Bead v. Holder, Jr.

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 12-1434
EBENEZER JACKSON BEAD,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Boudin* and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
Gregory C. Osakwe on brief for petitioner.
Robert Michael Stalzer, Trial Attorney, United States
Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Stuart F.
Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, and
Thomas B. Fatouros, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of
Immigration Litigation, on brief for respondent.
January 7, 2013
*
Judge Boudin heard oral argument in this matter and
participated in the semble, but he did not participate in the
issuance of the panel's opinion in this case. The remaining two
panelists therefore issued the opinion pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 46(d).
STAHL, Circuit Judge. In 2007, an Immigration Judge (IJ)
ruled that petitioner Ebenezer Jackson Bead had abandoned his
asylum application by failing to provide biometric information to
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Three years later, Bead
moved to reopen his case, arguing that he had received ineffective
assistance of counsel. We agree with the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) that Bead's motion to reopen was untimely, and we
therefore deny the petition for review.
I. Facts & Background
Bead, a native and citizen of Liberia, entered the United
States without inspection on an unknown date. In April 2003, he
filed for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture (CAT). He was referred into removal
proceedings in September 2003. Bead appeared without counsel at
two initial master calendar hearings. At a third master calendar
hearing in October 2004, he appeared with an attorney. Bead
conceded his removability, and the IJ scheduled a merits hearing
for December 2006 to adjudicate Bead's applications for asylum,
withholding of removal, and CAT protection. She also reminded Bead
to get his fingerprints taken.
In February 2006, the IJ directed Bead's attorney to
provide proof, by May 15, 2006, that Bead had submitted biometric
and biographical information to DHS, as required by 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.47. There was no response. As a result, in February 2007,
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the IJ found that Bead had abandoned his asylum application, see
id. § 1003.47(c), and ordered him removed to Liberia. Bead did not
appeal that decision.
In February 2010, Bead moved to reopen his case, arguing
that he had received ineffective assistance from his prior counsel,
who had failed (Bead said) to submit the biometric information and
to notify Bead that he had been ordered removed. Bead attached an
affidavit, which explained that he did not learn of the removal
order until June 2009, when, after attempting in vain to contact
his prior counsel, he obtained new counsel, who inquired about the
status of the case. The affidavit further stated that Bead had
filed a bar complaint against his prior counsel in July 2009. Also
attached to the motion were the bar complaint and Bead's prior
counsel's responses thereto, which asserted that Bead had hired him
only for the October 2004 master calendar hearing and had not paid
him for that appearance. Bead's prior counsel claimed that Bead
had confessed to him that he had lied in his asylum application and
that he planned to abandon the application rather than risk
discovery of that deception. Finally, Bead's prior counsel stated
that, upon receiving the removal order, he had given Bead a copy in
person. DHS did not file a response to Bead's motion to reopen.
The IJ denied the motion as untimely, because Bead had
filed it beyond the ninety-day limit established by 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.23(b)(1). She noted that this court has not yet decided
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whether equitable tolling is available in the immigration context,
but has held that, if so, tolling would be unavailable if the
petitioner has failed to exercise due diligence in pursuing his
case. See Nascimento v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2008).
She concluded that Bead had failed to demonstrate due diligence,
because he was present when his merits hearing was scheduled for
December 2006 and neither took action to pursue his case before
that date had passed, nor took steps to follow the court's
direction to have his fingerprints taken. She also found that,
even if Bead had learned of the removal order in June 2009 (as he
said), and not when it was issued (as his prior counsel said), his
unexplained delay in filing the motion to reopen until late
February 2010 further established a lack of diligence.1
The BIA affirmed, agreeing with the IJ that, even if the
equitable tolling doctrine applied, Bead had not established due
diligence, because he had failed to explain: (1) the three-year
delay between the issuance of the removal order and the filing of
his motion to reopen; or (2) the eight-month delay between his
alleged discovery of the removal order and the filing of his motion
to reopen. Bead now petitions for our review of that ruling.
1
The IJ also concluded that Bead had failed to show a
reasonable probability of prejudice, see Aponte v. Holder, 683 F.3d
6, 15 (1st Cir. 2012), given his prior counsel's allegations that
Bead planned to abandon his asylum application. We do not address
that finding here, since the BIA did not reach it. See Ouk v.
Keisler, 505 F.3d 63, 67 (1st Cir. 2007) (limiting our review to
those portions of the IJ's opinion that the BIA adopted).
-4-
II. Analysis
"The motion to reopen is an 'important safeguard'
intended 'to ensure a proper and lawful disposition' of immigration
proceedings." Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 834 (2010)
(quoting Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 18 (2008)). However, the BIA
enjoys "broad discretion" in deciding motions to reopen, and the
courts therefore employ "a deferential, abuse-of-discretion
standard of review." Id. (quoting INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314,
323 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Bead must
"show that the BIA committed an error of law or exercised its
judgment in an arbitrary, capricious, or irrational way." Raza v.
Gonzales, 484 F.3d 125, 127 (1st Cir. 2007). We review the BIA's
decision and "those portions of the IJ's opinion that the BIA has
adopted." Ouk v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 63, 67 (1st Cir. 2007)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
A motion to reopen removal proceedings must be filed
within ninety days of the final administrative decision, unless the
motion: (1) seeks rescission of an in absentia removal order;
(2) alleges changed country conditions; (3) is joined and agreed
upon by all parties; or (4) is filed by DHS. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.23(b)(1), (4). In his brief on appeal, Bead alludes to
exemptions one and three, but neither is applicable here.
Exemption one does not apply because Bead's removal order was not
in absentia. The in absentia hearing procedures are governed by 8
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U.S.C. § 1229a, while the IJ's authority to find a petitioner's
claims abandoned or waived derives from the regulations, e.g., 8
C.F.R. §§ 1003.31, 1003.47. Those determinations have different
substantive requirements, and there is nothing in either the
regulations or the statute to suggest that they are
interchangeable. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A) (authorizing
removal in absentia where a petitioner "does not attend a
proceeding" and is shown by clear and convincing evidence to be
removable), with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(c) (authorizing dismissal of an
application for failure to provide biometric and biographical
information); accord Williams-Igwonobe v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 453,
456 (5th Cir. 2006). As for exemption three, while 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.23(b)(1)(iv) required the IJ to treat Bead's motion to
reopen as unopposed because DHS did not respond to it, the motion
certainly was not "agreed upon by all parties and jointly filed,"
id. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iv).2
2
Equally lacking in merit is Bead's claim that the IJ and BIA
were not permitted to deny his motion to reopen because DHS never
responded to it. The regulations place the burden on the
petitioner to prove that reopening is appropriate, without any
exception for unopposed motions, and vest discretion in the IJ to
determine whether such a motion should be granted. See, e.g., 8
C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1)(iv) (stating that "[a] motion shall be
deemed unopposed unless timely response is made" but that "[t]he
decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen . . . is within the
discretion of the Immigration Judge"); id. § 1003.23(b)(3) ("The
Immigration Judge has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if
the moving party has established a prima facie case for relief.");
cf. Sousa v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 271, 273, 275 (1st Cir. 2005)
(affirming the denial of a motion to reconsider where DHS had
failed to oppose the motion below).
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That leaves Bead's argument that he should have the
benefit of the equitable tolling doctrine, which "provides that in
exceptional circumstances, a statute of limitations may be extended
for equitable reasons not acknowledged in the statute creating the
limitations period." Nascimento v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 12, 18 (1st
Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We
have yet to decide "whether the BIA has either the authority or the
obligation to apply equitable tolling in the immigration context."
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We have,
however, said that if the equitable tolling doctrine is available
to circumvent the statutory provision limiting motions to reopen,
it generally requires a petitioner to demonstrate that: (1) "he has
been pursuing his rights diligently"; and (2) "some extraordinary
circumstance stood in his way." Neves v. Holder, 613 F.3d 30, 36
(1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418
(2005)).
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Bead
had not diligently pursued his rights. See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at
834. Bead was present at the October 2004 master calendar hearing,
when the IJ scheduled his merits hearing for December 2006 and
directed him to get his fingerprints taken. The alleged
ineffective assistance began in May 2006, when Bead says his prior
counsel failed to submit the required biometric information.
Bead's affidavit provides no information about what, if any, steps
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he took to determine the status of his case until June 2009, when
he contacted a new attorney, almost five years after the master
calendar hearing. Bead's statement in his affidavit that he
"relied entirely on [his prior counsel] to advise [him] in [his]
removal hearing and file whatever documents [were] required," is
simply inadequate to demonstrate due diligence. See Jobe v. INS,
238 F.3d 96, 101 n.8 (1st Cir. 2001) (noting that the petitioner
"bears the burden of making a prima facie showing of entitlement to
equitable tolling, and therefore of filling in any gaps in the
record regarding whether his is a case warranting equitable
relief").
The affidavit is also silent as to what, if any,
communications Bead exchanged or tried to exchange with his prior
counsel during the five-year period between the master calendar
hearing and his consultation with a new attorney. It merely says
that he eventually contacted a new attorney "after trying in vain"
to reach his prior counsel. See Neves, 613 F.3d at 37 (affirming
the denial of a motion to reopen where the petitioner failed to
provide any details regarding "the dates or frequency of [his]
contacts" with his attorney over a three-year period between the
decision and his discovery of the ineffective assistance). Nor
does Bead's affidavit address why he then waited eight more months
to file a motion to reopen after learning of the removal order.
Those numerous unexplained delays foreclose any finding "that the
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[BIA] committed an error of law or exercised its judgment in an
arbitrary, capricious, or irrational way." Raza, 484 F.3d at 127.
The remainder of Bead's arguments on appeal are not
properly before us, because he failed to raise them before the BIA.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Silva v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 68, 72 (1st
Cir. 2006) ("Under the exhaustion of remedies doctrine, theories
insufficiently developed before the BIA may not be raised before
this court."). They include: (1) Bead's claim that Matter of
Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), required him to wait for
his prior counsel's response to his bar complaint before filing the
motion to reopen;3 (2) his contradictory claim (raised for the
first time in his reply brief) that Lozada actually does not apply
here, because the case should be governed either by the good-cause
standard in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(d) or by the exception to Lozada
articulated in Escobar-Grijalva v. INS, 206 F.3d 1331 (9th Cir.),
amended by 213 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir. 2000); and (3) his argument that
his due process rights were violated under Saakian v. INS, 252 F.3d
21 (1st Cir. 2001), because his ineffective assistance claim was
never adjudicated on the merits.
Finally, Bead challenges the IJ's February 2007 dismissal
of his application, but we lack jurisdiction to review that order,
3
In any event, Bead's Lozada argument does not explain the
further four-month delay between his prior counsel's October 2009
response to the bar complaint and the February 2010 filing of
Bead's motion to reopen.
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because Bead never appealed it to the BIA. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(d)(1).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for
review.
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