United States v. $8,440,190.00 in U.S. Currency

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 11-1611
UNITED STATES,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
$8,440,190.00 IN U.S. CURRENCY,
Defendant In Rem,
ROBERT HOVITO VAN BOMMEL DUYZING,
Claimant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Aida M. Delgado-Colón, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Lipez, and Thompson,
Circuit Judges.
Ramón M. Gonzalez, with whom Luis Rafael Rivera was on brief,
for appellant.
Myriam Yvette Fernández-González, Assistant United States
Attorney, with whom Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States
Attorney, Nelson Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney,
Chief, Appellate Division, and Thomas F. Klumper, Assistant United
States Attorney, were on brief, for appellee.
June 17, 2013
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. While fleeing from the Coast
Guard aboard a go-fast vessel, the claimant Robert Hovito Van
Bommel Duyzing ("Van Bommel") and his crew tossed approximately $8
million into the Caribbean Sea. The money was recovered by the
Coast Guard and the government filed this action seeking to have
the currency, along with some additional money found on the crew
members' persons, forfeited to the United States. Van Bommel tried
to put a stop to this, claiming that the money was his. The
district court dismissed his claim on summary judgment and Van
Bommel now appeals. After careful review, we affirm in part and
reverse in part.
BACKGROUND
A. The Interdiction
In the late evening hours of June 20, 2009, the United
States Coast Guard cutter Harriet Lane was conducting a routine
patrol in the waters off of Panama when the crew began tracking a
nearby small, fast-moving vessel. A helicopter was launched from
the Harriet Lane to initiate visual and radar contact. It was
determined that the boat was a go-fast vessel of approximately
forty feet in length that had four persons on board, four engines,
and no masthead, stern light or sidelights visible as required by
maritime regulations. The Coast Guard crew's suspicions were
aroused and so the helicopter approached the vessel, which was
located in international waters, and fired three warning shots as
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an order to stop. The vessel did not heed the warning and it took
a round of disabling fire from the helicopter to bring the vessel
to a halt. The helicopter crew witnessed the individuals aboard
the go-fast vessel throwing numerous bales overboard.
An inflatable boat was launched from the Harriet Lane and
Coast Guard crew members headed to the disabled boat. They boarded
to find four men, one of whom is the claimant in this case, Van
Bommel.1 The boat, which contained none of the tell-tale
indicators of a vessel's nationality, was determined to be
stateless after contact was made with Panamanian authorities.2
Surface samples were taken from the boat, revealing that certain
areas had been in recent contact with cocaine.
The jettisoned bales, which had been marked by the
helicopter's crew with strobe lights and a data marking buoy, were
found floating in the sea (six bales were never found; it seems
they may have sunk or drifted away). The Coast Guard scooped them
up. There were approximately twenty-one bales total, all of
similar shape and size, as well as a plastic package containing a
loaded semi-automatic handgun and ammunition. Aboard the Harriet
Lane, thirteen of the bales were opened. Each contained roughly
1
The other crew members were Arnaldo Henao-Serna, Manuel
Carrascal-Reales, and Abraham Carrascal-Carrascal. All, including
Van Bommel, were from Colombia.
2
It is unclear whether the Panamanian authorities were
contacted simply because the boat was found near the Panama coast
or because the crew reported it as being Panamanian.
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$400,000 putting the preliminary estimate of recovered currency at
$8.4 million.
Van Bommel and his three companions, who had also been
transferred to the Harriet Lane, were advised of their rights and
interviewed. Van Bommel stated that he was offered $40,000 to
transport the bales of money and was paid $10,000 of it up front.
Consistent with his story, Van Bommel had $10,000 cash on his
person as did each of his associates. Van Bommel also told Coast
Guard officers that he and his crew had tossed the bales overboard
when they saw the helicopter.3
B. Van Bommel Talks with Law Enforcement
About a week later, on June 29, Van Bommel was again
interviewed by law enforcement officials and he continued talking.
Van Bommel said that while drinking at a bar on San Andres Island,
he and his three crew members met a man named Tomas (last name
unknown). After the group hung out a few times, Tomas cut to the
chase. He wanted the four men to participate in a smuggling
venture that would involve them moving bales of money from one area
of Panama to another. Van Bommel said Tomas then made arrangements
3
The government claims that Van Bommel indicated that he
threw the bales overboard to sink them; Van Bommel says he made no
such admission. Another point of disagreement: the government
alleges that Van Bommel made other incriminating statements, tying
himself and the others to illegal endeavors such as drug and
weapons trafficking. Van Bommel denies this. This dispute is not
material for our purposes.
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for all four men to be transported from San Andres Island to Boca
de Toro, Panama to board the go-fast vessel.
Also on the day of his interview, June 29, Van Bommel
signed U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") forms
titled "Notice of Abandonment of All Rights and Interest in
Property" (the "notices of abandonment"). One form pertained to
the twenty-one bales and the other to $10,000 in currency
(indubitably the $10,000 found on Van Bommel's person).4 The forms
contained an "Acknowledgment and Abandonment of Claim" that stated:
I understand that I have a right to assert a claim in the
seized property described above and to seek return of the
property. With full knowledge of those rights, I hereby
abandon any and all claims I may have to that property.
I waive my right to receive notice of future
administrative or judicial proceedings involving the
property. I also waive any further right to contest the
administrative or judicial forfeiture of the property
described above.
Van Bommel signed the notices of abandonment, both for the twenty-
one bales and the $10,000, and an ICE agent and Drug Enforcement
Administration ("DEA") agent signed as witnesses.
C. Criminal Charges
The same day he met with law enforcement, a criminal
complaint was filed against Van Bommel (and his three cohorts). It
alleged that Van Bommel, by failing to stop his boat when ordered
4
The form we have pertaining to the twenty-one bales is in
English and the form pertaining to the $10,000 is in Spanish. The
forms, apart from being in different languages, look identical and
appear to provide for the same thing. No party claims otherwise.
We therefore treat both forms as containing the same terms.
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to do so by the Coast Guard, had violated 18 U.S.C. § 2237, which
makes it unlawful for an operator of "a vessel subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, to knowingly fail to obey" a
federal law enforcement officer's order "to heave to that vessel"
(in layman's terms, failing to slow down or stop). See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2237(a)(1), (e)(2). Van Bommel was ultimately indicted and pled
guilty on December 22, 2009. Van Bommel was sentenced on February
4, 2010 to time already served and a three year term of supervised
release was imposed.
D. The Forfeiture Action
We backtrack a little. A few months earlier, on November
25, 2009, the United States filed this action, a verified complaint
for forfeiture in rem as to $8,440,190. Relying on an affidavit
completed by ICE agent Antonio Rivera, who participated in the
investigation of Van Bommel, the government alleged that the
$8,440,190 in currency was seized from Van Bommel and his
accomplices, and the go-fast vessel that they were traveling on.
The complaint indicated that the currency, which represented the
$8,400,190 found in the bales and the $10,000 found on each crew
member's person, was currently in the custody of the DEA, ICE,
Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), U.S. Customs and Border
Protection ("CBP"), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
("FBI"). The complaint asserted that the currency should be
forfeited to the United States, see 46 U.S.C. § 70507, because it
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was involved in a violation of the law, specifically the
manufacture, distribution, or possession of a controlled substance
on a vessel, see id. § 70503. On December 1, the district court
ordered that a warrant of arrest in rem be issued for the seized
currency. On that same day, the court granted the government's
motion to seal the case.
Once Van Bommel and the others' criminal convictions were
all wrapped up, the court ordered the forfeiture case unsealed. A
week or so later, on March 19, 2010, Van Bommel filed a verified
claim of ownership with the district court for $8,410,190 of the
currency - representing all the money in the bales plus the $10,000
found on Van Bommel's person. The claim, after detailing the
amount of money and where it was presently being held,5 simply
indicated that Van Bommel was the owner of the currency. He signed
the document under the pain of perjury. That same day, Van Bommel
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. In essence, Van Bommel
argued that the government had not established that he was involved
in a drug smuggling venture and he also took issue with the timing
of the complaint and the fact that it was sealed. Attached to the
motion to dismiss were three more verified claims of ownership (one
each pertaining to the $10,000, $4,200,000, and $4,200,190) that
again simply averred that Van Bommel was the owner.
5
It indicated that $10,000 was being held by the FBI,
$4,200,000 by the DEA, and $4,200,190 by the CBP.
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The government then filed an amended complaint, which Van
Bommel moved to dismiss. He also filed an answer. Motion practice
continued with the government moving for summary judgment. It
argued that Van Bommel did not have Article III standing under the
United States Constitution to challenge the forfeiture because he
had no colorable interest in the seized currency. The government
said Van Bommel's claim for the money should be stricken. Van
Bommel objected, arguing among other things that he did have
standing and that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the
in rem action. Van Bommel reiterated his lack of jurisdiction
argument in a motion to quash the arrest warrant in rem.
Given the various filings going back and forth, the
district court decided that an evidentiary hearing was needed to
flesh out the standing issue. The hearing took place on August 19,
2010. Though billed as an evidentiary hearing, neither side ended
up offering factual evidence or testimony. Van Bommel, for his
part, had by then been deported to Colombia.6 The government had
two agents at the ready to testify - the ones who interviewed Van
Bommel and witnessed his signing the notices of abandonment -
however they were never ultimately called. The attorneys did make
6
Van Bommel's attorney, who also participated in Van Bommel's
deportation proceeding, never filed a motion with the court or
approached the prosecutor seeking to keep his client in the country
for this evidentiary hearing. In fact, when the government sought
to stay the deportation so that Van Bommel could be deposed, Van
Bommel's counsel opposed it.
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their pitches though. Van Bommel's argued that his client never
intended to abandon the property - supposedly he planned to
retrieve it from the sea later - and that Van Bommel's sworn claims
of ownership were sufficient to establish standing. The government
persisted that Van Bommel abandoned the property, pointing not only
to the fact that he tossed it into the sea but also that he signed
notices of abandonment. Van Bommel's attorney countered: he
intended to go back for the bales and he only signed because he was
not fully advised of his rights and was threatened with prosecution
for drug smuggling. After a little more back and forth, the
hearing came to a close.
A few months later,7 on March 15, 2011, the district
court issued its decision. It found that the claims of ownership
filed by Van Bommel, which were unsupported by any evidence other
than his affidavit, were inadequate. Van Bommel, it held, had also
given up any right he might have had to the loot by signing the
notices of abandonment. Because Van Bommel had not shown a
colorable interest in the seized currency, the court concluded that
he had failed to establish Article III standing to challenge the
forfeiture. The government's motion for summary judgment was
granted, and Van Bommel's claim of ownership and pleadings were
7
Van Bommel, in between the hearing taking place and the
decision issuing, filed yet another motion to dismiss.
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dismissed with prejudice.8 The court also dismissed Van Bommel's
various motions to dismiss and motion to quash as moot.
E. This Appeal
Van Bommel now appeals the district court's grant of
summary judgment. He advances two grounds: the district court did
not have jurisdiction over a portion of the defendant currency, and
the court erred in finding that he has no standing.
ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction
Van Bommel, though he never argued this below, contends
that the warrant for arrest in rem pertaining to just the
$4,200,190 in the custody of CBP was never executed.9 To support
8
To be clear, this was a grant of partial judgment. Full
judgment in favor of the government on its forfeiture complaint was
not granted at this time. One of the other members of Van Bommel's
crew, Henao-Serna, also had a claim pending that had to be sorted
out. When Henao-Serna ultimately failed to prosecute this claim,
the court dismissed it. With no claims left pending, the court
(over a year after partial judgment was entered against Van Bommel)
entered final judgment in favor of the United States and closed the
case.
9
Van Bommel raised a somewhat related argument below in his
motion to quash, which the district court twice denied (once
without explanation, and then again as moot based on its award of
summary judgment to the government). Van Bommel argued that the
warrant of arrest in rem for the entire defendant currency, which
was issued on December 1, 2009, was not timely executed because,
according to the process receipt and return, it was executed on May
10, 2010, one-hundred and sixty-one days later. Van Bommel averred
that the one-hundred plus days did not satisfy the requirement of
Rule G of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims
and Asset Forfeiture Actions, which requires that warrants in
forfeiture in rem actions must be executed "as soon as
practicable." Rule G(3)(c)(ii). However, as the government
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this theory he claims that no return of service was filed for that
portion of the money. According to Van Bommel, the failure of the
government to execute a warrant for that part of the defendant
currency results in the district court having no in rem
jurisdiction over it. The government offers no response to this
argument because it was not addressed by the district court. The
government suggests that if we find standing we should remand to
the district court to address this issue. We will not take the
government's proffered approach. Van Bommel challenges the
district court's jurisdiction and this court has an obligation to
satisfy itself that the court had jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 95 (1998); Sindicato
Puertorriqueño de Trabajadores v. Fortuño, 699 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.
2012). And so we take up Van Bommel's argument, although it does
not get him far.
Though Van Bommel says that the warrant was never
executed for the $4,200,190 held by the CBP, we do not see any
record support for this contention. While Van Bommel is not
specific about what portion of the record he is relying on (in his
correctly noted in its opposition, this argument is without merit
because Rule G specifically provides that the "as soon as
practicable" requirement does not apply when "the property is in
the government's possession, custody, or control" which the
defendant currency was here. Rule G(3)(c)(ii)(A). When Van Bommel
made this argument below he made no mention of his current
assertion that the warrant was never executed as to the $4,200,190.
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brief he simply says the "docket sheet" reveals that the warrant
was never executed), we think it safe to assume that he is focusing
on the Process Receipt and Return (the "process receipt") and so we
take a close look at that. The process receipt, which is the same
document that Van Bommel relied on to say that the warrant was not
executed in a timely manner, indicates that the warrant of arrest
in rem was served on the United States Marshals on May 10, 2010.
We assume that Van Bommel is honing in on a section of the process
receipt called "Special Instructions or Other Information That Will
Assist in Executing Service." This section contains the following
language: "Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) in U.S. Currency-09-
FBI-004982" and "Four Million Two Hundred Thousand Dollars and Zero
Cents ($4,200,000.00) in U.S. Currency 09-DEA-520362." There is no
reference to the $4,200,190 held by the CBP. This omission,
however, is not sufficient to establish that the warrant was never
executed on the $4,200,190.
The defendant listed at the top of the process receipt is
"$8,440,190.00 in U.S. Currency," in other words, the entire amount
of the defendant currency. There is nothing to indicate that the
special instructions section alters or in any way limits this
amount. The type of process to be served is listed as the
complaint, amended complaint, the warrant of arrest in rem, and an
unspecified order (the most likely candidate being the court order
granting the government's motion to issue the warrant). All of
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these documents speak in terms of the entire $8,440,190. None of
them excludes the $4,200,190. Indeed none of the documents even
distinguish between, or parse out, the different amounts being held
by the different government agencies, other than to say that the
defendant currency is being held by various agencies.
The warrant of arrest in rem, in particular, provides
that "a complaint has been filed in this Court praying for the
forfeiture of the above captioned defendant property" and that "we
do hereby command that you seize said defendant property, which is
described in the caption of the complaint, and to detain the same
in your custody until further order of the Court." The caption on
the warrant, and on the complaint, reads "$8,440,190.00 in U.S.
Currency, Defendant." The warrant of arrest in rem clearly calls
for the arrest of the entire property. And there is nothing on the
face of the process receipt to indicate that the warrant was not
executed for all of the money. The fact that the special
instructions, which are simply meant to assist in expediting
service, do not reference the $4,200,190 held by the CBP does not
clearly indicate that the warrant for that portion of the money was
never executed.
That is all we need to say on this point. Because the
record does not support the underlying premise that the warrant for
arrest in rem for the $4,200,190 was never executed, we need not
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get into the merits of Van Bommel's claim that the alleged failure
to execute the warrant divests the district court of jurisdiction.10
B. Standing
We move on to the main question on appeal: whether Van
Bommel has constitutional standing under Article III to challenge
the forfeiture.11 Van Bommel thinks the answer is yes, alleging
that his verified claims of ownership are sufficient to give him
standing to contest the entire $8,410,190 and that it is a disputed
issue of fact whether he voluntarily abandoned the money or waived
his right to it. The government continues to contend that Van
Bommel has not shown any possessory or ownership interest in any of
the confiscated money.
Our review, since this case comes to us on a grant of
summary judgment, is de novo. Kenney v. Floyd, 700 F.3d 604, 608
(1st Cir. 2012). Facts are viewed in a light most favorable to Van
Bommel, the non-movant; all reasonable inferences are also drawn in
10
Van Bommel had a follow-up argument too. He contended that
if the government were to now attempt to fix its alleged failure to
execute the warrant, it would be too late because the suit would be
untimely. Since we find no merit in his claim that the warrant was
not executed, we do not need to get into this claim.
11
Standing in forfeiture actions "has both constitutional and
statutory aspects." United States v. One-Sixth Share of James J.
Bulger in All Present & Future Proceeds of Mass Millions Lottery
Ticket No. M246233, 326 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 2003). The
government only challenged Article III standing before the district
court and the court deemed it uncontested that Van Bommel had
statutory standing. The government does not challenge that finding
on appeal. Therefore only Article III standing is at issue here.
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his favor. Rared Manchester NH, LLC v. Rite Aid of N.H., Inc., 693
F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2012). Ultimately, summary judgment is
called for when the movant, here the government, demonstrates that
"there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact" and that it
"is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). Genuine issues are those capable of being resolved in favor
of either party and material facts have the potential to impact the
case's outcome. Vera v. McHugh, 622 F.3d 17, 26 (1st Cir. 2010).
After careful review, we conclude that the answer to the
standing question is different depending on which amount of money
one is talking about - the approximately $8 million in the bales
versus the $10,000 on Van Bommel's person. We take the two groups
of currency separately.
i. The $8 Million in the Bales
In general, there are three components that must be
satisfied for Article III standing: a concrete and particularized
injury, a causal connection between that injury and the wrongdoer's
conduct, and the likelihood that prevailing in the action will
rectify the injury in some way. Antilles Cement Corp. v. Fortuño,
670 F.3d 310, 317 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v. U.S. Currency,
$81,000, 189 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 1999). "Standing is a threshold
consideration in all cases, including civil forfeiture cases."
United States v. One-Sixth Share of James J. Bulger in All Present
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& Future Proceeds of Mass Millions Lottery Ticket No. M246233, 326
F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 2003).
In forfeiture cases, the property is the defendant and
therefore defenses against forfeiture can only be brought by a
third-party intervenor, here Van Bommel, who generally must have
independent standing. See id. When faced with a motion seeking to
strike a claim, as Van Bommel is here, the burden is on the party
contesting the forfeiture (the claimant) to establish standing by
a preponderance of the evidence. Supplemental Rule for Admiralty
or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions G(8)(c)(ii)(B). To
have such standing, the claimant must start by demonstrating an
ownership or possessory interest in the seized property. One-Sixth
Share, 326 F.3d at 41. At the initial stages of intervention, the
requirements are not arduous and typically "any colorable claim on
the defendant property suffices." Id. (addressing the claimants'
standing at the motion to intervene/motion to set aside a judgement
phase); see also U.S. Currency, $81,000, 189 F.3d at 35(considering standing at the motion to dismiss stage); United
States v. One Parcel of Real Prop. with Bldgs., Appurtenances &
Improvements Known as 116 Emerson St., 942 F.2d 74, 78-79 (1st Cir.
1991) (deciding the claimant's standing at the motion to intervene
stage). An allegation of ownership, coupled with some evidence of
ownership, is sufficient to establish constitutional standing to
contest a forfeiture. U.S. Currency, $81,000, 189 F.3d at 35.
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This case comes to us not at the early stages of
intervention but following a hearing that the district court
ordered specifically to address the issue of standing.12 This was
a hearing that the court had every right to order as the burden is
on the claimant to prove standing, see One-Sixth Share, 326 F.3d at
41 (explaining that the onus is on the party seeking to challenge
the forfeiture to demonstrate the necessary ownership or possessory
interest to establish standing), and the court was entitled to
flesh out what evidence Van Bommel had, see, e.g., United States v.
Union Bank for Sav. & Inv. (Jordan), 487 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2007)
(the district court held an extended summary judgment hearing to
consider whether the claimant bank was the owner of the seized
currency for standing purposes); U.S. Currency, $81,000, 189 F.3d
at 37 (the district court sifted through evidence, including grand
jury testimony of the claimant, to address whether he had an
12
We do not go so far as to say that a distinct test should
be applied to civil forfeiture actions at the summary judgment
phase. In fact, in United States v. Union Bank for Sav. & Inv.
(Jordan), 487 F.3d 8, 22 (1st Cir. 2007), this court, in deciding
whether summary judgment was properly granted, decided that a
claimant had standing using the forgiving "colorable claim"
requirement that is typically applied at the early stages of
intervention. However, that case was very different from this one
in that the court did not need to delve into the factual
underpinnings of the claimant's ownership because it was undisputed
that the money the government was seeking forfeiture of was seized
from the claimant's bank account. See id. As we said, the court
here actually ordered an evidentiary hearing to flesh out the
standing considerations.
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ownership interest for standing purposes). In short, Van Bommel's
evidence was minimal.
In fact, the only evidence Van Bommel offered, in support
of his verified claim for the money, was his own affidavit
(proffered in connection with his summary judgment opposition) in
which he referred to the bales as "my bales" and indicated that he
concealed "my ownership of the defendant currency." This evidence
of ownership, minimal in its own right, was contradicted by the
other evidence on the record. Namely, the uncontradicted evidence,
which came in the form of the affidavit from the ICE agent, that
Van Bommel tossed the bales into the sea and told law enforcement
that he was paid to move the bales for someone else as part of a
smuggling venture. Van Bommel does not disagree that he did these
things.
To be more specific, it is undisputed that Van Bommel
twice affirmatively indicated to law enforcement that he was simply
a paid courier, transporting someone else's money for them. Van
Bommel went so far as to give specifics about how he came to
transport this money (recall his story about Tomas and the bar on
San Andres island). The $10,000 found on Van Bommel's person,
along with the $10,000 each of his cohorts had, fit into the story
he gave law enforcement. In fact, not one thing in the record
suggests that the $8 million was really Van Bommel's except his own
after-the-fact affidavit in which he made vague references to
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owning the bale money. Even crediting the conclusory, self-serving
statements made in the affidavit, see SMS Sys. Maint. Servs., Inc.
v. Digital Equip. Corp., 188 F.3d 11, 20 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting
that conclusory, self-serving testimony need not be credited on
summary judgment), the "'mere existence of a scintilla of evidence'
in favor of the nonmoving party is insufficient to defeat summary
judgment," Barreto-Rosa v. Varona-Mendez, 470 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir.
2006) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252
(1986)). We do not have any more than that here.
Furthermore, Van Bommel abandoned the property by tossing
it into the middle of open ocean. His affidavit claim that he
intended to go back and retrieve the bales defies common sense.
Not only did Van Bommel toss the bales out in plain sight of a
Coast Guard helicopter, but there is no indication in the record
that the bales had any built-in feature that would keep them
floating in place as opposed to sinking or drifting away. In fact,
six of the bales disappeared, presumably sinking or floating away
themselves. Again, more than a scintilla of evidence is called for
here. See Barreto-Rosa, 470 F.3d at 45. And though Van Bommel
persists that there is a factual dispute about whether he intended
to abandon the money to the sea, this dispute is of his own making
based solely on an after-the-fact affidavit that is uncorroborated
by any evidence and, like we said, contradicted by common sense.
Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Van Bommel, we
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do not see a genuine dispute of material fact. See Webb v.
Lawrence Cnty., 144 F.3d 1131, 1135 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that
a "non-movant cannot simply create a factual dispute; rather, there
must be a genuine dispute over those facts that could actually
affect the outcome of the lawsuit").
The common theme here is that not until after the
forfeiture action was filed did Van Bommel try to reverse course.
He alleged through verified claims and his affidavit that the money
was really his all along and that he did not mean to give up his
right to it. But when the district court ordered an evidentiary
hearing specifically for the purpose of evaluating Van Bommel's
standing and clearing up any factual discrepancies, Van Bommel
offered no evidence. Not only did he not submit to a deposition
beforehand but at the hearing, Van Bommel did not testify13 and did
not offer an additional affidavit to firm up his claim of
ownership. For instance, it strikes us that evidence about how he
came to own the $8 million and why he was racing across the sea
with it in the dark of night would have helped buttress his claim.
There was none of this.
For the reasons detailed above, Van Bommel did not have
the requisite ownership interest in the $8 million needed to
13
As we said earlier, Van Bommel was deported before the
hearing but the record indicates that his counsel did not seek any
relief from the district court to stay the deportation and even
opposed the government's efforts to keep Van Bommel here.
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establish standing in a forfeiture action. As we said, standing
requires an injury that is caused by the wrongdoer and likely to be
redressed by the relief sought. See Antilles Cement Corp., 670
F.3d at 317; U.S. Currency, $81,000, 189 F.3d at 34. With no
ownership interest in the $8,400,190, there is no possible way that
Van Bommel can be injured by the forfeiture of the money.
Dismissal of Van Bommel's claim as to the approximately $8 million
contained in the bales was appropriate.
ii. The $10,000 Van Bommel Was Carrying
The $10,000 Van Bommel was carrying is a different story.
Not only did Van Bommel assert in his verified claims and affidavit
that he was the owner, but other evidence corroborated this.
Specifically, Van Bommel was found with the $10,000 on his person
(he did not toss this into the ocean) and, at the time of his
capture, he told law enforcement that he was paid $10,000 as the
first part of a $40,000 payment to transport the bales. Consistent
with his story, all three of his crew members were found with
$10,000 on their persons. The tale continued to jibe when Van
Bommel later told law enforcement that he and his crew were hired
by Tomas for a smuggling venture. Given all of this evidence, we
find that Van Bommel demonstrated the requisite ownership interest
in the $10,000 to have standing to contest its forfeiture. See
One-Sixth Share, 326 F.3d at 41. At this stage in the proceedings,
Van Bommel need not prove the full merits of his claim, just that
-21-
he has a colorable interest in the proceedings such that he
satisfies prudential standing requirements. See U.S. Currency,
$81,000, 189 F.3d at 35. He has done that.
The fact that Van Bommel signed a notice of abandonment -
this is the fact that the district court harped on with respect to
the $10,000 - does not change things. In his affidavit, Van Bommel
indicated that he "involuntarily and unintelligently" signed the
notice after he was "threatened to be prosecuted for drug smuggling
if [he] did not abandon the currency." He added that law
enforcement did not advise him of his due process rights and that
the notice of abandonment did not advise him "of the full panoply
of rights counsel later explained to me," such as the right to
present evidence and to have a jury determine whether forfeiture
was warranted.
The dissent would have us disregard this affidavit on the
grounds that it is hearsay. We are not convinced such an approach
makes sense. First, the government did not raise any hearsay
objection to the affidavit, nor is it making such an argument on
appeal. Indeed it would be surprising if it was since the
government, in support of its motion for summary judgment, relied
heavily on its own affidavit - the affidavit completed by ICE agent
Antonio Rivera, which detailed what happened the night the money
was seized and Van Bommel's conversations with law enforcement.
The district court also raised no hearsay concerns.
-22-
Second, in analysis section B, i of this decision, which
the dissent agrees with and has signed on to, we utilize not only
Van Bommel's affidavit to explain why he has not proffered enough
evidence to establish standing to contest forfeiture of the bale
money, but we also rely on the government's affidavit. Given our
reliance on these affidavits to decide Van Bommel's standing to
contest the forfeiture of the bale money - again, the dissent does
not disagree with that analysis - it seems inconsistent to now say
that Van Bommel's affidavit should not be considered on the issue
of whether he waived his right to contest the $10,000 because it is
hearsay.
Finally, and perhaps more fundamentally, we disagree that
Van Bommel's affidavit should be treated as inadmissable hearsay.
While the district court called the parties in for an evidentiary
hearing, no evidence was in fact taken at the hearing. The judge
stated: "Well, I think that takes care of what we intended today,
which was basically I wanted to receive additional information on
certain issues, more so concerning the issue of standing. But as
it stands today it will have to be a determination made on the
record." Van Bommel's affidavit was never offered into evidence;
its admissibility was not at issue. Affidavits are of course
typically relied on to support or defend against motions for
summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). While it is
true that such affidavits "must be made on personal knowledge" and
-23-
"set out facts that would be admissible in evidence," Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c)(4), and it "is black-letter law that hearsay evidence
cannot be considered on summary judgment for the truth of the
matter asserted," Kenney, 700 F.3d at 609 (internal quotation marks
omitted), such hearsay concerns are not present here.
Furthermore, the case that the dissent cites for the
proposition that claimants cannot establish Article III standing
through hearsay, United States v. All Funds in the Account of Prop.
Futures, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (S.D. Fla. 2011), is not on all
fours with this case. The affiant in that case, who was the
attorney for the claimant company, attested to a company vote
taking place even though he was not present at it. Id. at 1331-32.
The court disregarded the evidence as inadmissable hearsay because
the facts attested to by the affiant were not within his personal
knowledge; instead the facts were only known to him because the
claimants told him about them. Id. at 1332. This is not the
situation here. Everything in Van Bommel's affidavit, including
the facts relating to his signing the notices of abandonment, were
within his personal knowledge. We see no reason why we should not
consider Van Bommel's affidavit.
Thus, on the issue of Van Bommel's knowing and voluntary
waiver of his interest in the $10,000 we are left with his
affidavit; an affidavit, which despite the dissent's
characterization, is not conclusory or cursory. Rather, Van Bommel
-24-
clearly explained the threats that the law enforcement agents
allegedly made and what rights he was not advised of. And no
evidence on record contradicts his claims. The notice of
abandonment, signed and dated by Van Bommel and witnessed by two
government agents, indicated that Van Bommel understood his "right
to assert a claim in the seized property" and to seek its return
and that with "full knowledge of those rights," he was giving them
up. Indeed the notice of abandonment does not go into detail
(though we are not saying it necessarily had to) about Van Bommel's
specific rights. And, more importantly, there is nothing in the
record to contradict Van Bommel's claim that law enforcement did
not advise him of certain rights and bullied him into signing the
notice by dangling the threat of drug smuggling prosecution over
his head. The government offered no affidavit evidence on this
point, and the law enforcement officers ready to testify at the
evidentiary hearing never testified. Furthermore, though the
burden is on Van Bommel to convince us of his standing, it is
important to remember that this case comes to us on the
government's motion for summary judgment. Thus, facts are viewed
in a light most favorable to Van Bommel and all reasonable
inferences go in his favor. See Rared Manchester NH, LLC, 693 F.3d
at 52.
The dissent's focus, on what it perceives as Van Bommel's
gamesmanship in avoiding having his deposition taken and not
-25-
appearing at the hearing, is misplaced. We are reviewing the
district court's grant of summary judgment, of course making our
review de novo. See Kenney, 700 F.3d at 608. This review centers
on the record evidence, not the parties' tactics or course of
conduct. The attention the dissent devotes to the latter two
things strikes us as a tack more appropriately taken when we are
operating under an abuse of discretion standard and giving the
district court a wide berth to make discretionary calls about the
parties' demeanor and behavior. But that is not the state of
affairs here.
Given all this, we conclude that Van Bommel presented
enough evidence to demonstrate constitutional standing to contest
the forfeiture of the $10,000 found on his person. While the
dissent disagrees with us on this point, we think the dissent's
approach gets close to collapsing the issue of Van Bommel's
standing with the merits of his forfeiture claim, something courts
should not do. See One-Sixth Share, 326 F.3d at 41 ("Courts should
not, however, conflate the constitutional standing inquiry with the
merits determination that comes later.") On this narrow issue of
standing, we find that Van Bommel established the necessary
ownership interest and has alleged an injury at the hands of the
government that can be remedied by forfeiture of the $10,000 not
going forward. See U.S. Currency, $81,000, 189 F.3d at 34-35. To
be clear, we are saying nothing more than Van Bommel has the right
-26-
to contest the forfeiture. Whether he will ultimately prevail on
his assertion that the property should not be forfeited is up to
the district court to decide.
CONCLUSION
To sum things up, there is no merit to Van Bommel's
contention that the district court lacked jurisdiction over a
portion of the defendant currency. As for Van Bommel's standing,
he does not have constitutional standing to contest the forfeiture
of the $8,400,190 found in the bales. He does, however, have
standing to contest the forfeiture of the $10,000 found on his
person. The district court's grant of summary judgment resulting
in the dismissal of Van Bommel's claim for the $8,400,190 is
affirmed. The court's grant of summary judgment as to the $10,000
is reversed and Van Bommel's claim for the $10,000 is reinstated.14
Each side shall bear its own costs.
-Concurring and Dissenting Opinion Follows-
14
The dissent suggests that, even assuming the district court
erred, reversal with reinstatement is not the proper disposition.
Rather it would have us vacate the grant of summary judgment and
give the parties a chance to have a full evidentiary hearing. We
disagree. We are asked to decide this appeal on the record at
hand. Here the court scheduled an evidentiary hearing but ended up
deciding the government's motion for summary judgment on the
record. The question we are faced with is whether, based on the
evidence that was considered by the court, this grant of summary
judgment was erroneous. As we explained above, we think it was as
to the $10,000. Reversal is proper.
-27-
HOWARD, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting
in part. I concur in the majority's opinion, except for its
conclusion that Van Bommel demonstrated constitutional standing to
contest the forfeiture of the $10,000 found on his person. Van
Bommel did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he had
a colorable interest in that money; he therefore lacks standing to
contest its forfeiture.
As the majority explains, there is every reason to
believe that Van Bommel was paid $10,000 to transport the bales of
currency that he later threw into the sea. Thus, at one point Van
Bommel had a colorable claim of ownership of that $10,000. But he
signed a waiver that stated, in Spanish,
I understand that I have a right to assert a
claim in the seized property described above
[i.e., the $10,000] and to seek return of the
property. With full knowledge of those
rights, I hereby abandon any and all claims I
may have to that property. I waive my right
to receive notice of future administrative or
judicial proceedings involving the property.
I also waive any further right to contest the
administrative or judicial forfeiture of the
property described above.
I think the majority would agree that if this waiver is valid, Van
Bommel has no claim to the $10,000 and no standing to participate
in this action. Van Bommel argues, however, that his waiver is
void because it was involuntary and unintelligent. The majority
believes that Van Bommel has produced sufficient evidence in
support of this argument. For the reasons below, I disagree.
-28-
I. Background
Throughout this case, Van Bommel has worked tirelessly to
prevent discovery of facts relating to his standing. I recount the
relevant procedural history.
The government began this action by filing a complaint
for forfeiture in rem on November 25, 2009. On December 22, 2009,
Van Bommel pleaded guilty to conspiring to fail to heave to a
helicopter, and on February 4, 2010, he was sentenced to time
served. On February 26, 2010, Van Bommel's counsel advised the
government that Van Bommel was scheduled for a final removal
hearing before an Immigration Judge just four days later, on
March 2. Van Bommel's counsel stated that the Immigration Judge
had previously rejected a request for Van Bommel to remain in the
United States pending the outcome of the forfeiture proceedings, so
he "encourage[d] [the government] to complete any matters
pertaining to any intended discovery, that would require Mr. Van
Bommel's presence in this district, before he is removed from the
United States." It appears that at the hearing, the Immigration
Judge ordered that Van Bommel be removed on March 26. On March 4,
the government responded to Van Bommel's counsel that it was trying
to stay Van Bommel's removal so that he could be deposed, and it
asked for dates on which Van Bommel's counsel would be available
for the deposition. Van Bommel's counsel did not respond, and the
government contacted him again on March 18 to arrange a deposition
-29-
on March 24. Van Bommel's counsel told the government that he
would check his schedule to confirm the date. Instead of doing so,
the next day he filed a claim in the forfeiture action for the
seized bales of currency and the $10,000 found on his person. On
the same day, he also filed a motion to dismiss the government's
complaint and unilaterally canceled the deposition, considering it
"unnecesary [sic] based on the arguments raised in our motion."
The motion to dismiss featured Van Bommel's bare, unexplained
claims of ownership of the $10,000 and the bales of currency, but
it nowhere mentioned that Van Bommel's waiver of ownership was
involuntary or unintelligent. When the government informed Van
Bommel's counsel that it intended to conduct the deposition with or
without Van Bommel, he filed an emergency motion for a protective
order staying the deposition, which the court granted without a
response from the government.
For reasons that are not clear from the record, Van
Bommel's removal was postponed. He was still in the United States
on April 13, when the government moved for summary judgment, asking
the court to strike Van Bommel's claim for lack of standing. The
government argued that Van Bommel had waived his ownership of the
seized currency, and it attached to its motion Van Bommel's signed
waivers of ownership of the bales of currency and the $10,000. As
the government pointed out, a motion to strike a claim "must be
decided before any motion by the claimant to dismiss the action."
-30-
Rule G(8)(c)(ii)(A), Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime
Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions ("Supplemental Rules").
Van Bommel was removed from the United States a week
later, on April 20.15 On May 3, he filed an opposition to the
government's motion for summary judgment. Attached to that motion
was a declaration, dated April 29, which stated that his waiver of
ownership was involuntary and unintelligent:
During law enforcement interviews I
involuntary [sic] and unintelligently signed a
Notice of Abandonment of All Rights and
Interest in Property. I signed the papers
after I was threatened to be prosecuted for
drug smuggling if I did not abandon the
currency. The law enforcement agents never
advised me of any of my Fifth Amendment rights
and I was completely unfamiliar with U.S. law.
The Notice of Abandonment did not advise me of
the full panoply of rights counsel later
explained to me, i.e., the standards of proof
under [the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act
of 2000], right to cross-examine witnesses,
present evidence, right to be assisted by
Counsel, and the right to have a jury
determine the forfeitability of the defendant
currency, so as to establish that I made a
knowing and intelligent waiver of these rights
and my Due Process right to contest the
forfeiture of the defendant currency. Once
advised by Counsel of these rights, I asserted
my ownership interest in the currency and
categorically pursued my right to contest the
forfeiture of my currency.
15
The government later told the district court that it had
requested a stay of deportation to depose Van Bommel, but the
motion was denied because of Van Bommel's counsel's opposition.
Van Bommel's counsel did not object to this characterization of the
facts.
-31-
On July 28, the district court entered an order
scheduling an evidentiary hearing "to evaluate disputed issues of
fact regarding claimant's standing." Van Bommel's counsel did not
notify the court that Van Bommel had left the United States and
would be unavailable to testify, nor did he seek assistance from
the court or the government with Van Bommel's application to enter
the United States on parole for the purpose of testifying. See
8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)(4) (describing authority to parole "[a]liens
who will be witnesses in proceedings . . . conducted by judicial,
administrative, or legislative bodies in the United States").
Instead, he sprang this information on the court at the evidentiary
hearing, which took place on August 19.
At the hearing, the government was prepared to refute Van
Bommel's declaration by calling two agents who had secured Van
Bommel's signature on the waiver, but the court informed the
government that they need not testify.16 On March 15, 2011, the
16
The court stated, "Here I take it that the burden remains
on the plaintiff to prove that he has the standing. And even
assuming that he has it, if there is a waiver that basically
supports the relinquishment allegation that the government is
presenting or the fact that the property was abandoned. Assuming
in the best scenario for the claimant here that he is questioning
that, or he has come forward with sufficient evidence to raise
doubts as to the voluntariness, I think as far as can I go is to
kind of even tip the scale further for no justified reason on the
record, and listen to the testimony of the agent as to how this
waiver was procured and what were the circumstances under which it
was offered just like in a suppression hearing. But still
recognizing that if the government puts the witness on the stand it
will be at the Court[']s request not because it has the burden of
doing so, in order to prove standing or in order to prove the
-32-
court entered an order stating,
Claimant provides no specific facts or details
of the alleged coercion in his opposition to
the motion for summary judgment, in claimant's
opposing statement of uncontested fact[s], or
in his verified declaration under penalty of
perjury. In fact, aside from a single
paragraph of allegations in his own sworn
statement, claimant provides no evidence of
law enforcement's coercion in obtaining his
waiver of rights and signature on the Notice.
Nor was claimant able to testify to provide
further details in support of his claim.
Thus, claimant has failed to establish that
his signature on the Notice was both
unintelligent and involuntary.
(citations omitted). Therefore, the court held that Van Bommel
"has failed to establish standing or raise a material issue of fact
as to his Article III standing" and dismissed his claims.
II. Analysis
In a forfeiture proceeding, a claimant's burden to
establish standing depends on the stage of the litigation. At the
pleading stage, standing is not difficult to establish. See United
States v. $133,420.00 in U.S. Currency, 672 F.3d 629, 638 (9th Cir.
2012); United States v. One-Sixth Share of James J. Bulger in All
Present and Future Proceeds of Mass Millions Lottery Ticket No.
M246233, 326 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 2003) ("At the initial stage of
intervention, the requirements for a claimant to demonstrate
constitutional standing are very forgiving. In general, any
colorable claim on the defendant property suffices."). But when he
validity of the document they have in their possession right now."
-33-
court holds an evidentiary hearing, as the district court did here,
the burden of proof rises: a claimant "carr[ies] the burden of
establishing standing by a preponderance of the evidence."
Supplemental Rule G(8)(c)(ii)(B); Supplemental Rule G(8)(c)(ii)
advisory committee's note. Thus, Van Bommel "must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he has a facially colorable
interest in the res." United States v. $148,840.00 in U.S.
Currency, 521 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 2008).
To establish standing at an evidentiary hearing, a party
must present admissible evidence supporting its claims. United
States v. $543,190.00 in U.S. Currency, 535 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1247
(M.D. Ala. 2008); Stefan D. Cassella, Asset Forfeiture Law in the
United States 381 (2d ed. 2013); see also Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (holding that "each element [of
standing] must be supported in the same way as any other matter on
which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the
manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of
the litigation"). The Federal Rules of Evidence determine whether
evidence is admissible in a civil forfeiture action. See Fed. R.
Evid. 101(a), 1101; United States v. $92,203.00 in U.S. Currency,
537 F.3d 504, 509-10 (5th Cir. 2008). Therefore, Van Bommel had
the burden to produce admissible evidence that his waiver was
unintelligent or involuntary.
Van Bommel's declaration--the linchpin of his claim to
-34-
standing--is inadmissible hearsay, not admissible evidence.
Hearsay, of course, is a statement made outside of a trial or
hearing, which a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted in the statement. Fed. R. Evid. 801. Van Bommel's
declaration is textbook hearsay: it was not made at a trial or
hearing, and it was offered to prove that Van Bommel was coerced
into signing the waiver. Generally, hearsay is inadmissible.17
Id. 802. While there are several exceptions to the rule against
hearsay, see generally id. 803, 804, 807, none applies here. As a
result, Van Bommel produced no admissible evidence whatsoever that
his waiver was unintelligent or involuntary.18 See United States
v. All Funds in the Account of Prop. Futures, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 2d
1305, 1331-32 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (holding that claimants could not
17
We have held that a court may receive hearsay at an
evidentiary hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction. Asseo
v. Pan Am. Grain Co., 805 F.2d 23, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1986). In that
case, however, we stressed "the need for expedition" that
characterizes an injunctive proceeding, and that the hearsay at
issue previously had been subject to cross-examination. Id. at 26.
Neither circumstance exists here. Even if it were appropriate both
to extend Asseo to an evidentiary hearing regarding standing in a
forfeiture action, and to take the further step of requiring the
affidavit's admission, Van Bommel's declaration would be entitled
to little or no weight, given its lack of factual detail and Van
Bommel's efforts to prevent cross-examination. Cf. Mullins v. City
of New York, 626 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 2010) ("The admissibility of
hearsay under the Federal Rules of Evidence goes to weight, not
preclusion, at the preliminary injunction stage.").
18
Van Bommel could have avoided this result by attending his
deposition. If he was unable to return to the United States for
the evidentiary hearing, he then could have offered his deposition
testimony into evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1).
-35-
establish Article III standing through hearsay). This alone
requires us to affirm the district court's decision.19
Even assuming that Van Bommel's declaration could have
been considered at the evidentiary hearing, it was not enough to
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he had a colorable
interest in the $10,000. "[J]udges simply cannot decide whether a
witness is telling the truth on the basis of a paper record and
must observe the witnesses' demeanor to best ascertain their
veracity--or lack thereof." United States v. 1998 BMW "I"
Convertible, 235 F.3d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970)). As the district court noted, Van
19
The district court had no need to address the admissibility
of the declaration, since Van Bommel's counsel never tried to move
it into evidence. In any event, the transcript of the evidentiary
hearing suggests that the court did not consider the declaration to
be competent evidence: "The question would be, what is the
evidence that you have of the threats? What is the evidence that
you have that the waiver was not voluntarily signed?" Even if this
was not the basis of the court's decision, we may affirm on any
ground supported by the record. In re Miles, 436 F.3d 291, 293-94
(1st Cir. 2006).
The majority views it as inconsistent to set aside Van
Bommel's declaration when deciding his standing to claim the
$10,000, while relying on the government's affidavit when deciding
his standing to claim the bales of currency. There is no
inconsistency. As to the bales of currency, Van Bommel either
failed to counter the government's allegations, or disputed them
with allegations that were too vague or incredible to create a
genuine dispute of material fact. Therefore, summary judgment was
appropriate, without any need for more evidence. As to the
$10,000, there was a genuine dispute about the circumstances of Van
Bommel's waiver. To prove his standing by a preponderance of the
evidence, Van Bommel was obligated to produce something more than
his bare-bones declaration.
-36-
Bommel offered a single paragraph with "no specific facts or
details of the alleged coercion." In determining whether Van
Bommel had established his standing by a preponderance of the
evidence, the court gave this lone paragraph the short shrift it
deserved. See $133,420.00 in U.S. Currency, 672 F.3d at 638 ("As
we have explained, a conclusory, self-serving affidavit, lacking
detailed facts and any supporting evidence, is insufficient to
create a genuine issue of material fact." (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Courts routinely demand more facts and evidence from
claimants than Van Bommel was willing to provide. See Stefan D.
Cassella, Asset Forfeiture Law in the United States 381-82 (2d ed.
2013) (collecting cases). Van Bommel's declaration falls far short
of proving his standing by a preponderance of the evidence.
Finally, even if the district court had erred (which it
did not), I believe that the majority has chosen the wrong
disposition by reversing the grant of summary judgment, rather than
vacating it. The government came to the evidentiary hearing with
two witnesses prepared to testify about the circumstances under
which Van Bommel signed his waiver. Given Van Bommel's failure to
offer any evidence at the hearing, the court told the government
that the witnesses' testimony would be unnecessary. By reversing
the grant of summary judgment and reinstating Van Bommel's claim,
the majority punishes the government for complying with the
district court's guidance. The more prudent course would be to
-37-
vacate the grant of summary judgment and give the parties another
opportunity to present their evidence on standing.
III. Conclusion
By letting this case proceed to the merits, the majority
rewards Van Bommel's gamesmanship.20 Van Bommel's counsel
unilaterally canceled Van Bommel's deposition, fought to have him
removed from the United States, failed to make a serious effort to
secure his attendance at the evidentiary hearing, and kept from the
court that he had been removed months before that hearing. It is
difficult to imagine a party trying harder not to meet its burden
of proof. Nevertheless, the district court must now expend
judicial resources on an abandoned claim to $10,000. On this
point, I respectfully dissent.
20
The majority states that I have focused too much on Van
Bommel's conduct and not enough on the record before the district
court. This is a false distinction: Van Bommel's efforts at
avoiding the development of evidence were well documented in the
record. In any event, I focus on this conduct not because I
believe that Van Bommel should be punished for it, but because it
demonstrates that Van Bommel failed to develop any evidence,
despite his burden to prove his standing by a preponderance of the
evidence.
-38-