United States v. Reed, III

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 15-1262
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
CHARLES REED, III,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Nancy Torresen, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Chief Judge,
Kayatta and Barron, Circuit Judges.
James S. Hewes on brief for appellant.
Margaret D. McGaughey, Assistant United States Attorney, and
Thomas E. Delahanty II, United States Attorney, on brief for
appellee.
July 18, 2016
KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. After pleading guilty to a
robbery in which he brandished a firearm, Charles Reed, III
("Reed"), received a 192-month prison sentence. Reed now appeals
this sentence, arguing that the district court erred in concluding
that his prior convictions subjected him to a 15-year mandatory
minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18
U.S.C. § 924(e), and also triggered a career offender sentencing
enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("the
Guidelines"). Because the district court properly applied the
career offender enhancement, and because Reed has shown no plain
error in the district court's conclusion that the ACCA applied, we
affirm.
I. Background1
On December 2, 2013, Reed and his roommates, Ryan Forrest
("Forrest") and Walter Heathcote ("Heathcote"), decided to commit
a robbery. The trio first discussed and discarded the idea of
robbing a gas station. They then visited a Walmart store with the
unrealized aim of stealing a television. Reed, high on heroin,
next suggested that they rob a Family Dollar store in Biddeford,
Maine. After Heathcote drove the trio to the store, Reed--who was
armed with a hunting rifle--went into the store with Forrest. The
1 Because Reed pled guilty, we draw the relevant facts from
the sentencing hearing and the unchallenged portions of the
Presentence Investigation Report. See United States v. Dávila-
González, 595 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 2010).
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two approached the cashier and demanded money. Recognizing Reed
as a regular customer, the cashier initially thought the robbery
was a joke, but Reed disabused the cashier of that impression by
asking him if he wanted to find out whether Reed's rifle was real.
The cashier told Reed and Forrest that he could not open
the store's safe without the store manager. Forrest found the
manager and the manager's pregnant fiancée in a nearby aisle and
brought them to the cashier. The manager input his code into the
safe, but he informed Reed and Forrest that the safe would not
open for two minutes due to a security feature. Becoming anxious,
Reed and Forrest left without waiting for the safe to open, pausing
only long enough to take the store's cordless phone, the cell phone
of a bystander, and multiple cartons of cigarettes, as well as
$600 from the open cash register.
Not surprisingly, police shortly thereafter arrested
Reed. He pled guilty to a federal information2 charging him with
one count each of robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); brandishing of a
firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, id.§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii); and possession of a firearm by a felon subject
to the ACCA's mandatory minimum sentence ("the ACCA count"), id.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924(e). A Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR")
2 Reed was initially prosecuted by state authorities, but
defense counsel represented that Maine has since dismissed its
charges in light of the federal prosecution.
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prepared by the probation office grouped the robbery count together
with the ACCA count, see U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c), and assigned the
grouped counts a base offense level of 24.3 That base offense
level was overridden, however, by the probation office's
determination that Reed's prior convictions rendered him subject
to the Guidelines' so-called career offender enhancement. See id.
§ 4B1.1. As a result of the enhancement, Reed's base offense level
was set at 37, and his Criminal History Category was set at VI.
See id. § 4B1.1(b). The PSR then granted Reed a three-level
reduction for his acceptance of responsibility, see id.
§§ 3E1.1(a)–(b), 4B1.1(b) n.*, resulting in a total offense level
of 34 on the grouped counts. The combination of Reed's total
offense level and Criminal History Category produced a recommended
Guidelines sentencing range of 262–327 months for the grouped
counts.
The remaining, ungrouped count--brandishing of a firearm
during and in relation to a crime of violence--carried an 84-month
mandatory minimum sentence to be served consecutively to the
sentence imposed on the grouped counts. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), (c)(1)(D)(ii). Adding this mandatory minimum
3 The PSR then increased this base offense level by two points,
to 26, because of Reed's supposed leadership role in the offense.
See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). Both parties agreed that this enhancement
should not apply, and the district court did not apply it. In any
event, the leadership enhancement ultimately had no bearing on the
Guidelines sentencing range the PSR recommended.
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to both ends of the grouped counts' recommended sentencing range
of 262–327 months, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(c)(2)(A), the PSR
ultimately produced a total Guidelines sentencing range of 346–
411 months.
Reed argued that neither the career offender Guidelines
enhancement nor the ACCA applied to him. The district court
disagreed on both points, approving the PSR's determinations in
relevant part. Nonetheless, the district court accepted the
government's recommendation that it apply a three-level downward
departure from the range recommended in the PSR and instead use a
range of 235-293 months as a "jumping off point" for Reed's
sentence. From this baseline, the government recommended a
downwardly variant or low-end sentence between 180 and 240 months.
For his part, Reed recommended a sentence of 156 months. The
district court agreed that a downward variance was appropriate and
imposed a 192-month sentence,4 specifically observing that "this
4The district court did not explain its justification for
sentencing Reed below 264 months, despite the PSR's observation
that the 84-month mandatory minimum applicable to the brandishing
count under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) "must be imposed consecutively" to
the sentence on the grouped ACCA and robbery counts, which
themselves carried a 180-month mandatory minimum sentence. See
Abbott v. United States, 562 U.S. 8, 13 (2010) ("[A] defendant is
subject to a mandatory, consecutive sentence for a . . . conviction
[under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)], and is not spared from that sentence
by virtue of receiving a higher mandatory minimum on a different
count of conviction."). Because the government raises no challenge
to Reed's 192-month sentence, however, we do not consider whether
that sentence should have been longer. See Greenlaw v. United
States, 554 U.S. 237, 240 (2008).
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[was] the right sentence for the crime that was committed" and
that it "would [have] impose[d] the same sentence under the
[sentencing factors laid out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)]" even had it
not found Reed to be a career offender under the Guidelines. Reed
now appeals his sentence.5
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
Where a defendant has preserved a claim that his past
convictions are insufficient to trigger the ACCA's mandatory
minimum or the Guidelines' career offender enhancement, we review
the claim de novo. See United States v. Hart, 674 F.3d 33, 40
(1st Cir. 2012); United States v. Santos, 363 F.3d 19, 22 (1st
Cir. 2004). We uphold the district court's resolution of any
subsidiary factual disputes, however, unless clearly erroneous.
See Santos, 363 F.3d at 22. Finally, even where an error in
sentencing occurs, we may nevertheless affirm the sentence if the
government demonstrates that "'the district court would have
imposed the same sentence' even without the error." United States
v. Tavares, 705 F.3d 4, 25 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Williams v.
United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992)); cf. also Molina-Martinez
v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1346 (2016) (error in
5Because Reed's sentence exceeds 180 months, both parties
agree that the terms of the appeal waiver in Reed's plea agreement
allow him to bring this appeal. See United States v. Serrano-
Mercado, 784 F.3d 838, 841 n.1 (1st Cir. 2015).
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calculating Guidelines sentencing range may be harmless on plain-
error review when the record shows that "the district court thought
the sentence it chose was appropriate irrespective of the
Guidelines range").
B. Career Offender Enhancement
The Guidelines provide that
[a] defendant is a career offender if (1) the
defendant was at least eighteen years old at
the time the defendant committed the instant
offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense
of conviction is a felony that is either a
crime of violence or a controlled substance
offense; and (3) the defendant has at least
two prior felony convictions of either a crime
of violence or a controlled substance offense.
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). Reed does not dispute that the first two
factors apply in this case; he argues only that he lacks the
requisite two prior felony convictions.
The basis for Reed's argument rests in the Guidelines'
stipulation that, in order to constitute "two prior felony
convictions," the sentences for the convictions in question must
be "counted separately" under certain Guidelines provisions. Id.
§ 4B1.2(c). To determine whether the sentences are so counted,
the Guidelines further provide:
Prior sentences always are counted separately
if the sentences were imposed for offenses
that were separated by an intervening arrest
(i.e., the defendant is arrested for the first
offense prior to committing the second
offense). If there is no intervening arrest,
prior sentences are counted separately unless
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(A) the sentences resulted from offenses
contained in the same charging instrument; or
(B) the sentences were imposed on the same
day. Treat any prior sentence covered by (A)
or (B) as a single sentence.
Id. § 4A1.2(a)(2). Relying on condition (B), Reed argues that the
three predicate felony convictions upon which the district court
relied--two convictions in state court for drug trafficking
offenses committed in July and September 2008 and one conviction
in state court for a previous bank robbery committed in November
2008--should have been counted as only a single conviction because
Reed pled guilty to all three offenses on the same date pursuant
to a comprehensive plea agreement that consolidated all three
offenses and that resulted in what Reed characterizes as a "de
facto" single sentence imposed on the day of the plea.6
6 Under the comprehensive plea agreement, signed on July 16,
2009, Reed agreed to a sentence of four years, with all but one
year suspended, on one of the drug trafficking offenses, with
sentencing on the remaining two offenses deferred until after
Reed's completion of Adult Drug Treatment Court ("ADTC"). Reed
was sentenced on the first offense on July 16, 2009, and on the
remaining two offenses on November 18, 2010, upon his successful
completion of ADTC. Reed argues, however, that because his plea
agreement outlined "the sentencing parameters of all his predicate
offenses," including the sentencing consequences of either
completing or failing to complete ADTC, he was "de facto" sentenced
for all three offenses the day he was sentenced in line with the
plea agreement on July 16, 2009. The district court rejected this
characterization of Reed's sentence, observing that it "couldn't
conclude from the [submitted] documents . . . that [Reed was]
sentenced on all three of [the predicate convictions] on the same
date." Because we find that Reed's argument fails for other
reasons, we express no view on whether the district court was
correct to reject Reed's argument on this point.
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This entire argument concerning condition (B) is beside
the point. Condition (B) plainly applies only "[i]f there is no
intervening arrest" between predicate offenses. Id. In Reed's
case, it is undisputed that there was such an arrest. Reed
committed his first predicate drug-trafficking offense on July 3,
2008. He was arrested for this offense on September 15, 2008, and
it was only after this arrest that he committed his second
predicate drug-trafficking offense, on September 24, 2008. Below,
Reed initially objected to the September 15, 2008, arrest date,
arguing that he had not been arrested for the first drug offense
until October 29, 2008, over a month after he had committed the
second drug offense. When questioned by the district court at a
presentencing conference, however, defense counsel affirmatively
stated, "I think I withdraw my objection" to the September 15,
2008, arrest date. And even now on appeal, Reed's brief accepts
September 15, 2008, as the date of arrest for the first predicate
felony.
The district court therefore committed no error in
finding that Reed had at least "two prior felony convictions of
either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense,"7
7Reed does not dispute that his drug-trafficking convictions
were for "controlled substance offense[s]." U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).
And because these two convictions suffice for imposition of the
Guidelines' career offender enhancement, we have no occasion to
determine whether Reed's conviction under Maine's robbery statute
could also properly serve as a predicate for the enhancement.
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id. § 4B1.1(a), and that, as a result, he was subject to the career
offender enhancement under the Guidelines.
C. Mandatory Minimum Under the ACCA
Reed separately challenges the district court's
determination that the ACCA's 15-year mandatory minimum applied in
his case.8 Under the ACCA, a felon in possession of a firearm is
subject to the mandatory minimum if he "has three previous
convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense,
or both, committed on occasions different from one another." 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Here, too, it is undisputed that Reed has
previously been convicted in Maine state court for (1) a drug
trafficking offense committed in July 2008; (2) a drug trafficking
offense committed in September 2008; and (3) a previous bank
robbery committed in November 2008.
Reed points out, however, as he did in the district
court, that his three predicate convictions, relating to offenses
that occurred within a single five-month span, were consolidated
as a result of a comprehensive July 2009 plea agreement in state
court. Therefore, he reasons, he does not have three predicate
convictions for the purposes of the ACCA, but has instead only
one. But each conviction was registered in a separate judgment,
The government has not argued that Reed's guilty plea to an
8
ACCA count constitutes an affirmative waiver of any challenge to
the applicability of the mandatory minimum, so we do not consider
the effect, if any, of Reed's plea agreement.
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and this circuit has already rejected the idea that the
consolidation of convictions for the purposes of sentencing
suffices to merge those convictions into a single ACCA predicate.
See United States v. Riddle, 47 F.3d 460, 461–62 (1st Cir. 1995)
(per curiam). Reed makes no persuasive argument that the temporal
proximity of his offenses establishes that they were not "committed
on occasions different from one another." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
Indeed, Reed as much as concedes that this string of offenses
cannot be characterized as a single spree. Cf. United States v.
Gillies, 851 F.2d 492, 497 (1st Cir. 1988) (convictions for
robberies of two different drug stores were treated separately,
even where the robberies were committed on consecutive days and
garnered concurrent sentences). And although Reed attempts to
argue that his single cluster of prior felony offenses does not
represent the sort of "career" of criminal conduct Congress sought
to address through the ACCA, this broadly purposivist argument,
too, has previously been rejected in this circuit. See Riddle, 47
F.3d at 462. The district court, in other words, did not err in
rejecting the ACCA arguments that Reed advanced below.
On appeal, Reed lodges an alternative attack against the
application of the ACCA. Despite making no such argument below,
Reed now suggests that his predicate convictions were not for
"violent felon[ies] or . . . serious drug offense[s]." 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(1). Because he raises this argument for the first time
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on appeal, we review it under the plain-error standard. See United
States v. Madsen, 809 F.3d 712, 717 (1st Cir. 2016). Under this
standard, Reed must demonstrate an obvious error that affected his
substantial rights and that "seriously impaired the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id.(quoting United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2001)).
Reed concedes that his two prior drug trafficking
convictions, although pertaining to relatively small drug
quantities, carried maximum sentences of at least ten years and so
we conclude that they were "serious drug offense[s]" as that term
is defined by the ACCA. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Reed
is left, then, with the argument that his prior robbery conviction
was not a "violent felony" under the ACCA. Id. § 924(e)(1).
The ACCA defines "violent felony" in relevant part as:
[A]ny crime punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year, . . . that--
(i) has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of
another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or
extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves
conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to
another . . . .
Id. § 924(e)(2)(B). In Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551(2015), the Supreme Court invalidated as unconstitutionally vague
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the clause in subsection (ii) permitting a crime that "involves
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury
to another" to serve as an ACCA predicate, see id. at 2557. Were
the district court to have relied on this clause in holding that
Reed's robbery conviction was a conviction for a violent felony,
it would have committed obvious error. See Henderson v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1130–31 (2013) ("[W]hether a legal
question was settled or unsettled at the time of trial, 'it is
enough that an error be "plain" at the time of appellate
consideration' . . . ." (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520
U.S. 461, 468 (1997))).
However, the district court never suggested that it was
relying on the invalidated portion of subsection (ii). Nor does
Reed claim that it did. So Reed's argument hinges on demonstrating
that his robbery offense fails to qualify as a violent felony under
subsection (i), the so-called "force clause," which encompasses
crimes that "ha[ve] as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of another."
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Reed, though, offers no argument at
all, even on appeal, that Maine's robbery offense does not so
qualify. Indeed, even after the government's brief proffered only
a possibility that Maine's robbery statute describes an offense
that qualifies as a violent felony under the force clause, Reed
offered no rebuttal. He has therefore not carried his burden of
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showing that an obvious error has occurred. See United States v.
Jimenez, 512 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2007) (burden of showing plain
error rests with appellant).
We do observe that even if Reed had successfully shown
clear error, his request for a remand likely would have failed, as
he has also barely ventured to make any showing that any error in
applying the ACCA would likely have affected his substantial
rights. After all, we have already determined that the district
court correctly applied the entirely separate career offender
enhancement, which resulted in a Guidelines sentencing range of
346–411 months--well above ACCA's 180-month mandatory minimum.
Despite this "stratospher[ic]" range, the district court applied
a substantial downward departure and, on top of that, a further
downward variance, ultimately arriving at a 192-month sentence.
Reed makes no argument that the district court would have varied
downward still further had the ACCA not applied.9
He would have been hard-pressed to support such an
argument. The district court had before it Reed's request for a
13-year sentence and the government's statement that it was
"comfortable with" a 15-year sentence. Nevertheless, the district
court found these suggested sentences inadequate in the face of
9 Indeed, were we to rule in Reed's favor, he would have no
guarantee that the district court on remand would exercise its
sentencing discretion so favorably toward him.
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Reed's "very serious offense," which "opened the door to the risk
to a lot of people," and the fact that Reed's "behavior with the
gun set[] [him] apart" from his codefendants. Accordingly, the
district court found that a 16-year sentence was "the right
sentence for the crime that was committed, for the person who [Reed
is] and what [he] bring[s] to the Court." Although we may in some
cases find that the improper application of a mandatory minimum is
presumptively prejudicial even in the absence of any direct
indication that the district court relied on that minimum in
fashioning a sentence, this is not such a case. The district
court's proper calculation of a Guidelines range well above the
statutory minimum, along with its considered application of the
statutory sentencing factors and its determination that Reed's
sentence was "correct" in light of those factors, satisfy us that
even if it were error to apply the ACCA's mandatory minimum, that
error would likely have had no impact on Reed's ultimate sentence.
Cf. United States v. Teague, 469 F.3d 205, 209–10 (1st Cir. 2006)
(erroneous application of career offender enhancement was harmless
where district court sentenced defendant within the range that
would have resulted had enhancement not been applied and where
district court "carefully explained the reasons for the sentence,"
reflecting "appropriate statutory considerations," id. at 209).
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III. Conclusion
Finding no error in the district court's application of
the Guidelines' career offender enhancement, and finding no plain
error resulting from the district court's application of the ACCA's
mandatory minimum, we affirm Reed's sentence.
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