolina, but
eventually lost him. They last saw him walking toward the multi-
unit building located at 1655 Santa Ana Street.
2. The Investigation
Although the investigation into the broader money
laundering conspiracy continued, more than a year passed and the
FBI was still unable to locate or identify the man who had
delivered the $321,956 to UI-1 in the Carolina parking lot. Under
-24-
pressure from their superiors to identify the subject before more
time was lost, agents Martz and Taylor discovered that there was
indeed a black male living at 1655 Santa Ana Street. His name was
Carlos Hernandez-Cuevas.
Other than his race and his address, nothing connected
this younger man to the money laundering conspiracy. Hernandez-
Cuevas did not match the physical description of the older man
observed in the Pueblo Supermarket parking lot, and he was not
associated with either the Jeep Cherokee or the Mitsubishi Montero
the surveillance unit identified at the scene.
3. The Photo Array
Realizing that this meager evidence would be woefully
insufficient to establish probable cause, Martz and Taylor decided
to create false evidence linking Hernandez-Cuevas to the crime. To
accomplish their unlawful means, Taylor and Martz worked in concert
with confidential informant UI-1 to arrange a tainted photo array.
Although the complaint does not specify how the co-conspirators
tainted the photo array, Hernandez-Cuevas has pled sufficient facts
to support a reasonable inference that something was amiss.
Specifically, Hernandez-Cuevas has alleged that rather than
selecting a photograph of someone matching the description of UNSUB
#3 -- short, stocky, and nearly sixty -- UI-1 picked a photograph
of Hernandez-Cuevas, who was tall, thin, and only forty.
The government is correct that a mistaken identification
-25-
is not necessarily inconsistent with innocent behavior. Here,
however, the facts alleged concerning the striking physical
dissimilarity between the surveillance description of UNSUB #3 and
Hernandez-Cuevas make the inference that the photo array was
somehow dishonest more plausible than the inference of an innocent,
but mistaken, identification. That is, Hernandez-Cuevas's
allegations are more than merely "consistent with conspiracy, but
just as much in line with" innocent behavior. Twombly, 550 U.S. at
554. Taken together, they raise a "reasonable expectation" that
further proceedings will reveal evidence of illegal conduct. Id.
at 556.
Like the district court, we are unconvinced by the
government's argument that Hernandez-Cuevas's allegation that the
photo array was "tainted" is "threadbare" in the sense of Iqbal.
Certainly, an allegation that a photo array has been "tainted" can
be a legal conclusion in a case where a plaintiff alleges that the
likelihood of misidentification was so high that use of the
identification at trial would amount to a due process violation.
See Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 442-43 & n.2 (1969) (noting
that "in some cases the procedures leading to an eyewitness
identification may be so defective as to make the identification
constitutionally inadmissible as a matter of law"). But we do not
understand Hernandez-Cuevas's allegation that his photo array was
"tainted" in this technical sense. Rather, his allegation is a
-26-
descriptive, factual statement identifying the means Martz, Taylor,
and UI-1 employed to frame him.
4. The Warrant Affidavit
Taylor then either knowingly or with reckless disregard
for the truth made sworn statements in a warrant affidavit
identifying Hernandez-Cuevas as the man who delivered the tainted
cash to UI-1 in the Pueblo Supermarket parking lot. It is a
plausible inference that Taylor acted with the requisite mental
state because the complaint alleges that Taylor made these
statements despite the fact that he knew that Hernandez-Cuevas did
not match the original description of UNSUB #3 in the surveillance
report, that Hernandez-Cuevas was not associated with either the
Jeep Cherokee or the Mitsubishi Montero identified by the
surveillance unit as participating in the parking lot transaction,
and that the only evidence linking Hernandez-Cuevas to the money-
laundering conspiracy was the tainted photo identification, his
race, and his address. See Burke, 405 F.3d at 81 ("Reckless
disregard for the truth in the submission of a warrant application
may be established where an officer in fact entertained serious
doubts as to the truth of the allegations or where circumstances
evinced obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the allegations in
the application." (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted)).
-27-
5. Arrest and Detention
The magistrate judge determined on the basis of Taylor's
affidavit that probable cause existed and issued a warrant for
Hernandez-Cuevas's arrest. Under the Franks analysis, see
discussion supra, we, like the district court, must reconsider the
evidence that was before the magistrate, omitting those
misstatements of Taylor that were intentionally or recklessly made,
to determine if, without the false evidence, there was still
probable cause to arrest Hernandez-Cuevas. See Franks, 438 U.S. at172 n.8 (noting that once the false evidence has been removed, "if
what is left is sufficient to sustain probable cause, the
inaccuracies are irrelevant"). We agree with the district court
that, without Martz's statements based on the photo identification,
the remaining facts linking Hernandez-Cuevas to the conspiracy –-
that he was black and that he lived in an apartment complex close
to where UNSUB #3 was last seen –- would be woefully insufficient
to establish probable cause.
Nevertheless, on the basis of a warrant that would have
never have issued without the tainted photo array, Hernandez-Cuevas
was arrested and brought before a magistrate judge, who bound him
over and ordered him detained in federal custody for three months
until a second magistrate judge ordered his release. Shortly
thereafter, the prosecutor dismissed the charges against Heranndez-
Cuevas, setting the stage for this claim of unlawful detention.
-28-
6. Conclusion
Given the specific facts Hernandez-Cuevas has included in
his complaint -– about the July 20, 2004 transaction in Carolina,
his own physical dissimilarity with UNSUB #3, the absence of any
relationship to the cars at the scene, and the lack of other
evidence tying him to the conspiracy -- we affirm the district
court's conclusion that the plaintiff has stated a plausible claim
that Martz and Taylor, through the use of a tainted photo array,
caused Hernandez-Cuevas to be held in federal custody for three
months without probable cause in violation of the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures.
III.
For these reasons, the district court's denial of qualified
immunity is affirmed. We remand to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
-29-