Fagre v. Parks

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 20-1343
JESSICA FAGRE, as personal representative of the Estate of
Ambroshia E. Fagre,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
JEFFREY PARKS, Trooper,
Defendant, Appellee,
MARK BROWN, Chief of Police; SCOTT W. IRELAND, Lieutenant,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Lance E. Walker, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch and Barron, Circuit Judges,
and Burroughs,* District Judge.
Hunter J. Tzovarras, with whom Pelletier Faircloth & Braccio
LLC was on brief, for appellant.
Jonathan R. Bolton, Assistant Attorney General of the State
of Maine, with whom Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General of the State
of Maine, was on brief, for appellee.
* Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
January 13, 2021
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. The plaintiff, Jessica Fagre
("Fagre"), acting as the personal representative of the estate of
Ambroshia Fagre ("Amber"), appeals from the district court's March
5, 2020 order granting summary judgment on claims related to
Amber's death on February 10, 2017. Fagre argues that the district
court erred because the defendant, Trooper Jeffrey Parks, violated
Amber's rights under the United States and Maine Constitutions
when he unintentionally shot and killed her and was not entitled
to qualified immunity. She also argues that Trooper Parks
committed state law torts against Amber and was not entitled to
tort immunity. We affirm.
I. Facts
On February 10, 2017, at around 4:00 PM, Lieutenant Scott
Ireland of the Maine State Police responded to a report of a
suspicious vehicle in his neighborhood in Vassalboro, Maine. He
arrived at the scene and found Amber Fagre asleep in the passenger
seat of a running Dodge Durango. He said he saw footprints in the
snow leading from the Durango to a nearby home. He woke Amber up
and questioned her. He said she appeared confused and was either
unwilling or unable to explain why she was there or where the
driver of the Durango had gone. Lt. Ireland believed that Amber
and the Durango's driver were breaking into homes. He reported
what he had found over the police radio.
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Lt. Ireland continued to question Amber. She admitted
that the Durango's driver was breaking into homes. The footprints
in the snow led to the home of Richard Browne. Lt. Ireland made
a series of phone calls to determine if Browne was safe. He
learned from one of Browne's relatives that someone had broken
into Browne's home, held him at gunpoint, tied him up, held him in
the basement, and ransacked his house. The attacker had also
stolen Browne's pickup truck. Lt. Ireland reported this additional
information over the radio and requested that all available units
report to the scene.
In response, Sergeant Galen Estes arrived at the scene
in his cruiser. Lt. Ireland then left to check on Browne, who
confirmed that he had been attacked and gave a description of his
attacker. Vassalboro Police Chief Mark Brown, followed later by
Trooper Jeffrey Parks, joined Sgt. Estes at the Durango in separate
vehicles.
When Trooper Parks, appellee here, arrived, he saw Chief
Brown talking to someone in the Durango. He did not look at the
person in the car but said he assumed it was the female suspect
Lt. Ireland had described over the radio. Trooper Parks then left
the scene to meet Lt. Ireland. At some point after Trooper Parks
left, Sgt. Estes moved his cruiser away from the scene.
Lt. Ireland met Trooper Parks and told him to conduct
safety checks of nearby residences. Lt. Ireland then returned to
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the Durango to join Sgt. Estes and Chief Brown. After he arrived,
he heard over the radio that another officer had located Browne's
stolen truck. Immediately thereafter, he received a call from
Kate Pineau. Pineau said that the armed suspect was in front of
her house, which was about two tenths of a mile from the Durango.
Lt. Ireland and Sgt. Estes left the scene to investigate. Lt.
Ireland drove his police cruiser and Sgt. Estes took Chief Brown's
vehicle. Chief Brown stayed with Amber and the Durango. No police
vehicles remained at the scene.
Lt. Ireland and Sgt. Estes arrived at the Pineau
residence. There, they found footprints. They followed the
footprints and eventually saw the suspect. Lt. Ireland said that
he realized that the suspect was heading back to the Durango. He
told Sgt. Estes to warn Chief Brown over the radio, which he did.
Lt. Ireland then headed back to the Durango.
After receiving Sgt. Estes's warning, Chief Brown saw
the suspect running toward him. He said the suspect appeared to
have a gun. Chief Brown identified himself as a police officer
and ordered the suspect to drop his gun. He said the suspect
ignored the order, ran to the passenger side of the Durango, and
raised his right arm toward Chief Brown. Chief Brown said he
believed his life was in danger and that the suspect was going to
shoot at him. He fired at the suspect. He then took cover behind
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a snowbank on the driver side of the Durango. Chief Brown heard
the suspect fire at least one shot and returned fire.
The suspect got into the Durango and began driving.
Amber was still in the passenger seat. Chief Brown said that he
feared the suspect intended to fire on him again. He fired at
least two additional shots at the driver-side door of the Durango,
aiming for the driver. All parties agree that, had Amber been
sitting upright in the passenger seat, she likely would have been
hit by one of Chief Brown's bullets. The parties have stipulated
that none of Chief Brown's shots hit Amber.
Meanwhile, Trooper Parks had heard over the radio that
Lt. Ireland saw the suspect heading back to the Durango. He drove
his police cruiser back to where the Durango had been. It had
been approximately seventeen minutes since Trooper Parks had last
been at the scene. Both police vehicles he had previously seen
there were gone. As he approached, he said he heard multiple
gunshots near the Durango. He said he saw someone crouched behind
a snowbank and movement outside of the Durango. He concluded that
the suspect and the police were exchanging fire. He parked his
cruiser in the middle of the road, approximately twenty-five yards
from the Durango. He got out and took cover behind his car.
Trooper Parks said he saw the Durango start driving
toward him. The car was accelerating rapidly, and Trooper Parks
said that from the engine noise he believed that the driver had
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pushed the gas pedal to the floor. The road was too narrow for
the Durango to pass Trooper Parks's cruiser without hitting a
snowbank, so Trooper Parks concluded that the driver intended to
ram his car. Trooper Parks quickly moved away from his cruiser
and climbed on top of a snowbank. He said that it was a sunny day
and that there was plenty of light outside. He said that, from
the snowbank, he could see directly into the Durango and that
nothing obstructed his view. He said that he saw only the driver
and that the passenger seat appeared to be empty.
The Durango continued to accelerate toward Trooper
Parks's car. Trooper Parks said he believed his life was in
immediate danger. He fired several shots into the Durango as it
passed within a couple feet of him and collided with his police
cruiser. He said he aimed all of his shots at the driver and that
he intended to stop the driver from using deadly force against
him. The Durango crashed into Trooper Parks's cruiser, missing
him by a few feet. The force of the impact pushed his cruiser
about fifty feet down the road.
Lt. Ireland then arrived back at the scene. He said he
had heard the gunshots but did not witness the crash. He saw that
the Durango had crashed into Trooper Parks's cruiser. Lt. Ireland
began to approach the Durango on foot. Once he was within fifteen
or twenty yards of the Durango, he said that he could see the
driver and that the driver appeared to have something in his hand.
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The driver had his hand out of the driver-side window. Lt. Ireland
identified himself as a state police officer and told the driver
to show him both of his hands. Instead of complying, the driver
put his arm back in the car, looked back over his shoulder at Lt.
Ireland, then looked at his lap and the Durango's center console
before looking back at Lt. Ireland. Lt. Ireland fired one shot,
killing the driver.
The police then approached the Durango and found Amber
slumped across the center console of the car with her head under
the driver's arm. An autopsy revealed that a single bullet,
stipulated to have been fired by Trooper Parks, had passed through
her right shoulder and head, killing her. The parties agree that
the trajectory of the bullet makes it extremely unlikely that Amber
had been sitting upright in the Durango when she was shot.
II. Procedural History
Fagre, as the personal representative of Amber's estate,
filed suit against Trooper Parks, Lt. Ireland, and Chief Brown.
Her complaint alleged: (1) use of excessive force against Amber in
violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; (2) use of excessive force against Amber in violation of
Article 1, § 5 of the Maine Constitution under the Maine Civil
Rights Act ("MCRA"), Me. Stat. tit. 5, § 4682; (3) failure to
protect Amber in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment under 42
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U.S.C. § 1983; (4) negligence under Maine state law; and
(5) wrongful death under Maine state law.
The district court dismissed all of the claims against
Chief Brown and Lt. Ireland, which Fagre does not appeal. After
discovery, the district court granted Trooper Parks's motion for
summary judgment. Fagre v. Parks, No. 19-CV-00083, 2020 WL
1066977, at *7 (D. Me. Mar. 5, 2020). As to Fagre's § 1983 claim,1
the court held that Trooper Parks had not violated Amber's Fourth
Amendment rights and was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
It added that, even if Trooper Parks had seized Amber in violation
of the Fourth Amendment, he would be entitled to qualified immunity
from § 1983 liability. The district court also granted summary
judgment for Trooper Parks on the MCRA § 4682 claim because the
protections of Article 1, § 5 of the Maine Constitution are
coextensive with those of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Martin,
120 A.3d 113, 118 n.2 (Me. 2015). On the remaining claims, the
court held that Trooper Parks's discretionary use of force was
reasonable and that the Maine Tort Claims Act ("MTCA"), Me. Stat.
tit. 14, § 8111(1), shielded him from tort liability.
Fagre appeals from the district court's grant of summary
judgment.
1 The district court did not address Fagre's other § 1983
claim that Trooper Parks failed to protect Amber because, after
discovery, Fagre agreed not to pursue it.
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III. Analysis
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. See,
e.g., Irish v. Fowler, 979 F.3d 65, 73 (1st Cir. 2020). We read
the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party --
here, Fagre -- and make all reasonable inferences in her favor.
Id.A. Federal Claim
Fagre says that the district court erred in three ways
when it granted Trooper Parks's motion for summary judgment on her
§ 1983 claim. First, she argues that the district court erred by
holding that Trooper Parks did not seize Amber under the Fourth
Amendment. Next, Fagre argues that the district court erred in
concluding that Trooper Parks's use of force was objectively
reasonable. Finally, she says that the court erred by concluding
that Trooper Parks was entitled to qualified immunity. We hold
that, on these facts, there was no Fourth Amendment violation
because Trooper Parks's use of force was objectively reasonable.
Further, the district court correctly concluded that Trooper Parks
was entitled to qualified immunity.
Plaintiffs whose constitutional rights have been
violated by someone acting under the color of state law can recover
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Cruz–Erazo v. Rivera–Montañez,
212 F.3d 617, 621 (1st Cir. 2000). Fagre says that Trooper Parks
used excessive force against Amber, which violated her Fourth
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Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure. See U.S.
Const. amend. IV. To avoid summary judgment, she must allege facts
showing that Trooper Parks (1) seized Amber and (2) did so
unreasonably. See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599
(1989) ("'Seizure' alone is not enough for § 1983 liability; the
seizure must be 'unreasonable.'"); see also Plumhoff v. Rickard,
572 U.S. 765, 774 (2014) ("A claim that law-enforcement officers
used excessive force to effect a seizure is governed by the Fourth
Amendment's 'reasonableness' standard.").
Setting aside whether Trooper Parks seized Amber,2 Fagre
"must show that the defendant officer employed force that was
unreasonable under the circumstances." Kenney v. Floyd, 700 F.3d
604, 609 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting Jennings v. Jones, 499 F.3d 2,
11 (1st Cir. 2007)). We assess reasonableness "from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with
2 In Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791 (1st Cir.
1990), we held that a hostage was not "seized" within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment when a police officer shot the hostage
while firing into a car containing both the hostage and a fleeing
suspect. Id. at 795 ("A police officer's deliberate decision to
shoot at a car containing a robber and a hostage for the purpose
of stopping the robber's flight does not result in the sort of
willful detention of the hostage that the Fourth Amendment was
designed to govern."). Fagre argues that Brendlin v. California,
551 U.S. 249 (2007), requires us to revisit our holding in Landol-
Rivera because Brendlin says that when a police officer
intentionally stops a vehicle, the officer subjects all of the
vehicle's occupants to a Fourth Amendment seizure. See id. at
255-57. Because we hold that Trooper Parks's actions were
objectively reasonable, we do not need to reach this issue.
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the 20/20 vision of hindsight" and account "for the fact that
police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments
-- in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving
-- about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular
situation." Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97
(1989)). The standard is objective and fact specific. See Graham,
490 U.S. at 397 ("[T]he question is whether the officers' actions
are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying
intent or motivation.").
We first note that, based on the facts alleged and
admitted by Fagre, no reasonable jury could conclude that Trooper
Parks knew or should have known that Amber was in the car when he
fired into the Durango. Trooper Parks had seen Chief Brown talking
to Amber, who was in the Durango, when he first arrived at the
scene. He then left to conduct safety checks on nearby residences.
Seventeen minutes passed before Trooper Parks returned to the
scene. In that time, he received no information indicating that
Amber was still in the Durango. And when he returned to the scene,
much had changed. Before, Trooper Parks had seen two police
cars -- Sgt. Estes's cruiser and Chief Brown's vehicle -- near the
Durango. Amber was with Sgt. Estes and Chief Brown. Now, he saw
only the Durango and heard what appeared to be a shootout between
the suspect and the police. He saw no police cars, did not see
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Amber, and could have believed that Amber had been taken away in
one of the police vehicles.
Trooper Parks's observations prior to him defending
himself by shooting at the driver confirmed his belief that Amber
was not in the Durango. After he climbed onto the snowbank, he
looked directly through the windshield into the Durango as it sped
toward him and saw only the driver. It is undisputed that he did
not see Amber in the passenger seat and that the passenger seat
appeared to be empty.3 As other evidence showed, Trooper Parks
did not and could not see Amber because she was slumped out of
sight rather than sitting upright in the passenger seat. As the
Durango sped toward Trooper Parks, Chief Brown had fired into it
and likely would have hit Amber if she had been sitting upright.
The path of Trooper Parks's bullet through Amber's body also
indicated that she had not been sitting upright in the Durango.
Indeed, when her body was found, her head was tucked under the
driver's arm. Based on what Trooper Parks saw, he did not know
and nothing in the record indicates he should have known that Amber
had been in the Durango when he fired at the driver.
Fagre argues that Trooper Parks's use of force was
unreasonable because Trooper Parks was not in imminent danger.
3 Although below Fagre denied Amber was not in the front
seat of the vehicle, she notably did not dispute Trooper Parks's
statement that he could not see Amber in the passenger seat from
his position on the snowbank.
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She says that the driver, the Durango, and Amber posed no threat
to anyone when Trooper Parks fired into the Durango.
"[T]he use of deadly force is constitutional only if, at
a minimum, a suspect poses an immediate threat to police officers
or civilians." Conlogue v. Hamilton, 906 F.3d 150, 156 (1st Cir.
2018) (quoting Jarrett v. Town of Yarmouth, 331 F.3d 140, 149 (1st
Cir. 2003) (per curiam)).4 No reasonable jury could conclude that
it was unreasonable for Trooper Parks to believe that the driver
posed an immediate threat. When Trooper Parks fired into the
Durango, the suspect was attempting to ram Trooper Parks and his
cruiser at full speed. See McGrath v. Tavares, 757 F.3d 20, 28
(1st Cir. 2014) ("The choices were to shoot or risk being run over.
. . . A reasonable officer in this situation could reasonably
believe he was facing a threat of serious physical harm, if not
death."); see also Mitchell v. Miller, 790 F.3d 73, 80 (1st Cir.
2015) ("[T]he test is not whether a person was actually directly
in the path of the car, but whether it was reasonable for [the
officer] to believe -- at the point when events were rapidly
unfolding -- that someone was at risk of serious physical harm.").
That Trooper Parks climbed a snowbank did not remove the oncoming
danger to him from the Durango or from his own cruiser once rammed
4 If feasible, the suspect must also be warned before
deadly force is used. Conlogue, 906 F.3d at 156. Fagre admits
that a warning was infeasible.
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by the Durango. The Durango passed within a few feet of Trooper
Parks before hitting his police cruiser. It was travelling fast
enough that, when it did hit his cruiser, the Durango pushed it
fifty feet down the road. Had the driver changed course even
slightly, he could have rammed into Trooper Parks instead of the
police cruiser or rammed the police cruiser into the snowbank where
Trooper Parks was. Fagre's argument that Trooper Parks was not in
immediate danger because the Durango did not hit him and appeared
to turn slightly away from him before hitting the cruiser is not
persuasive. It relies on the "20/20 vision of hindsight," not the
"perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene." Graham, 490
U.S. at 396.
Trooper Parks also knew that the suspect had a gun. The
driver, who had, moments earlier, fired his gun at another police
officer and was now accelerating at full speed toward Trooper
Parks, could have shot at Trooper Parks from the Durango. The
Durango came close enough to Trooper Parks for the armed driver to
pose an immediate threat. In the aftermath of the crash, the armed
driver would also pose a risk to Trooper Parks or other officers
at the scene. No reasonable jury could have concluded that Trooper
Parks did not reasonably believe his life was in danger. There
was no Fourth Amendment violation and summary judgment on Fagre's
§ 1983 claim was warranted.
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Trooper Parks was also entitled to qualified immunity.
"Government officials sued in their individual capacities are
immune from damages claims unless '(1) they violated a federal
statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of
their conduct was "clearly established at the time."'" Irish, 979
F.3d at 76 (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577,
589 (2018)). The "clearly established" prong of qualified immunity
involves two inquiries. It first "asks whether the precedent is
'clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret it to
establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.'" Id.(quoting Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590). Next, it asks "whether '[t]he
rule's contours [were] so well defined that it is clear to a
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation
he confronted.'" Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Wesby,
138 S. Ct. at 590).
Trooper Parks did not violate a federal statutory or
constitutional right. Further, on these facts, we cannot say that
every reasonable officer would have concluded that his life was
not in danger. The Supreme Court has "stressed the need to
identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances
was held to have violated the Fourth Amendment." City of Escondido
v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 504 (2019) (quoting Wesby, 138 S. Ct.
at 590). The case law does not clearly establish that it is
unreasonable for an officer to conclude his life is in danger and
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to use potentially deadly force under circumstances like these.
Cf. Mitchell, 790 F.3d at 76, 79-80 (holding that it was not
clearly established that an officer violated the Fourth Amendment
when he fired into a car that could have run him over); McGrath,
757 F.3d at 28 (holding there was no Fourth Amendment violation
when an officer fired into a car that could have run him over).
B. State Claims
Fagre also argues that the district court erred by
granting summary judgment on her state law claims.
On Fagre's MCRA § 4682 claim, "Article I, section 5 of
the Maine Constitution provides protections that are coextensive
with the Fourth Amendment." Martin, 120 A.3d at 118 n.2; Clifford
v. MaineGeneral Med. Ctr., 91 A.3d 567, 587 n.21 (Me. 2014). As
we have described, there was no Fourth Amendment violation.
Summary judgment on Fagre's § 4682 claim was proper.
On Fagre's negligence and wrongful death claims, Trooper
Parks argues that he is entitled to immunity under the MTCA's
discretionary function exception. See Me. Stat. tit. 14,
§ 8111(1)(C). This exception grants employees of governmental
entities "absolute[] immun[ity] from personal civil liability"
when they are "[p]erforming . . . any discretionary function or
duty." Id. § 8111(1). A police officer's use of force is a
discretionary act. See Roy v. Inhabitants of City of Lewiston, 42
F.3d 691, 696 (1st Cir. 1994) ("Maine case law has construed [the
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MTCA] to apply to claims of excessive force." (citing Leach v.
Betters, 599 A.2d 424, 426 (Me. 1991))). "Officers whose actions
are '"objectively reasonable" in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting them,' are not acting beyond the scope
of their discretion and are immune under the [MTCA]." Richards v.
Town of Eliot, 780 A.2d 281, 292 (Me. 2001) (citation omitted)
(quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Because no reasonable jury
could find that Trooper Parks's actions were not objectively
reasonable, he is entitled to immunity under the MTCA.
IV.
Affirmed.
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