Medina-Velazquez v. Hernandez-Gregorat

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 12-2492
LUIS M. MEDINA-VELÁZQUEZ, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
GLADYS E. RIVERA-BERDECÍA, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
RUBÉN HERNÁNDEZ-GREGORAT, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees,
MOISÉS DEIDÁ-GARCÍA, ET AL.,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Gustavo A. Gelpí, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lipez and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
Eduardo Vera Ramírez, with whom Eileen Landrón Guardiola,
Luis A. Rodríguez Muñoz, and Landrón & Vera, L.L.P. were on brief,
for appellants.
Margarita Luisa Mercado-Echegaray, Solicitor General, with
whom Rosa Elena Pérez-Agosto, Assistant Solicitor General, was on
brief, for appellees.
September 17, 2014
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Luis M. Medina-Velázquez, Juan J.
Méndez-Cruz, and Héctor R. Cruz-Medina ("appellants") -- employees
of Puerto Rico's Department of Transportation and Public Works
("DTOP")1 and members of Puerto Rico's Popular Democratic Party
("PDP") -- appeal the district court's dismissal of their claims of
political discrimination in violation of the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Marlene J. Paredes, the spouse of
Medina-Velázquez, and Mayra Méndez-Quiñones, the spouse of Méndez-
Cruz, also appeal, seeking the reinstatement of their derivative
causes of action.
We agree with appellants that they stated plausible First
Amendment claims against the appellees who received appellants'
cease and desist letters. Hence, we vacate the dismissal of the
First Amendment and derivative claims against those appellees.
I.
In reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss, we recite
the facts as alleged in the complaint and documents incorporated by
reference into the complaint. Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682
F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir. 2012). Here the Second Amended Complaint is
the operative complaint.
Medina-Velázquez and Méndez-Cruz each served as a DTOP
regional Auxiliary Director I -- Medina-Velázquez for the Humacao
1
We follow the district court's convention in using the
Spanish acronym.
-2-
Region and Méndez-Cruz for the Aguadilla Region. Cruz-Medina
served as the DTOP Storage Supervisor for the Ponce Region. All
three appellants were active PDP members. All appellants worked in
trust positions during past PDP administrations, and Cruz-Medina
attended PDP events and participated in party activities, such as
the "Concilio de Populares." Appellants claim that appellees, NPP
members, knew of their political activity.
Even though appellants performed their DTOP duties "in
excellent fashion," appellees, upon the change in political
administration to the NPP, discriminated against appellants on the
basis of political affiliation by relieving them of their job
responsibilities and eliminating their travel allowances.
Appellants lost supervisory authority -- their subordinates having
been instructed to report to others -- and were not permitted to
attend meetings. Ultimately, appellants were left without any
staff to supervise and without tasks, except for occasional menial
assignments. Cruz-Medina was also subjected to negative comments
regarding his political affiliation. He attended meetings to
discuss his allegations, but nothing changed.
Appellants sent letters to appellees requesting
resolution of the adverse employment actions.2 Medina-Velázquez
sent his letter to Rubén A. Hernández-Gregorat, the Secretary of
2
Like the district court, we deem these letters incorporated
by reference into the complaint.
-3-
DTOP, copying Juan A. Avilés-Hernández, the Executive Director of
DTOP; María M. Trinidad-Quiñones, the Human Resources Director of
DTOP; and Woldetrudis Cruz-Torres, the Humacao Regional Director of
DTOP. Méndez-Cruz wrote to Luz C. del Roldán-Sotomayor, the
Aguadilla Regional Director of DTOP, copying Hernández-Gregorat and
Avilés-Hernández. Cruz-Medina sent his letter to Trinidad-
Quiñones, copying Hernández-Gregorat; Avilés-Hernández; and Amilcar
González-Ortiz, the Auxiliary Secretary for Administration.3
Receiving no redress and no responses to their letters, appellants
subsequently brought suit along with six other plaintiffs,
claiming, inter alia, that the defendants discriminated on the
basis of political affiliation in violation of the First Amendment.
The spouses of appellants and their co-plaintiffs also brought
derivative claims.4
3
Cruz-Medina also copied attorney Celso Feliciano Rivera, who
is not a defendant.
4
Appellants' spouses appeal the district court's dismissal of
these derivative claims. We do not separately address the spouses'
derivative claims. Any conclusion we draw as to the sufficiency of
appellants' First Amendment claims will dictate the same result for
the derivative claims. We have acknowledged that "[u]nder Puerto
Rico law, close relatives of one who has suffered the slings and
arrows of employment discrimination may invoke Article 1802 as a
vehicle for prosecuting a cause of action." Cabán-Hernández v.
Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31 § 5141). "[S]uch a cause of action is
wholly derivative and, thus, its viability is contingent upon the
viability of the underlying employment discrimination claim." Id.
at 12-13.
-4-
II.
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). They
argued, inter alia, that the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged
two elements of a First Amendment political discrimination claim --
(1) that the defendants had knowledge of the plaintiffs' political
affiliation and (2) that political affiliation was a substantial or
motivating factor for the adverse employment actions.
In response to that motion, pursuant to the proposition
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009), that "'pleadings
that . . . are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth,'" the district court asserted that "the mere
allegation that a defendant knew, without providing facts as to the
source of this knowledge, is insufficient to satisfy a plaintiff's
burden to demonstrate a defendant's knowledge of a plaintiff's
political affiliation." Amended Opinion and Order, Medina-
Velázquez v. Hernández-Gregorat, No. 09-1692 (GAG), at 8 (D.P.R.
Jan. 3, 2011) (omission in original) (citing Jiménez-González v.
Alvarez-Rubio, 683 F. Supp. 2d 177, 183-84 (D.P.R. 2010); Del Toro-
Pacheco v. Pereira-Castillo, 662 F. Supp. 2d 202, 215 (D.P.R.
2009)). On that basis, the court concluded that the complaint's
general allegation of defendants' knowledge of plaintiffs'
political affiliation was, on its own, insufficient to state a
First Amendment claim.
-5-
The court then turned to the particular allegations
pertaining to each plaintiff. The complaint included allegations
that plaintiffs' letters, which demanded plaintiffs be assigned
tasks commensurate with their positions, identified their political
affiliation. However, the allegations did not specify to which
defendants the letters were sent. Unable to determine from the
face of the complaint which defendants had knowledge of plaintiffs'
political affiliation and whether this knowledge could have been a
motivating factor for defendants' decision to alter or fail to
reinstate plaintiffs' employment duties, the court ordered
plaintiffs to supply the letters.
After reviewing the letters, the court concluded that
appellants' letters described dissatisfaction with reduced duties
but did not identify appellants' political affiliation or refer to
discriminatory conduct based on political animus. Hence, the court
dismissed appellants' First Amendment claims and their spouses'
derivative claims.
Conversely, the court found that the remaining six
plaintiffs successfully pleaded political discrimination claims
against certain defendants. For plaintiff Eric E. Camacho-Resto,
the court found two allegations in the operative complaint -- (1)
that a particular defendant openly discussed Camacho-Resto's
political affiliation and (2) that another defendant threatened
Camacho-Resto's future employment -- sufficient to allege the
-6-
knowledge element of a political discrimination claim against those
two defendants. The court also found the letters of the six
plaintiffs sufficient to allege that the respective defendants who
received the letters both had, or should have had, knowledge of the
respective plaintiffs' political affiliation and committed, or
failed to take any action to rectify, the discriminatory acts.
Therefore, the court denied defendants' motion to dismiss the First
Amendment claims of those six plaintiffs against the respective
defendants who received the letters.
After discovery as to the remaining six plaintiffs, the
district court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment,
finding genuine issues of material fact regarding those plaintiffs'
First Amendment political discrimination claims. These six
plaintiffs and the defendants then reached a settlement agreement,
which the district court approved.
Appellants subsequently filed a motion under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 59(e) to alter the district court's judgment on
defendants' earlier motion to dismiss. Appellants argued that
relief was warranted because it had become clear through discovery
that the agency had a politically charged environment and that
political animus motivated personnel decisions. The district court
denied appellants' motion to alter the judgment, finding relief
unwarranted and untimely. The court ruled that appellants were not
entitled to "a second bite at the apple, simply because co-
-7-
plaintiffs who properly plead[ed] claims [were] able to engage in
discovery," and appellants could not "piggyback on settling
plaintiffs' success and evidence obtained." Order Denying Motion
to Alter Judgment, Medina-Velázquez v. Hernández-Gregorat, No. 09-
1692 (GAG) (D.P.R. Oct. 25, 2012). The court also observed that
since appellants' motion was premised on the discovery in the
surviving plaintiffs' cases, appellants could have brought their
motion at least by the time discovery closed and should not have
waited until almost a year after the remaining plaintiffs settled.
Each appellant appeals the district court's dismissal of
his First Amendment claim against only those appellees who received
his respective letter expressing dissatisfaction with the reduced
job responsibilities.5 Hence, we limit our review to whether the
district court properly dismissed the First Amendment claim of (1)
Medina-Velázquez against the recipients of his letter -- Hernández-
Gregorat, Avilés-Hernández, Trinidad-Quiñones, and Cruz-Torres; (2)
Méndez-Cruz against the recipients of his letter -- Roldán-
Sotomayor, Hernández-Gregorat, and Avilés-Hernández; and (3) Cruz-
Medina against the recipients of his letter -- Trinidad-Quiñones,
Hernández-Gregorat, Avilés-Hernández, and González-Ortiz.
5
While appellants initially appealed the dismissal of their
First Amendment claims against all defendants, each appellant, by
way of a joint filing after oral argument, withdrew that appeal as
to any defendants who did not receive his respective letter.
-8-
III.
We review de novo a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of
appellants' claims. Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d
1, 7 (1st Cir. 2011). We examine whether the operative complaint
states a claim for which relief can be granted when we construe the
well-pleaded facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs,
id., accepting their truth and drawing all reasonable inferences in
plaintiffs' favor, Grajales, 682 F.3d at 44. We may supplement
those facts and inferences with information from documents
incorporated by reference into the complaint. Id.
In resolving a motion to dismiss, we use a two-step
approach. Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 12. First, we "must
separate the complaint's factual allegations (which must be
accepted as true) from its conclusory legal allegations (which need
not be credited)." A.G. ex rel. Maddox v. Elsevier, Inc., 732 F.3d
77, 80 (1st Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second,
we "must determine whether the remaining factual content allows a
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to
state a plausible claim. Grajales, 682 F.3d at 44. To achieve
plausibility, a complaint need not plead facts sufficient to make
a prima facie case or allege all facts necessary to succeed at
trial. Carrero-Ojeda v. Autoridad de Energía Eléctrica, 755 F.3d
-9-
711, __, 2014 WL 2786536, at *6 (1st Cir. 2014). "The prima facie
standard is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading standard, and
there is no need to set forth a detailed evidentiary proffer in a
complaint." Rodríguez-Reyes, v. Molina-Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54
(1st Cir. 2013). Nevertheless, the elements of a prima facie case
are relevant to the plausibility assessment, forming "part of the
background against which a plausibility determination should be
made." Id. In the end, "[t]here need not be a one-to-one
relationship between any single allegation and a necessary element
of the cause of action. What counts is the 'cumulative effect of
the [complaint's] factual allegations.'" Id. at 55 (alteration in
original) (quoting Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 14).
An analysis of plausibility is "'a context-specific task
that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense,'" Grajales, 682 F.3d at 44 (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Moreover, "the court may not disregard
properly pled factual allegations, 'even if it strikes a savvy
judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable.'" Ocasio-
Hernández, 640 F.3d at 12 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). Indeed, "a well-pleaded complaint may
proceed even if . . . a recovery is very remote and unlikely."
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ultimately, "[t]he relevant inquiry focuses on the reasonableness
of the inference of liability that the plaintiff is asking the
-10-
court to draw from the facts alleged in the complaint." Ocasio-
Hernández, 640 F.3d at 13.
IV.
The First Amendment prohibits government officials from
taking adverse actions against public employees on the basis of
political affiliation, unless political association is an
appropriate factor for employment, Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at
13, as in "trust" positions, where employees serve at the pleasure
of the appointing authority, Grajales, 682 F.3d at 43 n.2. An
actionable political discrimination claim has four elements: (1)
the plaintiff and defendant belong to opposing political parties;
(2) the defendant had knowledge of the plaintiff's political
affiliation; (3) an adverse employment action occurred; and (4)
political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor for
the adverse action. Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 13.
The adequacy of allegations to support the first and
third elements of appellants' political discrimination claims is
not at issue.6 Hence, we must analyze whether appellants'
complaint adequately supports an inference that appellees had
knowledge of appellants' political affiliation and that appellants'
6
Appellees have not developed, and thereby waive, any
argument regarding the first element, see United States v. Zannino,
895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990), and they concede that appellants'
allegations satisfy the third element.
-11-
political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor for
the adverse employment actions.
A. Appellees' Knowledge
In determining whether the complaint sufficiently
supports the inference that appellees knew of appellants' political
affiliation, we address the allegations in the complaint and those
made in the letters that are properly incorporated by reference
into the complaint.
Appellants allege that the fact that they are members of
the PDP was "known to defendants at all times relevant to this
action." If the allegations of the complaint and the letters had
stopped there, the district court would have been correct to
dismiss appellants' claims. As we have repeatedly explained, we do
not credit "allegations that merely parrot the elements of the
cause of action." Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 12; see also
Rodríguez-Vives v. P.R. Firefighters Corps of P.R., 743 F.3d 278,
286 (1st Cir. 2014) ("A conclusory allegation . . . is one which
simply asserts a legal conclusion, such as 'I was retaliated
against,' not a specific factual allegation . . . ."). However,
appellants went on to make a number of non-conclusory allegations
that together support the inference that the defendants knew of
their political affiliations. See Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 15
("[T]he Supreme Court has suggested that allegations that would
individually lack the heft to make a claim plausible may suffice to
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state a claim in the context of the complaint's other factual
allegations.").
This is not a case in which a single employee was fired
or reassigned, and then sought to blame his supervisor for acting
with an animus based on party affiliation. Rather, the complaint
in this case alleges that, after a change in party control from the
PDP to the NPP, there commenced a systematic and more or less
simultaneous effort to essentially reassign and eliminate all the
duties and responsibilities of the nine plaintiffs, all active PDP
members who held trust positions during PDP administrations and
non-trust supervisory positions at the start of the new NPP
administration. The common modus operandi alleged in the complaint
required the active and sustained participation of the plaintiffs'
superiors on multiple levels. The same modus operandi was employed
with regard to nine different people in numerous regions of the
department. The defendants were all higher up officials who
belonged to the NPP and who had responsibility for personnel and
personnel transactions within their respective regions or across
the department. The complaint alleges that defendant
Hernandez-Gregorat, the senior official who appointed, or appointed
the person who appointed, four of the other defendants, was
personally involved in giving direct instructions that the
subordinates of two of the plaintiffs be reassigned to other
supervisors who lacked the qualifications to perform that
-13-
supervision. Cf. Travers v. Flight Servs.& Sys., Inc., 737 F.3d
144, 147 (1st Cir. 2013) (reasonable jury could infer that
subordinates acted to please their CEO).
Moreover, as noted, appellants allege that they all held
trust positions in previous PDP administrations. Puerto Rico
"'trust' employees participate in policymaking and can be hired and
fired on political grounds." Uphoff Figueroa v. Alejandro, 597
F.3d 423, 430 n.7 (1st Cir. 2010). We have recognized that
"political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for . . .
effective performance" in such trust positions. Id. at 429
(omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Hence,
we have previously held that defendants' knowledge of a plaintiff's
political affiliation was inferable where the defendant was aware
that the plaintiff previously served in a trust position. See
Grajales, 682 F.3d at 47-48. Although the plaintiff in Grajales
identified his particular trust position and appellants here do
not, "[i]n connection with a threshold plausibility inquiry, a high
degree of factual specificity is not required." Id. at 47 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Finally, each defendant received at least one letter from
one plaintiff (and generally more) claiming that their duties were
being eliminated in a manner that could not happen without the
active efforts of that plaintiff's superiors. Collectively, all of
this is enough to raise a plausible inference that a fairly wide-
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ranging and deliberate purge of high profile PDP members was
occurring, and that it must have been known to these defendants.
Cf. García-González v. Puig-Morales, No. 12-2357, 2014 WL 3765709
at *14-15 (1st Cir. Aug. 1, 2014) (a reasonable jury could infer
defendants' knowledge of plaintiffs' political affiliation from the
fact that defendants took contracts exclusively from many members
of one party and awarded them exclusively to many members of the
other party).7
B. Causation
For pleading purposes, appellants "need not establish"
causation. Rodríguez-Reyes, 711 F.3d at 56. "[T]he facts
contained in the complaint need only show that the claim of
causation is plausible." Id. "'Smoking gun' proof of
discrimination is rarely available, especially at the pleading
stage," and is unnecessary. Grajales, 682 F.3d at 49. Instead,
"telltale clues may be gathered from the circumstances surrounding
the adverse employment action." Id. In Rodríguez-Reyes, in
concluding that the pleadings sufficiently alleged causation, we
pointed to "allegations that all of the plaintiffs were affiliated
with political parties that opposed the NPP; that none of them ever
received a negative evaluation for her work . . . ; that each was
7
Although we hold that appellants' allegations are sufficient
to support an inference of appellees' knowledge, appellants are
certainly aware of the specific trust positions that they held, and
it was unwise for appellants not to identify them.
-15-
replaced by an NPP adherent; and that the critical decisions were
made by newly appointed officials loyal to the NPP and in a
politically charged atmosphere." Rodríguez-Reyes, 711 F.3d at 56.
As in Rodríguez-Reyes, appellants alleged that they had
always performed their duties in an "excellent fashion."
Nevertheless, they lost job responsibilities and subordinates
"systematically" "[u]pon the change of administration to the NPP."
Cruz-Medina alleged that he experienced "negative comments"
regarding his political affiliation and that he was told "he needs
to understand that there has been a change in the political party
that rules the government." Plaintiff Camacho-Resto claimed that
appellee Cruz-Torres openly discussed Camacho-Resto's political
affiliation and that defendant Jose Villegas threatened his
continued employment.8 These allegations support an inference that
the atmosphere in appellants' workplace was politically charged, as
was the situation in Rodríguez-Reyes. Moreover, "the close
proximity between the regime change and the onset of pervasive
cross-party harassment, coupled with the absence of any legitimate
reason for much of the offending conduct, permits a plausible
inference at the pleading stage that political animus was a
8
We must determine whether the complaint "'in toto'" renders
the claims plausible. See Rodríguez-Reyes, 711 F.3d at 55 (quoting
Twombly, 550 at 569 n.14). Hence, although Camacho-Resto is not an
appellant here, we may consider his allegations in the complaint as
we make reasonable inferences about the workplace atmosphere.
-16-
motivating factor behind the harassment." Grajales, 682 F.3d at
50.
Our inquiry, however, does not end here. We must also
assess whether the allegations in the complaint and in appellants'
letters incorporated therein sufficiently allege causation with
respect to each appellee. See Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 16
("[W]e must determine whether, as to each defendant, a plaintiff's
pleadings are sufficient to state a claim on which relief can be
granted." (internal quotation marks omitted)). The question is
whether the appellees who received a particular appellant's letter
are "plausible defendant[s]" with respect to that appellant's
claim. Id.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "[p]ublic officials may be held
liable . . . for a constitutional violation only if a plaintiff can
establish that his or her constitutional injury resulted from the
direct acts or omissions of the official, or from indirect conduct
that amounts to condonation or tacit authorization." Ocasio-
Hernández, 640 F.3d at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted). To
that end, "'[a]n important factor in making the determination of
liability is whether the official was put on some kind of notice of
the alleged violations, for one cannot make a "deliberate" or
"conscious" choice to act or not to act unless confronted with a
problem that requires the taking of affirmative steps.'"
Rodríguez-García v. Miranda-Marín, 610 F.3d 756, 768 (1st Cir.
-17-
2010) (quoting Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 902 (1st
Cir. 1988) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469,
483-84 (1986))). "Once an official is so notified, either actually
or constructively, it is reasonable to infer that the failure to
take such steps, as well as the actual taking of them constitutes
a choice 'from among various alternatives.'" Lipsett, 864 F.2d at
902 (quoting Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483).
We recognize that "precise knowledge of the chain of
events leading to the constitutional violation may often be
unavailable to a plaintiff" when a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is
filed; therefore, "we take to heart the Supreme Court's call to
'draw on our "judicial experience and common sense" as we make a
contextual judgment about the sufficiency of the pleadings.'"
Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 16 (quoting Sanchez v. Pereira-
Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 48 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679)).
On its own, the complaint does not specifically connect
the appellees to the adverse employment actions. Each appellant,
however, does claim that he "placed in writing his concern"
regarding the negative employment actions but that the
"communication went unanswered." The district court properly
requested these letters, which were incorporated by reference into
the complaint, and supplemented the allegations with the identity
of the recipient defendants.
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We have recognized that a letter may be used as evidence
at trial to show for purposes of § 1983 liability that the named
recipient personally knew of the writer's employment situation.
See Rodriguez-García v. Municipality of Caguas, 495 F.3d 1, 12-13
(1st Cir. 2007); see also Rodríguez-García, 610 F.3d at 768.
Whether the addressee actually received the letter is "a factual
question appropriate for jury determination." Rodriguez-García,
495 F.3d at 13. Hence, in resolving a motion to dismiss, where the
burden is merely demonstrating the plausibility of a claim and all
reasonable inferences are drawn in the plaintiff's favor, we can
infer that the recipients of the letters were aware of their
contents.
Although the district court ascertained the named
recipients of the letters, it found that the letters "fail[ed] to
identify the writer's political affiliation, and [did] not mention
any discriminatory conduct based on political animus." The
district court, however, required too much from the letters.9 The
9
We also disagree with certain of the district court's
assessments of the letters. Méndez-Cruz, in his letter, did
identify his affiliation and allege it to be the cause of the
adverse employment actions: "I do not agree with the manner in
which I am being discriminated because I have political beliefs
that are contrary to those of the new administration." Although
Cruz-Medina's letter alleged "a violation of guaranteed
constitutional rights," the court was correct that neither Cruz-
Medina nor Medina-Velázquez explicitly identified party
affiliation; however, as explained above, the complaint
sufficiently alleged facts to support an inference of appellees'
knowledge.
-19-
letters provided the link to specific defendants. Each appellant's
letter asked the recipients, individuals in positions of authority
over employees of DTOP, to cease and desist from continuing the
adverse employment actions and/or to resolve them. As in
Rodríguez-García, the letters support the claim that the named
recipients were put on notice of the alleged violations. See 610
F.3d at 768. Under our precedent, once the officials were notified
of the adverse employment actions, "it is reasonable to infer that
the failure to take" affirmative steps necessary to resolve the
problem "constitutes a choice" not to act. Lipsett, 864 F.2d at
902. Hence, the inference of notice, combined with the complaint's
allegation that the letters went unanswered, makes it plausible
that the adverse employment actions with respect to a particular
appellant "resulted from the direct acts or omissions . . . or from
indirect conduct that amounts to condonation or tacit
authorization" by the appellees named in that appellant's letter.
See Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 16 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Indeed, that is the very same conclusion that the
district court made for the six other plaintiffs who survived the
defendants' motion to dismiss. We thus hold that each appellant
adequately alleged a First Amendment claim against the respective
appellees named in that appellant's letter.10
10
Our holding makes it unnecessary to reach appellants' second
argument that the district court improperly denied their Rule 59(e)
motion to alter the judgment of dismissal.
-20-
V.
In conclusion, we hold that appellants' allegations
support reasonable inferences of knowledge and causation, such that
each appellant stated a plausible First Amendment claim against the
appellees who received that appellant's letter. Hence, we vacate
the district court's dismissal of (1) Medina-Velázquez's First
Amendment claim and Paredes's derivative claim against Hernández-
Gregorat, Avilés-Hernández, Trinidad-Quiñones, and Cruz-Torres; (2)
Méndez-Cruz's First Amendment claim and Méndez-Quiñones's
derivative claim against del Roldán-Sotomayor, Hernández-Gregorat,
and Avilés-Hernández; and (3) Cruz-Medina's First Amendment claim
against Trinidad-Quiñones, Hernández-Gregorat, Avilés-Hernández,
and González-Ortiz. We remand for further proceedings consistent
with this decision.
Vacated and remanded. Costs to appellants.
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