Redfern v. Napolitano

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 11-1805
JEFFREY H. REDFERN; ANANT N. PRADHAN,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
JANET NAPOLITANO, in her official capacity as Secretary of
Homeland Security; JOHN S. PISTOLE, in his official capacity as
Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Denise J. Casper, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lipez and Howard,
Circuit Judges.
Jeffrey H. Redfern, pro se, with whom Anant N. Pradhan, pro
se, was on brief for appellants.
Mahesha P. Subbaraman, with whom Robins, Kaplan, Miller &
Ciresi, LLP, was on brief for Freedom to Travel USA, Amicus Curiae.
Sharon Swingle, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil Division,
U.S. Department of Justice, with whom Mark B. Stern, Sydney Foster,
Douglas N. Letter, Attorneys, Appellate Staff, Tony West, Assistant
Attorney General, Stuart F. Delery, Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, and Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, were
on brief for appellees.
July 11, 2013
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Pro se plaintiff-appellants
Jeffrey H. Redfern and Anant N. Pradhan filed an action in the
district court challenging the constitutionality of the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) use of Advanced
Imaging Technology (AIT) body scanners and enhanced pat-downs as
primary methods of passenger screening at U.S. airports. The
district court dismissed appellants' claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief on the ground that it was without jurisdiction to
entertain them, because the case should have been filed directly
with this court in accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 46110. Appellants
appealed and we ordered the parties to conduct extensive briefing,
both on the jurisdictional issue and on the merits of appellants'
constitutional claims.
The government, however, has informed us that, as of May
16, 2013, the AIT scanners currently deployed at passenger
screening checkpoints are no longer generating the revealing images
of passengers' bodies that spawned this lawsuit; instead, they are
displaying a generic outline of a person for all passengers. Given
the potential impact of this new development on the justiciability
of the case, we ordered the parties to conduct additional briefing
addressing the question of whether appellants' claims have now
become moot. Having reviewed the pertinent submissions, we
conclude that the claims have indeed become moot, and we therefore
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vacate the judgment below and remand the case with instructions to
dismiss based on mootness.
I. Background
Congress created the TSA in response to the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks and charged it with ensuring civil aviation
security, including the screening of all passengers and property
that move through U.S. airports. See 49 U.S.C. § 114(d). The
agency complies with this mandate in part by issuing Standard
Operating Procedures (SOPs), which are approved by the TSA
Administrator and set forth the uniform practices to be followed by
TSA personnel. One such SOP, called the Screening Checkpoint SOP,
specifies the procedures that govern the screening of passengers
and property at all passenger screening checkpoints.
On September 17, 2010, the TSA issued a revised Screening
Checkpoint SOP, which was to be implemented on October 29, 2010
(the "2010 SOP"). The government notes that this directive
contains "updated procedures for detecting nonmetallic explosive
devices and weapons," including the use of AIT scanners and
enhanced pat-downs. The 2010 SOP authorizes the use of two types
of AIT scanners (1) backscatter x-ray scanners (which use small
amounts of x-rays) and (2) millimeter-wave scanners (which use
radio waves). The TSA began using AIT scanners in 2007 to provide
secondary screening for selected passengers, but the 2010 SOP for
the first time authorizes their use as primary screening tools.
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The 2010 SOP also provides that persons who prefer not to
undergo an AIT scan may instead opt for an enhanced pat-down.
According to appellants, this procedure is highly intrusive,
involving "the touching of the genitals, buttocks, and . . .
breasts of the individual being screened." In their view, this
procedure, "if done non-consensually, would amount to a sexual
assault in most jurisdictions." A traveler is not permitted to opt
out of the enhanced pat-down and receive a standard pat-down or
metal-detection inspection. Furthermore, a traveler who refuses to
undergo one or the other of these new procedures will not be
permitted to fly. 49 U.S.C. § 44902(a)(1).
Appellants commenced this action in federal district
court in Massachusetts against Janet Napolitano, in her official
capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security, and John Pistole, in
his official capacity as Administrator of the TSA (collectively,
the "appellees"). In their complaint, appellants submit that they
are "regular air travelers" who have been subjected to both AIT
scanners and enhanced pat-downs during recent trips around the
country, and that they foresee being subjected to the same
procedures in future planned trips. They claim that AIT scanners
"produce clear images of the nude body of the searched party" and
that the TSA has provided them with no guarantee that the generated
images will not be saved. They thus argue that the TSA's use of
these screening procedures violates their rights under the Fourth
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Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as
their right to privacy and interstate travel. Their complaint
seeks a declaratory judgment that the new screening procedures are
unconstitutional and a permanent injunction against the use of such
techniques "without reasonable suspicion or probable cause."
The appellees moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule
12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the
2010 SOP detailing the new screening measures was an "order" under
49 U.S.C. § 46110, and therefore only reviewable by federal courts
of appeals.1 The district court agreed that the SOP was an order
subject to review only by the federal courts of appeals and
determined that appellants' constitutional claims were inescapably
intertwined with the 2010 SOP. Finding that the application of
§ 46110 to the 2010 SOP would not deny appellants meaningful
review, and that they could properly bring their claims before this
1
Said statute provides as follows:
[A] person disclosing a substantial interest in an order
issued by the Secretary of Transportation (or the Under
Secretary of Transportation for Security with respect to
security duties and powers designated to be carried out
by the Under Secretary or the Administrator of the
Federal Aviation Administration with respect to aviation
duties and powers designated to be carried out by the
Administrator) . . . may apply for review of the order by
filing a petition for review in the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or in the
court of appeals of the United States for the circuit in
which the person resides or has its principal place of
business.
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court, the district court dismissed appellants' complaint.
Appellants timely appealed from this decision.
After the appeal was docketed and the parties briefed the
jurisdictional issue, we entered an order scheduling the case for
oral argument and directing the parties to also brief the merits of
appellants' constitutional claims. We took no stance on the
jurisdictional question presented by the appeal. In its brief
addressing the merits, dated December 26, 2012, appellees informed
us that the TSA had recently developed privacy software for
millimeter-wave scanners "that eliminates passenger-specific images
and instead indicates the location of potential threats on [a]
generic human figure." Appellees claimed that this software,
called "Automatic Target Recognition" (ATR),2 had been installed on
"all" millimeter-wave scanners currently being used for passenger
screening.
A few months later, on March 19, 2013, appellees
informed us, via a Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j)
letter, that Rapiscan, the manufacturer of the backscatter
scanners, had "been unable to develop effective ATR software for
use in its backscatter machines," and that as a result, TSA had
decided to terminate its contract with them. This move was the
2
49 U.S.C. § 44901(l)(1)(C) defines ATR as "software installed on
an advanced imaging technology that produces a generic image of the
individual being screened that is the same as the images produced
for all other screened individuals."
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result of a new law passed by Congress, the FAA Modernization and
Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 26, 126 Stat. 11, 132
(Feb. 14, 2012), which required the TSA to ensure that all AIT
scanners being used for passenger screening be equipped with ATR
software by June 1, 2012, a deadline which was further extended by
the TSA to May 31, 2013. An attachment to appellees' Rule 28(j)
letter also stated that "[a]ll Rapiscan AIT units currently
operational at checkpoints around the country, as well as those
stored at the TSA Logistics Center, will be removed by Rapiscan at
their expense and stored until they can be redeployed to other
mission priorities within the government." As a result, appellees
represented that all backscatter scanners were going to be removed
from passenger screening checkpoints by May 31, 2013, leaving only
millimeter-wave scanners equipped with ATR technology in their
stead.
Given the TSA's representation that appellants, at least
in the context of air travel, are no longer to be subjected to
scanning equipment that generates revealing images of their bodies
-- thus considerably allaying their privacy concerns -- we issued
an order requesting the parties to express themselves as to whether
this appeal, or any portion thereof, became moot. The order also
requested the parties to address the issue of whether the
information contained in appellees' March 19, 2013 letter,
regarding the TSA's plans to remove all backscatter scanners from
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checkpoints, could be appropriately considered by the court at this
time. After the parties briefed their positions on these issues,
on June 17, 2013, the government filed another Rule 28(j) letter
informing us that the TSA had indeed removed all backscatter
scanners from passenger screening checkpoints, and that, as of May
16, 2013, "all AIT units deployed by TSA are equipped with ATR
capability."
II. Discussion
This appeal calls on us to resolve two jurisdictional
issues: (1) whether the 2010 SOP is an "order" under 49 U.S.C.
§ 46110, such that jurisdiction did not lie with the district
court; and (2) whether, given recent events, this appeal has become
moot, such that we are no longer with jurisdiction to entertain it
under Article III of the United States Constitution. Because we do
in fact conclude that this appeal is moot and that entering into an
analysis on whether the 2010 SOP is an "order" under § 46110 would
serve no useful purpose, we will bypass that issue altogether, and
proceed to explain our reasoning.
Although an appellate court must normally "satisfy itself
both of its own subject-matter jurisdiction and of the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court before proceeding
further," Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff, 484 F.3d 139, 142 (1st Cir.
2007), both Supreme Court and circuit precedent allow us to
sidestep certain jurisdictional issues in select circumstances.
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The Supreme Court in Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment,
523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998), established the general principle that
federal courts are "required to determine whether Article III
jurisdiction exists prior to proceeding to the merits of the case."
United Seniors Ass'n, Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, 500 F.3d 19, 23
(1st Cir. 2007). In Parella v. Retirement Board of Rhode Island
Employees' Retirement System, 173 F.3d 46, 57 (1st Cir. 1999), we
noted that the justices in Steel Co. distinguished between
jurisdictional issues that arise under Article III and those that
arise under federal statutes; "the former should ordinarily be
decided before the merits, but the latter need not be." Id.Additionally, in subsequent cases we have held that appellate
courts remain free to bypass problematic jurisdictional issues
provided those issues do not implicate Article III's "case or
controversy" requirement. See, e.g., Kelley v. Marcantonio, 187
F.3d 192, 197 (1st Cir. 1999); Royal Siam Co., 484 F.3d at 144;
Aponte-Rosario v. Acevedo-Vilá, 617 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2010).
The question whether the district court possessed
jurisdiction to hear this case under § 46110 is plainly an issue of
statutory jurisdiction which we may bypass. This issue does not
involve Article III's requirement of a "case" or "controversy," and
even if we were to resolve it in the government's favor, this court
would still have jurisdiction to hear the case in the first
instance. The question of whether this case is moot, however, does
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call into question our power to hear this case under Article III
and we are thus prohibited from sidestepping it under the above
case-law. Because we find that this case is moot and that we are
without Article III jurisdiction to entertain it, there is little
reason for us to address the statutory jurisdiction issue. We thus
proceed to explain why the instant case must be dismissed on
mootness grounds.3
Our first line of inquiry is to decide whether we are
able to take judicial notice of the TSA's consummated decision to
remove all backscatter machines from passenger screening
checkpoints. Appellants note that "it is inappropriate to consider
evidence relating to contested issues of fact when that evidence is
submitted in a 28(j) letter." In this case, the appellees
introduced new facts concerning the TSA's plans to remove all non-
ATR scanners from security checkpoints via its March 19, 2013 Rule
28(j) letter, and, in addition, appellees filed another Rule 28(j)
letter dated June 17, 2013, stating that they had in fact removed
said scanners from all checkpoints. Appellees maintain that their
letter was filed pursuant to the Supreme Court's mandate directing
attorneys "to bring to the federal tribunal's attention 'without
3
We must recognize that several courts around the country have
already resolved the statutory jurisdiction question in favor of
the government. See, e.g., Blitz v. Napolitano, 700 F.3d 733, 739-
40 (4th Cir. 2012); Roberts v. Napolitano, 463 Fed. App'x 4 (D.C.
Cir. 2012); Corbett v. United States, 458 Fed. App'x 866, 871 (11th
Cir. 2012) (all holding that courts of appeals have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear challenges against the 2010 SOP).
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delay,' facts that may raise a question of mootness." Arizonans
for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n.23 (1997)
(citing Bd. of License Comm'rs of Tiverton v. Pastore, 469 U.S.
238, 240 (1985))(emphasis in original).
Although appellants note that Rule 28(j) letters may not
normally be used to submit new evidence to an appeals court, they
do recognize that in United States v. Brown, 631 F.3d 573, 580 (1st
Cir. 2011), we considered new facts presented in one such letter
when those facts were verified and relevant to the question of
mootness. Although appellants claim they are not bound to accept
the new facts presented by appellees in their Rule 28(j) letters,
they are nevertheless willing to accept as true the following
facts: (1) "that the government presently intends to stop using the
non-ATR-equipped backscatter scanners in U.S. airports for
passenger screening after June 1, 2013," and (2) "that the
backscatter scanners will be redeployed outside of airports."
Because both parties agree that, as of June 1, 2013, appellants
will no longer be subjected to body scanners that are not equipped
with ATR technology at airport checkpoints, we find no difficulty
in taking judicial notice of the facts presented in the
government's Rule 28(j) letters.4 Having determined that these new
4
In addition, in a recent notice of proposed rulemaking, the TSA
manifested its intent to remove all non-ATR-equipped scanners from
security checkpoints by June 1, 2013. We may also take judicial
notice of this fact. Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 638 n.12 (2d
Cir. 2003) ("[T]he court of appeals may take judicial notice of a
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developments are appropriately before this court, we now proceed to
assess whether they have rendered appellants' claims moot.
Article III of the Constitution confines our jurisdiction
to those claims that involve actual "cases" or "controversies."
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. It follows that federal courts
"lack constitutional authority to decide moot questions"; the fact
that a live controversy existed when the plaintiff brought suit is
not enough. Barr v. Galvin, 626 F.3d 99, 104 (1st Cir. 2010).
"When a case is moot -- that is, when the issues presented are no
longer live or when the parties lack a generally cognizable
interest in the outcome -- a case or controversy ceases to exist,
and dismissal of the action is compulsory." Maher v. Hyde, 272
F.3d 83, 86 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting Cruz v. Farquharson, 252 F.3d
530, 533 (1st Cir. 2001)).
This case began with appellants challenging the TSA's use
of both millimeter-wave and backscatter scanners, as well as the
use of enhanced pat-downs as a mandatory alternative method of
screening for those passengers who opted out of AIT scanning. Once
appellees informed us of their plans to equip millimeter-wave
scanners with ATR technology, the appellants abandoned their claims
against the use of such scanners, and instead maintained that
backscatter scanners should also be equipped with ATR technology.
However, now that appellees have informed us that the backscatter
proposed rule published in the Federal Register . . . .").
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scanners have been removed from security screening checkpoints, and
that appellants will no longer be subjected to body scanners that
depict revealing images of their bodies, it is apparent that the
remainder of appellants' claims have become moot.5
Appellants seek to overcome the mootness issue by arguing
that the kind of searches perpetrated by the government in this
case are "capable of repetition, yet evading review." S. Pac.
Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). They maintain that,
although the government promised to remove all backscatter scanners
from passenger screening checkpoints, the government also intends
to redeploy such scanners to "other mission priorities within the
government." Appellants claim that it is therefore "reasonable to
expect that we could at some point in the future be scanned again,"
because "as attorneys and residents of San Francisco and
Washington, D.C., we are no strangers to mass transit and
government buildings." For the reasons that follow, we are not
persuaded by appellants' arguments.
The "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception
to the mootness doctrine is well established, although it is
construed narrowly. Barr, 626 F.3d at 105-06. According to the
Supreme Court, the party arguing for the exception has the burden
5
At oral argument, appellant Redfern recognized that once all
backscatter scanners were removed from all checkpoints, appellants
would no longer have a free-standing claim against TSA's use of
enhanced pat-downs, as they do not intend to opt out of ATR-
equipped millimeter-wave scanners.
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of showing that "(1) the challenged action is in its duration too
short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration; and
(2) there is a reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability
that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action
again." FEC v. Wis. Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007)
(citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Barr, 626 F.3d at 105-06. In
this case, even if we assume -- without examining the issue -- that
appellants could show the requisite short timing for the exception
to apply, they would clearly fail to meet their burden as to the
second prong of the test: that there be a reasonable expectation or
a demonstrated probability that they will be subjected to non-ATR-
equipped body scanners in the future.
Appellants argue that, although they do not yet know the
precise locations in which the government will choose to redeploy
the backscatter scanners, it is reasonable to suppose that they
will be scanned again in the future. However, the basis for their
argument rests on the threadbare assertion that, because they
reside in major metropolitan areas, they are "no strangers to mass
transit and government buildings," and therefore are likely to
confront backscatter scanners again. This statement is entirely
speculative and we find that it is insufficient to prevent this
case from becoming moot. See Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 697 F.3d 1235,
1239 (9th Cir. 2012) ("A moot case cannot be revived by alleged
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future harm that is so remote and speculative that there is no
tangible prejudice to the existing interests of the parties."
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Protestant Mem'l Med. Ctr.,
Inc. v. Maram, 471 F.3d 724, 732 (7th Cir. 2006) ("[P]ure
speculation as to future injury is not sufficient to meet the
exception to mootness." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The truth of the matter is that the government has not
revealed where it plans to redeploy the decommissioned backscatter
machines, or whether it intends to reuse them on the traveling
public at all. There are a myriad of possibilities and it may very
well be that appellants will never be subjected to the backscatter
machines again. "[I]t is the original plaintiff, rather than some
other party, who must bear the onus of repeated exposure to the
challenged conduct in order to meet the 'capable of repetition'
standard." Ramírez v. Sánchez-Ramos, 438 F.3d 92, 101 (1st Cir.
2006). We thus find that, on this record, appellants have failed
to demonstrate that they remain at risk for the harm about which
they complain, namely, being scanned with non-ATR-equipped
backscatter machines in the future.
As appellants have been unable to establish the
applicability of the "capable of repetition" exception, it is clear
to us that no live case or controversy remains and that their
claims against the use of the backscatter machines must be
dismissed as moot. Ramírez, 438 F.3d at 100 (noting that, where
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"intervening events have wiped the slate clean, the case has become
moot.").
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment below
and remand with instructions to dismiss the case as moot. The
parties shall bear their own costs.
Vacated and Remanded.
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