Oahn Nguyen Chung v. StudentCity.Com, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 16-1765
OAHN NGUYEN CHUNG, Individually and as Administratrix
of the Estate of LISA TAM CHUNG, and LIEM CHUNG,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
OLLIE DAILY, LOREN DAILY and PATRICIA DAILY,
Plaintiffs,
v.
STUDENTCITY.COM, INC.,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Chief Judge,
Selya and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
Joseph P. Musacchio, with whom Anthony Tarricone and
Kreindler and Kreindler LLP were on brief, for appellants.
Rodney E. Gould, with whom Robert C. Mueller and Smith Duggan
Buell & Rufo LLP were on brief, for appellee.
April 14, 2017
SELYA, Circuit Judge. District courts have authority to
enter summary judgment on grounds not raised by the parties. That
authority, though, is far from unbridled. Here, the district court
— with the acquiescence of the parties — limited pretrial discovery
to specific issues. It later entered summary judgment on a
completely different issue — an issue not briefed and on which
discovery had not been allowed. Concluding, as we do, that the
district court's shift in focus exceeded its authority, we vacate
the judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
We rehearse the facts in the light most amenable to the
parties opposing summary judgment (here, the plaintiffs). See
Jones v. Secord, 684 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2012). StudentCity.com,
Inc. (StudentCity) is a Delaware corporation that maintains its
principal place of business in Massachusetts. It sells vacation
packages to students, including those traveling for spring break
or to celebrate graduations.
In the fall of 2007, Lisa Tam Chung and Loren Daily were
high-school seniors in Grand Prairie, Texas. A StudentCity
representative contacted Loren to promote the firm's wares and
piqued her curiosity about booking a graduation trip. Once a
critical mass of students had expressed interest about such a trip,
the StudentCity representative held an informational meeting. The
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representative assured the assemblage (including several parents)
that StudentCity staff attend all events and that participating
students would not be permitted to go anywhere unaccompanied. She
also distributed promotional materials that stated in pertinent
part:
 StudentCity will provide "[o]n site staff at all scheduled
events — beginning to end."
 StudentCity "staffs all scheduled events from beginning to
end."
 StudentCity maintains "the largest staff-to-student ratio
and our 24-hour staff is there to give you the peace of
mind you need."
 StudentCity staff will be present "to assure that everyone
is having a great and responsible time."
Loren's parents met with the StudentCity representative
and read the written materials. Lisa relayed StudentCity's
representations to her parents, who had limited English
proficiency. With the blessing of both families, the girls
purchased vacation packages for a June 2008 trip to Cancún, Mexico,
adding an optional snorkeling excursion.
The snorkeling excursion took place on June 7, when the
participants boarded the SS Sea Star, a catamaran owned and
operated by Servicios Maritimos y Acua del Caribe SA de C.V. (SMA).
A StudentCity staff member transported Lisa and Loren to the Sea
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Star, a vessel approved to carry eighty passengers and three crew
members for this kind of outing.1 On the day in question, however,
it carried at least 120 StudentCity travelers and no fewer than
210 persons in total. No on-duty StudentCity representative was
on board.
The snorkeling trip had a tragic ending: the Sea Star
hit a coral reef and began to take on water, yet the crew provided
no assistance to the passengers (indeed, some crew members deserted
ship). Acting on their own, Lisa and Loren donned life preservers
and tried to reach safety by grabbing a rope that extended between
the Sea Star and a small private vessel. Their efforts failed and
they were pulled under the water. Loren suffered serious injuries,
but survived; Lisa was pronounced brain dead at a local hospital
and died on June 10, 2008.
Following an investigation, the harbormaster concluded
that the "concentration of passengers in the boat" caused a
"considerable imbalance," which most likely led to the Sea Star's
collision with the coral reef. Similarly, the Mexican government
attributed the accident to the catamaran's "imprudent overload"
and the "negligent performance" of the captain.
1 StudentCity offered some evidence that the catamaran's
maximum capacity was 250 passengers (though not for voyages to the
coral reef). At the summary judgment stage, however, we are
constrained to view disputed facts in the plaintiffs' favor. See
Houlton Citizens' Coal. v. Town of Houlton, 175 F.3d 178, 184 (1st
Cir. 1999).
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A civil action ensued. Although this suit originally
had a wider compass, the only claim that is still velivolant is
the claim for Lisa's wrongful death — a claim brought by her
parents, Oahn Nguyen Chung (individually and in her capacity as
administratrix of Lisa's estate) and Liem Chung.2 As to this
claim, StudentCity moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for
summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 56(a). The
district court denied the motion to dismiss, but reserved decision
on summary judgment. See Chung v. StudentCity.com, Inc. (Chung
I), No. 10-10943, 2013 WL 6528516, at *2 (D. Mass. Dec. 12, 2013).
It reasoned that
[d]iscovery has not yet begun in this matter. . . . Much
of the factual information plaintiffs desire is in
defendant's control and can be turned over
expeditiously. That information may affect the
determination of whether defendant voluntarily undertook
a duty to ensure the safety of trip participants, and
whether defendant knew or should have known about
[SMA]'s dubious prior safety record, if indeed it
exists.
Id.After limited discovery — a circumstance to which we
shortly shall return — the district court granted summary judgment
in favor of StudentCity. With respect to one of the issues to
2The remaining claims, including claims brought by and on
behalf of Loren, were consigned to arbitration pursuant to the
terms of StudentCity's standard customer agreement. See Chung v.
StudentCity.com, Inc., No. 10-10943, 2013 WL 504757, at *4 (D.
Mass. Feb. 12, 2013). That ruling has not been appealed.
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which discovery had been allowed, the court concluded that there
was "no evidence to suggest that the steps StudentCity took in
selecting its snorkeling excursion vendor were unreasonable under
the circumstances."3 With respect to the other issue, the court
concluded that "StudentCity voluntarily assumed a duty to
generally supervise tour participants during all StudentCity-
organized/scheduled events, including the June 7, 2008 snorkeling
excursion." Even so, the court ruled that the negligent
supervision "claim fails on causation" because "Lisa's death
resulted not from inadequate supervision by StudentCity staff, but
rather from the boat accident caused by the overloading of the Sea
Star and its negligent operation by [SMA]." This timely appeal
followed.
II. ANALYSIS
We review a district court's entry of summary judgment
de novo. See Gomez v. Stop & Shop Supermkt. Co., 670 F.3d 395,
396 (1st Cir. 2012). In conducting this appraisal, we take "all
the facts in the light most flattering to the nonmoving party,
resolving any evidentiary conflicts in that party's favor, and
drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom to his behoof." Id."We will affirm only if the record discloses no genuine issue as
3
This portion of the district court's summary judgment ruling
has not been challenged on appeal, and we treat the "negligent
selection" claim as foreclosed.
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to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law." Tropigas de P.R., Inc. v. Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 637 F.3d 53, 56 (1st Cir. 2011).
An issue is genuine if a reasonable factfinder could resolve it in
favor of either party. See id. An issue is material if it holds
the potential to change the outcome of the suit. See id.Jurisdiction in this case is predicated on diversity of
citizenship and the existence of a controversy in the requisite
amount. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). In a diversity case, state law
supplies the substantive rules of decision. See Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); Geshke v. Crocs, Inc., 740 F.3d
74, 77 (1st Cir. 2014). The parties agree that, consistent with
the choice-of-law provision in the customer agreement,
Massachusetts law controls here. We have said that "a federal
court sitting in diversity is free, if it chooses, to forgo
independent analysis and accept the parties' agreement" as to which
state law applies. Borden v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 935 F.2d
370, 375 (1st Cir. 1991). Accordingly, we look to Massachusetts
law.
Under Massachusetts law, wrongful death is a species of
negligence, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 229, § 2 (imposing liability
for damages against "[a] person who . . . by his negligence causes
the death of a person"), and as such demands proof of four
elements: "that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of
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reasonable care, that the defendant breached this duty, that damage
resulted, and that there was a causal relation between the breach
of the duty and the damage," Jupin v. Kask, 849 N.E.2d 829, 834-
35 (Mass. 2006).
The existence vel non of a duty presents "a question of
law to be resolved by the judge." Cottam v. CVS Pharmacy, 764
N.E.2d 814, 819 (Mass. 2002). Massachusetts courts recognize that
a duty may be voluntarily assumed and, if it is, "must be performed
with due care." Id. at 821 (quoting Mullins v. Pine Manor Coll.,
449 N.E.2d 331, 336 (Mass. 1983)). Causation, by contrast,
generally presents a question of fact within "the special province
of the jury." Jupin, 849 N.E.2d at 835. It is thus apparent that
duty and causation are separate and distinct elements of negligence
and negligence-like actions.
Here, the plaintiffs' principal argument is that the
district court erred in premising its summary judgment decision on
the perceived absence of causation — an issue that was neither
argued by StudentCity nor open to discovery. StudentCity demurs:
it asserts that the issue of causation was squarely raised at
summary judgment. The record, though, belies this assertion. We
start there.
StudentCity posits that its motion papers made clear
that neither it nor its agents were
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part of the Sea Star's crew, and had no responsibility
for boarding passengers, determining where passengers
were to be positioned, navigating the vessel, providing
safety equipment on the vessel, controlling or limiting
the number of passengers, or otherwise instructing the
passengers or the StudentCity participants on the Sea
Star's rules and regulations.
In context, however, it is pellucid that these arguments were
advanced not in connection with any issue of causation, but to
support StudentCity's lack-of-duty theory. Its summary judgment
briefing does not in any way, shape, or form link these arguments
to causation. Instead, the arguments — to use StudentCity's own
term — related to its "responsibility," and "responsibility" is
synonymous with "duty." See Responsibility, Oxford English
Dictionary (3d ed. 2010), http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/163862
(defining responsibility as "[t]he state or fact of being in charge
of or of having a duty towards a person or thing").
Nor is StudentCity's assertion made more plausible by
either of two additional statements in its summary judgment papers.
It notes that, in its motion, it alleged that "[t]our operators
such as StudentCity are simply not liable for the alleged
negligence of third-party service suppliers, . . . regardless of
the theory advanced." This broad statement is of no help to
StudentCity, though, because it ignores the district court's
holding that, in this instance, StudentCity voluntarily assumed a
duty to supervise. Once assumed, that duty had to be performed
with due care. See Cottam, 764 N.E.2d at 821.
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StudentCity also points to a sentence in the memorandum
accompanying its summary judgment motion, to the effect that
"StudentCity owed no such duty [the breach of] which was the
proximate cause of Lisa Tam Chung's death." This statement plainly
went to duty, not causation, as a basis for summary judgment.
Consequently, we conclude, without serious question, that
StudentCity never raised causation as a ground for summary
judgment.
Because causation was not placed in issue, we deem the
district court's decision to base its ruling on that ground to be
"a species of sua sponte summary judgment." Berkovitz v. Home Box
Office, Inc., 89 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 1996). While a district
court may in rare circumstances enter summary judgment on a ground
not raised by any party, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)(2), that power
should be exercised sparingly and "with great circumspection,"
Stella v. Town of Tewksbury, 4 F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir. 1993). The
"spontaneous nature" of the district court's action, though, does
not affect our de novo standard of review. Berkovitz, 89 F.3d at
30; accord John G. Alden, Inc. of Mass. v. John G. Alden Ins.
Agency of Fla., Inc., 389 F.3d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 2004).
When considering the boundaries of a district court's
authority to grant summary judgment sua sponte, we have regularly
imposed two constraints: first, discovery must be "sufficiently
advanced" to afford the parties "a reasonable opportunity to glean
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the material facts"; and second, the "targeted party" must have
been given "notice and a chance to present its evidence on the
essential elements of the claim or defense." Berkovitz, 89 F.3d
at 29; accord Block Island Fishing, Inc. v. Rogers, 844 F.3d 358,
363 (1st Cir. 2016); Wells Real Estate Inv. Trust II, Inc. v.
Chardon/Hato Rey P'ship, S.E., 615 F.3d 45, 51 (1st Cir. 2010).
These conditions afford important protections: access to discovery
ensures that a litigant has an opportunity to learn the relevant
facts, and notice that an issue is in play ensures that a litigant
has an opportunity to put his best foot forward. Both safeguards
are applicable where, as here, the district court grants summary
judgment on a ground not previously raised. See Block Island
Fishing, 844 F.3d at 363.
In applying these tenets, discovery is deemed to be
sufficiently advanced once it has "proceeded to the point where
the parties underst[an]d the material facts." Sanchez v. Triple-
S Mgmt., Corp., 492 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Penobscot
Indian Nation v. Key Bank of Me., 112 F.3d 538, 562 (1st Cir.
1997)). This means, at a minimum, that there must be a reasonable
opportunity to conduct discovery on a particular issue. Here, the
plaintiffs were not given the chance to conduct any discovery at
all on the causation issue. The district court's order reserving
decision on the summary judgment motion, fairly read, contemplated
discovery on only two factual issues: the existence of a duty to
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supervise (that is "whether defendant voluntarily undertook a duty
to ensure the safety of trip participants") and whether StudentCity
breached its duty to investigate SMA (that is, "whether defendant
knew or should have known about [SMA]'s dubious prior safety
record"). Chung I, 2013 WL 6528516, at *2.
Subsequent proceedings and communications drove home the
circumscribed scope of the permitted discovery. When the parties
expressed uncertainty about the reach of the court's order, the
plaintiffs sought to confirm (by an e-mail to the court clerk)
"that the fact discovery deadline . . . only relates to the facts
related to the summary judgment issue of whether the defendant had
a duty to protect the decedent and the deadline does not relate to
all fact discovery on all issues in the event the motion for
summary judgment is denied." The clerk responded that discovery
was so limited and that "if the motion is denied, I will set up
another hearing for the parties to come in and talk to the Judge."
StudentCity's counsel was copied on both parts of this e-mail
exchange.
StudentCity's own objections to the plaintiffs'
discovery requests support our conclusion that discovery was
limited and excluded causation. In framing these objections,
StudentCity insisted that discovery was limited to "whether [it]
represented to Lisa Chung that it would be providing supervision
on the snorkeling excursion, the scope of that allegedly-assumed
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duty, whether that duty was breached, and whether StudentCity
negligently selected [SMA]." Causation was not mentioned — a fact
that undercuts StudentCity's assertion (at oral argument in this
court) that the plaintiffs could have deposed its employees freely
to seek information on the cause of Lisa's death. That assertion
is also undercut by the fact that, during discovery, StudentCity
objected to providing "the name and contact information of all
employees of [StudentCity] responsible for supervision and student
safety on the date of the subject accident."4
Later, the district court, acting on a motion to compel,
issued an order that confirmed the circumscribed nature of the
permitted discovery:
In its previous order the court allowed the parties to
conduct discovery limited to certain issues raised by
defendant's motion for summary judgment. They include
(1) representations made to the plaintiffs, both,
participants and their parents, concerning the safety of
participants; (2) investigations defendant undertook of
the entities engaged for particular activities and of
any brokers or agents who assisted the selection of such
entities; (3) defendant's knowledge of the
qualifications of the owners and crew of the vessel in
issue; and (4) any other information that bears on
defendant's duty, if any, to ensure participants' safety
and how they performed that duty.
4 Even though StudentCity proceeded to furnish this
information, it restated its belief "that this request
. . . exceeds the scope of the Court's . . . order in that it is
not limited to whether StudentCity assumed a duty to supervise the
June 7, 2008 snorkeling excursion."
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Chung v. StudentCity.com, Inc., No. 10-10943, 2014 WL 644439, at
*1 (D. Mass. Feb. 19, 2014). The purport of this order was quite
clear.5 And if any doubt lingered about the limited scope of the
permitted discovery, that doubt was erased when the parties (after
the discovery period ended) filed their supplemental briefing.
Most telling was StudentCity's supplemental brief, which declared:
the only issues are (1) whether StudentCity negligently
selected the Sea Star and thus could be held liable to
the plaintiffs on a negligent selection theory or (2)
whether StudentCity voluntarily assumed a duty where one
would not otherwise exist to ensure Lisa Chung's safety
on board the Sea Star.
The district court's summary judgment order overlooks
the restricted nature of the parties' opportunity to develop the
facts. It incorrectly states that "[d]iscovery is now complete."
It makes no mention of the limitation theretofore imposed on
discovery. The order, which turned on an issue not argued by the
parties and as to which no discovery had been allowed, was beyond
the district court's authority. "When a court charts a procedural
route, lawyers and litigants are entitled to rely on it."
Berkovitz, 89 F.3d at 30.
5 StudentCity argues that the phrase "how they performed that
duty" imports some ambiguity into the order. Given the context,
we do not think that a reasonably prudent lawyer would have
believed that this oblique reference, without more, opened the
door for unlimited discovery. Cf. Benitez-Garcia v. Gonzalez-
Vega, 468 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2006) (explaining that failure to
honor discovery orders may expose attorneys to sanctions).
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To compound the error, the plaintiffs had no notice that
causation was an issue ripe for decision at this stage of the case.
It is common ground that, as a precondition to the entry of summary
judgment, the targeted party must be "on notice that she had to
come forward with all of her evidence." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986). In this context, adequate notice has
two components: "the summary judgment target is entitled to know
both the grounds that the district court will consider and the
point at which her obligation to bring forth evidence supporting
the elements of her claim accrues." Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75,
79 (1st Cir. 1999). Here, the plaintiffs were not seasonably
apprised that the court would consider the causation issue, nor
were they put on notice to adduce evidence supporting their view
of that issue.
In Block Island Fishing, we suggested, albeit without
deciding, that it may be necessary to show prejudice when seeking
to vacate a sua sponte summary judgment. See 844 F.3d at 364 &
n.1. Here, the plaintiffs have satisfied any such burden. For
one thing, there is every reason to believe that discovery directed
at causation would have shed light on whether StudentCity's acts
or omissions contributed to Lisa's death. For another thing, even
on this underdeveloped record, the district court's conclusion
(that no reasonable jury could find that a breach of StudentCity's
voluntarily assumed duty to supervise caused Lisa's death) is far
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from ironclad. The district court stated, without any elaboration,
that "Lisa's death resulted not from inadequate supervision by
StudentCity staff, but rather from the boat accident caused by the
overloading of the Sea Star and its negligent operation by [SMA]."
As we explain below, the facts do not necessarily support that
leap in logic.
The plaintiffs' flagship claim is that StudentCity's
failure to supervise the snorkeling excursion, in combination with
the shipowner's negligence, caused Lisa's death. The district
court's reasoning seems to give insufficient weight to the
venerable rule that more than one tortfeasor can be held
responsible for a single incident. See Shantigar Found. v. Bear
Mtn. Builders, 804 N.E.2d 324, 332 (Mass. 2004) ("Under our current
system of joint and several liability, a plaintiff injured by more
than one tortfeasor may sue any or all of them for her full
damages.").
On the meager record before us, numerous potential jury
questions loom. For example, would an on-duty StudentCity
representative, if on board at the commencement of the voyage,
have thought that the boat was overcrowded and confronted its
captain and crew?6 Would that representative have prevented the
6 In this regard, we note that StudentCity admitted, through
the deposition of its director of operations, see Fed. R. Civ. P.
30(b), that its employees should step in to quell "obvious"
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passengers from congregating on one side of the vessel, and thus
avoided its tragic imbalance? Would StudentCity supervision have
effected a more efficient emergency exit for Lisa, particularly in
view of the fact that some Sea Star crew members deserted ship?
The answers to these (and other) questions of fact are
not certain. What is certain, though, is that none of these
questions was properly before the district court at summary
judgment.
To say more would be to paint the lily. The record
reflects that the district court granted summary judgment for
StudentCity on an issue — causation — as to which no discovery had
been allowed and no notice had been afforded. That was error, and
manifestly not harmless. The summary judgment ruling, therefore,
must be set aside.
III. CONCLUSION
We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,
we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Vacated and Remanded. Costs shall be taxed in favor of the
plaintiffs.
dangers. At an event not run by StudentCity, this might include
alerting the managers of the gathering to the danger.
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