Companonio v. O'Brien

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 09-2428
ALFREDO COMPANONIO,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
STEVEN O'BRIEN,
Respondent, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. F. Dennis Saylor, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Lipez and Howard,
Circuit Judges.
Chauncey B. Wood, with whom Wood & Nathanson, LLP was on
brief, for petitioner.
Natalie S. Monroe, Assistant Attorney General, with whom
Martha Coakley, Attorney General, was on brief, for respondent.
March 5, 2012
HOWARD, Circuit Judge. Alfredo Companioni appeals the
district court's denial of his request for habeas corpus relief
from a life sentence imposed after his 1987 Massachusetts
conviction for first degree murder. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The crux of
the petition is Companioni's claim that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel in his murder trial because his attorney
failed to pursue a defense based on his mental illness. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") rejected the
ineffective assistance claim, finding both that Companioni had been
competent to stand trial and assist in his defense, and that he had
instructed his attorney not to present a mental impairment defense.
See Commonwealth v. Companonio, 833 N.E.2d 136 (Mass. 2005).1 We
affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
We recount the facts as recited by the SJC, supplementing
them with other record facts that are consistent. Yeboah-Sefah v.
Ficco, 556 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2009); Healy v. Spencer, 453 F.3d
21, 22 (1st Cir. 2006).
During the evening of May 19, 1986, Companioni and Santos
Lopez arrived at the apartment of Gilbert Nohoya in Brockton,
Massachusetts. The three were friends, and Companioni had been
living in Nohoya's apartment for several months. Shortly after
1
State and federal case captions and records of prior
proceedings refer to the petitioner as "Alfredo Companonio," but
counsel informs us that his surname is "Companioni."
-2-
arrival, Companioni got into a brief argument with Nohoya, who
brandished a knife. Tempers cooled; the knife was put away; and
the altercation apparently concluded without further incident. A
short time later, Nohoya mentioned that the following day was his
birthday. To celebrate, each of the men drank a bottle of
champagne, and Companioni and Lopez snorted several lines of
cocaine. The trio then went for a drive in Companioni's car, and
took turns firing Companioni's .22 caliber automatic pistol into
the air. Afterwards, they returned to Nohoya's apartment.
Later in the evening, Companioni's cousin, Celia Vasquez,
stopped by Nohoya's apartment. The three men were drinking at the
time, and Vasquez later testified that all three appeared to be
drunk. Vasquez went into a bedroom with Nohoya and Companioni,
where Nohoya apparently touched Vasquez, causing Companioni to
become "a little bit upset." Vasquez left shortly thereafter, and
the men continued to drink.
Several hours later, Companioni announced that he was
going to go out and get "the pistol" so that they could "try out
the .38." Within five minutes after leaving the apartment, he
returned with a .38 caliber handgun. Upon his return, Companioni
said "Let's go for a ride," and then without warning fired once at
Nohoya and once at Lopez. Nohoya was hit in the chest, and Lopez
was hit on the finger. Nohoya died within a minute of being shot.
Lopez escaped out a back door and called the police from a nearby
-3-
payphone, as Companioni drove away. The police found Companioni
the following morning, sleeping at a friend's nearby apartment. He
was arrested and charged with killing Nohoya.
At his trial on a single count indictment charging him
with first degree murder, Companioni unsuccessfully urged the jury
to find that someone else could have shot Nohoya, that the killing
had been accidental, or that he had been too impaired by alcohol or
drugs to form the specific intent to kill.2 Upon conviction, he
was sentenced to life without parole.
II. POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS
A. Motion For New Trial
Almost five years after his conviction, Companioni filed
a motion for a new trial in which he advanced an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim based on trial counsel's failure to
present a mental impairment or illness defense. The Superior Court
granted the motion, but on appeal the SJC directed the Superior
Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and, specifically, to take
testimony from trial counsel about the nature and the extent of the
2
First degree murder in Massachusetts requires "deliberately
premeditated malice aforethought." See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265
§ 1. While Massachusetts does not recognize the defense of
"diminished capacity," Companonio, 833 N.E.2d at 142 n.7, it does
permit a defendant to "produce expert testimony on the issue
whether or not the impairment of his mental processes precluded him
from being able to deliberately premeditate." Id. (quoting
Commonwealth v. Gould, 405 N.E.2d 927 (Mass. 1980)).
-4-
defendant's instructions to him concerning trial strategy.
Commonwealth v. Companonio, 650 N.E.2d 351, 351 (Mass. 1995).
At the evidentiary hearing, held before the same judge
who had presided over Companioni's trial, the court heard not only
from trial counsel but also from four doctors, three of whom had
evaluated Companioni before his trial. Defense counsel testified
that because he had become aware of mental health issues affecting
Companioni, he had retained an expert, Dr. Robert Moore, to examine
him. Dr. Moore concluded that Companioni was not suffering from
any major mental disorder and was competent to stand trial and to
assist in his defense. Companonio, 833 N.E.2d at 141; see also
Commonwealth v. Companioni, Crim. No. 82617, Order on Defendant's
Motion For New Trial at 4 n.3 (Mass. Super. Sept. 6, 2000) ("New
Trial Order"). He also found "no substantial evidence" that
Companioni "lacked the capacity to appreciate the nature of his
actions or that he was unable to conform his behavior to the . . .
law at the time of the offense," and concluded that Companioni was
responsible for his behavior at the time of the killing. New Trial
Order at 4 n.3.
As a result of Dr. Moore's findings, trial counsel
testified, a "classic insanity defense" did not appear viable.
Companonio, 833 N.E.2d at 141. Counsel further testified that
despite Dr. Moore's report, he continued to press Companioni,
through an interpreter, about the possibility of pursuing a defense
-5-
based on mental disease or defect. Companioni appeared to
understand what was being discussed, and rejected counsel's
entreaties, both denying that he committed the crime and saying
that "crazy people go to hell." Id. at 142. Counsel further
testified that on the first day of trial, he met with Companioni,
his brother and an interpreter provided by the court and again
suggested presenting a mental impairment defense. Companioni,
however, remained steadfast in his opposition. Counsel testified
that he concluded at that point that Companioni understood the
options that had been presented and had made a decision. Although
defense counsel disagreed with Companioni's decision, he abided by
it. Companioni and his brother both testified that these meetings
and conversations never took place, and that counsel never
suggested the possibility of pursuing a defense based on mental
illness or impairment.
In addition to being examined at counsel's request by Dr.
Moore, Companioni had also been transferred three times prior to
trial to Bridgewater State Hospital to address mental health
concerns. The first hospitalization, in June 1986, followed
Companioni's complaints of hearing voices at night. (It was this
transfer that triggered defense counsel's consultation with Dr.
Moore.) He was examined by Dr. Jorge Veliz, the hospital's
director of clinical services, to determine both his competency to
-6-
stand trial, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, § 15(b),3 and his fitness
to await trial in jail, see id. § 18(a)4. Dr. Veliz diagnosed
Companioni with schizo-affective and personality disorders, as well
as cocaine dependency, but also concluded that he was competent to
stand trial and would be able to communicate with his attorney. Dr.
Veliz further found that Companioni was not a threat to himself or
others and could be released from Bridgewater and returned to the
jail.
The next Bridgewater transfer occurred in December 1986.
Dr. Leonard Bard, Bridgewater's assistant medical director,
evaluated Companioni to determine only whether he could remain in
jail, pursuant to Section 18(a). At his admission it was reported
that Companioni was suffering from hallucinations and was selling
his medication. Although jail officials reported suicide threats,
Companioni denied them. Dr. Bard ultimately concluded that
Companioni was suffering from "a major mental illness that can be
best described as paranoid schizophrenia." Nevertheless, he added
3
Massachusetts assesses competency to stand trial on the
basis of "whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding and whether he has a rational as well as a factual
understanding of the proceedings against him." Commonwealth v.
Companonio, 833 N.E.2d at 144 (quoting Commonwealth v. Goodreau,
813 N.E.2d 465, 472 (Mass. 2004)); see also Brown v. O'Brien, 666
F.3d 818, 825 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362
U.S. 402, 402 (1960)).
4
Massachusetts law requires that an assessment of this nature
be carried out whenever an inmate is transferred due to mental
health concerns. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123 § 18(a).
-7-
that Companioni's illness was "somewhat" controlled by medication
and that he could be returned to the jail to await trial.
Companioni's final pre-trial admission was on February 6,
1987. After he had set a fire in his cell, he was hospitalized to
determine whether he could remain in a jail setting. Companioni
denied any hallucinations, reporting only that he wanted to get
some air in his cell. He was returned to the jail roughly one
month later, which was approximately six weeks prior to trial.
Drs. Veliz and Moore both testified at the hearing on the
new trial motion, as did Dr. Malcolm Rodgers. Dr. Rodgers, a
psychiatrist, had been retained by the Commonwealth to prepare an
opinion regarding Companioni's mental state at the time of the
shooting, based on a review of Companioni's treatment records. All
three concluded that Companioni had been competent to stand trial.5
Companioni called Dr. Bard, who repeated his pretrial
diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, but offered no views regarding
either Companioni's competency to stand trial or his capacity to
form the specific intent to kill at the time of the shooting.
Companioni also submitted an affidavit from another psychiatrist,
Dr. Bernard Katz, indicating that Companioni suffered from "major
5
Dr. Rodgers testified that Companioni did not lack the
ability to deliberately premeditate. He also addressed an earlier
report that he had prepared in which he concluded that Companioni
was competent to stand trial.
-8-
mental illness" and could have lacked the capacity to form the
intent to kill in May 1986.
The Superior Court's findings on which it based its
denial of a new trial may be summarized as follows. Trial counsel
investigated the issue of Companioni's mental health, including
retaining Dr. Moore. Counsel's testimony was credited over the
account provided by Companioni and his brother, and, in light of
Companioni's insistence that he was innocent and that he did not
want to be deemed "crazy," the decision not to pursue the "mental
disease or defect" defense was reasonable. Companionio, 833 N.E.
2d at 142. Moreover, the record was devoid of evidence that
Companionio lacked the requisite mental capacity to premeditate or
form the mental state required for malice. It was, therefore, also
not unreasonable for trial counsel to forego further exploration of
Companioni's mental health as a basis for a defense. Id.
In addition to these findings, in considering the
defendant's capacity to make decisions about his defense, the
Superior Court also noted that both Dr. Moore and Dr. Veliz found
Companioni competent to stand trial, id. at 143-44, and that such
a finding in Massachusetts "includes the ability of a defendant to
assist and consult with counsel in the preparation of a defense."
New Trial Order at 9 n.7. Dr. Moore, the defense's putative
expert, explicitly stated that Companioni was able to assist his
attorney in his defense.
-9-
Companioni subsequently sought a hearing on an amended
motion for new trial. In support of this request, new counsel
arranged for Dr. Bard to re-interview Companioni and to review
Companioni's medical records and excerpts of the trial transcript.
On the basis of that assessment, Dr. Bard stated in a May 2003
affidavit his belief that Companioni lacked the capacity to form
the specific intent to kill in 1986 (the "2003 Affidavit"). The
amended motion was denied in September 2003.
B. Appeal to the SJC
As relevant here, Companioni argued in his appeal from
the denial of his new trial motion that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel at trial in two ways: first, because his
attorney did not challenge Companioni's competency to stand trial,
and second, because counsel did not pursue the mental impairment
defense.
1. Competency
In arguing that he should not have stood trial,
Companioni relied on his three pre-trial admissions to Bridgewater;
his conduct during incarceration in the month prior to trial; an
opinion that the upcoming trial worsened his mental health; the
observations of trial counsel; and a post-conviction admission to
Bridgewater that resulted in a finding of a twenty month period of
incompetency to serve his sentence. Companonio, 833 N.E.2d at 143.
He also argued that the pretrial observations of Drs. Veliz and
-10-
Moore were of little value because they took place several months
before trial and paled against his post-conviction commitment to
Bridgewater. Id.
Affirming the denial of a new trial, the SJC observed
that Dr. Veliz's competency report reflected the circumstances of
Companioni's first Bridgewater admission. The court noted that,
although Dr. Moore did not examine the records from Companioni's
first Bridgewater admission, he did review Dr. Veliz's accurate
report of that admission. Id. at 144. The SJC characterized the
one-page record of Companioni's February 1987 Bridgewater admission
as "disclos[ing] nothing of significance," given that it lacked any
indicia of mental illness. Id. The court further remarked that
any claim that Companioni's condition worsened as a result of his
return to jail for the six weeks prior to trial was speculation,
noting that the transfer back to the jail conformed to the
recommendations of the Bridgewater staff. Id. Finally, the SJC
determined that Companioni's post-conviction Bridgewater commitment
was "essentially irrelevant," because the relevant timeframe for
evaluating competency is the time of trial. Id. at 145 (citing
Commonwealth v. Hill, 375 N.E.2d 1168, 1175 (Mass. 1978)).
While the SJC acknowledged that a contemporaneous
competency evaluation would have been preferable, the court also
observed that Companioni submitted no expert testimony that he was
incompetent and that when he testified at the Superior Court
-11-
evidentiary hearing, he made no claim that he had not understood
the trial proceeding or was unable to communicate with counsel. Id.The court also rejected Companioni's argument that a first degree
murder defendant who is diagnosed with a major mental illness, but
who nevertheless refuses to consider an insanity defense,
necessarily has raised "a substantial question of possible doubt"
as to competency. The SJC concluded that, while Companioni "may
have been diagnosed, prior to trial, with a psychiatric condition
. . . despite that condition, he was competent to stand trial."
Id.
2. Mental Impairment Defense
In denying Companioni's claim that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to present a mental impairment defense, the
SJC noted that counsel had investigated the defense by retaining
Dr. Moore. The court also observed that Companioni's post-trial
failure to present any expert opinion testimony that he lacked the
requisite mental capacity by itself doomed his ineffective
assistance claim. Id. at 146. Moreover, the SJC agreed with the
Superior Court that counsel's decision to forego the mental
impairment defense was not unreasonable, given that the decision
was "based on [Companioni's] personal choice against the advice of
counsel." Id.-12-
Finally, the SJC found no error in the denial of a second
evidentiary hearing, noting that Dr. Bard's 2003 affidavit raised
"no substantial issue." Id.C. Federal Proceedings
Invoking 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Companioni filed the instant
petition in federal district court. He asserted four grounds for
relief, three of which are within the scope of this appeal: 1) that
his trial counsel was constitutionally deficient for failing to
demand a hearing to determine Companioni's competency to stand
trial; 2) that the state courts erred in finding him competent to
waive a mental illness defense and to stand trial; and 3) that
trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present a defense that
the combined effects of mental illness, drugs, and alcohol
prevented Companioni from forming the intent and premeditation
necessary for a first degree murder conviction.
After denying Companioni's request for an evidentiary
hearing, the district court rejected all of his claims and
dismissed the petition with prejudice. The heart of the court's
reasoning was that the state courts were permitted to conclude that
Companioni was competent to stand trial and that conclusion was
fatal to all of Companioni's habeas claims. This appeal followed.
III. DISCUSSION
Our review is de novo. Yeboah-Sefah, 556 F.3d at 56.
Habeas relief may be granted only if the state adjudication was
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contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court; or if
it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1)-(2); Grant v. Warden, Me. State Prison, 616 F.3d 72,
75-76 (1st Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 948 (2011). A
state court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law
if it "contradicts the governing law set forth in the Supreme
Court's cases or confronts a set of facts that are materially
indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court" but reaches
a different result. John v. Russo, 561 F.3d 88, 96 (1st Cir. 2009)
(internal quotations omitted). A court unreasonably applies
clearly established law if it applies Supreme Court precedent to
the facts of the case in an objectively unreasonable manner,
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000), such as reaching a
result that is "devoid of record support" for its conclusion.
McCambridge v. Hall, 303 F.3d 24, 37 (1st Cir. 2002) (en banc). A
state court's factual findings are presumed to be correct unless
the petitioner rebuts the presumption with clear and convincing
evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Torres v. Dennehy, 615 F.3d 1,
5 (1st Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1038 (2011);6 see also
6
Companioni makes arguments based on section 2254(d)(2), as
well as 2254(e)(1). The "relationship between the standards
enunciated in [the two sections] remains unclear." Teti v. Bender,
507 F.3d 50, 58 (1st Cir. 2007). Both, however, encompass
deference to state court findings, and "we apply a presumption of
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Clements v. Clarke, 592 F.3d 45, 47 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 130
S. Ct. 3475 (2010) (observing that presumption of correctness
applies to factual determinations made by both state trial and
appellate courts).7
Companioni here reprises the argument that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to
investigate and develop a mental illness defense. Relatedly, he
asks us to remand this case to the district court for an
evidentiary hearing on whether he was competent to waive the
defense prior to trial. He also argues that he was denied due
process when the state court refused to conduct a second post-
conviction hearing devoted solely to his competency to stand trial.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, Companioni must demonstrate both that trial counsel's
performance was deficient and that there was prejudice as a result.
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011). "If he falls
short on either requirement, his claim fails." Wright v. Marshall,
correctness to the trial court's factual findings and also examine
whether there has been an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings."
John, 561 F.3d at 92.
7
Review of the facts is limited to "the record that was
before [the] state court." Brown, 666 F.3d at 822 n.3 (quoting
Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1400 (2011)). Accordingly,
we decline to consider the affidavit from Santos Lopez that
Companioni submitted to the district court.
-15-
656 F.3d 102, 108 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984)). Performance is measured against an
"objective standard of reasonableness," id. (citation omitted), and
it is constitutionally deficient "only if no competent attorney
would have acted as [counsel] did." Id. Moreover, we start from
the presumption that counsel has "rendered adequate assistance and
made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment." Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
Prejudice is established by showing that there is a reasonable
probability that the trial would have had a more favorable outcome
if trial counsel had acted differently. Id.Turning to the particulars at hand, as previously noted
the SJC affirmed the Superior Court's determination that Companioni
was competent to stand trial, a finding that on these facts
includes a determination that he was competent to confer with his
lawyer about whether to pursue a defense based on his mental
health. See Robidoux v. O'Brien, 643 F.3d 334, 339 (1st Cir. 2011)
(observing that a finding of competency requires the subsidiary
findings that the defendant understands the nature of the
proceedings against him, and that he is able to assist counsel in
his defense), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 866 (2011); see also
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993) (a competency finding
encompasses the ability to "consult with counsel and to assist in
preparing his defense" (quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162,
-16-
171 (1975))); cf. Dean v. Superintendent, Clinton Corr. Facility,
93 F.3d 58, 61 n.1 (2d Cir. 1996) (explaining that a failure to
pursue a mental impairment defense when the client objects to the
presentation of one is not ineffective assistance because that
decision "belongs to the client"). If the SJC's competency
determination stands, the ineffective assistance claim must fail
because there can be no prejudice if Companioni was competent to
instruct counsel not to further pursue the mental illness defense.
Companioni attacks the state courts' competency finding
as an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(2); see also Recupero v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 118
F.3d 820, 832 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that competency is a question
of fact) (citing Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 111 (1995)). In
light of the record evidence in the state court proceedings,
however, the claim fails.8
8
The parties' briefs reflect a skirmish over the precise
details of Companioni's appellate claims. His reply brief contains
the following summary:
[C]ounsel should have obtained Dr. Bard's
Bridgewater evaluation, developed a mental
illness defense (including an opinion from a
mental health expert) and then discussed it
with Companioni. Assuming Companioni were to
refuse to consider the defense on the same
grounds that he did, then trial counsel should
have obtained an expert opinion about
Companioni's competency to waive a mental
illness defense in light of the paranoia,
hallucinations and refusal to discuss the
defense, and then raised the issue with the
trial judge.
-17-
Companioni points to evidence which he says should have
dictated a finding of incompetency before the SJC. First, he
argues that Dr. Moore's conclusion that Companioni was competent to
stand trial carries no weight because Moore did not review
Companioni's Bridgewater records and he was unaware of Dr. Bard's
later report that Companioni suffered from paranoid schizophrenia.
He further argues that his own denial of mental illness and his
refusal to pursue a defense based on that illness was itself proof
of his incompetency. Additionally, Companioni refers to comments
made by defense counsel that he was "disassociated with the facts
of the case," as well as those that he made to defense counsel
about "crazy people" going to Hell.9
Those facts, taken alone, may constitute some evidence of
incompetency. But that is not the exclusive take on the evidence.
Both the Superior Court and the SJC also considered numerous
countervailing facts. For example, whatever shortcomings Dr.
Moore's opinions may have possessed, they were echoed to a large
This explanation notwithstanding, the case rises and falls on the
finding of competency.
9
The parties dispute Companioni's precise language, which
itself was delivered through an interpreter. The record does not
clear up the dispute. At one point in the new trial hearing,
original defense counsel testified consistently with his affidavit
that Companioni said he was not crazy and that "crazy men go to
Hell." At another point he testified that the statement was "If
you make me crazy, I go to Hell." For present purposes, the import
of the two statements is the same: that a person putting on a
defense based on mental health would be seen as "crazy," a result
that he did not desire.
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extent by Dr. Veliz and Dr. Rodgers. Moreover, the bare fact that
a defendant has a mental illness does not necessarily render him
incompetent to stand trial. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164(2008) (affirming lower court appointment of counsel where
schizophrenic defendant was competent to stand trial, but not to
defend himself). Similarly, defense counsel's use of the term
"disassociated," when taken in context, was not necessarily a
medical diagnosis, but could have been a description of his
client's refusal to acknowledge the evidence arrayed against him,
while continuing to assert his defense that he did not commit the
crime. And finally, counsel testified that he understood
Companioni's comment about Hell to be an emphatic opposition to his
suggestion of presenting to the jury any sort of defense based on
his mental illness.
In the end, we cannot decide in the petitioner's favor
unless we supplant the SJC's reasoning by adopting his view of
arguably conflicting evidence. But "[w]here the record evidence
can be interpreted to support a different version, the case here,
we must reject such a request." John, 561 F.3d at 95; see also
Teti, 507 F.3d at 59 (holding that state court credibility
determinations "are exactly the type of factual determinations to
which we defer, at least short of any indication of serious
error"). Accordingly, we conclude both that the SJC's competency
finding was not unreasonable based on the facts before it and that
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Companioni has failed to rebut the presumption of correctness that
is part and parcel of that and other findings of fact.10
B. Evidentiary Hearing in the District Court
We review the district court's refusal to hold an
evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. Forsyth v. Spencer,
595 F.3d 81, 85 (1st Cir. 2010). The district court provided two
reasons for its decision. First, the court concluded that a
hearing was barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), which proscribes --
with certain exceptions -- a hearing if the petitioner has failed
to develop the factual basis for a claim in state court
proceedings. Alternatively, the district court concluded that
Companioni failed to demonstrate that a hearing would elicit
factual support for his claims. The latter rationale amply
supports denial of the hearing.
10
Companioni criticizes the SJC's affirmance of the Superior
Court's refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing with respect to Dr.
Bard's affidavit. That affidavit, however, did not address
Companioni's competency to stand trial or to assist defense
counsel, but only his mental condition at the time of the crime.
Since Companioni was found competent to reject the defense that Dr.
Bard was promoting, the denial of the hearing was not unreasonable.
Companioni also argues, for the first time on appeal, that his
request for a second evidentiary hearing to consider Dr. Bard's
affidavit was a denial of due process. Though he alluded to
violations of due process in connection with his Strickland claim
before the state court, his argument that due process violations
alone could provide an independent ground for relief was not
presented in his habeas petition, and no certificate of
appealability was issued on this claim. Appellate review on this
ground is therefore waived. Peralta v. United States, 597 F.3d 74,
83-84 (1st Cir. 2010)(citing Bui v. DiPaolo, 170 F.3d 232, 237 (1st
Cir. 1999)).
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Before granting an evidentiary hearing, a habeas judge
"must first consider whether such hearing could enable an applicant
to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would
entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief." Teti, 507 F.3d at62 (citing Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007)).
Companioni must therefore demonstrate that his allegations would
entitle him to relief and that the hearing is likely to elicit the
factual support for those allegations. See id.Companioni sought a hearing in the district court to
explore both his competency to stand trial and the question of his
mental state at the time of the killing. The fulcrum of the case,
however, is competency to stand trial -- including Companioni's
competence to instruct his attorney not to pursue a defense based
on his mental illness -- and the thrust of his appellate claim is
that he has never had a meaningful hearing on the issue of his
competence to waive a mental illness defense.
After reviewing the medical records and hearing testimony
over three days, the Superior Court concluded that Companioni was
competent to assist his attorney, a finding that the SJC affirmed.
The record reflects that Companioni's competency to stand trial and
to assist his attorney was addressed on several occasions in the
Superior Court hearing. Moreover, both defense counsel and the
court questioned Dr. Bard about Companioni's mental health as it
related to commission of the crime and to his dealings with trial
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counsel. And the hearing had been provoked by an SJC order
directing the Superior Court to take evidence on Companioni's
instructions to trial counsel, and it was followed by the parties'
post-hearing submissions addressing his competence to give those
instructions.
A "full and fair" hearing is one in which the defendant
is given an opportunity to present evidence and be heard on an
issue. See Neron v. Tierney, 841 F.2d 1197, 1199 (1st Cir. 1988)
(citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976)). Companioni had
such an opportunity. Indeed, approximately seven months elapsed
between the second and third days of the hearing, thus providing
Companioni significant opportunity to marshal more evidence. Where
a federal evidentiary hearing would "essentially replicate" the
state court record, the district court is on "shaky ground" in
ordering the hearing. Pike v. Guarino, 492 F.3d 61, 70 (1st Cir.
2007). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Companioni's request for an evidentiary
hearing.
IV. CONCLUSION
Finding nothing unreasonable about the SJC's finding that
Companioni was competent to stand trial and assist his attorney, or
its ultimate conclusion that he did not receive ineffective
assistance of counsel, we affirm the district court's denial of his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
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