Ligoussou v. Mukasey

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 08-1157
COLETTE MBOMY LIGOUSSOU; AUGUSTIN PAUL LIGOUSSOU,
Petitioners,
v.
MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER
OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Selya and Lipez, Circuit Judges.
Gina M. Gebhart, Bonnie S. McGuire, Heather S. Crall, and
Ropes & Gray LLP on brief for petitioners.
Greg D. Mack, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration
Litigation, Gregory G. Katsas, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Civil Division, Terri J. Scadron, Assistant Director, Office of
Immigration Litigation, on brief for respondent.
October 27, 2008
PER CURIAM. Colette Ligoussou, of the Central African
Republic ("CAR"), petitions for review of the denial of her
application, filed for herself and her husband, for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against
Torture.
We do not repeat here the familiar legal structure for
judicial review of such claims, which is set forth in numerous
opinions of this court. See, e.g., Kechichian v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d
15 (1st Cir. 2008). It suffices to say Ligoussou must establish
there was some material error of law by the immigration agency or
that the evidence before the immigration agency compelled the
granting of the relief she seeks. We have reviewed the record and
the arguments.
We start with Ligoussou's objection that her hearing
before the Immigration Judge ("IJ") did not comport with the due
process requirements of the Constitution. The case started in
Boston on March 30, 2005, and the hearing was continued to
September 23, 2005, when the parties appeared, without objection,
by tele-video conference. In her petition, Ligoussou contends the
conduct of the hearing by video conference itself violated due
process, the hearing was conducted by a hostile IJ in a manner
which prevented her from communicating her story, and that
translation errors added to the problem. There were, though, never
any objections made to the IJ to this effect. The Board of
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Immigration Appeals ("BIA") correctly ruled that it is well settled
that IJs may conduct video conferences to the same extent they
conduct hearings with witnesses present. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.25(c). The BIA rejected the other arguments that Ligoussou
was deprived of a fair hearing. Our own review of the record
confirms the BIA's view. As the BIA stated:
Further, the Immigration Judge's insistence
that the lead respondent testify
chronologically, the nature of his questioning
of the lead respondent, and his efforts to
ensure the lead respondent's responsiveness to
questions constituted the routine
administration of court proceedings that did
not offend principles of fundamental fairness,
deprive the lead respondent of an opportunity
to meaningfully present her case, or otherwise
cause a deficiency in the record. See, e.g.,
Laurent v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 59, 62-63 (1st
Cir. 2004).
We add there is nothing unfair in an IJ, especially one who has
spent hours reviewing the written materials in a case, urging that
the testimony of the petitioner get to the heart of the matter of
persecution and proceed in a chronological fashion. The argument
that Ligoussou's due process rights were violated fails.
Turning to the merits, the IJ supportably found that
Ligoussou was not credible on a number of her statements in her
account of why she feared persecution, and additionally found she
lacked for corroborating evidence, although such evidence would not
have been difficult to obtain. Colette Ligoussou was the only
witness offered by petitioners. The lack-of-credibility finding
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was based on direct contradictions and unexplained discrepancies in
her testimony, and on observation of her demeanor. Our own review
of the record confirms the BIA's upholding of the IJ's adverse
credibility finding and that the inconsistencies were material and
central to Ligoussou's claim. The declaration of her psychiatrist
does not require a different outcome.
Because Ligoussou was not credible, it was entirely
correct for the IJ to require her to provide corroboration. 8
C.F.R. § 1208.13. Corroboration was far from difficult, she had
family in both France and the CAR in a position to verify her
accounts of persecution, were they true. It was her choice not to
call her husband as a witness.
Moreover, Ligoussou voluntarily returned to the CAR in
April 2001 after the supposed persecution. She also left the CAR
with government permission in November 2001. The record certainly
does not compel the conclusion that she suffered persecution.
The BIA found that Ligoussou did not raise the issue of
the IJ's denial of voluntary departure in her appeal of the IJ's
decision. Since the BIA was correct in finding the issue had been
waived, we are consequently precluded from addressing it. Sela v.
Mukasey, 520 F.3d 44, 47 (1st Cir. 2008).
The petition is denied.
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