Haag v. Shulman

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 11-1979
KATHLEEN HAAG,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
DOUGLAS SHULMAN,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service,
Respondent, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Lipez, Circuit Judges.
Timothy J. Burke, with whom Burke & Associates, was on brief
for appellant.
John Schumann, Attorney, Tax Division, with whom Tamara W.
Ashford, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Teresa E.
McLaughlin, Attorney, Tax Division, was on brief for appellee.
July 2, 2012
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Taxpayer Kathleen Haag
("Haag") appeals from the Tax Court's ruling that she is ineligible
for "innocent spouse" relief and may not assert that defense
against the government's continuing attempts to reduce to judgment
certain federal income tax liabilities. Because the Tax Court
correctly concluded that Haag was not entitled to renew her claim
for the relief sought due to res judicata grounds, we affirm.
I. Background
The United States sued Haag and her husband, Robert Haag,
(collectively, the "Haags") in 2002 in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Massachusetts to reduce federal income tax
liabilities to judgment. These liabilities totaled $1,620,224 and
were incurred during separate time periods spanning tax years 1985
through 1991 and 1993 through 2001. In the answer the couple filed
with the district court, Haag raised, as an affirmative defense,
her asserted entitlement to "innocent spouse" relief from joint and
several liability under 26 U.S.C. § 6015(b)(1)-(2), (f).
In October 2004, while the initial action against them
was still pending before the district court, the Haags brought a
separate action against the United States in the same court
claiming that they had been denied their statutory right to a
collection due-process ("CDP") hearing. This hearing, in which a
taxpayer appears before the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") before
she is deprived of her property, is granted as of right under
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26 U.S.C. § 6320. In their filings, the Haags alleged that the IRS
failed to notify them of their right to a CDP hearing. The
district court then consolidated the two actions in December 2004.
In January 2006, the district court entered judgment
against the Haags with regards to the government's collection
action. On the issue of Haag's asserted eligibility for innocent
spouse relief under § 6015, the district court found that the
statutory limitations period and applicable tax regulation --
specifically, the provisions found at § 6015(b)(1)(E) and at Treas.
Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(1) -- required such claims to be filed with the
IRS within two years after the IRS's first collection action was
taken against the Haags. Because the IRS's efforts to collect on
the Haags' tax liabilities commenced in 1999, the court dismissed
Haag's claim for innocent spouse relief -- first raised in 2002 --
as untimely.
Although the government first conceded that it had failed
to notify the Haags of their right to a CDP hearing and allowed the
Haags to appear before the IRS in a substitute hearing, it later
reversed course when it discovered evidence that it had, in
actuality, sent proper notice. Consequently, on August 1, 2006,
the district court also ruled against the Haags as to their
separate action against the United States. The Haags appealed the
district court's judgment only as to their CDP claim and, on
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April 3, 2007, we affirmed. See Haag v. United States, 485 F.3d 1(1st Cir. 2007) ("Haag I").
Two more lawsuits involving the Haags are relevant to the
present appeal. First, in the interval between the district
court's August 1, 2006, ruling and our judgment in Haag I, the
Haags filed another suit against the United States, which alleged
that the government had failed to properly notify their attorney of
tax liens against them. This suit was first administratively
closed when Robert Haag filed for bankruptcy, then dismissed due to
the district court's finding that it was barred by res judicata.
Second, Haag, acting on her own, sued the United States claiming
that the IRS had failed to consider a request for innocent spouse
relief that she raised at her substitute CDP hearing in 2005. The
district court also dismissed this claim, reasoning that the Haag
I action barred it due to res judicata.
The Haags then appealed the district court's dismissal of
both cases to this Court. On December 14, 2009, we affirmed the
district court's judgment and endorsed its reasoning that both
actions were barred due to the preclusive effect of final judgment
in the Haag I action. See Haag v. United States, 589 F.3d 43 (1st
Cir. 2009) ("Haag II").
This appeal stems from Haag's renewed efforts to obtain
innocent spouse relief from liability. As we explain further
infra, Haag attempts to avail herself of an intervening change in
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the law that she posits is both applicable and beneficial to her.
Specifically, Haag relies upon Lantz v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 131(2009) ("Lantz I"), rev'd, 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2010), in which
the Tax Court invalidated the Department of the Treasury's
regulation imposing a two-year statute of limitations on § 6015(f)
requests for innocent spouse relief as an improper interpretation
of the statute. Haag filed administrative requests for § 6015(f)
relief with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue relying on Lantz
I in July 2009, which the Commissioner denied in the following year
on res judicata grounds. Haag then filed the present action with
the Tax Court to again assert her request for innocent spouse
relief and to challenge the Commissioner's application of res
judicata principles. In addition, Haag relied upon 26 U.S.C.
§ 6015(g)(2), which lifts the res judicata bar to allow certain
taxpayers' claims for relief in some circumstances, and contended
that her innocent spouse defense could proceed on those grounds as
well.
The Tax Court granted the Commissioner's request for
summary judgment. With regards to Lantz I and the fact that the
Tax Court had eventually invalidated the statute of limitations
that originally rendered Haag ineligible for relief, the Tax Court
reasoned that res judicata generally does not account for changes
in the law and, therefore, Haag's action remained barred. As to
the statutory provisions that would grant a taxpayer relief from
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res judicata, the Tax Court found that Haag did not meet the
requirements for such a dispensation to attach. This timely appeal
of the Tax Court's judgment followed.
II. Discussion
We review the Tax Court's decision to grant summary
judgment de novo. Burke v. Comm'r, 485 F.3d 171, 173 (1st Cir.
2007).
Taxpayers who file joint returns are held jointly and
severally liable for liabilities that flow from those submissions.
See 26 U.S.C. § 6013(d)(3). "Innocent spouse" relief provisions in
the tax code offer a narrow exception to this arrangement. Under
these, the tax code exempts a joint filer who "did not know or have
reason to know that there was an understatement on the tax return"
from joint and several liability. Jones v. Comm'r, 642 F.3d 459,
460 (4th Cir. 2011). Section 6015(f), upon which Haag specifically
relies in this action, allows the Secretary of the Treasury to
relieve an innocent spouse of liability if (1) the totality of the
circumstances make it inequitable for that person to be held liable
and (2) relief is not otherwise available to an individual under
certain related statutory provisions. 26 U.S.C. § 6015(f); see
also Lantz v. Comm'r, 607 F.3d 479, 480 (7th Cir. 2010) ("Lantz
II").
The tax code authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to
prescribe rules and regulations by which to implement the code's
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provisions. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6015(h), 7805(a). Acting under his
delegated authority, the Secretary promulgated a regulation
implementing a two-year limiting period during which an individual
may assert a claim for relief under § 6015(f). See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6015-5(b)(1). Per the regulation, the two-year deadline starts
to run as of the IRS's first action to collect tax liabilities,
e.g., by "issuing a notice of intent to levy on the taxpayer's
property." Lantz II, 607 F.3d at 480.
As noted above, Haag's present action unfolds against a
changed regulatory landscape because, in 2009, the Tax Court
invalidated the two-year statute of limitations on § 6015(f) claims
for relief as an improper interpretation of the tax statute. See
Lantz I, 132 T.C. at 138-40. In doing so, the Tax Court looked to
the other two subsections of 26 U.S.C. § 6015 that provide relief
from liability -- i.e., § 6015(b) and (c) -- and noted that those
provisions expressly incorporated a two-year deadline on a
taxpayer's request for relief. Because § 6015(f) lacked such a
deadline, the Tax Court reasoned that Congress did not intend for
there to be a two-year limit on claims brought under that
subsection. Id.
Our resolution of this appeal hinges on res judicata
principles and the statutorily-recognized exceptions to the same
found at 26 U.S.C. § 6015(g)(2). We are not called upon to pass
judgment on whether the Tax Court's decision to invalidate the
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Secretary of the Treasury's two-year statute of limitations on
innocent spouse claims brought under § 6015(f) was either proper or
correct. We limit our discussion accordingly, but find it
appropriate to note without saying more that the circuit courts of
appeal that have considered those issues have not viewed the Tax
Court's judgment kindly. See Jones, 642 F.3d at 465 (concluding
two-year deadline on § 6015(f) claims "is a reasonable approach to
filling the gap left in § 6015" and "conclud[ing] that it is a
valid regulation"); Mannella v. Comm'r, 631 F.3d 115, 122 (3d Cir.
2011) ("[T]he absence of a statutory filing deadline in subsection
(f) . . . does not require us to conclude that the Secretary cannot
impose a two-year deadline by regulation."); Lantz II, 607 F.3d at
482 (noting "fact that Congress designated a deadline in two
provisions of the same statute and not in third is not a compelling
argument that Congress meant to preclude the [Secretary] from
imposing a deadline applicable to cases governed by that third
provision").
The doctrine of res judicata dictates that "a final
judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties from
relitigating claims that were or could have been raised in the
prior action." Haag II, 589 F.3d at 45. Res judicata commonly
attaches if three requirements are discernibly present: "(1) a
final judgment on the merits in an earlier action; (2) an identity
of the cause of action in both the earlier and later suits; and (3)
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an identity of parties or privies in the two suits." Havercombe v.
Dep't of Educ. of P.R., 250 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting Kale
v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 924 F.2d 1161, 1166 (1st Cir. 1991)).
Speaking specifically to the tax liability context, the Supreme
Court has explained that because taxes are assessed annually,
"[e]ach year is the origin of a new liability and a separate cause
of action." Comm'r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 598 (1948).
Accordingly, "if a claim of liability or non-liability relating to
a particular tax year is litigated, a judgment on the merits is res
judicata as to any subsequent proceeding involving the same claim
and the same tax year." Id.It is beyond question that res judicata principles are
applicable in the present action: Haag does not contest -- nor
could she -- that she was party to the government's previous
attempt to reduce to judgment certain tax liabilities that she and
her husband incurred during the same tax years that are at issue
here.
Crucial to Haag's appeal, however, the tax code does
carve out certain narrow exceptions that would permit an innocent
spouse taxpayer to obtain relief even if her claim were otherwise
barred by res judicata. Specifically, under 26 U.S.C. § 6015(g)
(2), a taxpayer may stave off the preclusive effect of a prior
action if she can show "(1) that [her] innocent spouse claim 'was
not an issue' in the prior proceeding and (2) that [s]he did not
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'participate meaningfully' in the prior proceeding." Koprowski v.
Comm'r, 138 T.C. No. 5, 2012 WL 371888, at *8 (Feb. 6, 2012)
(original alterations omitted). As the accentuated conjunction
suggests, a taxpayer must satisfy both factors to lift the bar of
res judicata.
We conclude that Haag meets neither of the § 6015(g)(2)
elements and that she is therefore barred by res judicata from
disputing her asserted entitlement to innocent spouse relief under
§ 6015(f). With regards to the first of the above-cited factors,
we note that Haag's innocent spouse relief request was not only an
issue in the litigation that led to our judgment in Haag I, it was
also addressed in detail by the parties and considered by the
district court. As noted above, Haag raised the issue of her
innocent spouse claims under 26 U.S.C. § 6015 early on, by
asserting them in her answer to the government's complaint in its
tax collection action against Haag and her husband. See Haag II,
589 F.3d at 44. Indeed, as the government correctly underscores,
the points enumerated in this filing under the heading "Request for
Determination as an Innocent Spouse" together comprised the only
affirmative defense that Haag raised in her pleading to the court,
devoting approximately three full pages of a five-page answer to
arguments grounded on § 6015(b)(1)-(2) and § 6015(f). See Deihl v.
Comm'r, 134 T.C. 156, 165 (2010) (noting innocent spouse "relief
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from joint and several liability" was "an issue" where "raised in
the pleadings").
Having failed to satisfy the first § 6015(g)(2)
requirement, Haag's attempt to come under the provision's scope
must fail. We nonetheless address her remaining arguments for the
sake of thoroughness.
Haag expends more effort in contending that she satisfies
the second criterion under § 6015(g)(2) -- i.e., that a taxpayer
requesting relief under the relevant provisions may not have
"meaningfully participated" in prior proceedings that would trigger
res judicata's preclusive effect -- but her arguments on this issue
similarly lack merit. Whether a taxpayer requesting innocent
spouse relief has participated meaningfully in prior proceedings is
determined by looking to the "totality of the facts and
circumstances," see Harbin v. Comm'r, 137 T.C. 93, 98 (2011), but
the Tax Court has listed certain factors -- e.g., "exercising
exclusive control over" conduct in a prior proceeding, "having a
high level of participation" in the same, or previously "having the
opportunity to raise a claim for relief from joint and several
liability" -- as being particularly probative of meaningful
participation, id. We agree with the Tax Court that Haag handily
meets any standard for meaningful participation. In addition to
the above-referenced pleading, the district court's order rejecting
Haag's asserted § 6015 defense lists several filings that Haag
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submitted to the court in her singular capacity as a defendant and
independent of her husband.1 See United States v. Haag, No. Civ.
A 02-12490-REK, 2004 WL 2650274, at *1-2 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2004).
In a noteworthy example, Haag filed a detailed memorandum of law in
support of her own motion for summary judgment, which the district
court then carefully considered and rejected. See id. at *2-4(discussing Haag's asserted innocent spouse exemption from
liability and ruling "as a matter of law that Defendant Haag cannot
prove the elements of her affirmative defense"). Based on her
significant involvement in the Haag I litigation and, particularly,
her repeated attempts to vindicate her individual claims and
defenses we must conclude that Haag "participated meaningfully" in
the prior proceeding and thus fails to satisfy the second
§ 6015(g)(2) factor as well.
Insofar as Haag articulates any arguments that could
forestall this conclusion, she appears to rely on some of the
above-quoted language found in the Tax Court's Harbin decision for
the proposition that, in prior proceedings, she was unable to
"raise a claim for relief from joint and several liability," 137
1
Among these -- and aside from the motion for summary judgment
and corresponding memorandum in support of that motion that are
mentioned above -- the district court's order listed: a statement
of undisputed facts (filed April 16, 2004); an opposition to the
government's motion for summary judgment (filed September 14,
2004); a statement of facts in dispute (filed September 14, 2004);
and a sur-reply regarding her motion for summary judgment (filed
September 29, 2004).
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T.C. at 98, and thus, was precluded from meaningfully participating
in the same. Ultimately, this argument can be further reduced to
the contention that Haag would have been able to more fully
litigate her claims or defenses if her original assertion of
innocent spouse relief eligibility had not been deemed barred by
the applicable two-year statute of limitations. This is, of
course, a nonstarter: at the time Haag raised her initial claim for
innocent spouse relief, the regulatory limitation period for relief
under § 6015(f) had run and the district court in the Haag I
litigation had no choice but to correctly dismiss Haag's claim as
untimely. Whether she could have presented compelling arguments on
the merits at that time or further participated in the litigation
but for the two-year limiting period is of no issue.2 Cf. Lantz
2
In a footnote in her brief, Haag asserts that the policies found
in IRS Notice 2011-70, 2011-32 I.R.B. 135, 2011 WL 3035113(released July 26, 2011) ("Notice 2011-70"), apply to her. This
notice, issued on the heels of the Seventh Circuit's decision to
reverse the Tax Court's judgment striking down the two-year filing
deadline for § 6015(f) claims found at Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-
5(b)(1), see Lantz II, 607 F.3d at 480, states that going forward,
taxpayers seeking equitable innocent spouse relief from liability
under § 6015(f) will not be subject to a limitations period. We
note that Haag's reliance on the IRS's notice is ineffectual to the
resolution of the present appeal due to the well-settled principle
that res judicata does not allow dispensation for intervening
changes in the law. See Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie,
452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981) ("Nor are the res judicata consequences of
a final, unappealed judgment on the merits altered by the fact that
the judgment may have been wrong or rested on a legal principle
subsequently overruled in another case.").
In any event, we are constrained to agree with the government's
reasoning that the terms of Notice 2011-70 would be inapplicable to
Haag even if her claim were not precluded by res judicata. With
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II, 607 F.3d at 481 ("[A]ny statute of limitations will cut off
some, and often a great many, meritorious claims.").
III. Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the Tax Court's
grant of summary judgment.
Affirmed.
regards to the specific matter of innocent spouse claims that were
adjudicated and rendered final prior to its date of issue, Notice
2011-70 explains that the IRS will not take further collection
activity against a taxpayer if the agency had "stipulated in the
court proceeding that the individual's request for equitable relief
would have been granted had the request been timely." In Haag's
case, the IRS never stipulated that § 6015(f)'s two-year deadline
constituted the sole obstacle to her claim. On the contrary, we
note that in the Haag I litigation, the government argued that Haag
administratively waived her claim by not articulating her request
for relief before the Secretary prior to raising it at the district
court.
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