Grajales v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 11-1404
DANIEL GRAJALES ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
PUERTO RICO PORTS AUTHORITY ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Selya and Lipez,
Circuit Judges.
Eugenio W.A. Géigel-Simounet, with whom Géigel-Simounet Law
Offices C.S.P. was on brief, for appellants.
José Vázquez García, with whom Maza & Green, P.S.C. was on
brief, for appellee Puerto Rico Ports Authority.
Luis R. Román-Negrón, Acting Solicitor General, with whom
Jeanette M. Collazo-Ortiz, Acting Deputy Solicitor General, Zaira
Z. Girón-Anadón, Deputy Solicitor General, and Susana I.
Peñagarícano-Brown, Assistant Solicitor General, were on brief, for
individual appellees.
June 13, 2012
SELYA, Circuit Judge. This case requires us to revisit
the plausibility threshold that a complaint must cross in order to
survive a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556
(2007). After careful consideration of a scumbled record, we
reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand for further
proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
We briefly rehearse the background of the case, reserving
salient details for our discussion of the merits. Because this
appeal follows the granting of a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, we glean the facts from the operative pleading (in this
instance, the second amended complaint). See R.G. Fin. Corp. v.
Vergara-Nuñez, 446 F.3d 178, 182 (1st Cir. 2006). For purposes of
this appeal, we accept those facts as true.
At all times relevant hereto, plaintiff-appellant Daniel
Grajales worked for the Puerto Rico Ports Authority (PRPA).1 On
June 19, 2006, Fernando Bonilla, the PRPA's executive director,
named the plaintiff to a trust position within the PRPA.2 At the
1
Grajales's wife and their conjugal partnership also appear
as plaintiffs and appellants. Since their claims are wholly
derivative, we opt for simplicity and focus our ensuing discussion
on Grajales qua plaintiff and appellant.
2
In Puerto Rico, "career" positions are akin to civil service
positions. "'Career' employees must be selected and terminated
based on merit, not politics." Uphoff Figueroa v. Alejandro, 597
F.3d 423, 430 n.7 (1st Cir. 2010). By contrast, "trust" positions
-2-
time of his appointment, the Popular Democratic Party (PDP) held
the reigns of power in Puerto Rico. In 2008, the plaintiff
voluntarily resigned this post in order to accept a career position
at the Luis Muñoz Marín International Airport in Carolina. Within
a matter of months, he transferred to another career position as a
security supervisor at the Aguadilla airport (a facility located in
his hometown).
The PDP lost the general election held in November of
2008, and its main rival, the New Progressive Party (NPP), assumed
office. In early 2009, the plaintiff began experiencing workplace
harassment. Some of the most notable affronts included his
banishment from the Aguadilla airport, his transfer to the
Mercedita airport in Ponce (which was far from his home), the
removal of his sidearm, a series of negative performance
evaluations, and threats of suspension and termination. No
legitimate reason supported any of these actions.
Dismayed by these events, the plaintiff sued the PRPA and
six of his tormentors (defendants-appellees Alvaro Pilar-Vilagrán,
Elmer Emeric, Carlos Travieso, Manuel Villazán Lig-Long, Gonzalo
González-Santini, and Miguel Alcover). The centerpiece of his suit
was a claim of political discrimination. This claim asserted in
do not enjoy comparable protections. Thus, employees who occupy
positions of trust serve at the pleasure of the appointing
authority and are subject to selection and dismissal on, inter
alia, political grounds. See id.-3-
substance that the individual defendants had engaged in a campaign
of harassment against him because of his ties to the PDP.
We fast-forward past a melange of discovery and other
pretrial proceedings to the point at which the plaintiff filed his
second amended complaint. After filing their answers, the
defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the
complaint failed, in the words of the Supreme Court, to "state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The district judge referred the motion to a magistrate
judge, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), who recommended granting it.
On de novo review, the district judge accepted the recommendation
and dismissed all of the plaintiff's federal claims with prejudice.
For ease in exposition, we do not distinguish between the two
judicial officers but take an institutional view and refer to the
decision as that of the district court.
The district court concluded that the second amended
complaint failed to cross the plausibility threshold because it did
not allege sufficient facts to support a prima facie case of
political discrimination. Grajales v. P. R. Ports Auth., No. 09-
2075, 2011 WL 1742972, at *2-6 (D.P.R. Jan. 25, 2011).
Specifically, the complaint failed to allege facts demonstrating
that the defendants knew of the plaintiff's political affiliation.
Id. at *2. Moreover, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a "causal
-4-
connection between the challenged employment action . . . and any
conduct protected by the First Amendment that would have amounted
to political discrimination." Id. at *3.
Elaborating further, the court noted that the only
indication of political animus was the plaintiff's conclusory
statement to that effect. See id. at *6. In the court's
estimation, the facts alleged reflected no political undercurrents.
See id. This timely appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
When, as now, a motion for judgment on the pleadings
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is employed as a
vehicle to test the plausibility of a complaint, it must be
evaluated as if it were a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Remexcel Manag'l Consultants, Inc.
v. Arlequín, 583 F.3d 45, 49 n.3 (1st Cir. 2009); Gray v. Evercore
Restruc. L.L.C., 544 F.3d 320, 324 (1st Cir. 2008); see also Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2). It follows that the grant or denial of such
a motion engenders de novo review. SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436,
441 (1st Cir. 2010) (en banc). In conducting this review, we
accept the truth of all well-pleaded facts and draw all reasonable
inferences therefrom in the pleader's favor. Nisselson v. Lernout,
469 F.3d 143, 150 (1st Cir. 2006). "We may augment these facts and
inferences with data points gleaned from documents incorporated by
reference into the complaint, matters of public record, and facts
-5-
susceptible to judicial notice." Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d
39, 46 (1st Cir. 2011).
It is a truism that a complaint need contain only "a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Plausibility
determinations must be evaluated in light of this truism. See
Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2011).
In order "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Katz v.
Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 72-73 (1st Cir. 2012) (alterations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
A determination of plausibility is "a context-specific
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. To cross
the plausibility threshold a claim does not need to be probable,
but it must give rise to more than a mere possibility of liability.
Id. at 678.
The plausibility standard implicates a two-step pavane.
See id. at 678-79. First, "the court must separate the complaint's
factual allegations (which must be accepted as true) from its
conclusory legal allegations (which need not be credited)."
Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of P. R., ___ F.3d ___, ___ (1st Cir. 2012)
[No. 11-1589, slip op. at 7]. Second, the court must determine
-6-
whether the factual content permits "the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted); see Sepúlveda-Villarini v. Dep't of Educ.
of P. R., 628 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2010) (Souter, J.) ("The make-
or-break standard . . . is that the combined allegations, taken as
true, must state a plausible, not a merely conceivable, case for
relief.").
Before us, the plaintiff focuses single-mindedly on the
viability of his political discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.3 He marshals both procedural and substantive attacks on
the district court's rejection of that claim. Procedurally, he
contends that the district court abused its discretion when it
entertained a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings,
based on a supposed failure to state a plausible claim, after nine
months of discovery. Substantively, he contends that, in all
events, his second amended complaint states a plausible political
discrimination claim.
An understanding of the travel of the case is needed to
put the plaintiff's procedural contention into perspective. The
plaintiff commenced suit on October 16, 2009. The defendants moved
3
Although the district court dismissed with prejudice all of
the plaintiff's federal claims, the plaintiff has presented
developed argumentation only on this one claim. His other federal
claims are, therefore, deemed abandoned, see United States v.
Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990), and may not be resurrected
on remand.
-7-
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court did not rule on
the motion but, rather, allowed the plaintiff to file an amended
complaint. It then denied the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion as
"moot," and the defendants proceeded to answer the amended
complaint.
On April 22, 2010, the district court granted the
plaintiff leave to amend yet again. Although the proposed second
amended complaint (which was nearly identical to its predecessor)
was attached to the motion for leave to amend, it was not formally
docketed until September 27, 2010. The defendants served their
answers in October and, on December 9, the individual defendants
filed a Rule 12(c) motion. By then, both the deadline for filing
a motion for judgment on the pleadings (May 7, 2010) and the
discovery closure date (November 18, 2010) had passed.4 The court
below nonetheless entertained the motion and granted it.
Under ordinary circumstances, a court may measure the
plausibility of a complaint by means of a motion for judgment on
the pleadings. See, e.g., Elena v. Municipality of San Juan, ___
F.3d ___, ___ (1st Cir. 2012) [No. 10-1849, slip op. at 8-11 &
n.6]; Estate of Bennett v. Wainwright, 548 F.3d 155, 162-64 (1st
Cir. 2008); Pérez-Acevedo v. Rivero-Cubano, 520 F.3d 26, 29-31 (1st
4
The deadline for filing a motion for judgment on the
pleadings was established by the court in its initial scheduling
order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(1). That order also set a
discovery closure date, which the court subsequently extended to
November 18, 2010. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4).
-8-
Cir. 2008). We have not, however, spoken to the question of
whether it is appropriate to apply the plausibility standard after
substantial pretrial discovery has taken place. An obvious anomaly
arises in such a situation because a court attempting to determine
whether a complaint should be dismissed for implausibility must
decide, on the basis of the complaint alone, if the complaint lacks
enough factual content to allow a "reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. This is, by its nature, a threshold inquiry, and logic
strongly suggests that it occur prior to discovery. Ignoring the
entire panoply of facts developed during discovery makes little
sense.
An artificial evaluation of this sort seems especially
awkward because one of the main goals of the plausibility standard
is the avoidance of unnecessary discovery. See Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 556-58; Atkins v. City of Chicago, 631 F.3d 823, 832 (7th Cir.
2011). Applying the plausibility standard to a complaint after
discovery is nearly complete would defeat this core purpose. Cf.
Ginsburg v. InBev NV/SA, 623 F.3d 1229, 1233 n.3 (8th Cir. 2010)
(expressing concern about entertaining a Rule 12(c) motion to test
the plausibility of a complaint following a preliminary injunction
hearing that generated an extensive record). Thus, while district
courts enjoy broad discretion in managing their dockets, we think
that, once the parties have invested substantial resources in
-9-
discovery, a district court should hesitate to entertain a Rule
12(c) motion that asserts a complaint's failure to satisfy the
plausibility requirement.
Here, however, we need not decide the difficult question
of whether the district court's decision to entertain the
defendants' Rule 12(c) motion after nine months of pretrial
discovery was an abuse of discretion. As we explain below, this
case can readily be resolved on the merits of the plausibility
claim. We turn, therefore, to the plaintiff's substantive
contention.
The PRPA is "a public corporation and government
instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico." P.R. Laws
Ann. tit. 23, § 333(a). Non-policymaking public employees are
protected by the First Amendment from adverse employment actions
based on political affiliation. See Padilla-Garcia v. Guillermo
Rodriguez, 212 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2000).
For claims of political discrimination by state actors —
and Puerto Rico is, for this purpose, the functional equivalent of
a state, Santiago v. Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 69 (1st Cir. 2011)
— section 1983 is the customary vehicle through which relief is
sought. See Martinez-Vélez v. Rey-Hernández, 506 F.3d 32, 39 (1st
Cir. 2007). "There are two essential elements of an action under
section 1983: (i) that the conduct complained of has been committed
under color of state law, and (ii) that this conduct worked a
-10-
denial of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States." Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 984 (1st Cir. 1995)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Within this rubric, an
actionable claim of political discrimination must encompass four
elements: that the protagonists are members of opposing political
parties; that the defendant knows of the plaintiff's political
affiliation; that an adverse employment action occurred; and that
political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor behind
the adverse action. See Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 13. In the
case at hand, we look to these four elements as a backdrop for
determining the plausibility of the claim. See, e.g., id. at 13-
19.
A formal adverse action (such as a discharge or the
denial of a promotion) is not a sine qua non for a claim of
political discrimination. See Rojas-Velázquez v. Figueroa-Sancha,
___ F.3d ___, ___ (1st Cir. 2012) [No. 11-1447, slip op. at 8].
Political discrimination claims may be based on harassment as long
as the "acts are sufficiently severe to cause reasonably hardy
individuals to compromise their political beliefs and associations
in favor of the prevailing party." Welch v. Ciampa, 542 F.3d 927,
937 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We add a caveat. As a general matter, liability for
public officials under section 1983 arises only if "a plaintiff can
establish that his or her constitutional injury resulted from the
-11-
direct acts or omissions of the official, or from indirect conduct
that amounts to condonation or tacit authorization." Ocasio-
Hernández, 640 F.3d at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, supervisory liability under section 1983 cannot arise
solely on the basis of respondeat superior. Leavitt v. Corr. Med.
Servs., Inc., 645 F.3d 484, 502 (1st Cir. 2011). Such liability
requires that the supervisor's conduct (whether action or inaction)
constitutes "supervisory encouragement, condonation or
acquiescence[,] or gross negligence of the supervisor amounting to
deliberate indifference." Welch, 542 F.3d at 937 (alterations,
internal quotation marks, and emphasis omitted). Finally, the case
law requires a separate assessment of the potential liability of
each of the defendants. Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir.
1999).
With these principles in place, we first address the
district court's suggestion that the second amended complaint does
not sufficiently show that the protagonists belonged to different
political parties. The second amended complaint alleges that each
of the defendants "belong[s] to a different [political] party than
[the plaintiff]." This is a specific factual allegation which, in
itself, is adequate for pleading purposes. In connection with a
threshold plausibility inquiry, a high degree of factual
specificity is not required. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
-12-
We previously have upheld the sufficiency of an
allegation "that the defendants all belong to the NPP." Ocasio-
Hernández, 640 F.3d at 13 (alterations and internal quotation marks
omitted). The relevant allegation in the instant case is not
materially different.
It is equally plausible to infer that the defendants, all
of whom work for the PRPA, had knowledge of the plaintiff's
political allegiance. While the second amended complaint contains
only a conclusory averment of knowledge, we believe that, for
pleading purposes, knowledge is inferable from other allegations.
The complaint alleges that, in 2006, the plaintiff was designated
as the PRPA's interagency coordinator for emergency management.
This is, as the defendants conceded at oral argument, a trust
position. After serving in this highly visible trust position for
well over a year, the plaintiff — with a general election on the
horizon — arranged to be transferred into a career position at the
Aguadilla airport.
For purposes of a plausibility analysis, the allegations
of a complaint must be assessed in light of "judicial experience
and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Bonilla, in addition
to being the executive director of the PRPA and the appointing
authority for the plaintiff's trust position, was a high-ranking
member (Secretary of State) in the PDP administration. It is no
secret that political leaders most often choose political allies to
-13-
fill important policymaking positions. When examining the factual
allegations of the second amended complaint in context, we think
that a plausible inference can be drawn that the plaintiff, who was
named to a prestigious trust position by a PDP hierarch under a PDP
administration, was a member of the PDP and that the defendants
knew as much. Nothing about the plausibility standard requires a
court to blind itself to what is obvious.
This leads to the question of whether the conduct
described in the complaint comprises an adverse employment action.
The second amended complaint names the PRPA and six individual
defendants. We summarize the relevant factual allegations against
each individual defendant. See Rogan, 175 F.3d at 77. We do not
make a similar analysis with respect to the PRPA because the
defendants have not made any meaningful attempt to distinguish the
PRPA's liability, at least for equitable relief, from the putative
liability of the individual defendants. Cf. Domegan v. Fair, 859
F.2d 1059, 1065 (1st Cir. 1988) (declining to engage in such an
analysis when the defendants made "[n]o meaningful attempt at
individuation").
C Alvaro Pilar-Vilagrán (Pilar).
Pilar, an appointee of the NPP regime, became the
executive director of the PRPA following the 2008 election. On two
separate occasions in early 2009, the plaintiff notified Pilar of
"political persecution, discrimination[,] and harassment by other
-14-
employees of the PRPA." Pilar referred the complaints to a
subordinate for investigation but did not follow up, and no
investigation took place. For no apparent reason, Pilar later
banished the plaintiff from the Aguadilla airport and transferred
him involuntarily to an airport approximately ninety minutes from
his home. This was done without any provision to reimburse the
plaintiff for the additional travel involved.
C Elmer Emeric.
Emeric served as the PRPA's director of general security.
On two occasions, the plaintiff notified Emeric of the rampant
harassment that was taking place. Emeric dismissed these
complaints as "unimportant" and never investigated them. In
addition, Emeric insisted that the plaintiff clock-in at the
distant Mercedita airport instead of at the conveniently located
Aguadilla airport, thus adding roughly ninety minutes to the
plaintiff's work day. Other PRPA employees who worked at a
considerable remove from their homes were allowed to clock-in at
airports nearer to where they lived.
C Carlos Travieso.
Travieso, who was the interim security supervisor at the
Aguadilla airport, assumed the plaintiff's position after the
plaintiff was transferred. Prior to the transfer, he consistently
opposed the plaintiff's continuation as security supervisor,
charging that the plaintiff had received the position through
-15-
political patronage. As part of his campaign, Travieso falsely
reported to the PRPA's director of general security that a private
citizen had videotaped the plaintiff driving recklessly while on
official business. In reality, Travieso himself had done the
videotaping and no private citizen had complained. When requested,
Travieso refused to hand over the tape that he had made.
C Manuel Villazán Lig-Long (Villazán).
Villazán was the manager of general security at the PRPA.
He colluded with Travieso by falsely claiming that a private
citizen had reported and recorded the plaintiff's reckless driving.
Around this same time, Villazán urged that Travieso replace the
plaintiff as security supervisor at the Aguadilla airport.
Villazán also directed an underling to file false charges against
the plaintiff for offensive behavior. The charges were later
dismissed for lack of evidence.
C Gonzalo González-Santini (González).
González manages the Aguadilla airport. In that
capacity, he encouraged Pilar both to investigate the plaintiff and
to abolish the security office at the Aguadilla airport. These
actions clearly jeopardized the plaintiff's job. Moreover, PRPA
policy did not allow for the abolition of the Aguadilla airport's
security office.
This was only the tip of the iceberg. González
undermined the plaintiff's authority as security supervisor,
-16-
falsely reported supposed wrongdoing by the plaintiff to the Office
of Personnel and Management, engaged in verbal taunts, and tried to
have the plaintiff's wife transferred from her job at the Aguadilla
airport.
C Miguel Alcover.
Alcover was an internal security officer at the Aguadilla
airport and, as such, worked under the plaintiff's supervision.
His behavior toward the plaintiff was insubordinate, disrespectful,
and hostile. He filed false charges against the plaintiff for
supposedly offensive behavior. The charges were later dismissed.
Alcover made other bogus accusations, such as an untrue statement
that the plaintiff had used an official vehicle while on personal
business.
Taking these allegations as true, we think that their
combined effect, culminating in the plaintiff's involuntary
transfer to a remote and inconvenient work station, qualifies as an
adverse employment action. See Agosto-de-Feliciano v. Aponte-
Roque, 889 F.2d 1209, 1217-20 (1st Cir. 1989) (en banc). Fairly
read, the second amended complaint alleges sufficient facts to hold
each of the individual defendants liable for political
discrimination. At the same time, the second amended complaint
alleges sequential facts constituting a pattern of discrimination.
All of the individual defendants actively contributed to this
pattern, and the plaintiff's superiors (Pilar and Emeric)
-17-
deliberately ignored the plaintiff's repeated complaints about the
harassment.
The remaining question is whether the second amended
complaint alleges sufficient facts to support a reasonable
inference that political affiliation was a substantial or
motivating factor behind the adverse employment action. The
complaint mentions just one occasion on which the plaintiff's
political affiliation was openly discussed. This discussion was in
connection with Travieso's accusation that the plaintiff had
obtained his career position "as a political favor" prior to the
change in administration.
This paucity of direct evidence is not fatal in the
plausibility inquiry. "Smoking gun" proof of discrimination is
rarely available, especially at the pleading stage. See, e.g.,
Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 17. Nor is such proof necessary.
When "a protean issue such as an actor's motive or intent" is at
stake, telltale clues may be gathered from the circumstances
surrounding the adverse employment action. See Anthony v. Sundlun,
952 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1991). The plausibility threshold
"'simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence of the illegal conduct.'"
Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 17 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556)
(alteration omitted).
-18-
Viewing the pleaded facts in the light most hospitable to
the plaintiff, the following picture emerges. In 2008, the
plaintiff — who had an exemplary record of service within the PRPA
— moved from a trust (policymaking) to a career (non-policymaking)
position. Shortly after the change in administration wrought by
the 2008 election, the plaintiff began experiencing significant
harassment at the hands of persons loyal to an opposing political
party (which controlled the new administration). This course of
harassment consisted in large part of actions for which there was
no legitimate explanation. The harassment culminated in
unjustified disciplinary threats, disparate treatment, the loss of
the plaintiff's right to carry a sidearm, his involuntary transfer
to a remote work station, the elongation of his workday, and a
denial of remuneration for the extra time and travel involved.
The scenario here is not unfamiliar. Similar claims of
political discrimination in the public workplace following a change
in administration appear to be increasingly common in the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Sanchez v.
Municipality of Santa Isabel, 658 F.3d 125, 130 (1st Cir. 2011);
Negrón-Almeda v. Santiago, 528 F.3d 15, 18-20 (1st Cir. 2008). In
this instance, the close temporal proximity between the regime
change and the onset of pervasive cross-party harassment, coupled
with the absence of any legitimate reason for much of the offending
conduct, permits a plausible inference at the pleading stage that
-19-
political animus was a motivating factor behind the harassment.
See Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 17-18; cf. Geinosky v. City of
Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 746-50 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining that
allegations of a widespread pattern of negative conduct,
perpetrated by officers belonging to a single police unit, met the
plausibility threshold for equal protection and civil conspiracy
claims under section 1983).
We hold, therefore, that the factual allegations in the
second amended complaint, taken as true and considered as a whole,
state a plausible section 1983 claim for political discrimination.
We caution, however, that a favorable plausibility determination
does not necessarily herald a likelihood of success at subsequent
stages of the litigation. Factual allegations must be proven,
evidence to the contrary must be factored into the mix, and the
merits remain entirely open.
There is one loose end. On appeal, the individual
defendants attempt to assert a defense of qualified immunity. See,
e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982); Goyco de
Maldonado v. Rivera, 849 F.2d 683, 684 (1st Cir. 1988). In the
circumstances of this case, any consideration of such a defense at
this time would be premature. The defendants may, of course,
reassert this defense in the district court on a more fully
developed record. See Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 52
n.15 (1st Cir. 2009).
-20-
III. CONCLUSION
We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,
we hold that the plaintiff's second amended complaint sets forth
sufficient factual content to make out a plausible claim for
relief. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court
on the plaintiff's political discrimination claim and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The plaintiff's
local-law claims, which the lower court implicitly dismissed
without prejudice for want of supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c), may be revisited on remand.
Reversed and remanded.
-21-