White v. Hewlett Packard Enterprise Co.

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 19-1696
MATTHEW J. WHITE,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERPRISE COMPANY,
Defendant, Appellee,
and
HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY; HP INC.,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch and Barron, Circuit Judges,
and Burroughs,* District Judge.
Danielle Quinlan, with whom White & Quinlan, LLC was on brief,
for appellant.
Melinda J. Caterine, with whom Timothy J. Powell, Littler
Mendelson, P.C., and Ankur Vijay Desai were on brief, for appellee.
* Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
January 13, 2021
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LYNCH, Circuit Judge. The district court entered
summary judgment against Matthew White and for his former employer,
Hewlett Packard Enterprise, on his claims based on Maine employment
law. That court held that controlling Maine Law Court decisions
meant White's claims for accrued vacation pay and bonus pay were
without merit, and it rejected his remaining claims for equitable
relief. We agree and affirm the district court's grant of summary
judgment.
I. Background
A. Factual Background.
White worked for Hewlett Packard (now Hewlett Packard
Enterprise, and collectively "HP") in Kennebunk, Maine, as a
"Datacenter Interoperability Architect" (DIA) and later "Data
Center Architect" (DCA) from February 2013 until July 2015, when
he voluntarily resigned.
HP's Employment Offer
The terms of White's employment were first set out in an
offer letter, which stated that White would be subject to HP's
personnel policies concerning benefits, vacation time, and
compensation if he accepted the employment offer. It included a
link to HP's benefits page on HP's internal intranet, and stated
"[u]pon your hire, you will be eligible to participate in the
benefit programs offered by the Company to its similarly situated
employees. These and any other benefit programs are subject to
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modification from time to time." HP's1 2013 Benefits Policy
stated:
Employees are strongly encouraged to use all
of their vacation each year -- to take time
away to refresh, recharge, and enjoy life
outside of work. The vacation program does
not include a year-end carryover feature or a
payout provision if you leave the company, so
any time you don't use during the calendar
year will generally be lost on December 31
(some exceptions apply based on state laws in
California, Illinois, Montana, and Nebraska
and for hourly-paid [nonexempt] employees
governed by the McNamara-O'Hara Service
Contract Act [SCA]). For more information,
see "If you don't use all your vacation time
each year" later in this section.
A separate heading, titled "If you leave HP or go on
disability or leave," warned that "[i]f you leave HP for any
reason, either voluntary or involuntary, you will not receive pay
in lieu of unused vacation. Unless your primary work location is
in California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Montana, or Nebraska or
you are an hourly-paid (nonexempt) employee governed by the
McNamara-O'Hara Service Contract Act (SCA), all unused vacation
will be forfeited at the time of your separation."
White states that he "likely" asked questions about his
benefits package before accepting his offer, but there is no
evidence that he asked about his vacation benefits. He also
1 Shortly after White left, HP reorganized into two
separate companies: HP, Inc. and HP Enterprise Company (HPE). HPE
is the successor organization for the divisions that employed
White, and so is named as a defendant in this suit.
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acknowledges that he had access to the benefits portal for the
entire period of his employment with HP, although White was
sometimes frustrated by technical problems with HP's intranet
system. HP renewed its benefits policy yearly, and issued
employees a summary of material changes. The terms of the vacation
policy provision and the forfeiture provision remained
substantively unchanged during White's period of employment.
The terms of White's compensation were also set out in
the offer letter. On top of his base pay and incentive pay,2 HP
offered limited-duration bonus programs. HP's compensation policy
defined a bonus program as "a sales result, achievement-based
incentive program with a specified beginning and end date which is
offered to a defined sales population to meet a certain sales
focus." Sales teams could be eligible to participate in a number
of bonus programs at any given time.
White's Initial Assignment to the DIA Team
When he joined HP in February 2013, White worked in HP's
Enterprise group. White was a member of the DIA team, which
educated "senior level customers" -- typically large US companies
-- as well as other HP employees about HP server products,
2 When White started, he was paid a base salary of $190,400
per year and a $50,000 signing bonus (paid in increments over three
years). White was also eligible to earn incentive compensation
based on yearly sales targets and to participate in bonus programs.
If White met his incentive targets, his total compensation before
special bonus programs was $238,000.
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particularly "blade servers." In 2013, HP was increasingly worried
about losing blade server market share to its fastest-growing
competitor, Cisco. White states he was hired "for the specific
purpose of reducing Cisco (HP's top server market competitor)
market share in the server business."
The 1H Cisco Market Share Bonus Program during the First
Half of Fiscal Year 2014
On November 11, 2013, White received an email from the
HP Sales Operations Team with the subject line "New Bonus
Opportunity." The email announced the Market Share Bonus Program
for the first half of HP's 2014 fiscal year (running from November
1, 2013 to April 30, 2014). The email stated:
This bonus is to reward the DIA team for
specific changes to the Cisco X86 US Blade
Unit Market Share based upon quarter over
quarter calendar quarter results as reported
by IDC. Please take a moment to review all
program details in the Approved Bonus Programs
site. In the Search Field, you can search by
bonus ID number or by Sales plan number.
Contact your manager if you have any questions
concerning eligibility or the bonus program.
All bonus programs are governed by the HP
Sales Compensation Global Policy and HP Sales
Bonus Terms and Conditions.
The Market Share Bonus Program measured and rewarded
HP's success at reducing or slowing the growth in Cisco's market
share. Through the program White was eligible to receive up to a
$10,000 bonus for each quarter that the DIA team either slowed the
increase in Cisco's market share in the blade server business, or
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successfully reduced Cisco's market share in the blade server
market. Smaller reductions in Cisco's market share would result
in lower bonuses. HP used the "final IDC Final X86 US Blades unit
market share results" –- a third-party, publicly available metric
of server market share -- to calculate whether the DIA team
qualified for the bonus. The bonus portal described the Market
Share Bonus Program as "a team goal and dependent upon the IDC
Final X86 US Blades unit market share results, calendar quarters."
Under "Program Award Structure" it stated, "[a]ll quarters are
based upon calendar quarter, not HP fiscal quarter. All results
are based upon QoQ [Quarter over Quarter] with the starting
baseline of the 3Q13 (calendar quarter)."
Because IDC's reports tracked market share by calendar
quarter, not HP's fiscal quarter, the bonus period did not exactly
match the market share reporting period. The bonus period covering
the first and second HP 2014 fiscal quarters (November 1, 2013 to
April 30, 2014) was tied to publicly reported market share for the
fourth calendar quarter of 2013 and the first calendar quarter of
2014 (October 2013 through March 2014).
The Sales Compensation team believed that this somewhat
complicated structure -- where bonuses were paid per fiscal
quarter, but the performance metrics were calculated by calendar
quarter –- was unavoidable. HP calculated compensation per fiscal
quarter but it relied on IDC for its market share data, in part
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because this metric was used by HP's competitors. IDC only offered
market share data on a calendar quarter basis. HP's Rule 30(b)(6)
deponent, Scott Powell, testified that the Sales Compensation team
decided against using the IDC calendar quarter data to estimate
changes in market share by fiscal quarter because there were a
number of different methodologies that they could use to do this,
and the team was concerned that any particular method they used
would be seen by eligible employees as arbitrary. The DIA team
management participated in negotiating the terms of the bonus
programs, and won concessions from the Sales Compensation team.
The 2H Cisco Market Share Bonus Program Covering May
2014 to October 2014
HP renewed the Cisco Market Share Bonus Program for the
second half of 2014. That program ran for HP 2014 fiscal quarters
three and four (May 2014 to October 2014) and tracked calendar
quarters two and three (April 2014 to September 2014).3 The terms
of this program were also available via the HP bonus portal. The
portal page stated:
Program Name: (14.357) 2H US DIA Team Market
Share Bonus . . .
Program Start Date: 2014-05-01 . . .
Program End Date: 2014-10-31 . . .
3 Based on IDC's official market share data, the DIA team
did not qualify for a bonus for the third calendar quarter in 2014.
HP nonetheless paid $1,000 bonuses to the team because its internal
sales data showed that IDC underestimated HP's market share for
that quarter.
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Program Eligibility Details: Only DIA team is
eligible for this program, including DIA
Director. Team members must be active
employees on the DIA team on a valid sales
plan for the full calendar quarter to qualify
for payout. Bonus periods are based upon
Calendar Quarter results through IDC.
Participants Registration Steps: . . . No
registration is required. This is a team goal
and dependent upon the IDC Final X86 US Blades
unit market share results, calendar quarters.
Program Award Structure: All results are based
upon final IDC Final X86 US Blades unit market
share results. All quarters are based upon
calendar quarter, not HP fiscal quarter.
White "do[es] not recall" whether or not he accessed the bonus
portal for either Market Share Bonus Program. HP did not renew
the Market Share Bonus Program, so October 2014 was the last month
that the program was active.
The 2014 and 2015 Sales Letters
On April 3, 2014, White also received the 2014 "Sales
Letter," which set the terms for sales team compensation for the
period of March 2013 to October 2014. HP yearly issued a "Sales
Letter" that set incentive targets and sales metrics. The Sales
Letter gave the employee fifteen days to accept the new terms, or
to raise any concerns with the employee's manager and the Sales
Compensation team. It stated:
"[t]his Sales letter is considered accepted
after 15 calendar days unless you notify
Hewlett-Packard in writing otherwise, except
as provided by local requirements. In
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accepting, you represent that you have read,
understood and agreed to the content and terms
and conditions of your Sales plan, including
this Sales letter and all referenced
policies."
Page three of the letter pointed employees to the "Approved Sales
Bonus Programs Portal," for "[a]dditional information and
policies."4 White either actively or passively accepted the April
2014 Sales Letter. White also received a similar letter on
February 2, 2015, for the HP 2015 fiscal year.
HP Disbands the DIA Team in October 2014
In October 2014, HP disbanded the DIA team, and
reassigned the employees in that group. HP states it did so
because of changing technology and changing sales priorities.
White was reassigned to the DCA team, which focused on promoting
a different range of HP products to major institutional clients.
Despite the DIA team being disbanded, Cisco nonetheless
lost significant blade server market share in the fourth calendar
quarter of 2014. Because the Market Share Bonus Program was not
in effect under the terms listed on the bonus portal, no employees
who had been former DIA team members received bonuses for this
decline in Cisco market share.
4 White stated in his deposition that he "d[id] not recall
seeing" the link to the bonus portal in his HP fiscal year 2014
Sales Letter. But White has produced no evidence to challenge the
authenticity of the Sales Letter HP provided. We accept that the
Sales Letter provided by HP is an accurate reflection of the letter
that White received.
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White points to a number of conversations he had with HP
employees as evidence that there was significant confusion over
the terms of the Market Share Bonus Program, and whether it had in
fact ended. He notes, for example, that his former DIA supervisor,
Joey Vidal, asked the Sales Compensation team whether DIA team
members would be receiving the bonuses, and asked to speak with
the Sales Compensation team about the bonus program. White does
not contend that any member of the team received a market share
bonus from the disbanded program.
White also does not identify any communication where he
was promised a Cisco Market Share bonus tied to the fourth calendar
quarter of 2014. Instead, White admits that he was generally
unaware of the terms of the bonus program. He testified:
There wasn't a lot of time to keep up with
bonus programs. I kn[ew] that the [Market
Share bonus] program was available . . . [and]
there was talk of it during team meetings, and
there was also talk of it that we met the
objective number for the last period that we
were -– you know, that year or that period of
time that we were working in that capacity at
HP.
He also stated, "there was internal discussion [about the Market
Share Bonus Program] that I believe I did not keep track [of], I
was probably told in a group conversation that those metrics were
released and, in fact, we had earned the highest tier of that IDC
number." White also points to text and email conversations he had
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with coworkers about the program, where some former DIA members
expressed confusion about the Market Share Bonus Program.
White Resigns
On July 3, 2015, White voluntarily resigned. White asked
HP when he would be paid for his unused accrued vacation time.5
In response, HP sent White a memorandum referring him to its
intranet page for departing employees. That page explained that
departing employees in most states forfeited their unused vacation
days under the terms of HP's benefits policy. Maine was not
included in the list of exempt states. White states he was
surprised that Maine was not included on the list of exempt states,
and he thought that Maine had been one of the exempt states under
similar vacation policies issued by his past employers.
B. Relevant Procedural History.
In 2017, White sued HP, claiming that he should receive
compensation for his unused vacation days under Maine law, and
that HP owed him a bonus payment under the Market Share Bonus
Program for the period from October to December 2014. White
largely relied on Me. Stat. tit. 26, § 626, arguing that that
statute gave him a right to receive compensation for his unused
5 White does not dispute on appeal having received HP's
vacation policy with his offer letter, and he now acknowledges
that the vacation policy was available to him on HP's intranet
system at any time. But he states he "d[id] not know" that HP
"had a vacation policy in place when [he left]" the company.
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vacation time on the facts of this case, and a right to collect
bonus pay under the Market Share Bonus Program for the period of
October to December 2014. In the alternative, he argued he should
receive bonus pay under a theory of quantum meruit or unjust
enrichment. White also raised other claims not relevant to this
appeal. HP moved for summary judgment, and the parties submitted
competing statements of material facts.
On June 11, 2019, the district court granted summary
judgment in HP's favor. The district court found that section 626
did not displace the terms of White's employment agreement with HP
because the Maine Law Court has rejected precisely the claim that
White makes here. The district court rejected White's quantum
meruit and unjust enrichment claims relating to the bonus pay
because it found there was a valid contract between White and HP
that precluded recovery under these equitable theories.
Separately, the district court commented that "I have spent an
inordinate amount of time deciphering the record as the parties
presented it in their dueling statements of material fact. . . .
[T]he dueling statements are so argumentative, lengthy, and full
of qualifications, objections, and requests to strike that they
are basically unusable." Rather than rely on the statements of
material facts, the district court "focused directly on the
plaintiff's deposition and affidavit and the defendant's 30(b)(6)
deposition." White brought this timely appeal.
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II. Discussion
White argues the district court erred in finding that
Maine law does not create a substantive right to compensation for
unused vacation time on the undisputed facts here.6 He also argues
that Maine equitable doctrine obligates HP to pay him a Market
Share bonus for the fourth calendar quarter of 2014. Finally,
White claims the district court failed to fully consider the
summary judgment record by setting aside the parties' statements
of material facts, and erred by allowing HP to supplement its
document disclosures after the close of fact discovery. We affirm
the district court's grant of summary judgment.
"[S]ummary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
6 Having lost at the trial court on his proffered
arguments, White now argues for the first time on appeal that we
should certify all questions of Maine law to the Maine Law Court.
Because this argument was not raised to the district court it is
waived. Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463, 470 (2012) ("It is hornbook
law that theories not raised squarely in the district court cannot
be surfaced for the first time on appeal." (quoting McCoy v. Mass.
Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 22 (1st Cir. 1991))). Even if not
waived, it is meritless because Maine law is clear on the issues
raised in this appeal. Nieves v. Univ. of P.R., 7 F.3d 270, 274-
75 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Before [the] discretionary decision [to
certify] is even considered . . . we must first undertake our own
prediction of state law for we may conclude that 'the course [the]
state court [ ] would take is reasonably clear.'" (fourth and fifth
alterations in original) (quoting Porter v. Nutter, 913 F.2d 37,
41 n.4 (1st Cir. 1990))).
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to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). This court
"review[s] an order for summary judgment de novo, evaluating the
facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most
flattering to the nonmoving party." Nieves-Romero v. United
States, 715 F.3d 375, 378 (1st Cir. 2013). To survive summary
judgment, the non-moving party must produce evidence "that, if it
is credited, [would permit] a factfinder . . . [to] resolve the
case in favor of the nonmovant." Theriault v. Genesis HealthCare
LLC, 890 F.3d 342, 348 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Murray v. Kindred
Nursing Ctrs. W. LLC, 789 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2015)). This court
reviews the district court's management of the discovery process
only for abuse of discretion. Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd.,
83 F.3d 526, 530 (1st Cir. 1996).
A. Under Maine law White has no right to pay for unused
vacation time except as provided for in his employment
agreement.
Me. Stat. tit. 26, § 626 states: "An employee leaving
employment must be paid in full no later than the employee's next
established payday. . . . [And] [w]henever the terms of employment
or the employer's established practice includes provisions for
paid vacations, vacation pay on cessation of employment has the
same status as wages earned." On that basis, White argues that
under Maine law his accrued vacation must be treated as wages, and
so should have been paid in full.
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We disagree. The Maine Law Court's decision in
Richardson v. Winthrop School Department, 983 A.2d 400 (Me. 2009),
is controlling. In Richardson the plaintiff had accumulated
approximately 178 days of vacation time when his employment ended,
but forfeited all but 30 days of vacation time under the terms of
a forfeiture provision in his employment contract. Id. at 401.
Richardson sued and argued, just as White does, that his accrued
vacation time should be treated as wages under section 626. Id.
at 403. The Maine Law Court rejected this argument. It stated:
"the [employment] Contract is unambiguous. Despite Richardson's
contentions, the plain language of [the forfeiture provision]
clearly limits his entitlement to vacation pay upon retirement to
thirty days. Richardson's argument to the contrary would read
[that provision] out of the Contract." Id. The Maine Law Court
held that under section 626 "a former employee may only claim what
is owed according to the terms of the employment agreement; section
626 does not modify or supersede its terms." Id. at 402.
Richardson addresses the same type of claim as White's.
The employment agreement in Richardson required the employee to
forfeit vacation time he had accrued. The Maine Law Court held
that section 626 did not change the terms of this forfeiture
provision. To the contrary, it emphasized, "[a]lthough section
626 creates a statutory right for former employees to seek payment,
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entitlement to payment is governed solely by the terms of the
employment agreement." Id.The Maine Law Court's decision in Richardson is
consistent with its earlier opinion in Rowell v. Jones & Vining,
Inc., 524 A.2d 1208 (Me. 1987), which held section 626 does not
create a substantive right to payment for unused vacation time "at
the cessation of employment" except as provided for in the
employment contract. Id. at 1210-11.
White claims Richardson is distinguishable because the
plaintiff in that case accrued his vacation time over a longer
period than White did, and because in Richardson some of that
vacation time had rolled over from past years -- something White's
employment contract prohibits. In Richardson, the plaintiff
worked for his employer for seventeen years, 983 A.2d at 401,
whereas White worked for HP for two. But the Maine Law Court did
not rest any portion of its analysis on the length of Richardson's
employment, or the fact that portions of his vacation time had
rolled over from earlier employment contracts. Nor is there any
language in section 626 or case law from Maine that indicates that
those factors would be relevant. We conclude that Maine law is
clear on this point: section 626 does not create substantive
employment rights, so the terms of HP's vacation policy control.
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B. White's bonus compensation claims are meritless.
White next argues that he is entitled to a $10,000 Market
Share bonus for the fourth calendar quarter of 2014. It is
undisputed that the Market Share Bonus Program was no longer in
effect at that time, and that White was no longer on the DIA team.
White argued to the district court that under section 626 the bonus
should be treated as "wages" that "must be paid in full." White
does not brief this issue on appeal, so this argument is waived.
Rife v. One W. Bank, F.S.B., 873 F.3d 17, 19 (1st Cir. 2017).7
But White does maintain on appeal that based on his
confusion theory8 he should receive bonus compensation under
7 In any event, White's section 626 claim over bonus
compensation is meritless. As with the vacation time claim, the
Maine Law Court has made clear that section 626 cannot create a
substantive right to incentive pay or other compensation when
prohibited by the employer's policy. Burke v. Port Resort Realty
Corp., 714 A.2d 837, 839 (Me. 1998) ("The employment agreement,
not section 626, governs how wages are earned and, if specified,
when wages are to be paid."). Section 626 is intended only to
give employees the right to enforce the terms of their employment
agreement. Id. White acknowledges that he "actively or passively"
accepted the terms of the bonus program, and that he was not
eligible for the Market Share bonus under those terms. Because
White is not eligible for the Market Share bonus under the terms
of his employment agreement, he cannot recover under section 626.
8 White claims that the program was purposefully
confusing, management gave the impression that the team would be
receiving the bonuses, and he performed the work to earn the Market
Share bonus on the assumption that it would be available. He does
not point to any promise by HP to pay the Market Share bonus for
that period, so his claim is limited to this "confusion theory."
White also claims in his brief to this court that the
summary judgment record contained evidence that "HP intentionally
made its bonus programs so confusing that management did not
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equitable theories of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. We
disagree. At the outset, White's unjust enrichment claim fails
because of his contractual relationship with HP.
"Unjust enrichment describes recovery for the value of the benefit
retained when there is no contractual relationship, but when, on
the grounds of fairness and justice, the law compels performance
of a legal and moral duty to pay." Aladdin Elec. Assocs. v. Town
of Old Orchard Beach, 645 A.2d 1142, 1145 (Me. 1994) (emphasis
added) (quoting A.F.A.B., Inc. v. Town of Old Orchard Beach, 639
A.2d 103, 105 (Me. 1994)). White plainly had a contractual
relationship with HP, and so cannot maintain an unjust enrichment
claim.
A contractual relationship does not necessarily bar
quantum meruit recovery. As this court has previously stated,
under Maine law quantum meruit recovery may be available alongside
contractual remedies when the services at issue are outside of the
scope of the contract, or in "circumstances that render the
contract inoperative." Hodgkins v. New England Tel. Co., 82 F.3d
1226, 1232 (1st Cir. 1996); see also Uncle Henry's Inc. v. Plaut
Consulting Co. Inc., 399 F.3d 33, 46 (1st Cir. 2005); Runnells v.
Quinn, 890 A.2d 713, 716-17 (Me. 2006) (contractor could seek
quantum meruit recovery for work completed on the basis of an oral
understand its terms." But he cites to no evidence supporting
this proposition.
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agreement made in addition to a written contract). White has
presented no such evidence here. White’s sales support work fell
squarely within his employment agreements. White has not pointed
to any work that he performed outside of his roles on the DIA or
DCA teams. White accepted the terms of his employment according
to the manner HP set out in its offer. He cannot recover under a
theory of quantum meruit for work that is directly addressed by
his employment contract. Hodgkins, 82 F.3d at 1232.
C. The district court was well within its discretion to
permit HP to produce an additional document before
summary judgment.
White also takes issue with the district court's
decision to permit HP to supplement its document production. This
court reviews the district court's discovery orders for abuse of
discretion. In re Subpoena to Witzel, 531 F.3d 113, 117 (1st Cir.
2008). We reverse the district court only on a showing of
"manifest injustice." Id. (quoting Saldana-Sanchez v. Lopez-
Gerena, 256 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2001)). In this case, White
complains that HP was permitted to attach a copy of the 2015
vacation policy and certain deposition transcripts to the summary
judgment motion, even though those documents were not previously
provided. These challenges are meritless. The 2015 vacation
policy that HP provided at summary judgment was substantively
identical to other versions which HP had provided, and HP included
these documents after a request from White that it do so. In these
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circumstances, the district court was well within its discretion
to permit HP to submit the 2015 version of its vacation policy.
D. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
its comments about the parties' statements of material
facts.
The district court's comments about the parties'
statements of material facts are well-supported, and in any event,
there is no evidence that the district court ignored any portion
of the record. Cf. Martinez v. Petrenko, 792 F.3d 173, 180 (1st
Cir. 2015) ("[A] district court should consider the full record,
including affidavits and interrogatories, when considering a
motion for summary judgment."). The district court committed no
error by giving little weight to the statements of material facts
in this case.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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