Bayley's Campground Inc v. Mills

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 20-1559
BAYLEY'S CAMPGROUND, INC., d/b/a Bayley's Camping Resort;
FKT RESORT MANAGEMENT, LLC; FKT BAYLEY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP;
CURTIS BONNELL, DOLORES HUMISTON, and JAMES BOISVERT,
Plaintiffs, Appellants
v.
JANET T. MILLS, in her official capacity as the Governor of the
State of Maine,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Lance E. Walker, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Chief Judge,
Selya and Barron, Circuit Judges.
Tyler J. Smith, with whom Gene R. Libby and Libby O'Brien
Kingsley & Champion, LLC, were on brief, for appellants.
Christopher C. Taub, Deputy Attorney General, Chief,
Litigation Division, with whom Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General,
and Kimberly L. Patwardhan, Assistant Attorney General, were on
brief, for appellee.
January 19, 2021
BARRON, Circuit Judge. In the spring of 2020, as the
United States confronted the COVID-19 pandemic, the Governor of
Maine issued an executive order that, with few exceptions, required
persons traveling to that state to self-quarantine upon their
arrival for a period of fourteen days before venturing out in
public. The plaintiffs here -- three individuals who intended to
travel from New Hampshire to Maine and certain businesses reliant
on out-of-state customers -- filed suit in response. They alleged
that the self-quarantine requirement violated their federal
constitutional right to interstate travel as well as their federal
constitutional right to procedural due process, and they sought a
preliminary injunction prohibiting the requirement's enforcement.
The District Court rejected the request to issue the preliminary
injunction because it determined that the plaintiffs had not met
their burden to show that they had a likelihood of success on the
merits of their federal constitutional claims. The plaintiffs now
appeal the portion of that ruling that concerns the right-to-
travel claim, which we affirm, after concluding that the fact that
the Governor rescinded the executive order that contains the self-
quarantine requirement that is at issue here during the pendency
of this appeal and replaced that order with one that imposed a
less restrictive self-quarantine requirement does not moot the
case.
- 2 -
I.
On April 3, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 34
("EO 34"). Titled "An Order Establishing Quarantine Restrictions
on Travelers Arriving in Maine," EO 34 required, with limited
exceptions, all persons, "resident or non-resident," who were
"traveling into Maine" to "immediately self-quarantine for 14
days" upon their arrival in the state. EO 34 also directed all
lodging operations in Maine, including campgrounds, to cease
providing services aside from "[h]ousing vulnerable populations,"
"[p]roviding accommodations for health care workers," furnishing
"self-quarantine or self-isolation facilities," or offering
additional services pursuant to "verifiable extenuating
circumstances." EO 34 provided that it would "be enforced by law
enforcement" and that a violation of its terms could "be charged
as a Class E crime subject to a penalty of up to six months in
jail and a $1,000 fine."
The individual plaintiffs are two New Hampshire
residents, Curtis Bonnell and Dolores Humiston, and one Maine
resident, James Boisvert. The corporate plaintiffs -- Bayley's
Campground, Inc., d/b/a Bayley's Camping Resort; FKT Resort
Management, LLC; FKT Bayley Limited Partnership; and DMJ Parks,
- 3 -
LLC d/b/a Little Ossipee Campground1 -- operate campgrounds and
related businesses in Maine. Both Bonnell and Humiston are
consistent, seasonal patrons of Bayley's Campground.
The plaintiffs filed suit in the federal court for the
District of Maine on May 15, 2020, in which they sought declaratory
and injunctive relief from EO 34 on right-to-travel and procedural-
due-process grounds. The plaintiffs concurrently moved for a
preliminary injunction.2 The complaint alleged, among other
things, that the self-quarantine requirement that EO 34 imposed
"practically" prevented the three individual plaintiffs from
traveling between Maine and New Hampshire "to recreate, associate
with friends, visit businesses, and simply take trips." The
complaint also alleged that the requirement caused "economic
injury" to the corporate plaintiffs due to "a substantial number
of cancellations by out-of-state campers who [we]re unable or
unwilling to self-quarantine for 14[] days upon their arrival to
Maine."
1
DMJ Parks, LLC d/b/a Little Ossipee Campground is not
a party to this appeal, as it voluntarily dismissed its appeal
under Fed. R. App. P. 42(b).
2
Before the District Court, the plaintiffs also sought
preliminary injunctive relief from EO 34's prohibition against
"the Campground plaintiffs . . . opening to out-of-state visitors
until those visitors have completed a 14-day quarantine," but their
appeal concerns only their request to preliminarily enjoin the
self-quarantine requirement imposed on individual travelers to
Maine.
- 4 -
The Governor filed an opposition to the preliminary
injunction motion on May 25, 2020, and, on May 29, the District
Court denied the motion. See Bayley's Campground, Inc. v. Mills,
463 F. Supp. 3d 22, 38 (D. Me. 2020). In so ruling, the District
Court agreed with the plaintiffs that EO 34's self-quarantine
requirement implicated the federal constitutional right to
interstate travel and was subject to strict scrutiny in
consequence. Id. at 31-35. But, "at this early stage," the
District Court concluded, in light of what the record showed about
the Governor's basis for concluding that the self-quarantine
requirement would slow the spread of the virus in Maine and protect
the state's health care system from being overwhelmed by patients
infected with the disease, the plaintiffs had failed to show that
their right-to-travel claim regarding the requirement had a
likelihood of success on the merits. Id. at 35. On that basis,
the District Court denied the requested preliminary relief on that
claim.3 Id. at 38.
The plaintiffs filed this interlocutory appeal on June
1, 2020, in which they challenged that ruling, and they also moved
at that time for an injunction against the self-quarantine
requirement pending appeal. On June 25, 2020, a panel of this
3
The District Court also held that the plaintiffs were
unlikely to succeed on their procedural due process claim, a
decision which the plaintiffs do not challenge on appeal.
- 5 -
Court denied the plaintiffs' motion. An expedited briefing
schedule was set.
Shortly after the plaintiffs filed their notice of
appeal, on June 9, 2020, the Governor rescinded EO 34 in its
entirety and replaced it with Executive Order 57 ("EO 57"). The
new executive order contained a 14-day self-quarantine requirement
that was identical to EO 34's save for additional exceptions that
restricted its scope. As relevant here, EO 57, unlike EO 34,
exempted from the requirement to self-quarantine all persons who
(1) "[r]eceive[d] a recent negative test for COVID-19 in accordance
with standards established by" the Maine Center for Disease Control
and Prevention ("Maine CDC"), or (2) were "residents of New
Hampshire and Vermont, or . . . Maine residents returning from
travel to New Hampshire and Vermont." EO 57 also permitted lodging
operations, including campgrounds, to offer normal services to
persons in compliance with EO 57 -- but tasked such operations
with collecting "a complete certificate stating compliance with
this Order from each individual subject to [the self-quarantine]
requirement as a prerequisite to check-in."
In the wake of EO 57, the parties addressed in their
briefing to us whether the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary
injunction to prohibit the enforcement of EO 34's self-quarantine
requirement on right-to-travel grounds is moot. We begin our
analysis with this threshold jurisdictional question, which
- 6 -
concerns whether the parties' dispute over the plaintiffs' request
for injunctive relief from the now-rescinded requirement from EO
34 presents a "case or controversy" within the meaning of Article
III of the federal Constitution. See U.S. Const. Art. III § 2 cl.
1; Redfern v. Napolitano, 727 F.3d 77, 82 (1st Cir. 2013).
II.
"[A] case is moot when the issues presented are no longer
live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the
outcome. Another way of putting this is that a case is moot when
the court cannot give any effectual relief to the potentially
prevailing party." Town of Portsmouth v. Lewis, 813 F.3d 54, 58
(1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Am. C.L. Union of Mass. ("ACLUM") v. U.S.
Conf. of Cath. Bishops, 705 F.3d 44, 52 (1st Cir. 2013)).
The plaintiffs contend that, even though EO 34 has been
superseded by EO 57, their request for injunctive relief from the
self-quarantine requirement is not moot because it pertains to an
executive action that the Governor voluntarily rescinded and could
unilaterally reimpose. See Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v.
Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 68 (2020) (per curiam); City of Mesquite v.
Aladdin's Castle, 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982). We agree.
To be sure, nothing in the record suggests that the
Governor rescinded EO 34 for litigation-related reasons rather
than to account for changing conditions owing to the course of the
virus itself. Cf. Ne. Fla. Chapter of Assoc. Gen. Contractors of
- 7 -
Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 661-62 (1993)
(explaining that rescinding executive action for litigation
reasons does not necessarily moot a challenge to it). Indeed, any
decision by the Governor to issue an executive order that imposes
the same requirement to self-quarantine that EO 34 imposed would
most likely be predicated on at least somewhat different facts and
considerations. The dynamic nature of both the virus that has
given rise to this pandemic and the public health response to it
all but ensures that would be so, just as the dynamic nature of
both the virus and the response appears to explain why EO 34 was
rescinded in favor of EO 57.
Against this background, there is a question whether the
issues presented by the plaintiffs' request for relief from EO
34's self-quarantine requirement -- given that it has been
rescinded -- could recur. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia,
Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 n.1 (2012); Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 551 U.S. 167,
189 (2000). But, the Governor has not denied that a spike in the
spread of the virus in Maine could lead her to impose a self-
quarantine requirement just as strict as EO 34's. Thus, we cannot
say that the Governor has carried "the formidable burden" that she
bears "of showing that it is absolutely clear the allegedly
wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur."
ACLUM, 705 F.3d at 55 (quoting Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at
- 8 -
190); see also Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2019 n.1; Ne. Fla.
Chapter, 508 U.S. at 662. A contrary ruling, moreover, would run
the risk of effectively insulating from judicial review an
allegedly overly broad executive emergency response, so long as it
is iteratively imposed for only relatively brief periods of time.
Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiffs' request for
injunctive relief from EO 34's self-quarantine requirement is not
moot, see Roman Cath. Diocese, 141 S. Ct. at 68; Elim Romanian
Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker, 962 F.3d 341, 344-45 (7th Cir.
2020), and so we turn to the merits.4
III.
"The framework for considering whether to grant or deny
a preliminary injunction" is well settled:
An inquiring court must gauge the movant's
likelihood of success on the merits; must
evaluate whether and to what extent the movant
will suffer irreparable harm if injunctive
relief is withheld; must calibrate the balance
of hardships as between the parties; and must
consider the effect, if any, that the issuance
of an injunction (or the withholding of one)
will have on the public interest.
Akebia Therapeutics, Inc. v. Azar, 976 F.3d 86, 92 (1st Cir. 2020).
4
There is no problem with our reaching the merits based
on any concern about a lack of Article III standing on the part of
the plaintiffs, because the individual plaintiffs plainly have
suffered an injury-in-fact. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
497, 518 (2007) ("Only one of the petitioners needs to have
standing to permit us to consider the [merits]."); Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986) (similar).
- 9 -
We review the District Court's decision declining to issue a
preliminary injunction "for an abuse of discretion, with
conclusions of law reviewed de novo and findings of fact for clear
error." Trafon Grp., Inc. v. Butterball, LLC, 820 F.3d 490, 493
(1st Cir. 2016).
The fact that the plaintiffs are seeking a preliminary
injunction against a self-quarantine requirement set forth in an
executive order that was issued and then rescinded in response to
a dynamic public health crisis bears on whether the plaintiffs can
make the requisite showing under both the irreparable harm and
public interest prongs of the test just described. But, rather
than address those prongs of that test, we begin and end our
analysis with the likelihood-of-success-on-the-merits prong, as we
agree with the District Court that the plaintiffs failed to meet
their burden to satisfy it, see Bayley's Campground, 463 F. Supp.
3d at 33-34, and a failure to do so is itself preclusive of the
requested relief, see New Comm Wireless Servs., Inc. v. SprintCom,
Inc., 287 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002); see also Akebia Therapeutics,
976 F.3d at 92 ("If the movant fails to demonstrate a likelihood
of success on the merits, the remaining elements are of little
consequence."). Because the likelihood of success issue presents
a question of law in this case, our review of the District Court's
decision on that question is de novo. See Akebia Therapeutics,
976 F.3d at 92.
- 10 -
A.
"The textual source of the constitutional right to
travel . . . has proved elusive," but, "[w]hatever its origin, the
right to migrate is firmly established." Att'y Gen. of N.Y. v.
Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 902-03 (1986) (plurality opinion); see
also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999). This federal
constitutional right includes at least three distinct components:
[1] the right of a citizen of one State to
enter and to leave another State, [2] the
right to be treated as a welcome visitor
rather than an unfriendly alien when
temporarily present in the second State, and,
[3] for those travelers who elect to become
permanent residents, the right to be treated
like other citizens of that State.
Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500.
The Governor argues that EO 34's self-quarantine
requirement does not "burden[]" or "implicate[]" the right,
because it "imposes no barrier to entry . . . and treats residents
and non-residents precisely the same." For that reason, she
contends, the requirement is not subject to the strict scrutiny
that the plaintiffs argue applies and thus the requirement need
not constitute the least restrictive means of serving a compelling
governmental interest.5
5 Some courts have suggested that intermediate scrutiny
may be appropriate if a challenged regulation burdening the right
to travel is akin to a "time, place and manner restriction[],"
Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 269 (3d Cir. 1990); see also
- 11 -
We may assume, however, that the District Court was
correct to rule both that the requirement does burden the federal
constitutional right to interstate travel and that the requirement
is subject to strict scrutiny in consequence. See Bayley's
Campground, 463 F. Supp. 3d at 31-35. For, as we will explain,
even on those assumptions, the District Court was right to hold
that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to show that they
have a likelihood of success on the merits.
B.
The Governor contends that -- assuming strict scrutiny
does apply -- the interests in "protecting Maine's population from
further spread of the COVID-19 virus and preventing Maine's health
care system from being overwhelmed" by those infected with it are
"compelling state interests." The plaintiffs do not argue
otherwise on appeal, nor do we see how they could do so
successfully. See Roman Cath. Diocese, 141 S. Ct. at 67 ("Stemming
the spread of COVID-19 is unquestionably a compelling interest.");
see also Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1965) ("The right to
travel within the United States is of course . . . constitutionally
protected. But that freedom does not mean that areas ravaged
by . . . pestilence cannot be quarantined when it can be
Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 502 n.9 (6th Cir.
2002), but no party suggests that intermediate scrutiny may on
that basis be appropriate here.
- 12 -
demonstrated that unlimited travel to the area would directly and
materially interfere with the safety and welfare of the area or
the Nation as a whole." (citation omitted)); Edwards v. California,
314 U.S. 160, 184 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring) (explaining
that "[t]he right of the citizen to migrate from state to
state . . . is not . . . an unlimited one," and that certainly a
citizen may not "endanger others by carrying contagion about");
R.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 472 (1877) ("[W]e unhesitatingly
admit that a State may pass sanitary laws, and . . . for the
purpose of self-protection it may establish quarantine, . . .
[although a State] may not interfere with transportation into or
through the State, beyond what is absolutely necessary for its
self-protection."); Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 414
(1849) (opinion of Wayne, J.) ("[T]he States of this Union may, in
the exercise of their police powers, pass quarantine and health
laws, interdicting vessels coming from . . . ports within the
United States, from landing passengers and goods, prescribe the
places and time for vessels to quarantine, and impose penalties
upon persons for violating the same.").
Thus, the key question on appeal concerns the strength
of the support in the record for the Governor's further assertion
that "there were no other effective less-restrictive
alternative[]" means of serving Maine's compelling interests at
the time that EO 34's self-quarantine requirement was in place.
- 13 -
Given our assumption that strict scrutiny applies, the plaintiffs
contend that the burden is on the Governor to show that this
assertion about the absence of equally effective but less
restrictive means is correct, because if she cannot make that
showing, they contend that they necessarily will have met the
burden that they bear to show that they have a likelihood of
succeeding on the merits of their right-to-interstate-travel
claim.
We may assume that the plaintiffs have properly framed
the nature of the inquiry. For, even so framed, we agree with the
District Court that, on this record, the Governor has provided
adequate support for the conclusion that no less restrictive but
equally effective alternative was available to her during the time
period at issue. See Bayley's Campground, 463 F. Supp. 3d at 27-
28, 35. The Governor's evidentiary case on this score included,
most prominently, a declaration from the Maine CDC Director, Dr.
Nirav Shah. He was a member of the state's Coronavirus Response
Team that the Governor convened on March 2, 2020, prior to issuing
EO 34 and whose advice she sought in issuing that order. The
District Court relied on Dr. Shah's declaration, as well as other
evidence in the record, to find as follows.6
6
The plaintiffs do not challenge the District Court's
factual determinations on appeal, nor do we perceive any basis for
setting them aside as clearly erroneous.
- 14 -
First, the District Court supportably found that the
virus was understood during the period that EO 34 was in effect
-- as it remains (tragically) to this day -- to be both easily
transmissible and unusually deadly. See id. at 27. Indeed, the
record demonstrated that, as of May 25, the virus had already
killed nearly 100,000 people across the country, though less than
80 in Maine itself. Id.
Second, the District Court found, supportably, that it
was understood at the relevant time that the virus had an
incubation period of up to fourteen days and that it was common
for a person infected with it to be highly contagious but
asymptomatic. Id.; see also id. ("Approximately 40% of all COVID-
19 transmission can occur while individuals are asymptomatic and
approximately 35% of all COVID-19 patients do not have symptoms at
all."). The District Court supportably found, however, that at
that early stage of the pandemic, there was no vaccine or broadly
effective treatment for COVID-19 in place. Id. Nor, the record
showed, were there at that time "sufficient quantities" of test
kits in the state to permit effective testing of the population,
thereby making contact tracing of those who had come into contact
with an infected person all but impossible. Id. at 28.
The District Court then also supportably found -- based
on the predicate findings just described -- that it was a "critical
strategy in combatting the COVID-19 virus . . . to slow its spread
- 15 -
by limiting the extent to which persons come in contact with one
another." Id. at 27. And, the District Court supportably found,
Maine had special reason to implement this strategy that spring,
based on the influx of travelers that it could expect in due
course. In the summer of 2019, Maine experienced "roughly 22
million people travel[ing] to Maine for purposes of temporary
recreation" -- a number that dwarfed the state's "year-round
population of 1.3 million." Id. Such an influx would be
concerning to Maine in the face of the pandemic, moreover, because,
as the District Court found, as of May 25, 2020, Maine had a total
of only "391 critical care hospital beds and 318 conventional
ventilators," many of which were already occupied. Id.
We thus see no merit in the plaintiffs' contention that
the Governor failed to put forward "an affirmative, competent
evidentiary showing" that could suffice to establish the need for
the self-quarantine requirement, if they mean to suggest by that
contention that no evidence in the record supported the conclusion
that the requirement constituted a means of serving Maine's
compelling interests in managing the fallout from the pandemic.
As we have just explained, the record supportably showed that, as
the District Court found, the COVID-19 virus was deadly, highly
contagious, and spreading rapidly in other parts of the country;
there was not then evidence of similar widespread infection in
Maine itself; no known treatment or cure nor any easy means of
- 16 -
detecting the virus existed in Maine at the relevant time; it could
be spread by persons who were asymptomatic but infected with it;
it had an incubation period of up to two weeks; and Maine could
reasonably expect an increase in its population as large as 2,000%
over the coming summer months, while its critical care capacity in
its health system was already half full. With those findings in
place, the District Court had a strong foundation from which to
find -- as it did -- that EO 34's self-quarantine requirement would
make it "unlikely that [the travelers subject to it would be]
infected with the virus" when they interacted with others in Maine.
Id. Additionally, the District Court had a strong foundation to
find -- as it did -- that, through EO 34, Maine would permit travel
to the state while "both reduc[ing] the spread of the COVID-19
virus in Maine and reduc[ing] and/or prevent[ing] an undue strain
on Maine's health care system." Id.
The plaintiffs separately argue, however, that the
Governor's showing still comes up short, by pointing to what they
contend are various less restrictive alternative approaches to
addressing the virus that were available to the Governor at the
time EO 34 was in place. They contend that the record fails to
show that these alternative approaches would not have been at least
as effective in responding to the virus as the self-quarantine
requirement. But, here, too, we are not persuaded.
- 17 -
In pressing this aspect of their case, the plaintiffs
first posit that the Governor could have merely recommended rather
than mandated travelers to self-quarantine upon their arrival.
After all, they contend, the Governor has failed to show why such
a recommendation would not have been at least as effective as the
requirement she imposed. But, the plaintiffs put forth no evidence
-- nor cite to any authority -- that would support the conclusion
that the Governor could not at that early stage of the pandemic
rely on the common sense understanding that legal mandates induce
greater compliance than do precatory requests. Cf. Van Hollen,
Jr. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 811 F.3d 486, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
("[There is] no[] require[ment] to hold a hearing to prove what
common sense shows." (quoting San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v.
U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm'n, 789 F.2d 26, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1986)));
cf. also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) ("[W]ithout the
[exclusionary sanction,] the assurance against unreasonable
federal searches and seizures would be 'a form of words' [and]
valueless.").
Nor does the fact that Dr. Shah stated that EO 34 was
designed to "err[] on the side of caution" demonstrate that the
self-quarantine requirement was, as the plaintiffs claim,
"intentionally overbroad" and thus, necessarily, more restrictive
than necessary. That statement just suggests that Dr. Shah and
the Governor were of the view that the risk of taking a less
- 18 -
cautious approach than the one reflected in EO 34 was not
acceptable when so little was then known about the novel virus.
See Competitive Enter. Inst. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 863 F.3d
911, 917 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (recognizing that a "precautionary
approach" can be appropriate when decisionmakers confront "limited
evidence" about the true extent of known risks).7
The plaintiffs next suggest that EO 34's self-quarantine
requirement could have been just as effective if it had been
limited to apply only when "reasonable cause [existed] to believe
that the person has been exposed to [or infected with] COVID-19."
But, the plaintiffs do not explain how such a "reasonable cause"
standard would have been practicably administrable in Maine in
early 2020, given the lack of testing capacity in the state at
that time, the significant uncertainty regarding the strength and
duration of any immunity to the virus, and the fact of asymptomatic
transmission.
Indeed, Dr. Shah explained in his unchallenged
declaration that limiting the self-quarantine requirement to only
7The plaintiffs also assert in passing that EO 34 is
somehow "underinclusive," but "appellate arguments advanced in a
perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by citations to relevant
authority, are deemed waived," Ahmed v. Holder, 611 F.3d 90, 98
(1st Cir. 2010). In consequence, we do not have a contention
before us like those that have been made in cases challenging
various restrictions meant to slow the spread of the virus on free
exercise grounds. See, e.g., Roman Cath. Diocese, 141 S. Ct. at
66-67; Agudath Israel of Am. v. Cuomo, 2020 WL 7691715, at *1 (2d
Cir. Dec. 28, 2020).
- 19 -
persons exhibiting symptoms (or relying solely on contact tracing)
would have been a significantly less effective alternative, given
that asymptomatic spread of COVID-19 was common. Dr. Shah further
explained that while, "[i]n the future, it might be possible to
exempt from the 14-day requirement those individuals who can
document that they already had, and recovered from, COVID-19," at
the time there was "significant scientific uncertainty about
whether individuals who have previously been infected with COVID-
19 develop sufficient immunity to prevent them from transmitting
the virus." And, Dr. Shah added, implementing a test-based
exception was similarly impracticable at the time due to "an
inadequate national supply of the test kits needed" to test for
the virus.8
The plaintiffs' failure to account for concerns about
administrability also undermines their related contention that the
Governor did not meet her burden to show that a self-quarantine
requirement that allowed those subject to it to comply with it
immediately before traveling to Maine would not have been just as
effective as the self-quarantine requirement that EO 34 imposed.
8
Dr. Shah also represented that "[a]s the supply of test
kits increases, . . . [Maine CDC] will continue to evaluate the
use of the tests as a substitute for, or an addition to, the
existing quarantine requirement." In light of his affidavit, this
is not a case where, as the plaintiffs contend, "[t]he record is
silent as to the comparative effectiveness of the [proposed]
alternatives." United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., 529 U.S. 803,
826 (2000) (emphasis added).
- 20 -
The declarations submitted by the Governor explained that it would
be nearly impossible for Maine officials to verify the compliance
of those claiming to have self-quarantined outside of Maine, while
such verification would be appreciably easier if the requirement
to self-quarantine had to be met by travelers once they arrived in
Maine.9
The plaintiffs do invoke Supreme Court of New Hampshire
v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985), to argue that the Governor's
response on this score necessarily rests on the constitutionally
impermissible assumption that non-Mainers are "less likely to
comply with the law" than Mainers are. See id. at 285. But, we
do not agree that Piper provides any support for that contention.
Piper concerned a Privileges and Immunities Clause
challenge to a requirement that one had to be a New Hampshire
resident to be admitted to that state's bar. Id. at 275. The
United States Supreme Court explained that a requirement that non-
residents attend classes in New Hampshire on New Hampshire law
would be a less restrictive means of ensuring their knowledge of
the local law remained fresh and, on that basis, struck down the
9 We also note that, absent the travelers self-
quarantining at the border just before entering Maine, it is hard
to see how the plaintiffs' proposal would be equally effective at
preventing potentially infected individuals from interacting with
others inside Maine. After all, any quarantine undertaken before
entering Maine would be rendered ineffective if a traveler
interacts with other individuals while en route -- and before
arriving -- to Maine's borders.
- 21 -
discriminatory residency requirement for admission to the state's
bar as "markedly overinclusive," while noting that the state could
not properly justify that requirement on the ground that out-of-
staters would be less willing to comply with a requirement to
remain familiar with local rules and procedures than would New
Hampshirites. See id. at 285 & n.19.
Here, however, the less restrictive alternative that the
plaintiffs propose would not permit Maine to monitor the in-state
behavior of those coming from elsewhere, as the less restrictive
alternative identified in Piper would have permitted New Hampshire
to have done. Rather, the plaintiffs' proposed alternative
contemplates travelers self-quarantining outside of Maine
altogether. Thus, the Governor's explanation of the problem with
that alternative does not rest on any assumption about travelers
into Maine being less law-abiding than those who never leave Maine.
The plaintiffs next point to the fact that the positivity
rates of infection of those tested for the virus in certain states
with less stringent requirements to self-quarantine were "either
similar to or better than Maine." They contend that the stricter
self-quarantine requirement that EO 34 imposed was no more
effective than the less stringent ones that these other states
implemented, thereby demonstrating that less restrictive but
equally effective (or, at least, equally ineffective) means of
slowing the spread of the virus were available.
- 22 -
But, even if a comparison of the positivity rates in
test results across states is itself apples-to-apples,10 the
plaintiffs do not address the distinctions between those states
and Maine in terms of health care system capacity and population
surges from tourism. They fail as well to explain why later
outcomes in test results suffice to show what is relevant here --
namely, that earlier responses were undertaken when it was evident
(as opposed to sharply disputed) that less restrictive ones would
prove to be as efficacious. A city that calls out extra snow
removal crews to respond to a blizzard has not overreacted if the
ensuing storm overwhelms its extraordinary response just because
the neighboring town that gambled the storm would never come and
so made no special effort to combat it was overwhelmed by the
snowfall as well. We must judge the response based on what was
known at the time and not in hindsight. See Cooper v. Harris, 137
S. Ct. 1455, 1464 (2017) (explaining that governmental action does
not fail a narrow tailoring requirement simply because certain
measures "may prove, in perfect hindsight, not to have been
needed").
10
The plaintiffs are comparing the percentage of COVID-
19 tests that are coming back positive in a given jurisdiction
over a particular time period (usually a seven-day average). These
rates can vary widely not only over time, as a pandemic runs its
course, but also due to factors such as, for example, the accuracy
and availability of testing and whether asymptomatic persons (or
only overtly ill ones) are frequently tested.
- 23 -
In a final effort to demonstrate a likelihood of success
on the merits, the plaintiffs try to paint EO 34's self-quarantine
requirement as an impermissible attempt by Maine "to effectively
isolate itself from the rest of the Nation" and to "shift[] the
burden of dealing with United States citizens afflicted with COVID-
19 to other states." The plaintiffs here rely on City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), in which the
Supreme Court invalidated New Jersey's ban on importing waste that
originated in other states as an "impermissible . . . effort[] by
one State to isolate itself in the stream of interstate commerce
from a problem shared by all." Id. at 618, 629; see also Edwards,
314 U.S. at 173-74 ("The Constitution was framed . . . upon the
theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim
together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in
union and not division" (quoting Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511,
523 (1935))).
But, rather than suggesting that Maine was trying to
"isolate" itself from a "problem shared by all," City of
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629, the record suffices to demonstrate
that Maine was attempting to solve a common problem by means of a
familiar solution. This virus, by its nature, thrives on human
contact, and no less central an authority than the U.S. Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention has recommended that persons
distance themselves from others and avoid unnecessary travel. See
- 24 -
Domestic Travel During the COVID-19 Pandemic, U.S. CDC,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/travelers/travel-
during-covid19.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2021). Tellingly, City
of Philadelphia itself noted that "quarantine laws," as a special
category, are "repeatedly upheld even though they appear to single
out interstate [activity] for special treatment" -- explaining
that, in cases of viral outbreak, the very act of "movement [can]
risk[] contagion and other evils." 437 U.S. at 628-29.
IV.
The District Court correctly held that the plaintiffs
failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of
their right-to-travel claim. We thus affirm the District Court's
refusal to enter the requested preliminary injunction.
- 25 -