In re: Kehoe v.

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 02-2161
IN RE: ANDREW J. KEHOE AND CATHERINE M. KEHOE,
Debtors.
NORMAN NOVINSKY,
Appellee,
v.
ANDREW J. KEHOE AND CATHERINE M. KEHOE,
Appellants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Lipez and Howard, Circuit Judges.
Brian J. Kelly, with whom Roland Orlandi was on brief for
appellants.
A. Neil Hartzell, with whom David J. Hatem, Adam P. Whitney,
and Donovan Hatem LLP, were on brief for appellee.
May 22, 2003
Per Curiam. The appellants in this case, Andrew and
Catherine Kehoe, appeal from the district court's denial of their
Rule 60(b)(1) motion to vacate a judgment of dismissal on the basis
of excusable neglect. The Kehoes' travels through the federal
courts began with their bankruptcy proceedings. After the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court granted Norman Novinsky's application for
reimbursement of legal fees for services rendered during the
Kehoes' bankruptcy proceeding, the Kehoes appealed to the District
Court of Massachusetts. After the district court dismissed their
appeal on November 10, 1999, on the ground that the Bankruptcy
Court's order was not an appealable final order, the Kehoes
appealed to this court. After granting a series of extensions
before oral argument, we vacated the dismissal on July 2, 2001, and
remanded the case to the district court for continued proceedings.
On August 30, 2001, the district court ordered a status
conference to be held on October 22, 2001. The court sent notice
of this conference to counsel of record. After neither the Kehoes
nor their counsel appeared at the conference, the court dismissed
the case on October 24, 2001. The Kehoes took no further action
until August 13, 2002, nearly ten months after the dismissal, when
they filed a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) to vacate
the judgment of dismissal. The District Court denied the motion,
and the Kehoes now appeal.
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The decision to grant relief from judgment under Rule
60(b) is committed to the sound discretion of the district court.
We reverse only if there has been an abuse of that discretion.
Stonkus v. City of Brockton Sch. Dep't, 322 F.3d 97, 100 (1st Cir.
2003). The Kehoes argue that they never received the notice of the
scheduling conference from the district court, and they cite their
status as pro se plaintiffs. Yet the Kehoes never informed the
clerk's office that they would be representing themselves.
Additionally, the Kehoes were aware that they had won their first
appeal to this court in July 2001, yet they waited more than a year
before inquiring into the status of their suit on remand. They
offered no explanation for this delay to the district court. While
no single factor is determinative of the 60(b)(1) issue, the
aggregation of relevant factors confirms that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for 60(b)(1)
relief.
Affirmed.
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