In Re Kersey

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 01-2746
IN RE: GEORGE E. KERSEY,
Petitioner.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Lipez, Circuit Judges.
George E. Kersey on brief pro se.
July 29, 2002
Per Curiam. Attorney George E. Kersey appeals from
a district court order suspending him from the practice of law
for three months and requiring that he purge himself of an out-
of-state contempt citation before seeking reinstatement. The
district court's sanction, coming in a reciprocal-discipline
case in New Hampshire, mirrors that imposed first by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC), see In re Kersey,
432 Mass. 1020 (2000) (rescript), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1127
(2001), and more recently by several other tribunals including
the New Hampshire Supreme Court, see In re Kersey, No. LD-2001-
006 (2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1206 (2002); cf. In re
Kersey, 797 A.2d 864 (N.H. 2002). We review a district court's
choice of sanction for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., In re
Cordova-Gonzalez, 996 F.2d 1334, 1335 (1st Cir. 1993) (per
curiam). None being apparent, we affirm.
Kersey's principal assignment of error consists of an
assault upon the SJC's decision. He acknowledges both that he
violated a 1993 order of the Vermont Family Court and that he
never purged himself of the ensuing contempt citation. Yet he
contends (without supporting documentation) that he had fully
complied with that order within a year of its issuance. For
this reason, Kersey asserts that the most appropriate sanction
was not a three-month suspension, as the SJC determined, but
rather a reprimand. As he notes, two other courts have deemed
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the latter sanction to be suitable punishment for his
misconduct. See In re Kersey, 170 N.J. 409 (2002); In re
Kersey, 729 N.Y.S.2d 780, 783 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (per
curiam). Yet as a matter of Massachusetts law, Kersey's
argument overlooks the SJC's conclusion that "the appropriate
discipline for Kersey, 432
Mass. at 1020-21 (quoting In re Ring, 427 Mass. 186, 192
(1998)). Even on the arguendo assumption that Kersey did
ultimately satisfy the Vermont order, therefore, the SJC's
sanction was fully supportable. His related complaint--that
following the SJC's approach would entail a grave injustice or
would be grossly disproportionate--thus falls short.
Accordingly, the district court was justified in concluding
that the four exceptions enumerated in its Disciplinary Rule
3(d), as appearing in that court's Local Rule 83.5, were
inapplicable.
Kersey's remaining arguments require scant comment.
He invokes the doctrine of laches, noting that the New
Hampshire Supreme Court allegedly learned of the contempt
citation in 1994 but waited until 2001 to initiate disciplinary
proceedings. It was the SJC's 2000 decision, however, that
triggered that process. Nor is there any indication that the
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district court knew of Kersey's status until the New Hampshire
Supreme Court acted. Kersey also points to a model rule
declaring that reinstatement should be automatic for any
suspension of six months or less. That rule, however, is
without binding effect here.
Affirmed.
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