Abernathy v. Anderson

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 19-1880
FRANKLIN B. ABERNATHY,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
KRYSTAL ANDERSON,
Defendant, Appellee,
CAPTAIN SHAUN DEWEY; SERGEANT MICHAEL RUMERY;
THOMAS GROBLEWSKI, MD, Medical Director for UMass Correctional
Health Inc.; OFFICER GERARD BREAU, a/k/a John Doe II;
LIEUTENANT DAVID DARLING, a/k/a John Doe I;
OFFICER KYLE SHELDON, a/k/a John Doe III; OFFICER SHAWN GYLES,
a/k/a John Doe IV; BRUCE GELB; LUIS SPENCER;
JOHN DOE V, Officer for the D.O.C.,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. F. Dennis Saylor IV, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Chief Judge,
and Barron, Circuit Judge.*
* Judge Torruella heard oral argument in this matter and
participated in the semble, but he did not participate in the
issuance of the panel's opinion in this case. The remaining two
panelists therefore issued the opinion pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 46(d)
Ezekiel L. Hill, Diana E. Coleman, and Goodwin Procter LLP on
brief, for appellant.
Tory A. Weigand and Morrison Mahoney LLP on brief, for
appellee.
December 18, 2020
Per curiam. Plaintiff-Appellant Franklin B. Abernathy
("Abernathy"), an inmate at Souza-Baranowski Correctional Center
("SBCC"), appeals the district court's order granting summary
judgment on his deliberate indifference claim brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant-Appellee Krystal Anderson
("Anderson"), a nurse at SBCC. Because we agree with the district
court that Abernathy has failed to establish a triable issue that
he had a serious medical need to which Anderson was indifferent,
we affirm.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
On April 3, 2013, Abernathy was incarcerated at SBCC in
the J-Unit tier of the Special Management Unit. At the time,
Anderson worked as a nurse at SBCC. In the morning, Correctional
Officer Kyle Sheldon ("C.O. Sheldon") instructed Abernathy's
cellmate, Leon Shelby ("Shelby"), to remove a blanket that was
covering the rear window of the cell, which Shelby refused to do.
Later that morning, Sergeant Michael Rumery ("Sergeant Rumery")
accompanied Anderson for medication rounds in J-Unit. Upon
reaching Abernathy and Shelby's cell for distribution of
medication, Sergeant Rumery noticed the blanket covering the
window and instructed Abernathy to remove it. Abernathy refused
to remove the blanket because it belonged to Shelby. Sergeant
Rumery then instructed Shelby to remove the blanket, which Shelby
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once again refused to do. As a result of Shelby's refusal,
Sergeant Rumery instructed Anderson not to dispense the medication
and told Abernathy that he would not receive his medications until
the blanket was removed from the window.1
Around noontime, C.O. Sheldon went to Abernathy and
Shelby's cell and attempted to hand a tray of food to Shelby.
Shelby, who refused to take the tray, stated that he believed his
food had been tampered with, and then threw a cup of liquid at
C.O. Sheldon, hitting him in the face. As a result of the
altercation, it was ordered that Shelby be placed in restraints.
Sergeant Rumery told Abernathy that he also needed to be placed in
restraints because the correctional officers were going to open
the cell to remove Shelby from it. Abernathy stuck his hands out
of the cell door in order to be handcuffed. According to
Abernathy, the officers "slammed" or "squeezed" the handcuffs on
1 Anderson contends that Sergeant Rumery's decision to not
dispense the medication was due to safety concerns because the
cell was dark due to the blanket covering the window, making it
unsafe to reach into the cell. Abernathy disputes that the cell
was dark and asserts that he turned the light on in the cell when
the interaction with Anderson and Sergeant Rumery began. Also,
according to Anderson, Abernathy received his medication once
"everything calmed down." Abernathy, however, claims he did not
receive his medication until the following day when "[e]verything
went back to normal" and that the delay caused him to experience
muscle spasms ("off and on"), chest pain, and pain in his left
shoulder for twenty-four hours. These discrepancies, however, do
not create an issue of material fact preventing the entry of
summary judgment. See infra.
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his wrists so tightly that it affected his blood circulation, and
they then pulled on the handcuffs, twisting his fingers and hands,
causing bleeding and pain in the process.
Correctional officers escorted Abernathy over to the
Special Management Unit medical triage room, where Anderson was
the nurse on duty. According to Abernathy, even though he had
blood on his body and "visible cuts, bruises, and swelling on [his]
hands, wrists, and arms," Anderson refused to assess his medical
needs and refused to provide him with any medication or treatment.2
The next day, Abernathy submitted a sick-call request,
stating that he had bruises and lacerations on both arms, as well
as a strained or broken wrist. In the morning, he received his
medications for pre-existing conditions, including pain
medication, but was not medically assessed for his alleged injuries
from the day before. On April 5, 2013, the SBCC medical staff
assessed Abernathy and determined that he had no bruising or
2 Anderson disputes this fact, though her account has not always
been consistent. In 2013, she stated to OIS investigators that on
April 3, 2013 she assessed Abernathy and that he seemed to be fine
and had no complaints. In 2018, however, Anderson testified in
her deposition that Abernathy did not show up at the triage room
for examination on April 3, and that she was never told that he
wanted to be examined. Regardless, because we are reviewing a
grant of summary judgment, we construe the record in the light
most favorable to Abernathy, the nonmovant. See Ocasio-Hernández
v. Fortuño-Burset, 777 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2015).
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swelling, although he did have old, already healed scars. The
medical staff provided Abernathy Motrin 200mg and ordered x-rays.
On April 8, 2013, Abernathy reported the April 3 incident
to Feltus Bradford, a mental health professional at SBCC. The
next day, on April 9, 2013, Abernathy submitted another sick call
request, this time reporting that he was suffering from a numb
wrist, pain in the area near his thumb, soreness from the handcuff
cutting into the flesh of his wrist, and what he thought could be
"nerve damage." Medical progress notes prepared on April 10, 2013
reveal that Abernathy claimed a numb thumb, "scabbing" of the right
thumb joint, tenderness on his wrist, and "ecchymosis" (i.e.
bruising) on "both arms from wrist to elbow."
On April 15, 2013, x-rays were taken of Abernathy's right
wrist and right thumb, showing no fractures, dislocations or other
abnormalities. Progress notes from May 7, 2013, state that
Abernathy complained of "hand pain," but had "no functional
impairment." The medical examiner noted that Abernathy's hands
had no "gross deformity" or "pain on palpation."
B. Procedural Background
In February 2015, Abernathy filed his original complaint
pro se, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state tort law
against Anderson and several other defendants. Abernathy later
retained counsel and amended his complaint several times.
Abernathy contends that Anderson's failure to assess and treat his
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alleged medical needs on April 3, as well as her refusal to
administer his medication, caused him physical pain, fear, and
anxiety arising from not knowing the extent of his wounds.
The court dismissed the claims against all defendants,
save for those against Anderson. Anderson, the sole remaining
defendant, then moved for summary judgment on all claims against
her: a § 1983 deliberate indifference claim for the alleged denial
of medical care and treatment to Abernathy on April 3, 2013; a
claim for negligence due to Anderson's alleged failure to provide
medical assessment and/or treatment to Abernathy on April 3, 2013;
and a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress related
to Anderson's alleged actions and/or omissions on that same day.
Abernathy opposed. On July 31, 2019, the district court granted
summary judgment for Anderson on all claims. Abernathy appeals
only the disposition of his § 1983 claim. We thus limit our
discussion accordingly.
II. Discussion
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment
de novo, construing the record in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant and resolving all reasonable inferences in that party's
favor. Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 777 F.3d 1, 4 (1st
Cir. 2015); Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir.
1991) (quoting Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir.
1990)). Summary judgment may be granted only when "there is no
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genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.56(a). A fact is
considered material when it has the "potential to affect the
outcome of the suit under the applicable law." Sánchez v.
Alvarado, 101 F.3d 223, 227 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting One Nat'l
Bank v. Antonellis, 80 F.3d 606, 608 (1st Cir. 1996)). "A dispute
is 'genuine' if 'the evidence about the fact is such that a
reasonable jury could resolve the point in the favor of the non-
moving party.'" Id. (quoting Rivera–Muriente v. Agosto–Alicea,
959 F.2d 349, 351-52 (1st Cir. 1992)). The party opposing summary
judgment "bears 'the burden of producing specific facts sufficient
to deflect the swing of the summary judgment scythe.'" Theidon v.
Harvard Univ., 948 F.3d 477, 494 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting Mulvihill
v. Top-Flite Golf Co., 335 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 2003)). "For
this purpose, [it] cannot rely on 'conclusory allegations,
improbable inferences, acrimonious invective, or rank
speculation.'" Id. (quoting Ahern v. Shinseki, 629 F.3d 49, 54
(1st Cir. 2010)).
Abernathy's § 1983 claim alleges that Anderson violated
his Eighth Amendment rights. The Eighth Amendment prohibits "cruel
and unusual punishments." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Although the
Eighth Amendment "does not mandate comfortable prisons," Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981), it does not "permit inhumane
ones" either, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
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Accordingly, "the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the
conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under
the Eighth Amendment." Id. (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S.
25, 31 (1993)).
It is well established that "deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain' proscribed by the Eighth Amendment,"
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted)
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)), and is
actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, id. at 105. To succeed on a
deliberate indifference claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must
satisfy a two-prong standard. Leavitt v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc.,
645 F.3d. 484, 497 (1st Cir. 2011). First, a plaintiff must show,
as an objective matter, that he has a "serious medical need[]"
that received inadequate care. Id. A serious medical need is
that which "has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating
treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would
easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Id.(quoting Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 208
(1st Cir. 1990)). "The 'seriousness' of an inmate's needs may
also be determined by reference to the effect of the delay of
treatment." Id. at 497-98 (quoting Gaudreault, 923 F.2d at 208).
The serious medical need inquiry is fact-specific and must be
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tailored to the specific circumstances of the case. See id. at 500
(quoting Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 2003)).
Second, even if the plaintiff satisfies the objective
prong, "the Eighth Amendment is not violated unless prison
administrators also exhibit deliberate indifference to the
prisoner's needs." Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 83 (1st Cir.
2014). Deliberate indifference under this subjective prong
requires evidence that the failure in providing treatment to the
plaintiff was purposeful. Id. Thus, an "inadvertent failure to
provide adequate medical care" does not give rise to a
constitutional claim. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06; see also Watson
v. Caton, 984 F.2d 537, 540 (1st Cir. 1993). This prong can also
be met by showing a "wanton disregard to a prisoner's needs . . .
akin to criminal recklessness, requiring consciousness of
impending harm, easily preventable." Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 83
(quotations omitted).
Here, the district court concluded that Abernathy's
§ 1983 deliberate indifference claim failed because he could not
show a triable issue of fact as to whether his alleged injuries
constituted a serious medical need. Abernathy v. Anderson, 395 F.
Supp. 3d 123, 126 (D. Mass. 2019). First, the district court
determined that evidence of mere bruises, cuts, swelling, and
superficial lacerations that did not require treatment and did not
lead to infection or complications did not constitute a serious
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medical need under our precedent. Id. at 133-34. Second, the
court noted that the evidence in the record did not show that the
alleged delay in examining Abernathy's injuries exacerbated any
medical condition or resulted in permanent damage. Thus, it was
insufficient as a matter of law to show that Abernathy had a
serious medical need. Id. at 134. Finally, the court held that
"[e]ven assuming [that Abernathy's] bruises and cuts were visible
to Anderson on April 3," the record did not contain sufficient
evidence from which a rational jury could conclude that his need
for treatment was so obvious "that even a lay person would easily
recognize the necessity for [medical] attention." Id. (quoting
Gaudreault, 923 F.3d at 208).
On appeal, Abernathy argues that the district court
erred in granting summary judgment on his § 1983 deliberate
indifference claim because there is a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether he had a serious medical need within the meaning
of the Eighth Amendment. He offers three theories in support of
his position.
First, Abernathy posits that there is a material factual
dispute over whether he faced a significant risk of future harm
given that a correctional officer presented him to Anderson for
medical attention and she refused to perform any medical
assessment. Relying on Leavitt, 645 F.3d 484, 500 (1st Cir. 2011),
Abernathy argues that the mere fact that Anderson refused to assess
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his injuries "subjected [him] to a substantial risk of harm,"
thereby constituting a "serious medical need" for Eighth Amendment
purposes, regardless of whether his injuries were actually
serious.
"[S]ubjecting individuals to a risk of future harm . . .
can qualify as cruel and unusual punishment." Kosilek, 774 F.3d
at 85-86 (alterations in original) (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S.
35, 50 (2008)). It is "the particular risk of harm faced by a
prisoner due to the challenged deprivation of care, rather than
the severity of the prisoner's underlying medical condition,
considered in the abstract, that is relevant for Eighth Amendment
purposes." Leavitt, 645 F.3d at 500 (quoting Smith, 316 F.3d at
186). However, the particular risk of harm which can rise to the
level of a serious medical need cannot be a purely hypothetical or
abstract risk. Instead, it refers to an actual risk of harm faced
by the plaintiff-inmate who does not receive the medical attention
that he requests and genuinely needs. See Helling, 509 U.S. at 33(holding that prospective harm, defined as that which is "sure or
very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering" to an
inmate in the future, can be the basis for an Eighth Amendment
claim even if the inmate has "no serious current symptoms"); Smith,
316 F.3d at 188 (holding that although "an Eighth Amendment claim
may be based on a defendant's conduct in exposing an inmate to an
unreasonable risk of future harm and that actual physical injury
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is not necessary in order to demonstrate an Eighth Amendment
violation," the absence of present physical injury will
nonetheless "often be probative in assessing the risk of future
harm").
In Leavitt, the plaintiff-inmate was deprived of
medication needed to treat his HIV, causing him to suffer severe
withdrawal symptoms, such as "nightsweats, chills, fever, fatigue,
gastrointestinal problems, including vomiting and constipation,
and psoriasis." 645 F.3d at 501. Further, the deprivation of
care created long-term risks by exacerbating his underlying HIV
condition and making him statistically more likely to develop
cancer in the future. Id. We reversed the granting of summary
judgment for the defendant because a reasonable factfinder could
have found that the defendant's deprivation of care subjected the
plaintiff-inmate to serious harm, both short-term and long-term.
Id.Here, Abernathy claims to have suffered cuts, bruises,
swelling, and some bleeding as a result of the altercation he had
with SBCC's correctional officers on April 3, 2013. Although
taking the facts in the light most favorable to Abernathy, Anderson
refused to assess Abernathy's injuries that day, Abernathy was
medically assessed by SBCC medical staff on April 5, 2013.
Moreover, on April 15, 2013, x-rays were taken of his right wrist
and thumb, showing "[n]o acute fracture, dislocation, or other
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acute bony abnormality." Even though Abernathy alleges that
Anderson's refusal to assess his injuries on April 3 created a
"risk of harm" to his health, there is no evidence in the summary
judgment record showing what that future harm could have consisted
of, much less that it would "sure[ly] or very likely [] cause
serious illness and needless suffering" to him in the future.
Helling, 509 U.S. at 33. Accordingly, as opposed to the plaintiff
in Leavitt, for whom the deprivation of HIV medication created a
real and concrete risk of future harm, we conclude that, based on
the evidence in the record, the risk of future harm claimed by
Abernathy is purely hypothetical and that no reasonable jury could
find that Anderson's refusal to assess Abernathy's medical needs
on April 3, 2013 created an objective risk of future harm grave
enough to constitute a serious medical need.
Abernathy next argues that even if he is not entitled to
go to trial on his theory that Anderson's denial of medical care
subjected him to a "substantial risk of harm," there is
nevertheless a triable factual issue as to whether he had a serious
medical need because his injuries were so obvious that even a lay
person -- a correctional officer -- recognized the need for
treatment and escorted him to Anderson.
At the outset, Abernathy has not put forth any
affirmative evidence establishing that the correctional officer
brought him to Anderson because he "recognized" the severity of
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Abernathy's need for medical attention. Instead, Abernathy has
merely alleged that he was escorted to the triage room, which is
insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to
either his contention that the officers took him of their own
accord or that they did so because medical care was necessary. In
any event, even if the correctional officer himself thought that
Abernathy needed medical attention, that alone is not sufficient
for Abernathy's claim to survive.
The serious medical need inquiry for an Eighth Amendment
claim of this nature is an objective test, which cannot be met
merely by pointing to any one lay person's subjective impression
of the seriousness of Abernathy's injuries. The injuries suffered
by Abernathy, to wit, cuts, bruises, swelling, and some bleeding,
absent, for example, any underlying conditions or future
complications, are not the type of wounds that have been typically
viewed as constituting a serious medical need. See, e.g.,
Montes v. Ponce Municipality, 79 Fed. Appx. 448 (1st Cir. 2003)
(holding no serious medical need where detainee was active in cell
after beating and had only swelling and bruising); Chance v.
Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that "[t]he
standard for Eighth Amendment violations contemplates 'a condition
of urgency' that may result in 'degeneration' or 'extreme pain'")
(quoting Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994)).
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Relying on this Court's statements in Gaudreault
defining a serious medical need as "one that has been diagnosed by
a physician as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that
even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a
doctor's attention," 923 F.2d at 208 (emphasis added), Abernathy
argues that "a medical need may be proven serious based solely on
how a lay person would perceive it," regardless of whether
treatment is required or if a delay in medical assessment or
treatment had an adverse effect. However, such an interpretation
is inconsistent with our decision in Gaudreault.
In Gaudreault we affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the basis that the
plaintiff had failed to display any serious medical needs during
the hours following his arrest, even though he was beaten by
correctional officers, causing him "multiple bruises, to the
forehead, left and right orbits of his eyes, nasal area, left ribs,
right flank and left shoulder, and . . . a corneal abrasion and an
abrasion on the upper back." Gaudreault, 923 F.2d at 207.
Recognizing that the plaintiff's injuries "may have been 'obvious'
in the sense that his bruises and abrasions were visible," we
concluded that, "the medical record demonstrate[d] that [the
plaintiff] did not display any needs so patent as to make lay
persons" such as the defendant officers "remiss in failing to
arrange for immediate medical attention." Id. at 208. The
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plaintiff's injuries failed to constitute a serious medical need
because the doctors and nurses who did examine him ten hours after
his arrest "found him bruised but unbroken, requiring no more
medical care than a sling, an eye-patch and the application of
some disinfectant." Id. Although Abernathy criticizes
Gaudreault, arguing that how a prisoner's injuries turn out, i.e.
whether the injuries ultimately require stitches or become
infected, does not "determine whether [a prisoner's] injuries were
so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor's attention," the extent to which a
prisoner's injuries are ultimately assessed as insignificant may
reflect that an objective lay person would not found the injuries
so obvious as to mandate immediate attention in the moment.
Here, there is no evidence in the summary judgment record
showing that Abernathy's injuries were significant enough to give
rise to a serious medical need. Like the plaintiff in Gaudreault,
Abernathy remained "bruised but unbroken," 923 F.2d at 208, after
he was allegedly assaulted by the correctional officers on April
3, 2013. Nor is there any evidence in the record that the
approximately 48-hour delay in medical treatment had any
detrimental effect on Abernathy's injuries. See id. at 208-09(noting that, although the plaintiff complained that his injuries
would cause his "imminent demise," the medical record -- which
indicated the plaintiff had suffered a deviated septum, a cyst in
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his sinus, and some transient nerve damages -- showed no evidence
that the plaintiff's injuries were exacerbated by a delay in
treatment); see also Hernández v. Ashe, 745 F. Supp. 2d 15, 24 (D.
Mass. 2010) (explaining how "[a] primary factor in determining
whether a medical need is serious [in the Eighth Amendment context]
is the effect of denial of treatment"). Indeed, x-rays taken of
his right thumb and wrist revealed no issues and thus, no need for
treatment. Consequently, there is no evidence in the record from
which a reasonable jury could find that the injuries sustained by
Abernathy could have been so obviously serious that a lay person
would have recognized the need for a doctor's attention,
constituting an objective serious medical need for Eighth
Amendment purposes.
We do note, however, that this case is different from
Gaudreault. There, the claim was that several correctional
officers failed to arrange for medical attention for a detainee
whose injuries they did not find to be overly serious. Here, the
claim is that Abernathy reported to Nurse Anderson and she refused
to carry out even a simple assessment of his injuries. That
distinction does not bear, however, on whether Abernathy has
established a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he
had a "serious medical need" -- as we explain, he has failed to do
so, although we emphasize it could have been relevant to the
deliberate indifference portion of the Eighth Amendment analysis.
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Finally, Abernathy argues that there is a triable issue
of fact as to whether the delay in treating his injuries created
a serious medical need by subjecting him to "severe pain."
According to Abernathy, he was in "significant pain" when he was
taken to Anderson and it is for the jury to determine whether her
refusal to assess his medical needs "resulted in continued pain"
constituting a serious medical need.
Abernathy did not raise this argument below, and, thus
the district court did not consider it. Abernathy's argument in
the district court about there being a triable issue of fact as to
whether he had a serious medical need relied exclusively on
"physical trauma." He did not develop an argument that pain itself
could constitute a serious medical need. Although in his
opposition to summary judgment Abernathy mentioned that he
experienced "severe pain," this fleeting reference to pain was not
made in connection to the argument he now makes that the pain he
experienced constituted a serious medical need. See Pl.'s Opp'n
to Def. Krystal Anderson's Mot. for Summ. J. at 7 (noting that
"[w]hen he was presented to Nurse Anderson for treatment on April
3, 2013 . . . his wrists were lacerated, bruised, and swollen, .
. . and he was bloody and in severe pain," and arguing that,
contrary to Anderson's contentions, there is "a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether" "this physical trauma" qualifies as
a serious medical need). Our case law is clear that, "absent the
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most extraordinary circumstances" -- none discernable here -- such
a situation calls for finding Abernathy's newly unveiled argument
waived. Teamsters Union, Loc. No. 59 v. Superline Transp. Co.,
953 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1992) ("If any principle is settled in
this circuit, it is that, absent the most extraordinary
circumstances, legal theories not raised squarely in the lower
court cannot be broached for the first time on appeal."); see also
Gray v. Cummings, 917 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2019) (noting that
arguments not raised in the district court cannot be advanced on
appeal).
III. Conclusion
In sum, to defeat Anderson's summary judgment motion,
Abernathy had to produce evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable
jury to determine that he had a serious medical need under the
Eighth Amendment. Because the evidence in the record would not
allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the injuries he allegedly
sustained from the handcuffing incident posed a substantial risk
of future harm or were so obvious that even a lay person would
recognize the need for a doctor's attention, we affirm the district
court's entry of summary judgment for Anderson. No costs are
awarded.
Affirmed.
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