Montes v. Ponce Municipality

Not for publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 02-1409
PEDRO J. MONTES; ELIZABETH QUINONES;
PEDRO MONTES-QUINONES; JOSUE MONTES-QUINONES,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
PONCE MUNICIPALITY; RAFAEL CORDERO SANTIAGO;
GILBERTO COLON-RODRIGUEZ; MARCO MORALES-BARBOSA;
RAMOS CRUZ-LOPEZ; JOSE M. GALARZA-CAPIELO,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jose Antonio Fuste, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Seyla, Circuit Judge,
and Siler,* Senior Circuit Judge.
Jose R. Santiago Pereles, Santiago Pereles & Collazo, PSC, for
appellants.
Leticia Casalduc-Rabell, Assistant Solicitor General, with
whom Roberto J. Sanchez-Ramos, Solicitor General, was on brief,
for appellees.
October 31, 2003
*
Of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by
designation.
SILER, Senior Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Pedro Montes appeals
the district court’s judgments on his various 42 U.S.C. § 1983claims, and a jury verdict on his claim of excessive force. We
AFFIRM.
In 1999 in the City of Ponce, Puerto Rico, the police arrested
Montes after he got into a heated argument with his neighbor.
According to Montes, the arresting officers kicked and punched him
in the face repeatedly for over ten minutes. The police took him
to the nearest precinct where they put him in a three-foot by
three-foot cell that smelled like a sewer. Montes sued the City of
Ponce, its Mayor Santiago, the Police Commissioner Rodriguez, and
the three police officers effecting the arrest, asserting multiple
constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His family
joined his complaint asserting an emotional distress claim under
Puerto Rico law.
At trial, after Montes presented his evidence, the district
court granted judgment as a matter of law, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 50, for the City, Mayor, and Police Commissioner. After the
remaining police defendants countered with their evidence, the
district court granted judgment as a matter of law against
Montes’s claims of (1) arrest without probable cause, (2) unlawful
search and seizure, (3) unfit place of detention, and (4) failure
to provide prompt medical attention. The jury found for the police
defendants on the excessive force claim.
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Montes (and his family) filed a notice of appeal from the
judgment entered on February 7, 2002; however, the notice made no
mention of the February 5, 2002 judgment dismissing the City,
Mayor, and Police Commissioner.
Notice of Appeal
Since Montes’s notice of appeal failed to mention the February
5, 2002 judgment dismissing the claims against the City, Mayor, and
Police Commissioner, these defendants argue that this omission
waived any appeal.
Fed. R. App. P. 3(c) requires that a notice of appeal
“designate the judgment, order, or part thereof appealed from.”
Its requirements are to be construed liberally, and “mere
technicalities” will not defeat appellate jurisdiction so long as
the filing is the “functional equivalent.” Blockel v. J.C. Penney
Co., 337 F.3d 17, 23-24 (1st Cir. 2003). But First Circuit caselaw
as to when to allow deviations from the strict requirements of Rule
3 has evolved in a case by case basis, and articulating a definite
rule is difficult. Compare In re Spookyworld, Inc., --- F.3d ---,
2003 WL 22210065 (1st Cir. Sept. 25, 2003) with Blockel, 337 F.3d
at 23-24. In this instance there is no doubt that this court has
jurisdiction over the case in general – there was a timely appeal
filed for at least one order – and with respect to the other order
it turns out not to matter because the claim fails on the merits.
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Because it fails so clearly, we find it easier to assume without
deciding that the notice of appeal was adequate.
Montes’s viable1 claims on appeal challenge the judgments as
a matter of law against him on (1) municipal and supervisory § 1983
claims against the City, Mayor, and Police Commissioner, (2) his
conditions of confinement claim, and (3) his denial of medical
treatment claim. He also asserts that the evidence did not support
the jury’s verdict against him on the excessive force claim.
Conditions of Confinement
Montes makes a cruel and unusual punishment claim for his
detention in a poorly ventilated small cell for seventeen hours.
We review the judgment against Montes de novo, taking all evidence
in the light most favorable to him. See Tang v. Rhode Island Dep’t
of Elderly Affairs, 163 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1998). We may affirm
if there was “no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a
reasonable jury” to find for Montes. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a).
Since pretrial detainees are not technically being punished,
their protection for Eighth Amendment-type claims springs from the
liberty component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
1
Montes’s family’s claims under Puerto Rico tort law, and
Montes’s claims regarding the probable cause and unlawful search
and seizure are never mentioned in his brief; thus, they are
waived. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.
1990). Additionally, Montes’s claim under Puerto Rico tort law for
himself never appeared in his complaint, and we will not consider
the issue raised for the first time on appeal. Rocafort v. IBM
Corp., 334 F.3d 115, 121 (1st Cir. 2003).
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See Burrell v. Hamshire County, 307 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2002). No
unconstitutional deprivation of liberty occurs unless the
detainment amounts to punishment, which occurs when the condition
is imposed for the purpose of punishment rather than some other
legitimate reason. O’Connor v. Huard, 117 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir.
1997). We will uphold legitimate administrative purposes offered,
unless there is “substantial evidence” it is an “exaggerated
response“ to some concern. Id.The defendants’ proffered explanation is that the small cell
was the only cell located in the nearest precinct, and the police
have a policy of taking the arrestee to the closest precinct. This
policy serves a legitimate government interest in safely detaining
a possibly dangerous arrested person as soon as possible. Montes
offered no substantial evidence impeaching this reason. Given this
uncontroverted rational explanation, the detainment did not
constitute punishment. Therefore, the judgment as a matter of law
on that issue is upheld.
Medical Attention
Montes next complains about the lack of medical attention
during his confinement. The Due Process Clause requires the
government to provide medical care to pretrial detainees injured
while being apprehended by the police. Gaudreault v. Municipality
of Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990). Officials violate
this requirement only if they exhibit “deliberate indifference” to
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“serious medical needs.” Id. A “serious” medical need is one
diagnosed by a physician as mandating immediate treatment, or one
that is “so obvious” that a layman would “easily” recognize the
necessity for medical treatment. Id.Montes’s claim fails because he gave the lower court no
evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find he had a “serious
medical need.” He had no cuts or bleeding. His own doctor
testified that Montes only had swelling and some discoloration, and
simply treated him with over-the-counter pain killers. Moreover,
Montes was quite active in his cell, smashing the chair they had
given him and pulling tiles off the walls.
In Gaudreault, we upheld a summary judgment against an injured
detainee who only required a sling, an eye-patch and some
disinfectant for abrasions. See 923 F.2d at 208. In that case,
the detainee suffered a “blow out fracture of the right orbit,
resulting in a deviated septum, a cyst in his sinus and some
transient nerve damage.” Id. at 209 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Here, Montes’s condition was significantly less serious
because he only needed over-the-counter pain killers. Montes has
failed to give any evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find
a “serious medical need.” Therefore, judgment as a matter of law
was properly granted on that claim.
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Excessive Force
Montes next challenges the evidentiary basis for the jury’s
verdict finding no excessive force. Claims of excessive police
force derive from the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against
unreasonable seizures. The test for excessive force is whether the
police actions were “objectively reasonable” given the
circumstances, ignoring the officers’ subjective intent. Bastien
v. Goddard, 279 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir. 2002). Since the jury
rendered a verdict for the police, we must affirm unless the
evidence was “so strongly and overwhelmingly inconsistent with the
[verdict] that no reasonable jury could have returned [it].”
Crowley v. L.L. Bean, 303 F.3d 387, 393 (1st Cir. 2002). As part
of this determination, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the police and resolve all credibility issues in favor
of the jury’s verdict. Id.The arrest occurred because Montes was attacking his disabled
neighbor. The defense put on evidence that Montes screamed foul
words and was drunk and “aggressive.” The police testified that
Montes attempted to assault one of them, and explained this turned
the arrest into a struggle. Thus, the defense put forth evidence
of reasons for the force used and evidence showing the lack of any
serious injury. Since we must accept all this testimony as
credible and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
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jury’s verdict, we uphold the jury’s finding that the officers’
force was not excessive.
Municipal and Supervisory Liability
Having found no underlying constitutional violation by the
police, Montes’s municipal and supervisory § 1983 claims against
the City, Mayor, and Police Commissioner necessarily fail. See
Wilson v. Town of Mendon, 294 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 2002).
CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the district court on all claims.
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