Downing v. Globe Direct LLC

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 11-2075
MATTHEW K. DOWNING,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
GLOBE DIRECT LLC,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Circuit Judge,
Souter, Associate Justice,*
and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
Ian J. McLoughlin, with whom Edward F. Haber, Norman M.
Monhait, Rosenthal, Monhait & Goddess, PA, and Shapiro Haber & Urmy
LLP were on brief, for appellant.
Joel A. Mintzer, with whom Stephen M. Ferguson, George
Freeman, New York Times Company, Lisa Anne Furnald, Andrea K. Naef,
Chad Michael Shandler, Richards, Layton & Finger, PA, and Robins,
Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi were on brief, for appellee.
June 4, 2012
*
The Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the
Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation.
STAHL, Circuit Judge. In this putative class action
brought by Matthew K. Downing alleging that Globe Direct LLC
violated the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2721-25, the district court granted Globe Direct's motion on the
pleadings based on Downing's failure to join the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, which the court found to be an indispensable party.
Even if we were to assume that the district court abused its
discretion in so finding, we affirm because we see no violation of
the DPPA by Globe Direct.
I. Facts & Background
On March 3, 2008, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts's
Registry of Motor Vehicles (RMV) issued a "Request for Response"
(RFR) for its "Registration Renewal Notice Program" (the program).
The RFR sought proposals from outside contractors to perform the
service of printing and sending to Massachusetts drivers their
motor vehicle registration renewal notices along with
advertisements. The stated goals of the program included assisting
the RMV "in carrying out its registration renewal functions,"
"reduc[ing] RMV costs," and "potentially generat[ing] revenues to
the Registry to further defray costs or help fund other RMV
programs." The RFR elaborated that the program "w[ould] be funded
by the solicitation and sale of commercial advertising by the
Contractor for insertion into the Registry's Registration Renewal
Notice mailing," and that "[a]dvertising revenues must be
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sufficient to cover all motor vehicle registration renewal tasks
that the Contractor will perform." The RFR stated that "[t]he
Contractor sh[ould] devote commercially reasonable efforts to
generate additional revenues that potentially would enable the
Registry to participate in the economic success of the program."
Massachusetts retained the right to approve all advertising
materials included in the mailings. The RFR also noted that
information that the RMV would provide to the contractor,
including "name, address, date of birth, [and] license number" was
"generally exempt from public disclosure" due to the DPPA and its
Massachusetts analog, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 4, § 7, cl. 26(n), and
thus the contractor would need to "safeguard[] [the information]
from unlawful public disclosure."
On April 29, 2008, Globe Direct, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of the New York Times Company, submitted a bid in
response to the RFR. The bid stated that Globe Direct
"underst[ood] and accept[ed] the entire RFR," and its proposal
largely mirrored the language and structure of the RFR. Globe
Direct, presumably responding to the RFR's stated goal of raising
revenue for the RMV, proposed to contribute 25% of its net margin
to the RMV. Massachusetts accepted Globe Direct's bid, and on
August 12, 2008, the parties signed a contract, of which the RFR
was considered a part and pursuant to which Globe Direct was to
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serve as the contractor for the registration renewal program.1 The
contract specified that Massachusetts would continue to exercise
ownership over all personal data turned over, and that a violation
of the DPPA or the equivalent Massachusetts privacy law would cause
the contract to terminate.
Globe Direct began performing its contract duties in
January 2009. In May 2009, Downing, the owner of a 1998 Toyota who
had provided his name and address to the RMV, received a
registration renewal notice sent by Globe Direct. The notice also
included advertisements from Bath Fitter, Jiffy Lube, NTB, and AAA.
Downing had never given his consent to the RMV to provide his
personal information to third parties for purposes of solicitation
or marketing.
1
Massachusetts had previously entered into a substantially
similar contract with Imagitas, Inc. Imagitas was also sued for
alleged violations of the DPPA based on its participation in
Massachusetts's program, as well as similar programs in Florida,
Minnesota, Missouri, New York, and Ohio; all the suits were
consolidated into a multidistrict litigation case. The district
court first decided that the Florida scheme did not violate the
DPPA, In re Imagitas, Inc., Drivers' Privacy Protection Act Litig.
(Imagitas I), Nos. 3:07-md-2-J-32HTS & 3:06-cv-690-J-32HTS, 2008 WL
977333 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2008), and that decision was affirmed by
the Eleventh Circuit, Rine v. Imagitas, Inc., 590 F. 3d 1215 (11th
Cir. 2009). The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the cases
involving Minnesota and New York, and the district court found that
Imagitas did not violate the DPPA as a result of its contracts with
Massachusetts, Missouri, or Ohio. In re Imagitas, Inc., Drivers'
Privacy Protection Act Litig. (Imagitas II), Nos.
3:07–md–2–J–32JRK, 3:07–cv–389–J–32HTS, 3:07–cv–390–J–32HTS,
3:07–cv–391–J–32HTS, 3:07–cv–392–J–32HTS, 3:07–cv–393–J–32HTS,
3:07–cv–394–J–32HTS, 3:07–cv–395–J–32HTS, 2011 WL 6934127 (M.D.
Fla. Dec. 30, 2011).
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On September 18, 2009, Downing filed a putative class
action complaint2 on behalf of himself and other drivers who,
without providing consent, had received advertisements from Globe
Direct in addition to their registration renewal notices. See 18
U.S.C. § 2724 (providing a private right of action against a
person3 who violates the DPPA). Downing alleged that, by obtaining
the names and addresses that Massachusetts car owners had provided
to the RMV, and using that information to send out advertisements
without the car owners' consent, Globe Direct had violated the
DPPA. Downing sought as relief both a declaration that the
contract between Massachusetts and Globe Direct violated the DPPA
as well as a permanent injunction preventing Globe Direct from
performing under the contract.
The DPPA lays out a general rule prohibiting disclosure
of drivers' "personal information," id. § 2721(a)(1), which is
defined by the statute as "information that identifies an
individual, including an individual's photograph, social security
number, driver identification number, name, address . . . ,
telephone number, and medical or disability information . . . ,"
2
Downing initially filed his complaint in the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware. Globe Direct filed a
motion to transfer the case to the District of Massachusetts, which
was granted on June 18, 2010; the case was transferred on July 6,
2010.
3
The DPPA explicitly excludes states and state agencies from
its definition of a "person." See 18 U.S.C. § 2725(2).
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id. § 2725(3). However, the DPPA provides fourteen "[p]ermissible
uses" for which drivers' personal information may be disclosed.
Id. §§ 2721(b)(1)-(14). Disclosure is permissible "[f]or use by
any government agency . . . in carrying out its functions, or any
private person or entity acting on behalf of a Federal, State, or
local agency in carrying out its functions." Id. § 2721(b)(1).
Disclosure is also permissible "[f]or bulk distribution for
surveys, marketing or solicitations if the State has obtained the
express consent of the person to whom such personal information
pertains." Id. § 2721(b)(12). Downing alleges that Globe Direct's
use of DPPA-protected personal information to send advertisements
to Downing and those similarly situated constituted a DPPA
violation because none of the "permissible uses" was applicable.
On February 2, 2010, Globe Direct answered the complaint,
asserting various affirmative defenses, including qualified and
sovereign immunity, and argued that Downing's claims were barred
because Massachusetts was a necessary and indispensable party and
that Downing's claims failed because Globe Direct's use of personal
information was permitted by the DPPA pursuant to the government
function exception. See id. § 2721(b)(1). On October 8, 2010,
Globe Direct filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
elaborating on the arguments listed in its answer.4
4
On November 15, 2010, Downing cross-moved for judgment on
the pleadings, arguing that Globe Direct's conduct violated the
DPPA, and briefly addressed Globe Direct's Rule 19 arguments. The
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On August 25, 2011, the district court granted Globe
Direct's motion on the pleadings, reaching only the issue of
joinder. Downing v. Globe Direct LLC, 806 F. Supp. 2d 461, 470 (D.
Mass. 2011). The district court first determined that
Massachusetts was a necessary party under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 19(a) due to its interests in its contract with Globe
Direct, which would be "impaired as a practical matter" by its
absence from the litigation. Id. at 467 (internal quotation marks
omitted). However, the district court determined that it was not
feasible to join Massachusetts because it (along with its agency,
the RMV) enjoys Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, which
Congress did not abrogate through the DPPA. Id. at 467-68.
Finally, the district court found, after balancing the factors laid
out in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b), that Massachusetts
was an indispensable party, and therefore that the case had to be
dismissed. Id. at 468-70. Downing timely appealed to this court.
II. Discussion
We would normally review a district court's Rule 19
determination for abuse of discretion, Jiménez v. Rodríguez-Pagán,
597 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2010), but here, we can short-circuit the
district court's analysis. Even were we to find an abuse of
district court denied the cross-motion as it pertained to Rule 19
and abstained from ruling on the portion of the cross-motion that
related to the merits. Downing v. Globe Direct LLC, 806 F. Supp.
2d 461, 470 (D. Mass. 2011).
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discretion on the joinder issue, which we need not do, we approve
of the district court's result because we see no violation of the
DPPA. Though the district court did not reach the substantive DPPA
claim, because the parties fully briefed the issue before the
district court, we have discretion to resolve that issue.5 See
Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d
1, 16 (1st Cir. 1999); N.H. Motor Tranp. Ass'n v. Flynn, 751 F.2d
43, 52 (1st Cir. 1984).
The district court granted judgment on the pleadings for
Globe Direct under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). We treat
a motion for judgment on the pleadings much like a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss. Pérez-Acevedo v. Rivero-Cubano, 520 F.3d 26, 29
(1st Cir. 2008). To survive Globe Direct's motion, Downing's
complaint must allege "'enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.'" Elena v. Municipality of San
Juan, 677 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Even taking all the
complaint's well-pled allegations as true and viewing all other
facts in a light most favorable to Downing, see id., we are
5
We note that the question of whether a suit must be
dismissed due to the absence of an indispensable party is one of
equity, not one that calls into question our subject matter
jurisdiction. See Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 90
(2005) ("Rule 19 . . . address[es] party joinder, not federal-court
subject-matter jurisdiction."); 7 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.
Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1611 (3d
ed. 2001 & Supp. 2012).
-8-
convinced that the registration renewal program and Globe Direct's
participation therein falls under the government function exception
to the DPPA's general rule of nondisclosure, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 2721(b)(1), and that Globe Direct therefore is not liable under
the statute.
Downing concedes that if advertising were not a component
of the program, the DPPA would allow Massachusetts to contract with
a third party to send out its registration renewal notices, and to
provide that third party with statutorily protected personal
information, because sending out renewal notices is clearly a
government function. The only question is whether the integration
of advertising takes the registration renewal notice program
outside of scope of the (b)(1) exception.6
Downing argues that because of the advertising inserted
into the renewal notice mailings, a different exception, that under
subsection (b)(12), fits more closely to this set of facts and that
therefore subsection (b)(1) does not apply. The (b)(12) exception
allows for the use of statutorily protected personal information
for "bulk distribution for surveys, marketing or solicitations,"
but only "if the State has obtained the express consent of the
person to whom such personal information pertains." Id.6
Subsection (b)(1) allows for the use of personal information
by a state agency or a private entity acting on its behalf. See 18
U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1). Downing does not dispute that Globe Direct is
acting on Massachusetts's behalf.
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§ 2721(b)(12). Downing alleges, and we take as true here, that he
did not consent to receive solicitations. Relying on the canon of
statutory construction that the specific controls over the general,
see HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1, 6 (1981), Downing
argues that Globe Direct has violated the DPPA's general rule
against disclosure by failing to meet the requirements of
subsection (b)(12). This argument is off the mark, however, as we
do not find that (b)(12) is more specific than (b)(1); each
subsection merely governs different, although sometimes
overlapping, circumstances. See Rine v. Imagitas, Inc., 590 F.3d
1215, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding HCSC-Laundry inapplicable
under like circumstances because "[s]ubsection (b)(1) applies to a
situation not addressed by subsection (b)(12) and vice versa"); see
also Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992)
(allowing overlapping statutory provisions to be effective so long
as there was no "positive repugnancy" between them).
The structure of the DPPA supports the idea that one
permissible use does not define or control another. Each
"permissible use" under subsection (b) is a specific carve-out from
liability. Once a person's activities are deemed to fall within
one of the carve-outs, subsection (a)'s general rule of
nondisclosure no longer applies. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a)(1) ("A
State department of motor vehicles . . . shall not knowingly
disclose . . . personal information . . . except as provided in
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subsection (b). . . ."). Each "permissible use" under subsection
(b) is like a key to unlock a door through which a person may go to
escape DPPA liability. So long as Globe Direct may unlock the
(b)(1) door, the fact that they may or may not possess the key to
the (b)(12) door is irrelevant to our inquiry.
But we still must answer the question of whether the
program is permissible under subsection (b)(1).7 Downing argues
that the registration renewal program encompasses two distinct
functions: registration renewal, which he concedes falls under
subsection (b)(1) as a government function, and a separate
advertising function, which he argues is not permissible. Downing
urges us to follow the Third Circuit's finding in Pichler v. UNITE,
542 F.3d 380 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1662 (2009),
that "[t]he [DPPA] contains no language that would excuse an
impermissible use merely because it was executed in conjunction
with a permissible purpose," id. at 395. We are not persuaded,
however, that the advertising component of the program renders
Globe Direct liable.
7
We note that the government function exception has been
interpreted quite broadly. See, e.g., McQuirter v. City of
Montgomery, Ala., No. 2:07-CV-234-MEF, 2008 WL 401360, at *6 (M.D.
Ala. Feb. 12, 2008) (holding that release by a police department of
a suspect's driver's license photograph to media outlets was
permissible under (b)(1) due to serving law enforcement functions
including "appri[sing] the public of risks created by dangerous
suspects at large" and acting as a deterrent to criminal activity).
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We do not think there is a discrete separation between
the advertising component of the program and the undisputedly
legitimate government function of sending out registration renewal
notices. According to the RFR, in addition to assisting the RMV
"in carrying out its registration renewal functions," the program's
stated goals included "reduc[ing] RMV costs" as well as
"potentially generat[ing] revenues to the Registry to further
defray costs or help fund other RMV programs"; the RFR elaborated
that the means of achieving these goals would be through
advertising inserts.
This situation is unlike that in Pichler, where the
primary (and impermissible) purpose of collecting the statutorily
protected personal information was union organizing, which the
court found the union had "attempt[ed] to mask . . . behind the
veil of a [permissible and severable] litigation purpose." Id. at
396. Here, the advertising function is inextricably linked to the
proper government functions of registration renewal and increasing
the availability of funds for RMV programs. We think that the
integration of the advertising into the structure of the program
renders that advertising a part of the government function exempted
from the statute's reach under subsection (b)(1).
We are not alone in this line of analysis. Post-Pichler,
both the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have declined to impose DPPA
liability where solicitation or advertising was part and parcel of
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a permissible use of statutorily protected information. See
Maracich v. Spears, 675 F.3d 281, 293-94 (4th Cir. 2012)
("[B]ecause the solicitation was entirely consistent with state
law, was integral to, and was, indeed, inextricably intertwined
with the [defendants'] permissible use of the Buyers' personal
information pursuant to the litigation exception, the Buyers' claim
fails as a matter of law."); Rine, 590 F.3d at 1223 (holding, in a
factual situation similar this case, that "[f]unding public
programs through commercial advertising is a legitimate agency
function"); see also In re Imagitas, Inc., Drivers' Privacy
Protection Act Litig. (Imagitas II), Nos. 3:07–md–2–J–32JRK,
3:07–cv–389–J–32HTS, 3:07–cv–390–J–32HTS, 3:07–cv–391–J–32HTS,
3:07–cv–392–J–32HTS, 3:07–cv–393–J–32HTS, 3:07–cv–394–J–32HTS,
3:07–cv–395–J–32HTS, 2011 WL 6934127, at *3-4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 30,
2011) (upholding both a previous iteration of the Massachusetts
registration renewal notice program under subsection (b)(1) because
it was a legitimate government function "to offset costs through
commercial advertising," as well as upholding similar programs in
Missouri and Ohio); cf. Statement of Interest of the United States
at 16-19, In re Imagitas, Inc., Drivers' Privacy Protection Act
Litig. (Imagitas I), Nos. 3:07-md-2-J-32HTS & 3:06-cv-690-J-32HTS,
2008 WL 977333 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2008) (laying out the
government's interpretation that raising revenue through
advertising, where statutorily protected personal information is
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not disclosed to the advertiser, is a legitimate government
function under subsection (b)(1)).
Massachusetts law leaves ample room for the RMV to create
and engage in the program as a proper agency function under
subsection (b)(1). See Rine, 590 F.3d at 1223-24 (examining
whether a similar program was consistent with Florida law);
Imagitas II, 2011 WL 6934127, at *3-4 (examining whether similar
programs in Massachusetts, Missouri, and Ohio were consistent with
state law). Massachusetts law allows the Commonwealth to enter
into service contracts for purposes "needed by the various
executive and administrative departments and for other activities
of the commonwealth," see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 30, §§ 51-52, the
process through which Massachusetts and Globe Direct entered into
their contract. Additionally, Massachusetts law explicitly allows
for the use of advertising to raise revenue in analogous
transportation contexts. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 81, § 7C
(permitting advertisements on state highway property where revenue
is credited to the state highway fund); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 161A,
§ 3(n) (permitting advertisements in Massachusetts Bay
Transportation Association facilities). As there is no conflict
with state law, we are content to agree with the other courts that
have addressed nearly identical factual situations, and hold that
Massachusetts's program is a legitimate government function of the
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RMV that is covered by subsection (b)(1). See Rine, 590 F.3d at
1223-24; Imagitas II, 2011 WL 6934127, at *3-4.
Downing makes much of the fact that the Supreme Court has
approved of the DPPA as a means to "regulate[] the universe of
entities that participate as suppliers to the market for motor
vehicle information," Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000),
and asserts that this necessitates a finding that Globe Direct is
liable under the statute. But we think that cuts against his
argument. Under this scheme, there is no sale of any statutorily
protected personal information, and neither Massachusetts nor Globe
Direct supplies the market with such information.8 The only
disclosure of personal information is one that Downing concedes is
appropriate: from Massachusetts to its contractor, Globe Direct, so
that Globe Direct can send out the registration renewal notices.
Globe Direct, at Massachusetts's behest, then seeks out advertisers
and encloses their materials with the renewal notices, but never
discloses any personal information to those advertisers. Though it
is perhaps contrary to the "'spirit' of the DPPA" to include
advertising inserts,9 Imagitas I, 2008 WL 977333, at *15, there is
8
This is in contrast to situations where a state might sell
drivers' personal information in bulk to direct marketers, which
was one of Congress's concerns when passing the DPPA. See Reno,
528 U.S. at 143-44 (citing legislative history).
9
While limiting the access of direct marketers to drivers'
personal information was one motivation behind the DPPA, see, e.g.,
139 Cong. Rec. S15,764 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen.
John Warner) (noting that one purpose of the statute was to protect
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no improper disclosure or use of statutorily protected personal
information. Congress explicitly included an exception to the
DPPA's general rule of nondisclosure for government functions,
including those performed by contractors for state agencies, and
Massachusetts was careful to limit the disclosure and use of the
personal information that the statute protects. The fact that no
one other than the RMV and its contractor, Globe Direct, ever
possesses the personal information, combined with the integrated
goals of the program, including mailing the renewal notices as well
as cutting the costs of and raising revenue for RMV programs,
leaves us convinced that the program is a permissible government
function under subsection (b)(1). And because the program is a
permissible means for the use of personal information, Globe Direct
cannot be liable. See 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a) ("A person who . . .
uses personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for a
individuals from the sale of personal information for profit by
state agencies to marketers), the main purpose of the statute was
to prevent incidences of stalking and violence enabled by access to
personal information that is stored by motor vehicle registries,
see, e.g., Protecting Driver Privacy: Hearing on H.R. 3365, the
Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1993, Before the Subcomm. on
Civil and Const. Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d
Cong. (1994) (statement of Rep. James P. Moran); 140 Cong. Rec.
H2,526-27 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (statement of Rep. Porter Goss)
(noting that the bill was in response to the murder of an actress
by a stalker and that "the intent of the bill is simple and
straightforward: We want to stop stalkers from obtaining the name
and address of their pray before another tragedy occurs"); 139
Cong. Rec. S15,762-63 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Orrin Hatch) (opposing the bill because the crime bill "already
does much to combat stalking.").
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purpose not permitted . . . shall be liable . . . .) (emphasis
added).
III. Conclusion
Because we agree that judgment for Globe Direct is
proper, as Downing cannot state a claim under the DPPA, we affirm
the ruling of the district court.
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