United States v. Rougeau

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 18-1729
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
JOEL JAHAMAL ROUGEAU,
a/k/a Panther,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Chief Judge,
Thompson, Circuit Judge,
and Gelpí, Chief District Judge.*
Merritt Schnipper, with whom Schnipper Hennessy PC was on
brief, for appellant.
Randall E. Kromm, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom, Andrew E. Lelling, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
February 9, 2021
* Of the United States District Court for the District of
Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM. Defendant-appellant Joel Rougeau pleaded
guilty to his part in the cross-country transportation of a
quantity of fentanyl concealed in a truck that he was driving with
his girlfriend as his travel companion. He was sentenced to 135
months' imprisonment, which was the bottom of the applicable
guidelines range. On appeal, Rougeau argues that the unique facts
of his case should have resulted in a below-range sentence, and he
challenges the sentence imposed by the district court on grounds
of procedural and substantive reasonableness.
Soon after the truck that Rougeau was driving was seized
by local law enforcement officers in Oklahoma, Rougeau fled to
Mexico, where he remained for twenty months. He reported that the
cartel concerned with the shipment took him captive, brutally
tortured him, and forced him to commit atrocities, including at
least one murder and multiple dismemberments of corpses. After he
was returned to the United States, prison health staff diagnosed
him with post-traumatic stress and major depressive disorders. A
psychiatric evaluation confirmed these conditions.
While explaining its choice of sentence, the district
court took note of matters for which Rougeau bore responsibility,
including the participation of his girlfriend in the offense.
Rougeau objects, arguing that his companion was an equal
participant and insisting that nothing supports an attribution of
responsibility to him for her involvement. The record, however,
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does contain circumstantial evidence that the companion's
participation was contingent on that of Rougeau. The inference
that the district court drew from the facts presented was
permissible and did not cross the line of procedural
reasonableness. See United States v. Marceau, 554 F.3d 24, 32
(1st Cir. 2009) (sentencing court may draw plausible inferences
from circumstantial evidence). Even had the court erred in this
respect, the claim was not preserved and any possible error was
not "clear or obvious." United States v. Gaccione, 977 F.3d 75,
81 (1st Cir. 2020).
Rougeau also argues that the court's reliance on this
factual finding worked unfair surprise on him in violation of his
right to due process, but he developed this argument for the first
time in his reply brief and therefore waived it. See United States
v. Tosi, 897 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 2018). In any case, the
government argued at the Rule 11 hearing and in its sentencing
memorandum that this was Rougeau's drug trafficking operation, not
his girlfriend's.
Rougeau further argues that the district court did not
accord his life-altering trauma the significance that it was due
and thus imposed a sentence that was unnecessary and gratuitous.
He contends that, as a procedural matter, the court did not
adequately address his traumatization and its effect on the need
for specific deterrence or more generally a 135-month sentence;
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and that, as a substantive matter, the sentence was unreasonably
long when his trauma was considered alongside the fact that he had
only previously engaged in criminal activity as a teenager.
The district court addressed Rougeau's traumatization in
a direct and substantial manner, and Rougeau's insistence on even
more particularity is baseless. See United States v. Harrison,
899 F.3d 49, 52-53 (1st Cir. 2018). Moreover, the court expressly
acknowledged that it must consider the sentencing factors under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), and it discussed facts relevant to specific
deterrence not long after the parties argued over that factor.
That is all that was required. See United States v. Mendoza-
Maisonet, 962 F.3d 1, 24 (1st Cir. 2020) (court's reasoning can be
inferred from parties' arguments); United States v. Hassan-Saleh-
Mohamad, 930 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2019) (according weight to court's
acknowledgment of § 3553(a) and consideration of facts relevant to
sentencing factors).
Substantive reasonableness turns on the totality of
circumstances. United States v. Owens, 917 F.3d 26, 41 (1st Cir.
2019). The district court's balancing of the multiple
considerations bearing on the sentencing determination in this
case, including evidence that Rougeau had previously trafficked
significant quantities of drugs during his adult years, was within
permitted boundaries.
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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is affirmed.
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