Field v. Hallett

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 20-1571
EUNICE FIELD,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
ALLISON HALLETT, Superintendent, MCI Framingham,
Respondent, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Denise J. Casper, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Thompson, and Gelpí,
Circuit Judges.
Elizabeth Caddick for appellant.
Maria Granik, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Maura
Healey, Attorney General, was on brief, for appellee.
June 14, 2022
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Eunice Field
("Field") seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 to vacate her conviction for murder in the first degree.
The conviction stems from Field fatally stabbing her ex-
girlfriend's Alcoholics Anonymous ("AA") sponsor Lorraine Wachsman
("Wachsman") nine times in the head, chest, and neck. After
Massachusetts' state courts denied Field's appeal of her
conviction and motions for a new trial, see Commonwealth v. Field,
79 N.E.3d 1037 (Mass. 2017), her claims made their way to the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts,
where she sought a writ of habeas corpus via 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as
amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub.
L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 ("AEDPA"). Field contended that
her trial counsel failed to provide her with her constitutionally
protected right to have effective assistance of counsel, but the
district court denied her petition. Field v. Hallett, No. 18-CV-
11618-DJC, 2020 WL 1821863 (D. Mass. Apr. 10, 2020). Given the
highly deferential leash to which we are strapped by the standards
governing this appeal, we affirm the district court's denial of
Field's petition.
A. Background
"We take the facts largely as recounted by the [SJC]
decision affirming [Field's] conviction, 'supplemented with other
record facts consistent with the SJC's findings.'" Yeboah-Sefah
- 2 -
v. Ficco, 556 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Healy v. Spencer,
453 F.3d 21, 22 (1st Cir. 2006)).
The Initial Encounter
Though not the traditional way to tell a story, we'll
start this tragic recounting in the middle of things, when Field
was first encountered by police. On the afternoon of August 9,
2010, police officers at the Brockton Police Department spotted a
car parked outside the lobby doors of the precinct, blocking the
exit area of the station. A woman who was later identified as
Field was in the driver's seat, smoking a cigarette and drinking
a coffee. Three officers approached her car and spoke with Field,
who complained of chest pain. She also stated that she was
bipolar. One of the officers asked her if she was well enough to
get out of the car so they could move it out of the way of the
exit, and when she agreed, the officer noticed blood on her hands
and forearms. The officer asked how she got the blood all over
her, and she replied, "I just killed someone."
How It Started
Let's back up now and fill in the backstory leading up
to the murder, cobbling together the story of what transpired with
the benefit of hindsight (i.e., using information provided in the
police interviews and trial testimony, as recounted in the state
court decision denying Field's motion for a new trial, and the
SJC's review of the same). Eunice Field was a fifty-four-year-
- 3 -
old woman at the time she committed this crime. In the years
leading up to its commission, Field had a history of suffering
from mental health and substance abuse disorders, the most
prominent of her issues being her battle with bipolar disorder.
Her ex-girlfriend, Renee Williams ("Williams"), testified at trial
that Field had been hospitalized at least ten times in twenty
years. At one point, she was in a Veterans Administration program
on Cape Cod for over two years. Not all of these hospitalizations
were specifically mental health related -- some of her
hospitalizations were for substance abuse or abuse of medications.
Earlier in the year, Williams and Field ended their twenty-year
relationship and opted to just be friends, though it appears they
continued to share an apartment in Brockton, Massachusetts.
According to Williams, Field felt Wachsman had influenced Williams
into ending the relationship. Following the breakup, Field spent
a few months living in Tennessee but later returned to Brockton;
upon her return, Field and Williams maintained a platonic
friendship. The weekend before the murder, Williams and Field
attended a few cookouts and meetings, and Williams testified Field
generally seemed normal, if a bit quiet. They were also together
the day before the incident (Sunday), which Williams similarly
testified was a normal day (for example, they watched movies, Field
spent time on her computer) -- Field even told Williams she had
called Wachsman and said she was going to meet with her at 11:00
- 4 -
a.m. the next day -- a Monday. As it turns out (Field later
explained at the post-killing police interview), another reason
Field wanted to visit Wachsman was because she wanted to "clear
the air" about Ruthie (a friend of Field's who was terminally ill,
and Field said that Wachsman would not allow her to go see Ruthie
before she died a few years previous, but we are unclear about the
relationship between Wachsman and Ruthie based on the record).
That night, Field posted a message to her Facebook page
that read, "Tic toc, tic toc. I'm going to finish my book tomorrow.
You're all going to be real interested in it because you're all in
it. The title is Tormented Minds by Eunice Field." She also wrote
a letter to Williams (found the evening of the murder in Field's
apartment pursuant to a search warrant), which read in part that
Wachsman "will get what she deserves for coming between you and
me." The morning of the crime, Williams testified that there was
nothing odd about Field's behavior.
We know that after making breakfast for Williams, Field
went to Wachsman's home in Bridgewater. She stabbed Wachsman nine
times -- six times in her neck, two in her chest, and one in her
back. She then found herself at the Brockton Police Department.
The Police Interviews
Back to the Brockton Police Department. After
approaching Field in her car, the officers proceeded to ask Field
if she would come into the lobby of the station. One of the
- 5 -
officers asked Field who she killed, and she replied, "Lorraine
Wachsman." The officer then asked why she killed Wachsman, and
she replied, "[b]ecause she got in my way." She later clarified
this statement to mean that the victim got in the way of her and
her ex-girlfriend (later identified as Williams). When asked what
she used to kill the victim, Field said that she used a kitchen
knife. Field could not identify the address of Wachsman, but
instead gave a general location. Some time later, EMTs arrived to
provide medical assistance to Field because of her complaint about
having chest pain. Field reiterated to the EMTs that she stabbed
someone. During this time, Field did not appear to be confused by
the questions and did not have difficulty answering any questions,
though she was slow in answering the questions, sometimes taking
five or ten seconds before answering. Bridgewater police
eventually discovered Wachsman's body in her home that afternoon.
After the initial inquiries, the Brockton police
subsequently conducted a video-recorded interview with Field. The
interview lasted approximately one hour and forty minutes. One of
the detectives conducting the interview, Detective Clark, read
Field her Miranda warnings and a warning of the right to stop
questioning. When asked if she understood these warnings, Field
replied, "Yeah." She was then asked if she wished to waive her
Miranda rights and she replied, "Yeah."
- 6 -
The other detective, Detective Congdon, asked Field if
she needed medical attention, which she declined. During the video
interview, Detective Congdon asked Field about any medical
ailments she had, to which she responded she was bipolar. The
detectives then proceeded to interview her about the incident, and
she stated that she stabbed Wachsman in the chest with a kitchen
knife, and said that Wachsman "always got in the way." She
admitted that she went to Wachsman's home with the purpose of
killing her, and that she took the knife from her own home. As we
mentioned earlier, she called Wachsman the night before to arrange
the visit. When she got to her house, she "took the knife out
right away" and "rushed" it into Wachsman's chest. She indicated
that there was a struggle.
During the interview, Field exhibited a slowness in
answering the questions, and took unusually long pauses between
words and sentences. She also at times appeared not to be
listening to the questioning and talking about other things, which
were often "irrelevant and nonsensical."
Later in the day, Field was transferred to the
Bridgewater Police Department. There, officers conducted yet
another video-recorded interview with Field. Once again, she was
given her Miranda warnings and also advised of her right to stop
the questioning. Field signed the Miranda form, and requested
food and a cigarette. She agreed to questioning while she waited
- 7 -
for her food order. During this interrogation, Field made
additional incriminating statements, including Field indicating
that she did not attempt to help Wachsman and that she felt good
about her actions that day. But she stated that she would not
answer any additional questions without food. However, one of the
officers conducting the interview, Lieutenant Coppenrath,
continued to ask her questions, some of which she answered, some
of which she did not. The interview lasted around forty-six
minutes.
B. Procedural History
A state court grand jury indicted Field for murder in
the first degree on October 21, 2010. Approximately two years
later, on October 2, 2012, her trial began in Plymouth Superior
Court. During the trial, the Commonwealth introduced the two
video-recorded police interviews and called a forensic
psychiatrist, Dr. Russell Vasile ("Dr. Vasile"), as an expert
witness. Dr. Vasile testified that after watching Field's
interviews, he did not see evidence of manic behavior, depression,
delusions, psychosis, or hallucinations. He also testified to a
"reasonable degree of medical certainty" that Field was criminally
responsible for her actions. Dr. Vasile was cross-examined by
Field's trial counsel. The focus of trial counsel's cross was to
point out that the basis of Dr. Vasile's testimony was not
"generally accepted in the psychiatric field" and also to "impeach
- 8 -
him with his statements that made it sound as if it was appropriate
to look at a DVD of a police interrogation and make a diagnosis."
In Field's defense, trial counsel did not introduce a
mental health expert, nor did he contest that Field killed
Wachsman. Rather, his strategy was to convince the jury that
Field's bipolar disorder prevented her from forming the requisite
intent to commit first-degree murder. He later testified at the
post-trial motion hearing that he believed that the "bizarre
behavior" in the two interviews would make the jurors sympathetic
to Field, and they would only convict her of second-degree murder.
That strategy proved unsuccessful, and Field was convicted of
first-degree murder based on deliberate premeditation and extreme
atrocity or cruelty on October 11, 2012. She was sentenced to a
term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
Field filed a notice of appeal on October 17, 2012, to
the Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC"). Equipped with a new attorney,
and while her appeal was pending, on June 19, 2014, she filed a
motion for a new trial, asserting that her trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to consult a mental
health expert on trial strategy. Later that month, the SJC stayed
the appellate proceedings and remanded Field's motion for a new
trial to the Plymouth Superior Court. Field then filed a
supplemental motion for a new trial, asserting that trial counsel
was also ineffective for failing to move to suppress the two video-
- 9 -
recorded police interviews. The trial court held an evidentiary
hearing on January 8, 2016, on the motions for a new trial. Field
enlisted a post-trial expert witness, Dr. William Land ("Dr.
Land"), a clinical and forensic psychiatrist, who testified that
Field, on the day she was questioned, was incapable of voluntarily
waiving her Miranda rights or voluntarily making a statement. He
also testified that she was incapable of acting with extreme
atrocity or cruelty at the time of the crime because of her mental
illness. Dr. Land did not testify, however, that she lacked the
capacity for deliberate premeditation -- a theory on which she was
convicted of first-degree murder. Our review of the record
indicates that her counsel did not ask Dr. Land for testimony as
to whether Field had the mental capacity to form the mindset
necessary for deliberate premeditation.
After the evidentiary hearing, Field filed a second
supplemental motion for a new trial on the same grounds of
ineffective assistance of counsel, this time arguing that trial
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to consult a
mental health expert to determine Field's competency to stand
trial. Ultimately, the trial judge denied all three motions for
a new trial, and Field filed a new notice of appeal to the SJC.
Unconvinced, the SJC affirmed the trial court's rulings. See
Field, 79 N.E.3d at 1039.
- 10 -
In its opinion, the SJC assessed Field's ineffective
assistance claims under the Massachusetts equivalent of
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), Commonwealth v.
Saferian, 315 N.E.2d 878, 882 (Mass. 1974) (we get into the
Strickland standard later on, so we won't repeat it here). The
SJC found that trial counsel erred by failing to consult a mental
health expert on trial strategy, but the error did not warrant
relief because the SJC found Field did not demonstrate prejudice,
or a "basis on which to conclude that consultation with [an] expert
would have altered the jury's conviction of murder in the first
degree based on deliberate premeditation." Field, 79 N.E.3d at
1043.
Its holding regarding the failure to suppress was
similar (though it did not hold that not suppressing the video
tapes was in error). Instead, the SJC concluded that showing them
to the jury was a "tactical decision that was not without
justification." Id. Trial counsel's belief was "that allowing
the jury to view the video recordings of both police interviews
and to observe her strange behavior firsthand would increase the
likelihood that the jury would find that [Field] had not
premeditated the killing or acted with extreme atrocity or
cruelty." Id. On the record before it, said the SJC, it could
not conclude that if the videos had been excluded, it would have
affected the jury's verdict. Finally, the SJC found that although
- 11 -
consulting with a mental health expert may have helped her counsel
discern whether Field was incompetent to stand trial, she
"presented no evidence, beyond trial counsel's statement that he
was not sure that the defendant understood the mental impairment
defense, that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial." Id.
at 1044.
Gaining no traction in state court, Field filed a habeas
petition in the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts. In her petition, she claimed ineffective
assistance on substantially the same grounds as she did in state
court. First, she claimed trial counsel failed to consult a mental
health expert in raising a mental health defense and in cross-
examining Dr. Vasile (i.e., trial strategy); second, trial counsel
failed to move to suppress the video-recorded interviews; and
third, he failed to consult a mental health expert to determine
Field's competency to stand trial. The district court denied
Field's petition, and we now assess her claims with fresh eyes.
C. Standard of Review
Because Field's murder case was adjudicated in state
court, AEDPA marshals our review of the claims brought before the
state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to AEDPA,
the application for habeas corpus must be denied unless
the state court's adjudication of the claim satisfies
either of two conditions: (1) it "resulted in a decision
that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law as
- 12 -
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding."
Yeboah-Sefah, 556 F.3d at 65 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphasis
our own)).
With respect to the first condition under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1), "a state court's decision is contrary to clearly
established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion
opposite from that reached by the U.S. Supreme Court on a question
of law, or if the state court decides the case differently than
the U.S. Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable
facts." Sleeper v. Spencer, 510 F.3d 32, 37-38 (1st Cir. 2007).
Whereas, most relevant here,1 "[a]n unreasonable application occurs
when 'the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule
. . . but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular
state prisoner's case.'" Bebo v. Medeiros, 906 F.3d 129, 134 (1st
Cir. 2018) (quoting White v. Woodall, 527 U.S. 415, 425 (2014)).
"To be unreasonable, the state court's application of existing
legal principles must be more than merely erroneous or incorrect."
Sleeper, 510 F.3d at 38. An unreasonable application "must be
great enough to make the decision unreasonable in the independent
1 The Supreme Court has found an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim to be a mixed question of law and fact and is thus
to be evaluated under the unreasonable application clause of 28
U.S.C. § 2254. Yeboah-Sefah, 556 F.3d at at 70 (citing Williams,
529 U.S. at 409).
- 13 -
and objective judgment of the federal court." Id. (quoting
McCambridge v. Hall, 303 F.3d 24, 36 (1st Cir. 2002)). "Even where
a state court has misapplied federal law, we will only grant relief
to the petitioner 'in cases in which all fairminded jurists would
agree that a final state court decision is at odds with the Supreme
Court's existing precedents.'" Strickland v. Goguen, 3 F.4th 45,
53 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Dorsica v. Marchilli, 941 F.3d 12, 17
(1st Cir. 2019)). If the petitioner does succeed in demonstrating
error, "it is still not enough to win because [s]he must also
illustrate 'actual prejudice' resulted from the mistake." Id. at
54.
As it relates to the second factor (28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(2)), "AEDPA sets out a separate and exacting standard
applicable to review of a state court's factual findings." Pike
v. Guarino, 492 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir. 2007). "A determination of
a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be
correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the
presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Our judicial superiors instruct us that "a
state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim
being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification
that there was an error well understood and comprehended in
existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement."
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103, 131 (2011). "When a
- 14 -
habeas claim has been adjudicated on its merits in state court,
[AEDPA] mandates highly deferential federal court review of state
court holdings." Zuluaga v. Spencer, 585 F.3d 27, 29 (1st Cir.
2009).
Having laid out this deferential foundation, we'll note
that we review the federal district court decision de novo, see
Scott v. Gelb, 810 F.3d 94, 98-99 (1st Cir. 2016)2, bearing in mind
we have limited leeway under AEDPA, and even less when it comes to
ineffective assistance claims.
D. Discussion
Field brings claims for ineffective assistance of
counsel related to three errors she contends were made by her trial
counsel, and she also makes a cumulative error argument. Of
course, her ineffective assistance claims must be viewed in light
of the habeas framework we just described, and she sums up her
argument like this: "The [SJC's] decision was contrary to and
involved and unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law where . . . its finding that [Field] was not denied
the effective assistance of counsel was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence." And more
2 There is a simple reason for that: "[W]e are effectively in
the same position as the district court" to look at "the state
court record" when, as here, the district court did not conduct
any factfinding. Rivera v. Thompson, 879 F.3d 7, 13 (1st Cir.
2018) (quoting Pike, 492 F.3d at 68).
- 15 -
specifically, "the finding that [Field] was not prejudiced by
counsel's failures was an unreasonable application of Strickland's
prejudice prong."3 We will address each of her arguments in turn
as we move forward.
Before we dive into the merits, first a primer on
ineffective assistance claims which will help guide our analysis.
"The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution afford a defendant the right to effective assistance
of counsel in all state criminal prosecutions which may result in
the loss of [her] liberty." Yeboah-Sefah, 556 F.3d at 70. In
order to demonstrate that she received ineffective assistance of
counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, Field must show two things: that her defense
counsel's performance was (1) constitutionally deficient and (2)
that this deficiency prejudiced her case. Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687. At prong one, Field must demonstrate that "counsel's
Field has framed her arguments under AEDPA in a way that is
3
not consistent with how we understand the law to operate, and
therefore it has required some interpretation on our part. We
understand Field's argument to be that, under AEDPA, her claim
satisfies both conditions that entitle her to habeas relief,
meaning she is arguing that the SJC both misapplied federal law in
its interpretation of Strickland's prejudice prong, and separately
and in part, that it made an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence before it. Field appears to mix
both these considerations together in her brief with little
explanation of how she meets the exacting standards under AEDPA
for each consideration, but we've tried to separate them out as
best we can.
- 16 -
performance was objectively unreasonable 'under prevailing
professional norms.'" United States v. Mercedes-De La Cruz, 787
F.3d 61, 67 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).
This standard is "highly deferential" and thus we must "indulge a
strong presumption that . . . under the circumstances, the
challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy.'"
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S.
91, 101 (1955)). Further, "[w]hen examining counsel's conduct,
the court considers the facts of the particular case from counsel's
perspective at the time." Sleeper, 510 F.3d at 38.
At Strickland's prong two, Field must affirmatively
prove that the deficient performance was prejudicial. 466 U.S. at
687. To demonstrate prejudice, Field must show "that, but for
counsel's unprofessional error, there is a reasonable probability
that the result of the proceeding would have been different."
Yeboah-Sefah, 556 F.3d at 70 (quoting Sleeper, 510 F.3d at 38).
"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
To bring it all together, the Supreme Court has
instructed us that "[w]hen [AEDPA] applies [in concert with
Strickland], the question is not whether counsel's actions were
reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable
argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential
standard." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105.
- 17 -
Ineffective Assistance in Failing to Procure a Mental
Health Expert
Field first argues that trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to consult a mental
health expert in raising a mental health defense and in cross-
examining the Commonwealth's expert, Dr. Vasile, at trial. Her
ineffective assistance argument goes like this: "It is not within
the most tolerant standard of competence to forego having the
defendant undertake a mental health defense examination." Had
trial counsel consulted a mental health expert, it would have
become obvious that Field's statements were not voluntary, and
using a forensic psychologist as opposed to Field's statements
"would not have opened the door to the contents of her statements
by police." This matters, says Field, because her statements were
not voluntary given that she was not rational at the time she gave
them.
As evidence of trial counsel's incompetence in cross-
examining Dr. Vasile, she points to the fact that Dr. Land (the
post-trial motion expert for Field) "countered the testimony of
the Commonwealth's armchair expert [Dr. Vasile]." Had trial
counsel hired an expert himself to counter the testimony of Dr.
Vasile at trial, the "risk of mistakes" made by Dr. Vasile would
have been "minimized." Tying this back to AEDPA, we read her
- 18 -
argument to be that the SJC unreasonably applied federal law when
it misapplied the prejudice prong of Strickland. She argues that
"even if evidence independent of [her] confession was not
insubstantial, or that it could have supported a guilty verdict in
the absence of [her] confession, that is not the standard in
Strickland." In Field's view, the SJC (and the trial court in the
post-conviction proceedings) ignored crucial facts, including:
that Dr. Land "found evidence of psychosis at the time of the
crime"; that the evidence of premeditation that came in through
the videos was involuntary and highly prejudicial; and that had a
motion to suppress the statements been filed, it would have likely
been meritorious.
Whether the SJC applied Strickland unreasonably is not
the same as asking whether defense counsel's performance fell below
Strickland's standard. Our obligation is the former -- to
determine whether the SJC unreasonably applied the clearly
established federal standard for examining Field's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim as outlined in Strickland. In
considering Field's argument, the SJC did not take issue with her
argument as to the inadequate performance of Field's counsel.
Instead it concluded that although trial counsel erred in failing
to consult a mental health expert, Field ultimately had not
"established that [trial counsel's] failure was likely to have
influenced the jury's verdict of murder with deliberate
- 19 -
premeditation." Field, 79 N.E.3d at 1041. Meaning, the SJC found
that Field was not prejudiced by trial counsel's error in not
consulting an expert. Given the AEDPA limits of our review, we
cannot conclude that the SJC applied the Strickland standard to
the facts in an objectively unreasonable manner. Brown v. Payton,
544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005).
While it is certainly concerning, given the lengthy
history of Field's mental health struggles, that an attorney would
not, at a minimum, consult a mental health expert to assist in
trial strategy, we cannot say that the SJC's determination under
Strickland was unreasonable. Field fails to present specific
arguments as to why consulting a mental health expert would have
influenced the jury in deciding deliberate premeditation.
Crucially, Dr. Land (the post-conviction mental health expert)
never testified that Field lacked the capacity to deliberately
premeditate. The record is replete with evidence -- from Field
arranging the meeting with Wachsman, to drafting her Facebook post,
the letter to Williams essentially confessing or at least
previewing her planned revenge on Wachsman for "getting in the
way," and her issues with Wachsman over her friend Ruthie -- all
of which reasonably support the conclusion that she deliberately
premeditated the crime. Concluding that the SJC's application of
Strickland's prejudice prong was not unreasonable, we also note
- 20 -
that "we must give double deference[4] to the [SJC's] choices about
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, especially when
fairminded jurists could not disagree on the correctness of the
[SJC's] application of federal law." Goguen, 3 F.4th at 61
(cleaned up); see also Walker v. Medeiros, 911 F.3d 629, 636 (1st
Cir. 2018) ("Thus, under AEDPA, so long as the SJC's ruling that
there was no 'miscarriage of justice' due to the other evidence of
[the defendant's] guilt that the jury had before it is not 'so
lacking in justification' as to be 'beyond any possibility for
fairminded disagreement' we must defer to it." (citing Harrington,
562 U.S. 86 at 131)).
Ineffective Assistance in Failing to Move to Suppress
Video-Recorded Police Interviews
Next, Field claims that trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance for failing to move to suppress the two
video-recorded interviews. Field focuses the weight of her
ineffective assistance argument on rehashing the mistakes trial
counsel made in the first instance, rather than focusing on whether
the SJC unreasonably applied Strickland (which, as we previewed
above, is what we must focus on here). For instance, she argues
that the waiver of her Miranda rights was not made "knowingly,
4 Layered on top of the significant respect we afford to a
defense counsel's advocacy choices under Strickland is the
significant respect we give a state court's reasonable application
of federal law.
- 21 -
intelligently, and voluntarily" due to the fact that she suffers
from mental illness, as Dr. Land testified. Her statements made
to the police were not voluntary for the same reason. Adding to
that, she points out that trial counsel was ineffective in not
moving to suppress the interviews (and the statements contained
therein) for another reason: Field had invoked her right to
silence by saying she did not want to be asked more questions in
the Bridgewater police interview, but they continued to ask her
questions. Her statements moving forward from there should have
been inadmissible, she says.
Tying all of this to AEDPA, she argues that the SJC's
determination that failing to suppress the statements did not lead
to prejudice was an unreasonable application of the Strickland
prejudice prong.5 As she sees it, "[w]ithout these recordings
. . . the jury would not have had a sufficient basis to find either
premeditation or extreme atrocity or cruelty." Field, 79 N.E.3d
at 1043. Trial counsel testified at the post-trial motion hearing
5 Field also claims in her brief that she intends to put forth
an argument that the state court's decisions regarding her
arguments relating to the failure to file a motion to suppress the
statements was an unreasonable determination of the facts, and
points to findings made at the trial court and at the SJC. For
one, we are only reviewing the decision of the SJC, so her claims
regarding findings of the trial court are not relevant to this
petition. Second, we must accept the SJC's factual findings as
true, and nowhere does she say explicitly what the SJC got wrong,
never mind meeting the "burden of rebutting the presumption of
correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. §
2254(e)(1).
- 22 -
that he "believed that allowing the jury to view the video
recordings of both police interviews and to observe her strange
behavior firsthand would increase the likelihood that the jury
would find that the defendant had not premeditated the killing or
acted with extreme atrocity or cruelty." Id. Because of this,
the SJC concluded that trial counsel's choice not to move to
suppress was a "tactical decision not without justification." Id.The SJC decided that it did not "need to resolve whether counsel's
judgment was manifestly unreasonable because even if we were to
assume that it was . . . [it could not] conclude on this record
that the admission of the video-recorded interviews was likely to
have affected the jury's verdict of murder by deliberate
premeditation." Id. The SJC noted (as we have, above) the record
contains plenty of "evidence of deliberate premeditation from
other sources (such as her confessional note, her social media
post, and her arranging the meeting with the victim) . . .
[evidence] so overwhelming that we cannot say admission of the
video recording was likely to have influenced the jury's decision
to convict her on the theory of premeditation." Id. at 1044.
While the SJC did not explicitly determine whether trial counsel
erred in not moving to suppress the video-recorded interviews,
under Strickland,6 this court is cautioned that "strategic choices
6 As Strickland has noted:
- 23 -
made [by trial counsel] after thorough investigation of law and
facts relevant to plausible options are virtually
unchallengeable." 466 U.S. at 690. The SJC determined, as we've
noted, that trial counsel made a "tactical decision," and we cannot
say that the SJC unreasonably applied the Strickland ineffective
assistance of counsel standard as it relates to prejudice,
particularly where there was overwhelming evidence of
premeditation that was in evidence absent the video-recorded
interviews. Because of that, as the SJC found, there was not a
reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial. What's
more, remember that "we must use a doubly deferential standard of
review that gives both the state court and the defense attorney
the benefit of the doubt." Pena v. Dickhaut, 736 F.3d 600, 606
(1st Cir. 2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
We therefore agree with the district court's determination that
Field is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.
[A] court need not determine whether counsel's
performance was deficient before examining the prejudice
suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged
deficiencies. The object of an ineffectiveness claim is
not to grade counsel's performance. If it is easier to
dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of
lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often
be so, that course should be followed.
466 U.S. at 697.
- 24 -
Ineffective Assistance in Not Challenging Competence to
Stand Trial
Field argues that by failing to consult a mental health
expert in order to ascertain her competency to stand trial, trial
counsel's assistance was ineffective. In support of this argument,
she points to evidence from the new trial proceedings, such as
trial counsel's statement that he did not think she understood
"what was going on" or that "she caught on what was going on."
This, combined with her bipolar disorder and the symptoms attendant
to her mental health condition, made it unreasonable for trial
counsel not to consult with a mental health expert.
Under AEDPA, the SJC's findings, according to Field,
"were based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." The
"factual finding" that Field points to is the SJC's determination
"that counsel merely 'was not sure that the defendant understood
the mental health impairment defense,'" which constituted "an
unreasonable determination of the facts." Field also points out
that the SJC (and the trial court) both ignored the testimony of
trial counsel himself, who noted that Field could not effectively
communicate with him, which was "all the evidence the court needed"
to determine that she received ineffective assistance.
The SJC disagreed. It concluded that there was no
evidence presented (beyond trial counsel's statement that he was
- 25 -
not sure she understood the mental impairment defense), that Field
was incompetent to stand trial. Field, 79 N.E.3d at 1044.
Although Field argued that a mental health expert may have helped
trial counsel realize that she was incompetent to stand trial,
there was no evidence presented to support that conclusion. Id.
Field herself, when presented with the post-trial opportunity to
have an expert witness opine on whether she was competent to stand
trial, did not ask her expert, Dr. Land, to opine on that subject.
Id. at 1044-45.
As we've said before, we accept the SJC's factual
determinations to be true, and in order to succeed on her AEDPA
claim, it is Field's burden to "rebut[] the presumption of
correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(1). Field does not meet her burden. Instead, what Field
asks us to do here is to consider other statements made by trial
counsel at the post-trial motion hearing, such as that Field was
not substantively communicating with him and that she didn't
understand what was going on. But, since this claim is entitled
to double deference under AEDPA (as it was decided on the merits
in state court), and there was "no indication that trial counsel
failed to exercise 'reasonable professional judgment' [in not
consulting a mental health expert on competency] . . . we cannot
say that the SJC applied Strickland in an objectively unreasonable
manner in finding a lack of deficiency in counsel's performance."
- 26 -
Yeboah-Sefah, 556 F.3d at 82–83 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
690).
Cumulative Error
Finally, Field contends that the totality of trial
counsel's errors resulted in prejudice. "Absent any
particularized error, there can be no cumulative error." Williams
v. Drake, 146 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 1998). Because we find no
prejudice on any of the three purported errors above, Field is not
entitled to relief on her cumulative error claim.
E. Conclusion
For the reasons detailed above, we affirm the district
court's denial of Field's habeas petition.
- 27 -