Rabbat v. Mukasey

Not for Publication in West’s Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 08-1330
CHUKRI RIZKALLAH GERGES RABBAT,
Petitioner,
v.
MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF
THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Before
Torruella, Baldock, * and Howard, Circuit Judges.
Joan M. Altamore, on brief, for petitioner.
Gregory G. Katsas, Acting Attorney General, Civil
Division, Alison Marie Igoe, Senior Litigation Counsel, and
Ada E. Bosque, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation,
on brief, for respondent.
September 24, 2008
*
Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
BALDOCK, Senior Circuit Judge. The Department of
Homeland Security charged Petitioner Chukri Rizkallah Gerges
Rabbat, a citizen of Lebanon, with overstaying his non-
immigrant visa. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). Petitioner
admitted the charge’s factual allegations (contained in a
Notice to Appear) and filed an application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the United
Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). See 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1158(b), 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16. In his
application, Petitioner alleged a fear of persecution at the
hands of Syrians based upon his Christian religion.
Following a hearing at which Petitioner testified at
length, the Immigration Judge (IJ) first found Petitioner’s
application for asylum untimely under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2).
Subsection (a)(2)(B) provides that, absent changed or
extraordinary circumstances, an alien is not eligible for
asylum “unless the alien demonstrates by clear and
convincing evidence that the application has been filed
within 1 year after the date of the alien’s arrival in the
United States.” Based on blanket findings, the IJ
alternatively concluded that Petitioner was not eligible for
asylum because his testimony was not credible. See id. §
1158(b)(1)(B)(ii),(iii) (establishing a framework for
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credibility determinations). The IJ explained that
Petitioner did not meet his burden of establishing he was a
“refugee” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42),
i.e., one having a well-founded fear of persecution
based on, among other things, religion. See id.§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (requiring applicant for asylum to
establish refugee status). The IJ further concluded
Petitioner was not entitled to withholding of removal
because he did not meet his burden of establishing his life
or freedom would be threatened on account of religion if
removed to Lebanon. See id. § 1231(b)(3). Finally, the IJ
concluded Petitioner had not proven “more likely than not”
that he would be tortured upon returning to Lebanon as
required for protection under CAT. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.16(c)(2). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
agreed with the IJ’s decision in all respects and dismissed
Petitioner’s appeal. In doing so, the BIA explained that
Petitioner’s application for asylum was time-barred, and the
IJ’s adverse credibility determination was not clearly
erroneous. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i).
At the outset, we note our lack of jurisdiction to
review Petitioner’s asylum claim. Subsection (a)(3) of 8
U.S.C. § 1158 plainly states “[n]o court shall have
jurisdiction to review any determination of the Attorney
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General under paragraph (2),” relating to time limits for
filing an application for asylum. See Guillaume v.
Gonzales, 504 F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir. 2007). Thus, we possess
jurisdiction only to review the BIA’s denial of relief based
on withholding of removal and CAT. In Jiang v. Gonzales,
474 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 2007) we set forth the standard of
review applicable to those claims:
This court reviews findings of fact in immigration
proceedings, including findings with respect to
credibility, to determine whether those findings
are supported by substantial evidence in the
record. Under that standard, an adverse
credibility determination may stand if it is
supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative
evidence on the record considered as a whole.
(internal quotations and citation omitted); see also
Settenda v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 89, 93 (1st Cir. 2004)
(explaining the substantial evidence standard “applies both
to the asylum and withholding claims as well as to claims
brought under CAT”).
Applying this standard, we need not repeat Petitioner’s
story here. We have carefully reviewed the entire record
and the parties’ briefs, and conclude the BIA reached the
correct result under the applicable law. We have repeatedly
opined that “‘when a lower court accurately takes the
measure of a case and articulates a cogent rationale, it
serves no useful purpose for a reviewing court to write at
length.’” Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Zaldivar, 413 F.3d 119,
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120 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Seaco Ins. Co. v. Davis-Irish,
300 F.3d 84, 86 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing cases)). Because
substantial evidence supports the BIA’s decision, we deny
the Petition for Review for substantially the reasons set
forth in that decision. See Lin v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 22, 26
(1st Cir. 2008) (“Where the BIA does not [expressly] adopt
the IJ’s findings, we review the BIA’s decision rather than
the IJ’s.”).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED IN PART, AND DISMISSED IN
PART FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.
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