Alasaad v. Wolf

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 20-1077
20-1081
GHASSAN ALASAAD; NADIA ALASAAD; SUHAIB ALLABABIDI; SIDD
BIKKANNAVAR; JEREMIE DUPIN; AARON GACH; ISMAIL ABDEL-RASOUL,
a/k/a Isma'il Kushkush; DIANE MAYE ZORRI; ZAINAB MERCHANT;
MOHAMMED AKRAM SHIBLY; MATTHEW WRIGHT,
Plaintiffs, Appellees/Cross-Appellants,
v.
ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, in his official capacity;* TROY MILLER, Senior Official
Performing the Duties of the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, in his official capacity;** TAE D. JOHNSON,
Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director of U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, in his official capacity,***
Defendants, Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
* Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Secretary of the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas has been
substituted for former Acting Secretary of the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security Chad F. Wolf as appellant/cross-appellee.
** Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Senior Official
Performing the Duties of the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and
Border Protection Troy Miller has been substituted for former Chief
Operating Officer and Senior Official Performing the Duties of the
Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection Mark A. Morgan
as appellant/cross-appellee.
*** Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Senior Official
Performing the Duties of the Director of U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement Tae D. Johnson has been substituted for former
Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director of U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Tony H. Pham as
appellant/cross-appellee.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Denise J. Casper, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch and Selya, Circuit Judges,
and Laplante,**** District Judge.
Joshua Paul Waldman, Appellate Staff, Civil Division U.S.
Department of Justice, with whom Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney
General, Scott R. McIntosh, Appellate Staff, Civil Division U.S.
Department of Justice, and Andrew E. Lelling, United States
Attorney, were on briefs, for appellants/cross-appellees.
Esha Bhandari, with whom Adam Schwartz, Sophia Cope, Saira
Hussain, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Hugh Handeyside, Nathan
Freed Wessler, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Matthew
R. Segal, Jessie J. Rossman, and American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation of Massachusetts, Inc. were on briefs, for
appellees/cross-appellants.
Caroline M. DeCell, Stephanie Krent, Bruce D. Brown, Katie
Townsend, Gabriel Rottman, Caitlin Vogus, and Linda Moon on brief
for the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University,
the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, and 12 Media
Organizations, amici curiae.
Kurt Wimmer, Rafael Reyneri, Calvin Cohen, Frank Broomell,
and Covington & Burling LLP on brief for the Center for Democracy
& Technology, the Brennan Center for Justice, R Street Institute,
and Techfreedom, amici curiae.
Michael J. Iacopino, Michael Price, and Mukund Rathi on brief
for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus
curiae.
Christopher T. Bavitz and Cyberlaw Clinic, Harvard Law
School, on brief for Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinic, amicus
curiae.
Meghan Koushik, Mark C. Fleming, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale
and Dorr LLP, Glenn Katon, and Hammad Alam on brief for Asian
Americans Advancing Justice, Asian Law Caucus, et al., amici
curiae.
Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, Brian R. Frazelle, and
**** Of the District of New Hampshire, sitting by
designation.
Dayna J. Zolle on brief for Constitutional Accountability Center,
amicus curiae.
Jennifer Pinsof, David A. Schulz, Media Freedom & Information
Access Clinic, Yale Law School Abrams Institute, Elizabeth A.
Ritvo, Joshua P. Dunn, and Brown Rudnick LLP on brief for Floyd
Abrams, Jack M. Balkin, Hannah Bloch-Webah, Kiel Brennan-Marquez,
Ryan Calo, Danielle Keats Citron, Julie E. Cohen, Catherine Crump,
Mary Anne Franks, Woodrow Hartzog, Heidi Kitrosser, Gregory
Magarian, Neil M. Richards, Scott Skinner-Thompson, Daniel J.
Solove, Amie Stepanovich, Katherine J. Strandburg, and Ari Ezra
Waldman, amici curiae.
February 9, 2021
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs bring a civil action
seeking to enjoin current policies which govern searches of
electronic devices at this country's borders. They argue that
these border search policies violate the Fourth and First
Amendments both facially and as applied. The policies each allow
border agents to perform "basic" searches of electronic devices
without reasonable suspicion and "advanced" searches only with
reasonable suspicion. In these cross-appeals we conclude that the
challenged border search policies, both on their face and as
applied to the two plaintiffs who were subject to these policies,
are within permissible constitutional grounds. We find no
violations of either the Fourth Amendment or the First Amendment.
While this court apparently is the first circuit court to address
these questions in a civil action, several of our sister circuits
have addressed similar questions in criminal proceedings
prosecuted by the United States. We join the Eleventh Circuit in
holding that advanced searches of electronic devices at the border
do not require a warrant or probable cause. United States v.
Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 2018). We also join
the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits in holding that basic border
searches of electronic devices are routine searches that may be
performed without reasonable suspicion. United States v. Cano,
934 F.3d 1002, 1016 (9th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed (Jan.
29, 2021) (No. 20-1043); United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227,
- 4 -
1233 (11th Cir. 2018). We also hold the district court erroneously
narrowed the scope of permissible searches of such equipment at
the border.1
I. Facts
The material facts are not in dispute. We supplement
our description of the facts with the district court's
comprehensive statement of facts. Alasaad v. Nielsen, 419 F. Supp.
3d 142, 148-50 (D. Mass. 2019); Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-
11730-DJC, 2018 WL 2170323 at *1-2 (D. Mass. May 9, 2018).
A. Agency Policies
Two policies promulgated by U.S. Customs and Border
Protection ("CBP") and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
("ICE") are at issue in this case.
The first policy is CBP Directive No. 3340-049A, Border
Search of Electronic Devices (2018), https://www.cbp.gov/
sites/default/files/assets/documents/2018-Jan/CBP-Directive-
3340-049A-Border-Search-of-Electronic-Media-Compliant.pdf (the
"CBP Policy"). The CBP Policy "provide[s] guidance and standard
operating procedures for searching, reviewing, retaining, and
sharing information contained in . . . mobile phones . . . and any
other communication, electronic, or digital devices . . . to ensure
compliance with customs, immigration, and other laws that CBP is
1 We acknowledge with appreciation the assistance of the
amici curiae in this case.
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authorized to enforce and administer." CBP Policy at 1.2 The CBP
Policy defines an "electronic device" as "[a]ny device that may
contain information in an electronic or digital form, such as
computers, tablets, disks, drives, tapes, mobile phones and other
communication devices, cameras, music and other media players."
Id. at 2. The CBP Policy does not address CBP's authority to
search electronic devices with a warrant, consent, or in response
to exigent circumstances. Id.
The CBP Policy distinguishes between "basic" and
"advanced" searches.3 It defines an "advanced search" as "any
search in which an Officer connects external equipment, through a
wired or wireless connection, to an electronic device not merely
to gain access to the device, but to review, copy, and/or analyze
its contents." Id. at 5. Advanced searches require "supervisory
approval" and under the CBP Policy may only be performed "[i]n
instances in which there is reasonable suspicion of activity in
violation of the laws enforced or administered by CBP, or in which
there is a national security concern." Id. A "basic search" is
any non-advanced search. Id. at 4. The CBP Policy states that a
basic search may be performed "with or without suspicion." Id.
2 The policy is mandatory. CBP Policy at 1 ("All CBP
Officers . . . shall adhere to the policy." (emphasis added)).
3 "Advanced" searches are sometimes referred to as
"forensic" searches. Though the terms are not precisely co-
extensive, any difference is immaterial here.
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For both basic and advanced searches, the CBP Policy
only allows officers to search "information that is resident upon
the device," and devices must be disconnected from the internet
before a search is performed. Id.
In addition, the CBP Policy states that "[a]n Officer
may detain electronic devices . . . for a brief, reasonable period
of time to perform a thorough border search." Id. at 7.
The second policy is Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Directive No. 7-6.1, Border Searches of Electronic Devices (2009),
https://hdhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ice_border_search_electronic_
devices.pdf, ("ICE Directive") as superseded in part by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Broadcast: Legal Update --
Border Search of Electronic Devices (2018) ("ICE Broadcast"),
(together "ICE Policy" and, together with the CBP Policy, the
"Policies"). The ICE Policy governs ICE's searches of electronic
devices at the border "to ensure compliance with customs,
immigration, and other laws enforced by ICE." ICE Directive at 1.
The policy defines an "electronic device" as "any item that may
contain information, such as computers, disks, drives, tapes,
mobile phones and other communication devices, cameras, music
players, and any other electronic or digital devices." ICE
Directive at 2. The policy allows for suspicionless basic searches
but states that as of May 11, 2018, ICE agents "should no longer
perform advanced border searches of electronic devices without
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reasonable suspicion." ICE Broadcast. The ICE Policy also allows
agents to detain electronic devices for a "reasonable time given
the facts and circumstances of the particular search." ICE
Directive at 4.
Plaintiffs do not argue there are any meaningful
differences between the two agencies' policies.
B. The Searches of Plaintiffs' Electronic Devices
Plaintiffs are ten U.S. citizens and one lawful
permanent resident. Each states that CBP or ICE officers searched
his or her electronic devices on one or more occasion.
Only plaintiffs Zainab Merchant and Suhaib Allababidi
allege that they were searched after CBP issued its revised 2018
policy and ICE published its advanced search policy. These
searches were basic searches. These two plaintiffs do not allege
that their devices were retained pursuant to the Policies.
Accordingly, no factual information has been presented to us as to
any detention under these policies.
II. Procedural History
Plaintiffs filed suit on September 13, 2017 -- before
the effective date of the challenged Policies -- alleging that CBP
and ICE violated the Fourth and First Amendments by performing
various types of searches of electronic devices without warrants
and violated the Fourth Amendment by retaining plaintiffs'
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electronic devices for an extended period absent probable cause.4
The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including
expungement of "all information gathered from, or copies made of,
the contents of Plaintiffs' electronic devices."
On May 9, 2018, the district court denied the
government's motion to dismiss. Alasaad, 2018 WL 2170323 at *24.
After discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment. The district court granted in part and denied
in part plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied the
government's motion for summary judgment. Alasaad, 419 F. Supp.
3d at 174. The district court also held that plaintiffs had
standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief as well as
expungement of their data from CBP and ICE databases. Id. at 151-
54.5
As to the merits of the Fourth Amendment challenges, the
district court first held that basic and advanced searches are
4 No plaintiff in this case asserts that his or her
electronic device passcodes or passwords were entitled to
additional constitutional protections.
A petition for a writ of certiorari is pending before
the Supreme Court in Andrews v. New Jersey as to whether the Fifth
Amendment protects an individual from being compelled to disclose
the passcodes to his or her electronic devices when doing so may
expose the individual to criminal prosecution. Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, Andrews v. New Jersey, (No. 20-937).
5 The government does not challenge plaintiffs' standing
on appeal.
- 9 -
both "non-routine" searches, and thus that both types of searches
required reasonable suspicion.6 Id. at 163, 165. The court
concluded that the basic search component of the Policies violated
the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 165, 168.
As to the scope of both basic and advanced searches
permitted under the Policies, the court found two constitutional
violations. It reasoned that because the border search exception
is premised on the government's paramount interest in "stopping
contraband at the border," "the reasonable suspicion that is
required . . . is . . . that the electronic devices contain[]
contraband [itself]," rather than (a) evidence of contraband or
(b) evidence or information regarding other crimes enforced at the
border. Id. at 166. Thus, the Policies were unconstitutional
because they did not restrict agents to searches for contraband
contained in the devices themselves and allowed border searches as
to evidence of all crimes CBP or ICE are authorized to enforce.7
CBP Policy at 1, 5; ICE Directive at 1, 2.
6 The district court noted that a "cursory search of an
electronic device -- e.g., a brief look reserved to determining
whether a device is owned by the person carrying it across the
border, confirming that it is operational and that it contains
data . . . [would] not require a heightened showing of cause."
Alasaad, 419 F. Supp. 3d at 163.
7 ICE and CBP are authorized to enforce a broad spectrum
of laws. See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. § 211(c)(5) (requiring CBP to
"detect, respond to, and interdict terrorists, drug smugglers and
traffickers, human smugglers and traffickers, and other persons
who may undermine the security of the United States"); id.§ 211(c)(11) (requiring CBP to "enforce and administer the laws
- 10 -
As to the long-term detention of plaintiffs' electronic
devices, the district court held that devices detained based on
reasonable suspicion could be retained only for a "reasonable
period that allows for an investigatory search for contraband."
Alasaad, 419 F. Supp. 3d at 170.
The district court granted declaratory relief stating
that
the CBP and ICE policies for "basic" and
"advanced" searches . . . violate the Fourth
Amendment to the extent that the policies do
not require reasonable suspicion that the
devices contain contraband for both such
classes of non-cursory searches and/or seizure
of electronic devices; and that the non-
cursory searches and/or seizures of
Plaintiffs' electronic devices, without such
reasonable suspicion, violated the Fourth
Amendment.
Id. at 173.
The district court declined to grant broad injunctive
relief based on its finding of constitutional violations. Id. at
174. It did enjoin the government from searching or detaining any
of plaintiffs' electronic devices at the border absent "reasonable
suspicion that the device contains contraband," and from detaining
relating to agricultural import"); 31 U.S.C. §§ 5316-17(authorizing warrantless border searches to enforce limitations on
transferring $10,000 or more out of the United States); 19 C.F.R.
§ 12.39 (authorizing CBP to enforce law restricting the importation
of "articles involving unfair methods of competition").
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plaintiffs' electronic devices for "longer than a reasonable
period."
The district court denied plaintiffs' request for
expungement. Id. at 171-73.
As to the First Amendment claim, the district court did
not analyze that claim independently from the Fourth Amendment
claim. It denied plaintiffs' claim for relief, saying "to the
extent that [the First Amendment claim] seeks some further ruling
or relief based upon Plaintiffs' invocation of First Amendment
rights, not otherwise granted as to [plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment
claim]," it would deny plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.
Id. at 170.
The government filed a timely notice of appeal, and
plaintiffs cross-appealed.
III. Analysis
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Henderson
v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 977 F.3d 20, 29 (1st Cir. 2020).
"Cross-motions for summary judgement do not alter the basic . . .
standard, but rather simply require us to determine whether either
of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on facts that
are not disputed." Adria Int'l. Grp., Inc. v. Ferre Dev., Inc.,
241 F.3d 103, 107 (1st Cir. 2001).
We begin with plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims before
moving to their First Amendment claim and request for expungement.
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A. The Level of Suspicion Required for Border Searches of
Electronic Devices
Plaintiffs argue that all electronic device searches at
the border require a warrant, or in the alternative that such
searches require reasonable suspicion that the device contains
contraband. Plaintiffs do not contest that the Policies require
ICE and CBP to have reasonable suspicion to perform an advanced
border search. We address the arguments in turn.
1. Border Searches of Electronic Devices Do Not Require a Warrant
The Fourth Amendment forbids "unreasonable searches and
seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. "In the absence of a warrant,
a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception
to the warrant requirement." Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373,
382 (2014). Otherwise,
[a]bsent more precise guidance from the
founding era, we generally determine whether
to exempt a given type of search from the
warrant requirement "by assessing, on the one
hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an
individual's privacy and, on the other, the
degree to which it is needed for the promotion
of legitimate governmental interests."
Id. at 385 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
One such exception to the warrant requirement,
recognized from early in our history, is the border search
exception. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925). The
exception is grounded in the government's "inherent authority to
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protect, and a paramount interest in protecting, its territorial
integrity." United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 153
(2004). Further, "the expectation of privacy [is] less at the
border than in the interior . . . [and] the Fourth Amendment
balance between the interests of the Government and the privacy
right of the individual is also struck much more favorably to the
Government at the border." United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,
473 U.S. 531, 539-40 (1985).
Plaintiffs rely on Riley v. California to argue that the
border search warrant exception does not encompass the search of
electronic devices because such searches do little to advance the
underlying purposes of the border search exception -- which they
say are limited to interdicting contraband and preventing the entry
of inadmissible persons.8
This argument rests on a misapprehension of the
applicability here of the Supreme Court's holding in Riley. In
Riley, the Supreme Court held that the search incident to arrest
exception to the warrant requirement did not extend to searches of
cellphones. 573 U.S. at 403. In doing so, it reasoned that
individuals have a heightened privacy interest in their electronic
devices due to the vast quantity of data that may be stored on
8 For reasons articulated later in this opinion, we reject
plaintiffs' narrow view of the purposes of the border search
exception.
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such devices, and that the government's interest in searching an
arrestee's cellphone during an arrest was limited because such
searches do not meaningfully advance the search incident to arrest
exception's purposes of protecting officers and preventing the
destruction of evidence. Id. at 386, 388-91. Thus, the balance
of interests did not support extending the search incident to
arrest exception. Id. at 386.
Contrary to plaintiffs' assertions, Riley does not
command a warrant requirement for border searches of electronic
devices nor does the logic behind Riley compel us to impose one.
As recently explained by this circuit, Riley "d[id] not either
create or suggest a categorical rule to the effect that the
government must always secure a warrant before accessing the
contents of [an electronic device]." United States v. Rivera-
Morales, 961 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2020). Nor does Riley by its
own terms apply to border searches, which are entirely separate
from the search incident to arrest searches discussed in Riley.
The search incident to arrest warrant exception is premised on
protecting officers and preventing evidence destruction, rather
than on addressing border crime. Riley, 573 U.S. at 384-86.
Further, given the volume of travelers passing through
our nation's borders, warrantless electronic device searches are
essential to the border search exception's purpose of ensuring
that the executive branch can adequately protect the border. See
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Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 544 (stating that border
officials are "charged . . . with protecting this Nation from
entrants who may bring anything harmful into this country"). A
warrant requirement -- and the delays it would incur -- would
hamstring the agencies' efforts to prevent border-related crime
and protect this country from national security threats.
Every circuit that has faced this question has agreed
that Riley does not mandate a warrant requirement for border
searches of electronic devices, whether basic or advanced. The
Eleventh Circuit held that "[b]order searches have long been
excepted from warrant and probable cause requirements, and the
holding of Riley does not change this rule." Vergara, 884 F.3d at
1312-13. The Fourth Circuit held after Riley that "law enforcement
officers may conduct a warrantless forensic search of a cell phone
under the border search exception where the officers possess
sufficient individualized suspicion of transnational criminal
activity." United States v. Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d 713, 719 n.4 (4th
Cir. 2019).9 The Ninth Circuit, noting that even "post-Riley, no
court has required more than reasonable suspicion to justify even
an intrusive border search," held that both basic and advanced
9 The Fourth Circuit did not decide whether an advanced
search must be supported by probable cause. Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d
at 720 & n.5.
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border searches may be performed without a warrant or probable
cause. Cano, 934 F.3d at 1015-16.
We too hold that neither a warrant nor probable cause is
required for a border search of electronic devices.
2. Basic Searches May Be Performed Without Reasonable Suspicion
Agents may perform "routine" searches at the border
without reasonable suspicion. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at
538, 541. Under this circuit's law, certain "non-routine" searches
must be grounded on reasonable suspicion. United States v. Molina-
Gómez, 781 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 2015); United States v. Braks,
842 F.2d 509, 513-14 (1st Cir. 1988). Whether a border search is
routine or non-routine depends on an assessment of the facts of
the case. Braks, 842 F.2d at 512 (holding that request to female
at border to lift skirt was routine search); Molina-Gómez, 781
F.3d at 19 (holding that the search of a laptop and PlayStation,
whether routine or non-routine, was justified because reasonable
suspicion existed); United States v. Robles, 45 F.3d 1, 5 (1st
Cir. 1995) (holding, where the government conceded that drilling
into metal cylinder was non-routine search, that the search was
justified by reasonable suspicion). Subjecting individuals to
strip searches or body-cavity searches are examples of non-routine
searches. Molina-Gómez, 781 F.3d at 19.
Plaintiffs argue that because electronic devices may
contain a trove of sensitive personal information, basic border
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searches of electronic devices are non-routine searches requiring
at least reasonable suspicion. While, as noted above, Riley's
warrant requirement in the search incident to arrest context does
not extend to border searches, Riley recognized that modern
electronic devices "implicate privacy concerns far beyond those
implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse"
and "differ in both a quantitative and qualitative sense from other
objects that might be kept on [a traveler’s] person." 573 U.S. at
393. These privacy concerns, however significant or novel, are
nevertheless tempered by the fact that the searches are taking
place at the border, where the "Government’s interest in preventing
the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith,"
Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152, and the "Fourth Amendment balance
of interests leans heavily to the Government," Montoya de
Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 544. Electronic device searches do not fit
neatly into other categories of property searches, but the bottom
line is that basic border searches of electronic devices do not
involve an intrusive search of a person, like the search the
Supreme Court held to be non-routine in Montoya de Hernandez. 473
U.S. at 541 & n.4. Basic border searches also require an officer
to manually traverse the contents of the traveler's electronic
device, limiting in practice the quantity of information available
during a basic search. The CBP Policy only allows searches of
data resident on the device. CBP Policy at 4. And a basic border
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search does not allow government officials to view deleted or
encrypted files.10
We thus agree with the holdings of the Ninth and Eleventh
circuits that basic border searches are routine searches and need
not be supported by reasonable suspicion. Cano, 934 F.3d at 1016;
Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233; see also United States v. Kolsuz, 890
F.3d 133, 146 n.5 (4th Cir. 2018) (stating that United States v.
Ickes, 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005) "treated a [basic] search of
a computer as a routine border search, requiring no individualized
suspicion for the search").
B. The Scope of Searches Permitted under the Border Search
Exception
Plaintiffs next argue that border searches of electronic
devices "must be limited to searches for contraband." This
argument is premised on plaintiffs' assertions that the border
search exception (a) extends only to searches aimed at preventing
the importation of contraband or entry of inadmissible persons
and (b) covers only searches for contraband itself, rather than
10 Plaintiffs argue that because a basic border search can
take place over an extended period, "the policies place no limit
on the scope of a basic search." This claim is not supported by
the record. As laid out in the complaint, basic searches are
limited to "allocated space physically resident on an electronic
device that is accessible using the native operating system of the
device." And the agencies must process the entry of over one
million travelers per day, further restricting the practical
limits of a basic search.
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for evidence of border-related crimes or contraband. The argument
fails and its premises are incorrect.
In non-border contexts the Supreme Court has held that
warrantless searches "must be limited in scope to that which is
justified by the particular purposes served by the exception."
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion);
see also Riley, 573 U.S. at 386. Riley did not purport to extend
this rule to the border search context. Even assuming arguendo
that the analysis used in Riley applies here, such an analysis
would only require that warrantless border searches be tethered to
"the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by
stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this
country."11 Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (quoting United States
v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977)). Further, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly said that routine searches "are reasonable simply
by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border." Id. at 152-
53 (quoting Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616). This is so because the
government's interest in preventing crime at international borders
"is at its zenith," see id., and it follows that a search for
evidence of either contraband or a cross-border crime furthers the
purposes of the border search exception to the warrant requirement.
11 Plaintiffs do not challenge any specific law enforced by
CBP or ICE as having no relationship to the border search
exception's broad purposes.
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As for advanced searches, we cannot reasonably conclude
that the "substantive limitations imposed by the Constitution" on
the border search exception prevent Congress from giving border
agencies authority to search for information or items other than
contraband. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620; see also Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at
152 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[T]here is a
longstanding historical practice in border searches of deferring
to the legislative and executive branches."). To the contrary,
Montoya de Hernandez makes clear that the border search exception's
purpose is not limited to interdicting contraband; it serves to
bar entry to those "who may bring anything harmful into this
country" and then gives as examples "whether that be communicable
diseases, narcotics, or explosives." 473 U.S. at 544.
Congress is better situated than the judiciary to
identify the harms that threaten us at the border.12 Kolsuz, 890
F.3d at 152 (Wilkinson, J, concurring in the judgment) ("[Riley
does not] begin to answer the question of who should strike the
balance between privacy and security at the border of the
12 As explained by Judge Wilkinson, "[w]e have no idea of
the dangers we are courting" at the border. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at
152 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in the judgment). He notes the
risk that "[p]orous borders are uniquely tempting to those intent
upon inflicting the vivid horrors of mass casualties" and "the
danger of highly classified technical information being smuggled
out of this country only to go into the hands of foreign nations
who do not wish us well and who seek to build their armaments to
an ever more perilous state." Id.
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country."); see also Riley, 573 U.S. at 408 (Alito, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating with respect to
the reasonableness of warrantless searches of mobile phones that
"[l]egislatures . . . are in a better position than we are to
assess and respond to the changes that have already occurred and
those that almost certainly will take place in the future"). In
weighing the competing policy considerations, Congress or the
Executive may choose to strike a different balance as to border
searches of electronic devices and may choose to grant greater
protection than required by the Constitution.
As to plaintiffs' distinction between evidence of
contraband and contraband itself, the border search exception is
not limited to searches for contraband itself rather than evidence
of contraband or a border-related crime. Searching for evidence
is vital to achieving the border search exception's purposes of
controlling "who and what may enter the country." Ramsey, 431
U.S. at 620; see also Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d at 721 (holding that the
purposes of the border search exception are "protecting national
security, collecting duties, blocking the entry of unwanted
persons, [and] disrupting efforts to export or import contraband"
(emphasis added)); United States v. Gurr, 471 F.3d 144, 149 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) (holding in the context of the border search exception
that "[t]he distinction that [plaintiff] would draw between
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contraband and documentary evidence of a crime is without legal
basis").13
We acknowledge that our holdings on both of these points
are contrary to the Ninth Circuit's holdings in United States v.
Cano. 934 F.3d at 1018 (holding that the border search exception
"is restricted in scope to searches for contraband"). We cannot
agree with its narrow view of the border search exception because
Cano fails to appreciate the full range of justifications for the
border search exception beyond the prevention of contraband itself
entering the country. Advanced border searches of electronic
devices may be used to search for contraband, evidence of
contraband, or for evidence of activity in violation of the laws
enforced or administered by CBP or ICE.
13 Plaintiffs cite Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, for the proposition
that the border search exception does not extend to searching for
evidence of border-related crimes. But the Supreme Court rejected
in Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden the distinction articulated
in Boyd between searches for "mere evidence" and searches for
"instrumentalities, fruits of crime, or contraband." 387 U.S.
294, 301 (1967). Plaintiffs argue that Hayden only rejected this
distinction in relation to searches authorized by a warrant rather
than warrantless searches, but we conclude that Hayden should be
more broadly applied. See United States v. Molina-Isidoro, 884
F.3d 287, 297 n.7 (5th Cir. 2018) (Costa, J., specially concurring)
("Hayden is viewed as a broad rejection of the 'mere
evidence'/instrumentality distinction" (citing Wayne LaFave,
Search & Seizure, A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 4.1(c))).
But see id. ("[T]here are reasons to believe the [mere
evidence/instrumentality] distinction still matters when it comes
to border searches.").
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C. Device Detention
Plaintiffs further argue that the CBP and ICE Policies
violate the Fourth Amendment because they do not impose an
"effective limit on [the] duration" of electronic device
detentions.14 Plaintiffs' argument is in the abstract as they have
not presented any facts concerning the actual retention of devices
pursuant to the policies at issue.
The CBP Policy permits an officer to "detain electronic
devices or copies of information contained therein, for a brief,
reasonable period of time to perform a thorough border search."
CBP Policy at 7. Supervisory approval is required to detain
devices after the device owners "departure from the port or other
location of detention." Id. The ICE Policy permits the detention
of "electronic devices, or copies of information therefrom [for]
a reasonable time given the facts and circumstances of the
particular search." ICE Directive at 4. Both Policies require
supervisory approval to extend a device detention beyond an initial
span of time -- five days under the CBP Policy and thirty days
under the ICE policy. CBP Policy at 7; ICE Directive at 5.
14 Because we conclude that no reasonable suspicion is
required for a basic border search of an electronic device, we
need not reach plaintiffs' contention that the Policies are
deficient in allowing the agencies to detain devices without
reasonable suspicion.
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The nature of plaintiffs' challenge is unclear. The
Policies permit detention for only a reasonable period, which is
the constitutional test. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at
544. If the argument is that "reasonable" must be replaced with
hard time limits, the Supreme Court has rejected that proposition.
Id. at 543. If the argument is that the judgment as to
reasonableness should not be left in the first instance to the
agent who conducts the search, that misreads the Policies. The
CBP Policy requires a supervisor's permission to detain a device
after its owner leaves the border, a higher level of supervisory
approval to extend a detention for longer than five days, and a
third level of approval to extend a detention beyond fifteen days.
CBP Policy at 7. What is reasonable is surely fact specific and
future as applied attacks are not foreclosed should there be
abuses.15
D. First Amendment
Plaintiffs next argue that under the First Amendment,
government searches of electronic devices at the border require a
warrant, or at least reasonable suspicion. They contend that
because electronic devices may contain sensitive personal data,
the threat of warrantless or suspicionless border searches will
15 Plaintiffs do not develop the argument that any
individual detention of any plaintiff's electronic device was
unreasonable, but instead say that several particularly long
detentions demonstrate that the Policies are facially deficient.
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impermissibly chill speech.16 They further argue that such
searches unduly interfere with the First Amendment freedoms to
"'engage in association' . . . without government scrutiny, . . .
speak anonymously, . . . receive unpopular ideas, confidentially
and without government scrutiny, . . . read books and watch movies
privately . . . [and] gather and publish newsworthy information
absent government scrutiny."
Because plaintiffs seek relief "beyond [their]
particular circumstances," "they must 'satisfy [the] standards for
a facial challenge to the extent of that reach.'" Proj. Veritas
Action Fund v. Rollins, 982 F.3d 813, 826 (1st Cir. 2020) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 194
(2010)). Thus, plaintiffs must show that "a substantial number of
[the ICE and CBP Policies'] applications are unconstitutional,
16 Plaintiffs purport to rely on United States v. Ramsey,
431 U.S. 606 (1977), but misunderstand the case. In Ramsey,
plaintiffs argued that the search of international mail was a
violation of the First Amendment. The applicable law allowed the
search of international mail only where there was "'reasonable
cause to believe' that customs laws [were] being violated prior to
the opening of envelopes" and a regulation forbade the "reading of
correspondence absent a search warrant." Id. at 623 (emphasis
added). The Supreme Court held that under those circumstances,
the opening of international mail did not "impermissibly chill[]
the exercise of free speech." Id. at 624.
The court explicitly reserved and did not decide the
question of whether the search of international mail, "in the
absence of the regulatory restrictions" would chill speech and, if
it did, "whether the appropriate response would be to apply the
full panoply of Fourth Amendment requirements." Id. at 624 n.18.
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judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (quoting Wash.
State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6
(2008)).
The First Amendment provides protections -- independent
of the Fourth Amendment -- against the compelled disclosure of
expressive information. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64
(1976); Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 102 n.4 (2d Cir. 2007)
(analyzing First Amendment challenge to targeted border searches
independently of Fourth Amendment); Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 623-24.
Neither this circuit nor the Supreme Court has specified the
appropriate standard to assess alleged government intrusions on
First Amendment rights at the border. See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at
623-24 (refusing to "consider the constitutional reach of the First
Amendment in this area"); see also Tabbaa, 509 F.3d at 102 n.5
("It may also be true that the First Amendment's balance of
interests is qualitatively different where, as here, the action
being challenged is the government's attempt to exercise its broad
authority to control who and what enters the country.").
Under any standard plaintiffs have not shown that the
content-neutral border search Policies facially violate the First
Amendment. See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 623 ("More fundamentally,
however, the existing system of border searches has not been shown
to invade protected First Amendment rights, and hence there is no
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reason to think that the potential presence of correspondence makes
the otherwise constitutionally reasonable search 'unreasonable.'"
(footnote omitted)). The Policies have a plainly legitimate sweep
and serve the government's paramount interests in protecting the
border.17
Nor, as plaintiffs contend, does the presence of
expressive material on electronic devices "trigger[] a warrant
requirement." A higher level of suspicion is not generally
required to search potentially expressive materials. See New York
v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 875 (1986); United States v.
Brunette, 256 F.3d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding the probable
cause standard "is no different where First Amendment concerns may
be at issue"); see also Ickes, 393 F.3d at 507 (refusing to apply
a different standard to border searches of expressive material);
United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1010 (9th Cir. 2008)
(same).
As explained by the Ninth Circuit in Arnold, providing
a different standard for "expressive material" at the border would
17 Plaintiffs do not present the issue of whether the First
Amendment would require a different outcome if CBP and ICE were
targeting journalists or using border searches to pierce attorney-
client privilege. Two plaintiffs are journalists, but they do not
contend that they were searched by CBP for this reason. See
Alasaad, 419 F. Supp. 3d at 169. This decision does not foreclose
a future as applied First Amendment challenge in such
circumstances. See Ortiz-Graulau v. United States, 756 F.3d 12,
21 (1st Cir. 2014) (noting that this court may leave open "the
possibility of a future as-applied challenge").
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(1) protect terrorist communications "which
are inherently 'expressive'"; (2) create an
unworkable standard for government agents who
"would have to decide -- on their feet -- which
expressive material is covered by the First
Amendment"; and (3) contravene the weight of
Supreme Court precedent refusing to subject
government action to greater scrutiny with
respect to the Fourth Amendment when an
alleged First Amendment interest is also at
stake.
533 F.3d at 1010 (quoting Ickes, 393 F.3d at 506). Plaintiffs'
First Amendment challenge fails.
E. Expungement
Plaintiffs argue they are entitled to expungement of any
data obtained in violation of the Constitution. The district
court's refusal to grant the equitable remedy of expungement is
reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Reyes v. DEA, 834 F.2d
1093, 1098-99 (1st Cir. 1987).
There was no abuse of discretion here. The district
court adequately justified its conclusions that expungement was
not warranted. And contrary to plaintiffs' assertions, it was not
error for the district court to analogize to caselaw regarding the
suppression of evidence.
IV. Conclusion
We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and
remand for the entry of a revised judgment consistent with this
opinion. No costs imposed.
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