United States v. Ridolfi

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 13-2127
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
COREY RIDOLFI,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Howard and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.
Elizabeth Prevett for appellant.
Donald C. Lockhart, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Peter F. Neronha, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
October 6, 2014
HOWARD, Circuit Judge. The defendant, Corey Ridolfi, was
charged with federal firearms offenses after Cumberland, Rhode
Island police found him at the wheel of a car whose trunk was jam-
packed of stolen property, including two shotguns. After hearing
evidence of Ridolfi's involvement in a recent burglary crime spree,
the fruits of which were in the trunk of the car, a jury convicted
him of being a felon in possession of one or more firearms and of
knowingly possessing one or more stolen firearms. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1); id. §§ 2 & 922(j). On appeal, Ridolfi primarily
challenges the evidentiary sufficiency for his knowing possession
of the shotguns. We affirm his convictions.
I
In the early morning hours of November 28, 2011, local
police responded to a report of a suspicious person in a
residential neighborhood of Cumberland, Rhode Island.1 At around
4:15 a.m., a caller reported that a man had just rung his doorbell
and then walked away from the house. Sergeant Jonathan Cook
arrived on site in less than one minute and immediately approached
the lone car (a Ford Focus) parked in the neighborhood, about 250-
300 feet from the complaining residence. The two men in the
vehicle matched the description given by the caller, including the
1
As usual, we recite the record evidence in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict, along with all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom. See United States v. Burgos, 703 F.3d
1, 4 n.2 (1st Cir. 2012).
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winter hats with ear flaps worn by both. Ridolfi was in the
driver's seat; his cousin Jared Lemay was in the passenger's side.
Ridolfi explained to the officer that he had become lost
traveling from his girlfriend's house and had pulled off the main
road to use his GPS unit. Ridolfi began perspiring heavily as his
conversation with Sergeant Cook continued. A second police
officer, David Rosa, soon arrived to assist. He spoke with Ridolfi
and Lemay separately, and both men denied ringing the doorbell at
the nearby residence. Lemay told Officer Rosa that he had been
with Ridolfi all night at the home of Ridolfi's girlfriend in North
Attleboro, Massachusetts and that the two were heading to
Cumberland where they lived.
Ridolfi's story was that he had spent the night with his
girlfriend in North Attleboro and then called Lemay, who was in
Woonsocket, Rhode Island, to pick him up. Ridolfi spontaneously
displayed his cell phone to the officer as proof of the call.
Officer Rosa remarked that the time notation showed that the call
had just occurred minutes earlier at 4:08 a.m. and questioned how
the two could have traveled such a distance in such a short time.
Ridolfi had no explanation, and his nervous behavior increased.
Meanwhile, Sergeant Cook had learned that the Ford Focus
was registered to Lemay's father, and that neither Ridolfi nor
Lemay had a valid driver's license. He decided to arrest Ridolfi
for driving without a valid license and to impound the car since
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Lemay could not lawfully drive it. Before the tow truck arrived,
Sergeant Cook and Officer Rosa conducted an inventory search of the
Ford Focus and discovered, among other items, a 20-gauge shotgun
shell in plain view on the back seat. When they opened the trunk
to continue their accounting, the officers observed that it was
filled with boxes and bags stuffed full. Sergeant Cook also
noticed two rifle bags buried among the belongings. Because of the
sheer volume of the trunk cache, he opted to complete the inventory
at the police station. There, Sergeant Cook found that the rifle
bags indeed contained two shotguns, a pump action 12-gauge and a
bolt action 20-gauge, with the serial numbers etched off. A
different officer cataloged the various other items.
The police later learned that most of the belongings in
the trunk comprised stolen property from three recent home
burglaries that occurred in the month of November 2011. In
addition to the shotguns, the loot included a large quantity of
baseball cards and other sports memorabilia, jewelry, watches, a
cell phone, and a replica handgun. The shotguns, in particular,
were connected to a burglary that had occurred at a Cumberland home
some time during the overnight hours of November 8th and November
9th. Many items of women's jewelry also were stolen during that
same burglary. Other stolen property recovered from the trunk,
such as the large sports memorabilia collection, were connected to
yet another burglary of a Cumberland home that was located directly
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across the street from where Sergeant Cook found Ridolfi and Lemay
parked in the Ford Focus. The testimony of the homeowner
established that this burglary had occurred around the time that
the two men showed up in the neighborhood.
The police also discovered that Ridolfi had sold some of
the stolen jewelry connected to the early November burglary at a
pawnshop in Woonsocket, Rhode Island, shortly after that theft had
occurred. On November 9th, at around 5:30 p.m., Ridolfi,
accompanied by Lemay and another individual, entered the shop,
where Ridolfi sold ten pieces of jewelry for $1,200.00 in cash.
While Ridolfi informed the store clerk that a family member had
given him the jewelry, he later told the police that he had
received the valuables from some unknown woman at a party. He also
told the police that he had visited the pawnshop alone, unaware
that the store's security recording debunked his tale.
Finally, the police learned that on November 11th, just
a few days after the early November burglary, Ridolfi and Lemay
went to a party at the home of Lemay's girlfriend. Amidst the
festivities, Lemay decided to showcase one of the stolen shotguns
to Ridolfi's sister and others, demonstrating how to use the pump
action feature. Although Ridolfi also was at the party, the record
does not indicate whether he was present in the room at the time
that Lemay boasted the weapon.
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The government subsequently levied two firearms charges
against Ridolfi as earlier outlined.2 In addition to the police
account, witnesses from each of the three burglarized homes
provided a description of the items stolen, as well as the
approximate dates and times that their respective residences were
burglarized. The homeowners also identified their property that
the police had procured from the Ford Focus on November 28th.
Additionally, a pawnshop document was admitted into evidence. It
contained descriptions of the unique items of women's jewelry that
Ridolfi had sold on November 9th, which were identical to the items
that had been reported as stolen along with the shotguns. Finally,
the parties stipulated to certain legal elements, such as that the
shotguns were moved from one state to another and that Ridolfi
previously had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than
one year of imprisonment.
Lemay's father was the sole witness who testified for the
defense. He confirmed that the Ford Focus was registered to him
and explained that he had bought the car for his son, Lemay. He
also testified that his son regularly loaned the car to other
people, including Ridolfi.
Ridolfi unsuccessfully challenged the sufficiency of the
evidence for both the felon in possession of a firearm charge
2
The government also charged Lemay with knowingly possessing
a stolen firearm, and the cousins faced trial together. This
appeal concerns only defendant Ridolfi's resulting convictions.
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(count I) and the knowing possession of a stolen firearm charge
(count II). The jury ultimately returned guilty verdicts against
Ridolfi, and this timely appeal followed.
II
Ridolfi argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove
that he knowingly possessed the firearms (an element common to
counts I and II) and that he knew that the firearms were stolen (an
element of count II). We review de novo preserved challenges to
the sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Rodríguez, 735
F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2013). Applying a familiar standard, "we
consider whether any rational factfinder could have found that the
evidence presented at trial, together with all reasonable
inferences, viewed in the light most favorable to the government,
established each element of the particular offense beyond a
reasonable doubt." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979).
As the district court informed the jury here, a guilty
verdict may rest on reasonable factual inferences drawn from direct
or circumstantial evidence, but not on insupportable or overly
speculative evidentiary interpretations. See United States v.
Burgos, 703 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v. Spinney,
65 F.3d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 1995). And, it is within the jury's
purview to evaluate competing factual inferences and theories that
are supported by the evidentiary presentation. See Jackson, 443
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U.S. at 319; United States v. Cruz, 352 F.3d 499, 511 (1st Cir.
2003).
In urging reversal, Ridolfi cites to cases that include
admonishments against improper stacking of factual inferences. See
United States v. Valerio, 48 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting
that "we are loath to stack inference upon inference in order to
uphold the jury's verdict" (citing Ingram v. United States, 360
U.S. 672, 680 (1959))). Bare citation to this inference-stacking
principle as a type of normative call, however, rings hollow. It
is true that in certain contexts, such as prosecutions for
conspiracy crimes and criminal fraud schemes, heightened caution
sometimes may be warranted to ensure that the particular conviction
does not depend upon too attenuated a link between the evidentiary
presentation, the necessary predicate facts urged by the
prosecutor, and the ultimate facts and legal elements of the
charged offense. See Ingram, 360 U.S. at 680 ("'[C]harges of
conspiracy are not to be made out by piling inference upon
inference, thus fashioning . . . a dragnet to draw in all
substantive crimes.'" (citation omitted)).3 Still, our focus when
considering a sufficiency challenge always remains fixed on
discerning whether the jury's guilty verdict finds support in a
3
See, e.g., Burgos, 703 F.3d at 11-17 (conspiracy conviction
overturned); O'Laughlin v. O'Brien, 568 F.3d 287, 301-02 (1st Cir.
2009) (listing example cases); Valerio, 48 F.3d at 64-65 (reversing
convictions for possession with intent to distribute and
conspiracy).
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plausible rendition of the record, which properly includes
reasonable, common sense inferences drawn from the evidence. See
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19; United States v. DeCologero, 530 F.3d
36, 65 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Portalla, 496 F.3d 23, 27
(1st Cir. 2007).
III
We first address Ridolfi's challenge to the jury's
finding that he knowingly possessed the shotguns. Knowing
possession may be proven through either actual or constructive
possession, and the government rests on the latter in this case.
See United States v. Guzmán-Montañez, 756 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.
2014).
Constructive possession of a firearm may be established
when a person "knowingly has the power and intention at a given
time of exercising dominion and control over [it] either directly
or through others." United States v. McLean, 409 F.3d 492, 501
(1st Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Constructive
possession may be sole or joint and does not require actual
ownership of the firearm. Id. However, a person must have actual
knowledge of the weapon in order to have constructive possession of
it. Id. at 502-03.
Establishing a person's culpable knowledge, like specific
intent, often depends on circumstantial evidence alone. See United
States v. O'Brien, 14 F.3d 703, 706 (1st Cir. 1994). For
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constructive possession of a firearm in particular, the requisite
knowledge and intention can be inferred from circumstances "such as
a defendant's control over the area where the contraband is found
(e.g., defendant's home or automobile)." McLean, 409 F.3d at 501;
see United States v. Booth, 111 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating
that "knowledge can be inferred in some circumstances from control
of the area"). Knowledge must be fairly inferrable from the
circumstances, however, and mere presence with or proximity to
weapons, or association with another who possesses a weapon, is not
enough. United States v. Rodríguez-Lozada, 558 F.3d 29, 40 (1st
Cir. 2009); McLean, 409 F.3d at 501. The record must contain
evidence of "some action, some word, or some conduct that links the
individual to the [firearm] and indicates that he had some stake in
it, some power over it." McLean, 409 F.3d at 501 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Here, Ridolfi claims that there is no "specific,
particularized and individual" evidence linking him to the shotguns
to establish that he knew of the weapons' existence and that he had
the power and intention to exercise dominion and control over them.
He emphasizes, for instance, that the record lacks any evidence
showing his "special proximity to the firearms, access to the
firearms, movement toward the firearms, prior handling of the
firearms, or statements about the firearms" to support a finding of
constructive possession.
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Ridofli's position is spurious given his involvement with
the stolen goods immediately following the early November burglary,
the inculpatory events at the time of Ridolfi's arrest, his
dominion over the car where the items were stored, and his false
statement to the police during the ensuing investigation.
First, less than a day after the early November burglary
in which the shotguns were stolen, Ridolfi, accompanied by his
cousin Lemay, took the lead in selling several items of women's
jewelry pilfered during that theft. Indicative of an inculpatory
state of mind for (at a minimum) having handled stolen goods,
Ridolfi gave inconsistent answers about the source of the jewelry
that he had sold for over $1,000 cash. Then, just a few days
later, Lemay showcased one of the stolen shotguns at a party that
Ridolfi also attended. While there is no direct evidence that
Ridolfi actually saw this bravado, a rational jury could fairly
infer (again, at a minimum) that Lemay had displayed that prize
from the early November burglary to the very person whom Lemay had
accompanied when selling other treasure from that same crime --
Ridolfi. See United States v. Marek, 548 F.3d 147, 153-54 (1st
Cir. 2008) (defendant's role in the criminal enterprise and close
association with another participant allowed a reasonable inference
of shared knowledge); United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 713-14
(1st Cir. 1992) ("the existence of a close relationship between a
defendant and others involved in criminal activity can, as part of
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a larger package of proof, assist in supporting an inference of
involvement in illicit activity").
Next, during the early morning hours of November 28th,
Ridolfi was found sitting in the driver's seat of his cousin's car,
the trunk of which was packed full with stolen property from three
November 2011 burglaries, including the shotguns from the early
November theft. From a rational jury's perspective, the cousins
were essentially caught red-handed having just burgled the
Cumberland home across the street from where Ridolfi parked the
Ford Focus: the loot in the trunk included property stolen from
that home, and the homeowner established that the crime had
occurred within the relevant time frame. The jury could have drawn
yet another reasonable inference, as well: given their close
proximity to the home whose owner had reported a suspicious man in
the neighborhood, and their clothing matching that described by the
caller, the cousins were about to embark on another burglary.
Moreover, a nervous Ridolfi gave an implausible account to the
police about his recent whereabouts. This response evinced his
inculpatory mindset regarding his larcenous conduct that night and
the stored spoils in the trunk. See United States v. Lochan, 674
F.2d 960, 966-67 (1st Cir. 1982) (defendant's significant dominion
and control over the vehicle that he did not own, and surrounding
suspicious circumstances, was material evidence of his knowing
possession of the hidden contraband).
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Ridolfi's significant control and dominion over his
cousin's vehicle, which included the stored items in the trunk, is
pertinent to his possession of the shotguns. By his own account
(as testified to by the police witnesses), Ridolfi had called his
cousin Lemay for a ride that night and took control of the car for
the lengthy return drive to Cumberland. And, as we know, Sergeant
Cook found Ridolfi in the driver's seat when he approached the Ford
Focus. See Lochan, 674 F.2d at 966 (the defendant's control over
a vehicle that he did not own "was not fleeting," which served as
material evidence for his knowing possession of the hidden drugs);
see also United States v. Robinson, 473 F.3d 387, 399 (1st Cir.
2007) (defendant's relationship with the person who actually rented
the car he had been driving was material evidence for his
constructive possession of the hidden firearms).
Finally, the jury was aware of Ridolfi's statements to
police during the subsequent investigation. After having been
found at the wheel of Lemay's car with spoils squirreled away in
the trunk, Ridolfi opted to lie to the police about Lemay's
presence with him during the pawnshop transaction on November 9th.
The jury was entitled to infer that Ridolfi, a convicted felon, was
seeking to disassociate from Lemay, particularly with respect to
the early November burglary when the two shotguns were stolen.
All told, the evidence was sufficient to ground a finding
that the cousins committed a string of burglaries in November 2011
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and that they shared the plunder. This plausible rendition of the
record easily supports the essential facts that Ridolfi both knew
of the shotguns and had a joint stake in them as part of the
burglary spoils, fully intending to share in their possession and
control. See DeCologero, 530 F.3d at 67 (defendant's role in the
criminal enterprise evinced that he could access and make use of
the weapons cache at will, which served as material evidence to his
constructive joint possession of the firearms); McLean, 409 F.3d at
504 (noting that "the gun was among the proceeds of the drug sales,
which [defendant] was obliged to protect" as material evidence for
his construction possession).
Ridolfi makes various attempts to distance himself from
the stolen firearms by isolating aspects of the "evidence gleaned
during his arrest." Yet, the perceived record lapses, such as the
lack of evidence that he made a movement toward the trunk when
interacting with the police, are no impediment to a finding of
constructive possession of the firearms on this record. See United
States v. Liranzo, 385 F.3d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 2004) ("The fact that
the government did not present certain kinds of evidence does not
mean that there was insufficient evidence for conviction.").
Ridolfi argued his alternative theories at trial, and the jury
remained free to discount them and find constructive possession on
the whole of this record. See United States v. Scott, 564 F.3d 34,
40 (1st Cir. 2009).
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Furthermore, this case hardly represents one of guilt-by-
association standing alone, as Ridolfi paints it. Indeed, the
cases that he relies on are meaningfully different from the
circumstances presented here. See, e.g., Rodríguez-Lozada, 558
F.3d 29; McLean, 409 F.3d 492; see also United States v. Chairez,
33 F.3d 823 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Pedro, 999 F.2d 497
(11th Cir. 1993). The evidence of Ridolfi's dominion and control
over the area where the shotguns were found is far more pronounced,
as is the evidence of his direct involvement in the criminal
enterprise in which the shotguns were part of the bounty that he
shared with his cousin.4
In short, the jury's finding that Ridolfi knowingly
possessed the shotguns found in the trunk is eminently supportable
on this record.
This leaves Ridolfi's brief challenge to the jury's
finding that he knew the shotguns were stolen, an element exclusive
to his count II conviction. For this element, the government was
required to prove that Ridolfi knew or had reasonable cause to
4
By contrast, the defendant in Rodríguez-Lozada, for
instance, was a temporary visitor of the apartment (albeit a member
of a drug trafficking conspiracy), only a single personal belonging
of his was present in the room where guns were hidden, and the
room's sole occupant was the individual whom the police had just
seen in actual possession of a firearm. 558 F.3d at 40-41. And,
in Pedro, the defendant's cohort in an alleged burglary that had
just occurred was carrying a gun in a suitcase, and the evidence
was wholly lacking on whether the defendant was ever aware that a
gun was part of the loot taken. 999 F.2d at 501-02.
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believe that the firearms were stolen. 18 U.S.C. § 922(j). The
government contends that Ridolfi did not challenge the evidentiary
sufficiency of this element before the district court, and Ridolfi
does not address the purported trial record lapse in his reply
brief. We need not sort out the appellate review standard, see
United States v. Marston, 694 F.3d 131, 134-45 (1st Cir. 2012),
because the rational inferences outlined in our constructive
possession discussion also permitted a rational jury to find that
Ridolfi knew or had reasonable cause to believe that the shotguns
were stolen.
In particular, the evidence surrounding the pawnshop
transaction and Lemay's bravado at the party provides solid
grounding for the jury to have found that Ridolfi knew of the
shotguns and had reasonable cause to believe that they were stolen.
And that, of course, was not all. The evidence resulting from the
events of November 28th and Ridolfi's later dissembling with the
police lend further evidentiary support for the finding.
IV
Because the jury's determinations firmly rest on the
evidence, we affirm Ridolfi's firearms convictions.
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