United States v. Gemma

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 14-2120
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL GEMMA,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. George A. O'Toole, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Circuit Judge,
Souter, Associate Justice,*
and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
Elaine Mittleman, by Appointment of the Court, for appellant,
and Michael Gemma, with whom Charles W. Rankin, Kerry A. Haberlin,
and Rankin & Sultan, were on pro se brief.
Mark T. Quinlivan, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
March 30, 2016
_________________
* Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the
Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation.
STAHL, Circuit Judge. In 2012, Defendant-Appellant
Michael Gemma was convicted in federal district court of sex
trafficking and transporting minors to engage in prostitution. In
this appeal, Gemma makes a plethora of challenges to the district
court's judgment. Finding none of merit, we AFFIRM.
I. Facts and Background
In September 2011, Massachusetts State Police Trooper
Dylan Morris spotted a red Nissan Altima with Pennsylvania tags
traveling approximately 95 miles per hour on I-84. After giving
chase, the officer pulled the vehicle over. Upon approaching the
vehicle, the trooper requested identification from the driver,
Michael Gemma, who produced a Florida driver's license and a car
rental agreement.
Trooper Morris also noticed that the female passenger,
"A.L.," was not wearing a seatbelt. Because of this, Morris asked
her for identification in order to cite her for the violation.
A.L. informed the trooper that she did not have her I.D., but
stated that her name was "Ashley Torres." Morris asked for her
date of birth. A.L. responded "December 23." When asked for the
year, A.L. responded "1992?," with a rising vocal inflection as
though her birth year was a question.
Trooper Morris then asked A.L. to step out of the car so
that he could speak with her separately. A.L. told Morris that
she had moved back to Boston from Puerto Rico, gave her mother's
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address, and indicated that she had known Gemma for about two
years. Trooper Morris returned to the vehicle and asked Gemma
about A.L. Gemma responded that he knew only her first name and
had known her only for about a month.
Trooper Morris later testified that, at this point, he
noticed a faint odor of raw marijuana coming from the interior of
the vehicle. Morris asked Gemma to step out of the vehicle,
advised him of his Miranda rights, and proceeded to conduct a
thorough search of the vehicle, including the trunk. Inside the
vehicle, Morris observed lingerie, high heel shoes, a quantity of
condoms, and a laptop computer, but no marijuana.
Around this time, Trooper Scott Shea arrived at the
scene. Shea ran Gemma's driver's license information and
discovered that his right to operate a motor vehicle in
Massachusetts had been suspended. Gemma was placed under arrest
for driving with a suspended license.
Trooper Morris then resumed questioning A.L. about her
identity. A.L. provided her mother's name and address, and said
that her mother's phone number was stored in her cell phone, which
was still in the vehicle. With A.L.'s permission, Morris retrieved
the phone from the car so that A.L. could call her mother. When
A.L. turned the phone on, Morris noticed text messages, such as
"Are you available for an outcall?" and "I have $200." Trooper
Morris recognized these messages as consistent with prostitution.
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Morris then spoke on the phone with A.L.'s mother, who provided
A.L.'s true name, informed him that she was sixteen years old, and
advised him that A.L. had run away from Department of Children and
Families ("DCF") custody. A.L.'s mother also informed him that
there was a Child-in-Need-of-Services warrant outstanding for her.
The troopers took both Gemma and A.L. back to the state police
barracks in separate cruisers.
Back at the barracks, Morris interviewed A.L., who
revealed that she and Gemma were returning from New York and New
Jersey where Gemma had been posting internet advertisements
offering sex with her. Trooper Morris later found ads on the
internet for sex that showed A.L.'s photograph and contained A.L.'s
or Gemma's phone number. During police questioning, Gemma admitted
that A.L. was a prostitute, but he denied any involvement.
On May 17, 2012, Gemma was indicted in the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts for sex
trafficking of children or by force, fraud, or coercion, and aiding
and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2 (Count 1), and transporting minors to engage in prostitution
and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) and
18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 2). Before trial, Gemma moved to suppress
all physical and testimonial evidence deriving from Trooper
Morris' search of the Nissan Altima. The district court partially
granted this motion, excluding the contents of the defendant's
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laptop and cell phone as well as Trooper Morris' observations.
The court, however, declined to suppress A.L.'s cell phone and the
contents thereof. The court held that neither party had adequately
addressed the circumstances of its seizure and found that the phone
had been taken with A.L.'s consent. Because Gemma had "no
possessory interest in A.L.'s cell phone," the court held that he
lacked standing to challenge its seizure and subsequent search.
At the start of the trial, as part of the preliminary
instructions to the jury, the court read the allegations of the
indictment. This reading included the charges of aiding and
abetting. During the course of the trial, A.L. testified that she
had run away from DCF custody and met the defendant through a
friend. The defendant had communicated with A.L. by text messages
and Facebook. A.L. testified that she told the defendant how old
she was, and that her Facebook page listed her correct age. A.L.
eventually went to stay with the defendant, who brought her to a
hotel in Woburn, Massachusetts and introduced her to a pimp who
went by the name "Rich Dollar" and a prostitute, Nicki. According
to A.L., the defendant then took "sexual" pictures of her with his
cell phone, brought her to another hotel in Shrewsbury,
Massachusetts, and instructed Nicki to explain to A.L. that she
had been brought there to exchange sex for money. After the
defendant posted ads on the internet, A.L. began to receive calls
and texts from men who wanted to pay to have sex with her.
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A.L. testified that she initially refused these calls,
but, after Gemma threatened to hit her if she did not answer them,
she thereafter engaged in prostitution, giving the money paid for
her services to the defendant. According to A.L., Gemma continued
to threaten her, telling her that if she told anyone what she was
doing, she would not like the outcome. She also testified that
when Gemma brought her to New York and New Jersey, she told him
that she did not want to have sex for money anymore and threatened
to call the police. In response, Gemma pushed A.L. into a car,
causing her to hit her head and suffer a slight concussion.
At the trial's conclusion, the district court provided
its final jury instructions. For Count 1, the court explained
that there were two theories under which the government could prove
its sex trafficking case. The first theory, which the court
referred to as "Alternative 1A," was summarized as "sex trafficking
by force, fraud or coercion." The second theory, "Alternative
1B," required proving that "the defendant knew or recklessly
disregarded the fact that A.L. was under the age of 18 and would
be caused by anyone, not necessarily the defendant, to engage in
a commercial sex act." This knowledge element could be proven by
showing that "[t]he defendant actually knew that A.L. was under
the age of 18; that he recklessly disregarded facts that would
have given him that knowledge; or, . . . that he had a reasonable
opportunity to observe A.L. in the course of events."
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The court then instructed the jury on Count 2, explaining
that the government must prove the transportation of a minor to
engage in prostitution by showing "[1] that the defendant knowingly
transported A.L. in interstate or foreign commerce; [2] that he
did so with an intent that A.L. would engage in prostitution; and,
[3] that A.L. had not attained the age of 18 years." The court
instructed that the government needed to prove A.L.'s age, but not
the defendant's knowledge of A.L.'s age.
Neither the court's final jury instructions, nor the
jury form, mentioned a charge of aiding and abetting. After
deliberations, the jury found the defendant guilty on each count
and found that the government had proven his guilt under both
alternative theories for liability under Count 1.
II. Analysis
On appeal, Gemma raises a number of challenges to the
judgment of the district court.1 In short, the defendant argues
(1) that his indictment was defective based on its failure to
allege facts to support the aiding and abetting charges; (2) that
the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to
exclude evidence from A.L.'s cell phone; (3) that the district
1 These challenges were raised by the defendant's appointed
appellate counsel as well as by the defendant in a pro se capacity
with assistance from his trial counsel. For the sake of
convenience, we refer to these challenges collectively as the
defendant's challenges.
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court abused its discretion in denying his motion for production
of DCF records that purportedly would show that A.L. had previously
offered men sex in exchange for a place to stay; (4) that the
district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that he
had prostituted and assaulted another woman named "Faye"; (5) that
the government improperly commented on his failure to take the
stand in its closing argument; and (6) that the district court
erred in instructing the jury regarding the knowledge requirement
of § 1591(a). We address these challenges seriatim.
A. Defective Indictment
The defendant alleges error from the outset, pointing
first to the indictment, which he contends was defective because
it failed to provide facts to support the charges of aiding and
abetting contained within each count. Because Gemma failed to
timely object to the indictment,2 we review only for plain error.
United States v. Laureano-Pérez, 797 F.3d 45, 60 (1st Cir. 2015).
Thus, Gemma must show that "(1) an error occurred; (2) which was
clear or obvious; and both (3) affected [his] substantial rights;
and (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings." Id.
2 Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B), objections to the
sufficiency of an indictment "must be raised by pretrial motion if
the basis for the motion is then reasonably available and the
motion can be determined without a trial on the merits."
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"[A]n indictment is sufficient if it, first, contains
the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant
of the charge against which he must defend, and, second, enables
him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future
prosecutions for the same offense." United States v. Serino, 835
F.2d 924, 929 (1st Cir. 1987) (alteration in original) (quoting
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974)). The indictment
should "inform the court of the facts alleged" and will generally
be sufficient if it "'set[s] forth the offense in the words of the
statute itself,' as long as those words set forth all the elements
of the offense without any uncertainty or ambiguity." Id. (quoting
Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117).
Gemma points out that the indictment, and the court's
recitation of the charges to the jury, included allegations of
aiding and abetting within each count. Gemma argues that the
government's inclusion of the aiding and abetting charges and
failure to identify or allege the existence of a principal or
codefendant rendered the indictment defective and constitutes
reversible error. United States v. Martin, 747 F.2d 1404, 1407
(11th Cir. 1984) (noting that, because "[t]he only person charged
with committing [the] offense[s] is [the defendant]," the
indictment "can be read . . . as charging an offense not known to
the law, i.e., [the defendant's] aiding and abetting himself").
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Although Gemma raises a potentially interesting question, we need
not reach it because his contention stumbles from the start.
First, Gemma cannot show plain error. The courts of
appeals have divided over whether an indictment that alleges aiding
and abetting is defective if it does not identify a principal or
codefendant. Compare United States v. Somers, 950 F.2d 1279, 1283
(7th Cir. 1991) (finding an indictment charging aiding and abetting
was not required to name a principal or codefendant) and United
States v. Mehrmanesh, 689 F.2d 822, 835 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding
aiding and abetting indictment not fatally defective where it
failed to identify a principal), with United States v. Garcia-
Paulin, 627 F.3d 127, 133-34 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding indictment
had insufficient factual basis where the government identified no
co-conspirators or principal whom the defendant aided and abetted)
and Martin, 747 F.2d at 1407-08 (finding indictment insufficient
because no principal or codefendant was named and one cannot aid
or abet himself). Where this Court has not addressed an issue,
and the law is unclear, the defendant cannot show plain error.
United States v. Diaz, 285 F.3d 92, 96 (1st Cir. 2002) ("If a
circuit conflict exists on a question, and the law is unsettled in
the circuit in which the appeal was taken, any error cannot be
plain or obvious.").
Second, even if this Court were to adopt Gemma's view
of the law, his appeal would still fail. As the Eleventh Circuit
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has indicated, a denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment "is
not necessarily reversible error; defects in an indictment can be
harmless or can be cured by instructions to the jury." Martin,
747 F.2d at 1407. Here, the court omitted any instructions on
aiding and abetting in its final charge and the verdict form did
not refer to aiding and abetting with respect to either count.
Gemma, therefore, cannot show that his substantial rights were
affected or that any possible error seriously impaired the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
Because Gemma cannot show plain error, and any error would be
harmless, his argument fails.
B. Motion to Exclude/Suppress
Before trial, Gemma moved to suppress the physical and
testimonial evidence derived from the search of his vehicle. The
district court granted the motion in part, but declined to suppress
evidence from A.L.'s cell phone. The defendant later filed a
motion to exclude evidence derived from A.L.'s cell phone,
reiterating, inter alia, that the evidence was seized in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. The court summarily denied this claim.
Gemma contends that the district court erred because he
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle, A.L. lacked
authority to consent to the seizure of her phone from the vehicle,
and the phone should be suppressed as "fruits" of Trooper Morris'
initial, unlawful search. Although the parties battle at length
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over the proper standard of review,3 "we would find no error in
the district court's decision even if our review were de novo."
United States v. Allen, 573 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir. 2009).
The evidence supports the denial of Gemma's motion to
suppress. United States v. Boskic, 545 F.3d 69, 77 (1st Cir. 2008)
("If any reasonable view of the evidence supports the denial of a
motion to suppress, we will affirm the denial."). A.L.'s phone
was not seized during the initial search, which the court found
unlawful. Instead, at the time A.L.'s phone was retrieved so that
she could call her mother, Morris found himself on the side of a
major interstate highway facing a now-unoccupied vehicle, an
3
The government argues that Gemma's motion to exclude on the
basis of the Fourth Amendment is better understood as a motion to
reconsider the court's prior denial of his motion to suppress. In
his motion to exclude, Gemma specifically "request[ed] leave . . .
to raise this constitutional issue late" because "counsel was not
fully aware of the significance of . . . A.L.'s cell phone . . .
at the time of the litigation of [the] motion to suppress." A
motion for reconsideration is not to be used as "a vehicle for a
party to undo its own procedural failures." United States v.
Allen, 573 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Iverson v. City of
Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 104 (1st Cir. 2006)). Instead, such motions
are appropriate only "if the moving party presents newly discovered
evidence, if there has been an intervening change in the law, or
if the movant can demonstrate that the original decision was based
on a manifest error of law or was clearly unjust." Id. Because
the defendant's motion did little more than introduce an argument
that was readily available at the time of the motion to suppress,
the government contends that we should review the district court's
summary dismissal based on a waived argument for abuse of
discretion. Id. In response, Gemma argues that an error of law
is, by definition, an abuse of discretion, United States v.
Carpenter, 781 F.3d 599, 608 n.8 (1st Cir. 2015), and that we
should therefore review the merits of his Fourth Amendment argument
de novo.
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arrested driver, and an unidentified and seemingly underage girl
in a potentially unsafe situation.
In these circumstances, the government is right to rely
on the Fourth Amendment's general reasonableness command. United
States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 783 (1st Cir. 1991).
The Supreme Court recognized several decades ago that "[l]ocal
police officers, unlike federal officers, frequently . . . engage
in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community
caretaking functions." Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441
(1973). Apart from investigating crime, police are "expected to
aid those in distress, combat actual hazards, prevent potential
hazards from materializing and provide an infinite variety of
services to preserve and protect public safety." Rodriguez–
Morales, 929 F.2d at 784–85.
Here, Morris encountered the unfolding of "unexpected
circumstances present[ing] [a] transient hazard" that he had to
"deal[] with on the spot." Id. at 787. Viewed objectively, Morris
had "solid, noninvestigatory reasons" for retrieving A.L.'s cell
phone from the vehicle so that she could call her mother. Id.
A.L. did not have identification, could not make use of the
defendant's vehicle, and was now effectively stranded. Gemma's
and A.L.'s conflicting answers suggested that A.L. might be in a
potentially compromised position and require assistance "separate
and apart" from an investigation into any crime. Id. at 784.
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Finally, A.L.'s hesitation with respect to her age and her response
that she lived with her mother all suggested that she was a minor
who should be returned to the care of a confirmed legal custodian,
whoever and wherever that person may be. We will not find the
officer's extempore actions unreasonable in circumstances such as
existed here. See id. at 786 ("There is no requirement that . . .
officers must select the least intrusive way of fulfilling their
community caretaking responsibilities.").
Because Morris retrieved the phone and witnessed the
text messages suggestive of sex trafficking activity in the course
of his community caretaking duties, the evidence was properly
admissible. Id. at 785 ("[E]vidence which comes to light during
the due execution of the caretaking function is ordinarily
admissible at trial."). Although Morris' original search of the
car may have been unlawful, Gemma introduced no evidence or
testimony suggesting that Morris' later retrieval of A.L.'s phone
was a pretext for conducting an additional search of the vehicle
or of the phone itself. Id. at 787 (holding that, so long as an
officer's actions are "not a mere subterfuge for investigation,
the coexistence of investigatory and caretaking motives will not
invalidate the [search or] seizure").
On this record, Gemma's constitutional challenge,
whether couched as a motion to suppress, to exclude, or to
reconsider, would fail any applicable standard of review.
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C. Production of Records
Gemma next argues that the district court erred by
denying his motion to compel the production of classified DCF
records. The Court reviews the denial of a defendant's discovery
motion for abuse of discretion. United States v. Cartagena, 593
F.3d 104, 112 (1st Cir. 2010).4
Prior to trial, Gemma requested the production of
records in the possession of DCF. A magistrate judge denied the
motion, finding that Gemma had failed to show that the requested
records were relevant or to describe the documents with any
specificity. In addition, the magistrate judge noted that, to the
extent the DCF records contained information regarding prior
instances of A.L. engaging in prostitution, such information might
not be admissible because Federal Rule of Evidence 412(a)(1)
"prohibits the admission of 'evidence offered to prove that a
victim engaged in other sexual behavior' in a case involving
allegations of sexual misconduct."
Gemma thereafter filed a renewed motion for production
in which he argued that the exclusion of evidence that A.L. had
previously engaged in prostitution before meeting him would
4 Because neither party requests de novo review, the question
of whether this standard would apply is waived. Cf. United States
v. Rivera, 799 F.3d 180, 184 (2d Cir. 2015) ("[W]e review
interpretations of law de novo, including whether an evidentiary
ruling violates a defendant's constitutional rights.").
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violate his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to confront her by
cross-examination and to have a meaningful opportunity to present
a complete defense. After reviewing a set of records submitted ex
parte and under seal, the court ordered the government to disclose
an email from a social worker that discussed an incident involving
A.L. The email stated that another young woman who had been on
the run with A.L. told this social worker that A.L. had been
wandering the streets offering to sleep with men in exchange for
a place to stay. At trial, A.L. denied these statements and
testified that she did not remember the names of the other two
young women she was with at the time. The defendant then moved
for disclosure of records identifying these two young women. The
court denied the motion, calling it "speculative" that additional
evidence would become available and noting that the defense already
had an opportunity to cross-examine A.L. about the issue.
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 412(a), "evidence offered
to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior" is
generally prohibited in a "criminal proceeding involving alleged
sexual misconduct." This rule "aims to safeguard the alleged
victim against the invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment
and sexual stereotyping that is associated with public disclosure
of intimate sexual details." Fed. R. Evid. 412 advisory
committee's note to 1994 amendment. Rule 412(b)(1)(C) provides an
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exception for "evidence whose exclusion would violate the
defendant's constitutional rights."
"The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the
right of an accused in a criminal prosecution to be confronted
with the witnesses against him." Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308,
315 (1974). Supreme Court "cases construing the (confrontation)
clause hold that a primary interest secured by it is the right of
cross-examination." Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965).
Additionally, the Fifth Amendment guarantees the right to a fair
trial, and courts have "long interpreted this standard of fairness
to require that criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense." California v.
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). In order to protect this
right, "[a] defendant has a constitutionally protected privilege
to request and obtain from the prosecution evidence that is either
material to the guilt of the defendant or relevant to the
punishment to be imposed." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963). "Less clear . . . is the extent to which the Due Process
Clause imposes on the government the additional responsibility of
guaranteeing criminal defendants access to exculpatory evidence
beyond the government's possession." Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 486.
On appeal, Gemma challenges the court's denial of his
request for the production of additional evidence pertaining to
A.L.'s alleged prior prostitution. We can find no error. First,
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the evidence sought is either entirely irrelevant or of such slight
probative value in comparison to its prejudicial effect that a
decision to exclude it would not violate Gemma's constitutional
rights. A number of other circuits have held that evidence of
prior prostitution is irrelevant to a charge under § 1591(a), and
thus is properly barred. See United States v. Rivera, 799 F.3d
180, 185 (2d Cir. 2015); United States v. Roy, 781 F.3d 416, 420
(8th Cir. 2015); United States v. Cephus, 684 F.3d 703, 708 (7th
Cir. 2012); United States v. Valenzuela, 495 F. App'x 817, 819-20
(9th Cir. 2012) (unpublished).
Gemma contends that he did not force A.L. into
prostitution and that evidence of her prior sexual behavior would
shore up his cause. Not so. "The victim's participation in
prostitution either before or after the time period in the
indictment has no relevance to whether [Gemma] beat her, threatened
her, and took the money she made from prostitution in order to
cause her to engage in commercial sex." Roy, 781 F.3d at 420.
Nor is Gemma's contention significantly strengthened by
shifting away from a coercion basis for criminal liability.
Because the victim[] [was a] minor[] and could
not legally consent, the government did not
need to prove the elements of fraud, force, or
coercion, which are required for adult
victims. Instead, the government was only
required to prove [Gemma] knowingly recruited,
enticed, harbored, transported, provided, or
obtained a minor, knowing the minor would be
caused to engage in commercial sex acts.
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United States v. Elbert, 561 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted).
Moreover, even if we were to accept Gemma's contention
that the evidence had some probative value with respect to his
relationship with A.L., the balance of probative and prejudicial
effect is such that the court's decision could hardly be said to
have violated his constitutional rights. See id. In this case,
there was no dispute that A.L. engaged in prostitution; the only
question was whether Gemma acted as her pimp. Rather than evincing
Gemma's intent at the time of the offense, introducing A.L.'s
alleged acts of prior prostitution would have only strengthened
Gemma's hand by reinforcing a narrative that A.L. acted consistent
with prior sexual behavior. This evidence and line of reasoning
falls squarely within a class deemed so extremely prejudicial as
to warrant special treatment under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Second, this is not a case wherein a discrete piece of
identified evidence was deemed inadmissible by the district court;
rather, this is a case where the defendant's request for additional
discovery was denied. As the district court noted, this rendered
the defendant's request more speculative than specific and
weakened an already attenuated basis for his motion.
Finally, the requested evidence was not only speculative
and likely inadmissible, but bordered on cumulative. As the court
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emphasized, the defense already had an opportunity to cross-
examine A.L. about her alleged acts of prior prostitution. This
is arguably more than Gemma was entitled to in the first place.
In sum, Gemma has a right to cross-examine the witnesses
against him and a right to present a complete defense, but these
do not create an auxiliary right to have all discovery and
evidentiary rulings turn in his favor. If Gemma was deprived of
anything, it was the opportunity to seek unspecified and presumably
inadmissible evidence to engage in additional cross examination on
a topic of questionable relevance to begin with.5
D. Evidence Regarding Faye
In what might be viewed as the inverse of the challenge
above, Gemma also argues that the court erred in admitting evidence
that he had previously prostituted and physically abused a woman
named Faye. Gemma points to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), which
provides that "[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not
admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on
a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character."
5Gemma alternatively asserts that, at a minimum, the district
court should have reviewed the additional records in camera. But
Gemma did not make that request before the district court and, for
the same reasons articulated above, cannot show plain error on
appeal.
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This Court reviews a ruling that evidence was admitted
consistent with Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403 for abuse
of discretion. United States v. Moon, 802 F.3d 135, 144 (1st Cir.
2015). "Only rarely--and in extraordinarily compelling
circumstances--will we, from the vista of a cold appellate record,
reverse a district court's on-the-spot judgment concerning the
relative weighing of probative value and unfair effect." United
States v. Baynard, 642 F.3d 59, 63 (1st Cir. 2011).
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence of
previous crimes or acts may be admitted for the purpose of "proving
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident." In deciding
whether to admit such evidence, "[t]he court may exclude relevant
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a
danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 403.
A critical factual dispute in this case was whether the
relationship between Gemma and A.L. was that of a pimp and
prostitute. Therefore, evidence that Gemma was in the prostitution
business and exercised control over prostitutes other than A.L.,
sometimes by means of physical violence, was highly probative of
Gemma's intent. See United States v. Jarrett, 956 F.2d 864, 866-
67 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding testimony by witnesses that defendant
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approached them seeking to secure their services as prostitutes in
his employ was admissible under Rule 404(b) to show knowledge and
intent); United States v. Love, 449 F. App'x 338, 339-40 (5th Cir.
2011) (unpublished) (holding evidence that defendant prostituted
another female a year prior to crime admissible because defendant
contested his intent to prostitute the victim).
At trial, the district court permitted A.L. to testify
that she knew Faye, that Faye was a girl who used to prostitute
for Gemma, and that Gemma had an argument with Faye about
prostitution and A.L. saw Gemma slap her. Unlike A.L.'s alleged
prior prostitution activities, which shed relatively little light
on the disputed issue of Gemma's intent, Gemma's prior acts as a
pimp were highly probative of his intent in the instant case.
Although Gemma contends that the introduction of this
evidence carried an unacceptable risk that the jury would find him
guilty "because he was a bad person who deserved to be punished,"
we are hardly convinced that the court abused its discretion in
admitting the evidence given its probative value in answering the
central question of this case. To be sure, the similarity of
"other acts" evidence "simultaneously establishes its relevance
and heightens the possibility that the jury will draw an unfair
inference of propensity." United States v. Appolon, 715 F.3d 362,
374 (1st Cir. 2013). However, "given the facts of this case and
the notable similarity between the uncharged conduct and the basis
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of [the defendant's] indictment," we find "that the district court
properly evaluated the 'risk of an improper criminal propensity
inference . . . in light of the totality of the circumstances.'"
Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Varoudakis, 223 F.3d 113, 123 (1st Cir. 2000)).
E. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Gemma's penultimate challenge is to certain statements
by the government in its closing argument that he contends
constituted prosecutorial misconduct. During the government's
closing, the prosecutor repeatedly pointed to the defendant's
admission of certain facts, emphasizing that these facts were
undisputed. The defendant objected, arguing that these references
improperly shifted the burden to the defendant, and requested a
curative instruction. The district court found that an instruction
was unnecessary given that the jury would be instructed on the
government's burden of proof prior to deliberations.
The defendant now argues that these remarks constituted
improper comments on his failure to take the stand, in violation
of his Fifth Amendment rights. Where a defendant contemporaneously
objects on different grounds than those raised on appeal, the Court
reviews the issue as an unpreserved objection for plain error.
United States v. Bey, 188 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1999).
The Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from
commenting on a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent.
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United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 30 (1988); United States
v. Zarauskas, ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 524250, at *4 (1st Cir. Feb.
10, 2016). References to evidence as undisputed can constitute a
violation when the defendant is the only person who could logically
dispute that evidence. Bey, 188 F.3d at 9. In deciding whether
such comments violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights, we
consider "whether, in the circumstances of the particular case,
the language used was manifestly intended or was of such character
that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a
comment on the failure of the accused to testify." United States
v. Glantz, 810 F.2d 316, 322 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting United States
v. Monaghan, 741 F.2d 1434, 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Here, the government stated that certain facts in the
case were not in dispute because Gemma had admitted to them,
particularly with respect to Count 2 of the indictment.
You've heard a lot of disputed facts about
[A.L.] and her history and her time with the
defendant. But before we get into what is
disputed I want to briefly go over with [you]
what's not disputed. [A.L.] was prostituted
both in Massachusetts and in New Jersey.
[A.L.] was 16 years old at the time. The
defendant met [A.L.] through a girl, M., who
was 12 years old. Between September 27th and
September 30th the defendant drove [A.L.] from
Massachusetts to New York and New Jersey, and
back to Massachusetts for purposes of
prostitution. These facts are not in dispute
because the defendant admitted to them. These
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facts are all you need to find the defendant
guilty of Count 2. . . .
You have the rental car documents. You have
the toll transponder documents. You have the
documents that show that this defendant rented
a car on September 27th, and the documents
that show that he drove from Massachusetts to
New York and New Jersey and back. And more
importantly, you have his admission that he
drove [A.L.] and other girls to New York and
New Jersey, and you have his admission that he
knew [A.L.] and girls were engaged in
prostitution. And you know that [A.L.] was 16
at the time. This is all you need to convict
him on Count 2. . . .
There's also no dispute that the email account
that posted these ads was the defendant's. He
admitted them. It's also not disputed that
when she was posted in these ads, she was in
hotel rooms rented by Michael Gemma. You have
before you all of the documents that you need
to prove that the defendant was indeed
involved in prostituting [A.L.] (emphases
added).
Viewed in the context of the case, we can find no error, let alone
plain error, in the court's decision to allow these comments. The
comments merely highlighted the defendant's own admissions, and
the government tied the evidence that it said was undisputed to
admissions that Gemma made. No reasonable jury would have
understood these remarks as a comment on the defendant's failure
to testify. Taken together, "[t]he comment itself, the court's
response, and the defendant's failure to object or to move for a
dismissal or new trial indicate that the prosecutor's remark did
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not refer to the defendant's failure to testify." United States
v. Lavoie, 721 F.2d 407, 408 (1st Cir. 1984).
Finally, any lingering trace of doubt would have been
put to rest by the district court, which instructed the jury at
the end of the trial that a defendant in a criminal case has a
constitutional right not to testify, and that the jury "may not
under any circumstances draw any inference or presumption against
the defendant from his decision not to testify." See United States
v. Smith, 145 F.3d 458, 462 (1st Cir. 1998) ("We 'must presume
that jurors, conscious of the gravity of their task, attend closely
the particular language of the trial court's instructions in a
criminal case, and that they follow those instructions.'" (quoting
United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1287 (1st Cir. 1996))).
For these reasons, Gemma's prosecutorial misconduct challenge
fails.
F. Instruction Regarding § 1591(a)'s Knowledge Requirement
Lastly, Gemma floats an argument that there is
"uncertainty" regarding the knowledge element of § 1591(a).
Because the defendant did not object to the jury instruction after
the charge was given but before deliberations began, we review for
plain error. See United States v. Santana–Rosa, 132 F.3d 860, 863
n.1 (1st Cir. 1998); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(d).
The text of § 1591(a) proscribes two forms of sex
trafficking: (1) sex trafficking involving a commercial sex act
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induced by means of force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion,
or a combination thereof; and (2) child sex trafficking in which
the person induced to perform the commercial sex act is under the
age of 18. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). The mens rea elements for the
two forms of sex trafficking are different. Under the first form,
a defendant must act knowingly, or in reckless disregard of the
fact, that a commercial sex act was induced by means of force,
threats of force, fraud, coercion, or any combination thereof.
Under the second form, a defendant must act knowingly, or in
reckless disregard of the fact, that the person induced to perform
the commercial sex act was not 18 years old. Id. With respect to
this second form, Congress provided:
In a prosecution under subsection (a)(1) in
which the defendant had a reasonable
opportunity to observe the person so
recruited, enticed, harbored, transported,
provided, obtained, maintained, patronized,
or solicited, the Government need not prove
that the defendant knew, or recklessly
disregarded the fact, that the person had not
attained the age of 18 years.
Id. § 1591(c).
The government charged Gemma with violating both forms
of § 1591(a), the court instructed the jury on both theories of
liability, and the court advised the jury that the government could
prove the knowledge element under the second theory by showing (1)
that the defendant actually knew A.L. was under 18; (2) that he
recklessly disregarded facts that would have given him that
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knowledge; or (3) that he had a reasonable opportunity to observe
A.L. in the course of events.
The defendant contends that this instruction was
erroneous in light of our decision in United States v. Encarnación-
Ruiz, 787 F.3d 581 (1st Cir. 2015). There, we examined whether an
aider and abetter of the production of child pornography under 18
U.S.C. § 2251(a), a strict liability crime for a principal, could
be held liable without knowing that the victim was a minor. We
held that he could not. Id. at 591.
Simply put, our holding in Encarnación-Ruiz has no
import here. Not only are we examining an entirely separate
statute, § 1591(a), but Gemma was convicted as a principal, not an
aider and abetter. Even more importantly, Gemma was convicted
under both theories of § 1591(a) liability, meaning that any error
pertaining to his knowledge of A.L.'s age would have been utterly
harmless. Once again, the defendant's basis for appeal is
distinctly unpersuasive and falls far short of that necessary to
survive the rigors of plain-error review.
III. Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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