Rodríguez v. Drug Enforcement Administration

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 06-1795
06-1832
JUAN RODRÍGUEZ,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION,
Respondent, Appellee.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Joseph A. DiClerico, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lynch and Lipez,
Circuit Judges.
Juan Rodríguez on brief pro se.
Jean B. Weld, Assistant U.S. Attorney and Thomas P.
Colantuono, United States Attorney on brief for appellee.
March 30, 2007
Per Curiam. The appellant filed suit alleging that an
administrative forfeiture of $ 1905.00 violated due process because
he had contested the forfeiture, and he received no notices in the
administrative proceeding after an initial notice of seizure. The
district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
We vacate and remand with instructions that the district court
consider the merits of the appellant's due process claims.
In dismissing for lack of subject matter, the district court
read the appellant's complaint too narrowly. The appellant alleged
that DEA clearly misconstrued his petition by interpreting it as
seeking only mitigation or remission. He argued that if he had not
intended to contest the forfeiture, he would have had no reason to
file the petition under oath (by the appropriate deadline), and
argue that the money could not be forfeited because it was obtained
legally and intended for legitimate purposes.
A clear misconstrual of his petition states a due process
claim within the district court's subject matter jurisdiction.
Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2001);
United States v. Giraldo, 45 F.3d 509 (1st Cir. 1995). The
appellant was entitled to an opportunity to be heard, with effect
given to the substance of his petition. United States v. One 1987
Jeep Wrangler, 972 F.2d 472 (2nd Cir. 1992); Longenette v. Krusing,
322 F.3d 758 (3rd. Cir. 2003); Scarabin v. Drug Enforcement Admin.,
919 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1990); Marozsan v. United States, 852 F.2d
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1469 (7th Cir. 1988); Gete v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
121 F.3d 1285 (9th Cir. 1997).
Concerning the government's argument that the appellant never
used the term 'claim', which goes to the merits of the claim, we
note that if special language was required, the notice should have
said so. The appellant was entitled to notice that was not patently
misleading or uninformative. United States v. One Ford Coach, 307
U.S. 219 (1939); Glasgov v. United States Drug Enforcement Admin.,
12 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 1993).
The appellant also claimed that the administrative proceeding
denied due process because he received no notices in the ongoing
proceeding. He could neither correct DEA's misconstrual of his
petition nor seek timely reconsideration of the denial of
administrative relief.
While certified mail may often satisfy due process, the
inquiry is fact-specific. United States v. One Star Class Sloop
Sailboat, 458 F.3d 16, 22-3 (1st Cir. 2006). The district court did
not explore whether the notice was reasonable under the specific
circumstances of this case. The record supported the appellant's
contention that MCI-Concord twice signed certified mail receipts on
his behalf when he was elsewhere, and DEA had some reason to know
that he was elsewhere. We have warned that "the government must
show, if the issue is contested, that the notice was mailed to the
prison in which the claimant was in fact being held." Whiting v.
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United States, 231 F.3d 70, 76-77 (1st Cir. 2000). See also United
States v. Williams, 130 Fed. App. 301 (11th Cir. 2005). Moreover,
if the government knew or had reason to know that the notice would
not reach the appellant then notice was inadequate. Jones v.
Flowers, 126 S. Ct. 1708, 1717 (2006).
Finally, concerning MCI-Concord, we warn: "if the government
knew that mail delivery in a particular prison was unreliable but
sent the notice by this means without any other precaution, mail
delivery would not satisfy due process." Whiting, 231 F.3d at 77.
We vacate and remand with instructions that the district court
entertain the merits of the appellant's claims.
So ordered. 1st Cir. Loc. R. 27.0(c).
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