United States v. Houston

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 16-1017
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
ALVIN HOUSTON, JR., a/k/a/ Chip,
Defendant, Appellant,
No. 16-1020
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
SHAWNA CALHOUN,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Jon D. Levy, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Circuit Judge,
Souter, Associate Justice,*
and Baldock, Circuit Judge.**
* The Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.) of
the Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation.
** Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Syrie D. Fried on brief for appellant Houston.
Jeffrey W. Langholtz on brief for appellant Calhoun.
Renée M. Bunker, Assistant United States Attorney, and
Thomas E. Delahanty II, United States Attorney, on brief for
appellee.
May 19, 2017
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BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. Defendants Alvin Houston,
Jr., and Shawna Calhoun pleaded guilty to charges of
transporting Minor A from Maine to Massachusetts and back to
Maine over an eight-day period with the intent that Minor A
engage in prostitution. See 18 U.S.C. § 2421. The district
court sentenced each Defendant to 108 months' imprisonment. In
these consolidated appeals, Houston asserts the district court
erroneously applied sentencing enhancements for undue influence
and computer use, U.S.S.G. §§ 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) & (b)(3)(B), and
the government breached the terms of a proffer agreement in its
sentencing memorandum. Calhoun argues the district court failed
to adequately weigh the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors when
fashioning her sentence. Exercising jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and concluding that all these claims lack merit,
we affirm.
I.
When, as here, a sentencing appeal follows a guilty
plea, we obtain the facts from the change-of-plea colloquy, the
unchallenged portions of the presentence investigation report,
and the record of the disposition hearing. United States v.
Dávila-González, 595 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 2010). "We rehearse
only those facts that are needed to put the claims of error into
context." Id.
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On December 13, 2014, Minor A contacted Calhoun via
Facebook. In response to a question about her age, Minor A, who
was 13 years old, wrote that she was 15. Calhoun replied,
"[W]hat I do you need to be of age." They later discussed
meeting up to travel from Maine to either Massachusetts or New
York.
Calhoun asked her acquaintance Houston to rent a car
to drive Calhoun and Minor A from Maine to Boston,
Massachusetts. In exchange, the group would pay his expenses
and he could visit his child in Boston. On December 23, Houston
drove Calhoun, Minor A, and another individual from Maine to
Boston. While in Boston, Calhoun used her smartphone to prepare
online advertisements on Backpage.com to market her own and
Minor A's sexual services. Calhoun coached Minor A on how to
post to Backpage.com and also purchased condoms for Minor A to
use. Houston, meanwhile, drove Minor A to various locations in
the Boston area to engage in prostitution, and Minor A provided
the money from these encounters to Calhoun. Both Houston and
Calhoun learned Minor A's true age either at the outset of the
trip or while in Boston.
On December 30, Calhoun, Houston, and Minor A learned
the FBI was looking for Minor A in Massachusetts. Houston then
drove the group to Bangor, Maine. While en route, they stopped
briefly in the Lewiston/Auburn area, near Minor A's hometown.
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Minor A hid in the backseat of the car because the group knew
the authorities and her mother were looking for her.
Advertisements for Minor A's sexual services in the Bangor area
were posted to Backpage.com, and Minor A again performed sexual
services for money.
Early in the morning on December 31, Calhoun and
Houston drove Minor A to a hotel in the Bangor area so that she
could meet with a client. The purported client was a law
enforcement detective who identified himself after Minor A
entered the hotel room. Police then arrested Calhoun and
Houston, who were in the parking lot in the rental car.
That same day, Houston waived his Miranda rights and
agreed to speak with the police. He said he knew that Minor A
and Calhoun had both been engaging in prostitution at different
hotels, that he had driven them to Boston and back to Maine, and
that they paid for his expenses during the trip.
In January 2015, Houston and Calhoun were charged in a
one-count complaint with transporting an individual in
interstate commerce with the intent that she engage in
prostitution, and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2421 and § 2.
The following month, Houston agreed to provide
information relating to the human trafficking of Minor A via a
proffer agreement. The government agreed not to offer Houston's
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statements from the proffer session in evidence in its case-in-
chief or in connection with a sentencing proceeding, except in a
prosecution for false statements or perjury. But the terms of
the agreement also provided that, in the event of a prosecution,
the government would provide Houston's statements to the
district court. The parties acknowledged that the government
could not bind the district court from using the statements to
the extent permitted by law.
In March 2015, Calhoun and Houston were charged in a
one-count indictment with the trafficking charges from the
January complaint. Calhoun and Houston each pleaded guilty
without a plea agreement. Their separate Revised Presentence
Investigation Reports (PSRs) calculated the same offense level
under the Guidelines. Starting with a base offense level of 24
under U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3, the PSRs computed 2-level enhancements
for unduly influencing Minor A under subsection (b)(2)(B); 2-
level enhancements for use of a computer under subsection
(b)(3); 2-level enhancements as the offense involved the
commission of a sex act under subsection (b)(4)(A); and 3-level
reductions for accepting responsibility, resulting in total
offense levels of 27. As Calhoun and Houston's prior
convictions placed them both in criminal history category III,
their Guidelines ranges were 87–108 months' imprisonment.
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In December 2015, the district court held separate
sentencing hearings for Calhoun and Houston. Overruling
Houston's objections to the undue-influence and computer-use
enhancements, the district court accepted all of the suggested
enhancements and reductions and sentenced each Defendant to 108
months' imprisonment. Calhoun and Houston now appeal their
sentences for the reasons described below.
II.
A.
Houston argues the district court erred in applying
U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B), which provides for a two-level
enhancement when "a participant . . . unduly influenced a minor
to engage in prohibited sexual conduct."1 To the extent Houston
objected to the undue-influence enhancement below, we review
under a multifaceted abuse of discretion standard, in which we
review the district court's interpretation of the Guidelines de
novo, its findings of fact for clear error, and its judgment
calls for abuse of discretion. United States v. Leahy, 668 F.3d
18, 21 (1st Cir. 2012). But we review the specific claims of
error Houston failed to preserve for plain error. Under that
standard, Houston must establish that (1) an error occurred;
1A “participant” is “a person who is criminally
responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have
been convicted.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.1; see U.S.S.G.
§ 2G1.3 cmt. n.1 (referring to the application notes of § 3B1.1
to define “participant”).
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(2) the error was clear or obvious; (3) the error affected his
substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously impaired the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial
proceedings. United States v. Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d 223, 226
(1st Cir. 2015).
Houston does not dispute that Calhoun warranted the
enhancement for her conduct, but he faults the district court
for accepting the government's "simplistic" argument that
Calhoun's conduct as a "participant" could be attributed to him
as relevant conduct. To qualify as a defendant's relevant
conduct, acts and omissions of others that occurred during, in
preparation for, or while attempting to avoid detection of an
offense must be "(i) within the scope of the jointly undertaken
criminal activity, (ii) in furtherance of that criminal
activity, and (iii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with
that criminal activity." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). Houston
argues the district court held him vicariously liable for
Calhoun's manipulation and undue influence over Minor A without
making an individualized finding that Calhoun's conduct was
"within the scope" of the criminal activity to which he agreed
to jointly undertake. Because Houston did not make this
specific argument before the district court, but instead argued
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that he himself did not unduly influence Minor A, we review this
argument for plain error.2
Contrary to Houston's assertion, the district court
did not uncritically hold Houston vicariously liable for all of
Calhoun's conduct, nor did it find that the scope of Houston's
involvement was identical to Calhoun's. The district court did
not, for example, hold Houston responsible for conduct that
predated his involvement, such as Calhoun's Facebook
communications with Minor A. Instead, the district court
focused on events that took place after Houston joined the
criminal activity. The court found that Houston "participated
actively with Calhoun" and facilitated her manipulation of Minor
A by driving Calhoun and Minor A, renting motel rooms, and
sleeping in the same room or same car with Calhoun and Minor A.
Although the district court could have more specifically
delineated the scope of the criminal activity Houston agreed to
undertake, the court nonetheless indicated that Calhoun's
conduct was within that scope because Houston actively
2
We make a distinction between events that predated
Houston’s involvement and those events that took place after he
agreed to take part in the criminal activity. While Houston
urged the district court not to hold him responsible for
Calhoun’s manipulation over Minor A that predated his
involvement, he did not argue that Calhoun’s undue influence
over Minor A that occurred after he became involved was outside
the scope of the activity he agreed to jointly undertake. As to
the latter conduct, Houston disregarded the enhancement’s
discussion of a “participant” and instead argued to the district
court that he did not do anything to unduly influence Minor A.
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participated in the offense and facilitated Calhoun's conduct.
See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.3(B) (U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 2015)
(directing a court to determine the scope of criminal activity
the defendant agreed to jointly undertake, and allowing the
court to consider "any explicit agreement or implicit agreement
fairly inferred from the conduct of the defendant and others").3
The district court did not plainly err by inferring
that Calhoun's undue influence over Minor A that took place
after Houston began participating in the offense was within the
scope of the criminal activity he implicitly agreed to
undertake. Houston pleaded guilty to transporting Minor A with
the intent that she engage in prostitution. Houston relied on
Calhoun's and Minor A's success in prostitution activities to
pay for his lodging, food, and alcohol. He admitted to
3
In an amendment effective November 1, 2015, the
Sentencing Commission restructured § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) and its
commentary to “set out more clearly the three-step analysis” for
determining a defendant’s relevant conduct in offenses involving
multiple participants. U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 791. While the
commentary had previously addressed the “scope” element of the
analysis, the amendment specifically includes that element in
the text of the Guideline itself. Id. Houston’s revised PSR
states that it was prepared under the 2014 Guidelines Manual,
but we assume the district court used the 2015 Guidelines Manual
when sentencing. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11 (directing a sentencing
court to “use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that
the defendant is sentenced,” so long as doing so does not
violate the ex post facto clause of the Constitution). Although
the district court did not expressly set out each step of the
relevant conduct analysis, we cannot say it plainly erred in
this regard when Houston did not object to the lack of a
specific finding under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3.
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overhearing at least some of Calhoun's manipulative conduct over
Minor A, including negotiations with customers, yet he continued
to drive them between Massachusetts and Maine to meet with
customers and avoid authorities who were looking for Minor A.
Further, even when a defendant does not agree to the
precise conduct of another participant, the participant's
conduct may still be within the scope of the jointly undertaken
criminal activity. For example, the Guidelines commentary
explains that a defendant who agrees to commit a robbery is
accountable for the other defendant's assault and injury of a
victim during the robbery, "even if the . . . defendant had not
agreed to the assault and had cautioned the [other] defendant to
be careful not to hurt anyone." See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt.
n.3(D). In that case, "the assaultive conduct was within the
scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity (the robbery),
was in furtherance of that criminal activity (the robbery), and
was reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal
activity (given the nature of the offense)." Id.
The district court likewise did not abuse its
discretion in determining that Houston's own conduct qualified
for the undue-influence enhancement. First, the district court
applied a rebuttable presumption that Houston unduly influenced
Minor A because of their age difference—he was 27 and she was
13. See U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3 cmt. n.3(B) (providing for a
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rebuttable presumption of undue influence when a participant is
at least ten years older than the minor). Houston asserts in a
footnote that it would be impossible to rebut this presumption
when the district court applied it on a theory of vicarious
liability, but the district court did not focus solely on
Calhoun's conduct.4 Rather, the court found Houston's unique
role in the offense compromised the voluntariness of Minor A's
behavior, including driving Minor A across state borders away
from her family and familiar surroundings. Additionally,
Houston drove Minor A to various locations to meet with adult
4
Even if the district court did apply the enhancement
solely based on Calhoun’s conduct, we disagree with the premise
that Houston could not rebut the presumption of undue influence
because of their age difference. The case he cites for support,
United States v. Chriswell, 401 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2005), is
inapposite. In Chriswell, the Sixth Circuit refused to apply
the undue-influence enhancement in cases involving undercover
agents portraying imaginary minor victims. Id. at 469. The
Sixth Circuit reasoned that applying the enhancement, along with
its rebuttable presumption, would “render[] the presumption
irrebuttable” because an undercover officer can always portray
the victim “as an unwilling and inexperienced victim whose will
is easily overcome,” making it “virtually impossible” for a
defendant to show that “the victim’s will was not overcome.”
Id. at 470.
We do not face the same problem of an “irrebuttable
presumption” here, even when applying the enhancement based on a
different participant’s conduct. A defendant may always point
to evidence that the other participant did not unduly influence
the minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct. Houston did
not have that option available in this case because even he
agrees that Calhoun’s conduct easily warrants the enhancement,
but that does not render the presumption irrebuttable as a rule.
And so long as that participant’s conduct is relevant to the
defendant under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, the plain text of the
Guideline allows a sentencing court to apply the undue-influence
enhancement for the conduct of the “participant.”
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men for sexual encounters, thus giving her few options other
than engaging in prohibited sexual conduct. Contrary to
Houston's arguments, the district court faithfully discharged
its duty to "closely consider the facts of the case to determine
whether a participant's influence over the minor compromised the
voluntariness of the minor's behavior." U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3 cmt.
n.3(B). The district court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that Houston failed to rebut the presumption that he
unduly influenced Minor A. Between Calhoun's conduct and
Houston's own role in the offense, we affirm the district
court's application of the undue-influence enhancement to
Houston.
B.
Houston also argues the district court erred in
applying the computer-use enhancement under U.S.S.G.
§ 2G1.3(b)(3). Specifically, he contends the enhancement does
not apply to him because the application note limits the
enhancement's scope. We review this legal argument de novo.
See Leahy, 668 F.3d at 21.
Under § 2G1.3(b)(3), a defendant is subject to a two-
level enhancement "[i]f the offense involved the use of a
computer . . . to (A) persuade, induce, entice, coerce, or
facilitate the travel of, the minor to engage in prohibited
sexual conduct; or (B) entice, encourage, offer, or solicit a
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person to engage in prohibited sexual conduct with the minor."
Application Note 4 to this section states:
Subsection (b)(3) is intended to apply only to
the use of a computer or an interactive computer
service to communicate directly with a minor or
with a person who exercises custody, care, or
supervisory control of the minor. Accordingly,
the enhancement in subsection (b)(3) would not
apply to the use of a computer or an interactive
computer service to obtain airline tickets for
the minor from an airline's Internet site.
U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3 cmt. n.4. There is obvious tension between the
plain text of the Guideline in subpart (b)(3)(B), which involves
using a computer to "solicit a person to engage in prohibited
sexual conduct with the minor," and Application Note 4, which
only mentions using a computer to communicate with a minor or a
minor's caretaker. "[C]ommentary in the Guidelines Manual that
interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it
violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is
inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that
guideline." Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993).
Today, we join the Circuit courts that have concluded
Application Note 4 is inconsistent with the plain language of
U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(3)(B). See United States v. Gibson, 840
F.3d 512, 514 (8th Cir. 2016); United States v. Hill, 783 F.3d
842, 846 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Cramer, 777 F.3d
597, 606 (2d Cir. 2015); United States v. McMillian, 777 F.3d
444, 450 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Pringler, 765 F.3d
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445, 454 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Winbush, 524 F. App'x
914, 916 (4th Cir. 2013) (unpublished). As these courts have
recognized, § 2G1.3(b)(3) "has two distinct subsections, one
relating to inducement of a minor and the other relating to
solicitation of a third party." Cramer, 777 F.3d at 606. If
the drafters of the Guidelines intended Application Note 4 to
apply to subsection (b)(3)(B), "it would render Subsection 3(B)
inoperable in all but [a] narrow subset of cases under only one
of the criminal statutes the Guideline covers." Pringler, 765
F.3d at 454 (noting that although the Guideline covers six
statutory provisions, only a specific scenario under one of the
statutes—18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)—could satisfy both the plain text
of the Guideline and the Application Note). But "there is no
indication that the drafters of the Guidelines intended to limit
th[e] plain language [of subsection (b)(3)(B)] through
Application Note 4." Cramer, 777 F.3d at 606. Instead, as the
Fifth Circuit observed, the Guideline's drafting history shows
that the application note was originally meant to apply only to
subsection (A), not to subsection (B). Pringler, 765 F.3d at
455. The amendment that changed the application note to
encompass both subsections "was a mere drafting error." Id.
Applying Stinson, we conclude Application Note 4 is not
authoritative as to subsection (b)(3)(B). This reading of
Application Note 4 does not, as Houston argues, "nullify" the
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note "altogether," as it still applies to explain and clarify
subsection (b)(3)(A).
The district court did not err when it disregarded
Application Note 4 and instead applied the plain text of the
computer-use enhancement in § 2G1.3(b)(3)(B). The district
court applied the enhancement to Houston because he jointly
undertook criminal activity that involved using smartphones to
solicit men to engage in prohibited sexual conduct with Minor A.
We affirm the enhancement.
C.
Houston's final argument is that the government
breached the proffer agreement by referencing statements he made
during the proffer session in its sentencing memorandum.
Because Houston did not object below, we review for plain error.
See Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d at 226 (providing the four prongs of
plain error review).
"Informal immunity agreements, such as proffer
agreements, 'are shaped . . . by the language of the contract
conferring immunity.'" United States v. Melvin, 730 F.3d 29, 37
(1st Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Hogan, 862 F.2d 386,
388 (1st Cir. 1988)). Houston's brief relies on and heavily
quotes from the Proffer Agreement. As such, we directly quote
portions of the Proffer Agreement's terms:
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(2) In any prosecution brought against
[Houston] . . . , the Government will not offer
in evidence in its case-in-chief, or in
connection with any sentencing proceeding for the
purpose of determining an appropriate sentence,
any statements made by [Houston] at the meeting,
except in a prosecution for false statements,
obstruction of justice or perjury with respect to
any acts committed or statements made during or
after the meeting or testimony given after the
meeting. The parties understand, however, that
in the event of a prosecution of [Houston], the
Government will provide to the Court the
information which [Houston] provides pursuant to
this Agreement. The parties understand that,
while the Government will not introduce
[Houston's] statements in evidence except as
permitted in this agreement, the Government
cannot bind the Court as to its appropriate use
of such information and that the Court will use
such information to the extent permitted by law.
(3) Notwithstanding item (2) above: . . . the
Government may also use statements made by
[Houston] at the meeting to rebut any evidence or
arguments offered by or on behalf of [Houston]
(including arguments made or issues raised sua
sponte by the District Court) at any stage of the
criminal prosecution (including bail, all phases
of trial, and sentencing) in any prosecution
brought against [Houston].
Houston contends the government breached these terms when it
asked the district court to apply the computer-use enhancement
to Houston. Specifically, in his brief, he faults the
government's sentencing memorandum for urging the district court
to
infer from all of the evidence, including
[Houston's] post-arrest statements, that
[Houston] would have been aware of the repeated
use of phones to post advertisements for Minor
A's services given the extensive amount of time
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[Houston], Calhoun, and Minor A spent together
over an approximately 8-day period.
Houston contends that "the only support" for the government's
argument that he was aware of Calhoun and Minor A's repeated use
of phones to post advertisements came from his statements during
the proffer session when he admitted driving Calhoun and Minor A
to a drugstore to purchase pre-paid Visa cards to post
advertisements on Backpage.com. And he argues that, by
definition, his proffer statements are post-arrest statements,
and thus, the government improperly urged the district court to
consider the protected statements.
But Houston has divorced the government's argument
from its context. In the sentencing memorandum, the government
quotes the statements Houston made during the first interview
after he was arrested—his "post-arrest statements"—not the
statements he made during his proffer session. During that
initial interview the morning Houston was arrested, two officers
asked Houston how customers found Calhoun's number to set up
sexual encounters with Calhoun or Minor A. Houston responded,
"I don't know. That's on their phone. That's on their phone.
They do everything on their phone. I don't do. I told you I
drive." Read in context, the government urged the district
court to infer from these post-arrest statements that Houston
was aware that Calhoun and Minor A regularly used a phone to
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post advertisements. The government did not mention or refer to
Houston's proffer session statements.
The district court latched onto Houston's proffer
session statements during sentencing but not at the government's
request. When Houston argued at sentencing that there was "not
a single objective fact that the Government can point to in
which [Houston is] involved in any degree with the use of a
computer in this case," the district court asked about Houston's
role in driving Minor A and Calhoun to a drugstore to purchase
Visa cards to post ads on Backpage.com. In line with the terms
of the agreement, the government had submitted the proffer
session record to the district court, and, also consistent with
the terms, the district court could then rely on that evidence
to the extent permitted by law. Houston has not argued that the
district court erred in relying on the proffer session
statements sua sponte. The fact that the district court seized
on the statements does not show that the government
impermissibly urged the court to do so; it shows only that the
district court independently reviewed the statements and used
them to rebut Houston's argument that he was not involved in
using a computer in this case. The government did not breach
the terms of the proffer agreement. We see no error, plain or
otherwise.
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III.
We turn now to Calhoun's argument on appeal that the
district court abused its discretion by failing to carefully
consider all the evidence presented during sentencing and
adequately weigh the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. She contends
the district court relied too heavily on the nature of the
offense and the value of deterrence, while minimizing mitigating
evidence of Calhoun's own difficult childhood in which she was
sexually abused, grew up in violent households, was introduced
to the drug world by relatives, and entered a series of abusive
relationships.
To the extent Calhoun has attempted to raise a
procedural error—that the district court "fail[ed] to consider
the § 3553(a) factors," Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007)—we review for plain error since Calhoun did not object
below, see Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d at 226. A district court
must consider all the relevant § 3553(a) factors, but it does
not need to address each factor, "one by one, in some sort of
rote incantation when explicating its sentencing decision."
United States v. Dixon, 449 F.3d 194, 205 (1st Cir. 2006). When
the district court explicitly states that it has considered all
of the § 3553(a) factors, "[s]uch a statement 'is entitled to
some weight.'" United States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588, 592
(1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Dávila-González, 595 F.3d at 49).
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After adopting the Revised PSR's Guidelines
calculations, the district court outlined the circumstances of
the offense as well as Calhoun's criminal and personal history,
and then stated it "considered all the sentencing factors
authorized by law." The district court went on to address the
seriousness of the offense, Minor A's vulnerability, Calhoun's
history of criminal conduct, the need to protect the public and
deter Calhoun from criminal conduct, the importance of
treatment, and its task in determining a just punishment in
light of Calhoun's guilty plea and personal history as a victim.
The district court considered all the § 3553(a) factors and
simply focused its analysis on the factors it considered most
relevant. Further, a within-Guidelines sentence requires less
explanation than one that varies from the Guidelines range.
Clogston, 662 F.3d at 592. We discern no procedural error,
plain or otherwise.
To the extent Calhoun attempts to argue the district
court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence, we note
that the applicable standard of review "is somewhat blurred"
because she did not object below. See Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d at
228 (declining to decide whether a defendant must "preserve a
claim that the duration of a sentence is substantively
unreasonable" to avoid plain error review). But whether we
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review for abuse of discretion or plain error, Calhoun's
substantive reasonableness argument fails.
Calhoun primarily alleges that the district court
overemphasized the seriousness of the offense and value of
deterrence, while minimizing the mitigating factors of Calhoun's
personal history and difficult childhood. But this complaint
amounts to little more than a disagreement over how to weigh the
various § 3553(a) factors. The district court addressed
Calhoun's "predatory conduct" in transporting a 13-year-old for
prostitution, but it also considered Calhoun's difficult
upbringing, noting that she too had been victimized in the past.
In the end, the district court concluded that as a mother,
Calhoun understood what she was doing and how it would impact
Minor A, and thus, the mitigating circumstances did not require
a lesser sentence. The district court was well within its
discretion in determining how much weight to give the various
factors. See Clogston, 662 F.3d at 593 ("A sentencing court is
under a mandate to consider a myriad of relevant factors, but
the weighting of those factors is largely within the court's
informed discretion."). In sentencing Calhoun to 108 months in
prison, the district court provided a plausible rationale and
reached a defensible result within the range of reasonable
sentences. See United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 96 (1st
Cir. 2008) ("[T]he linchpin of a reasonable sentence is a
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plausible sentencing rationale and a defensible result."). The
district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable
sentence.
IV.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the sentences
the district court imposed on Defendants Alvin Houston, Jr., and
Shawna Calhoun.
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