Morales-Figueroa v. Valdes, D.C.

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 20-1092
MIGUEL MORALES-FIGUEROA,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
ALICIA M. SANTOS; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP VALDES-SANTOS;
NCMIC INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants, Appellees,
RUBEN VALDES, D.C.,
Defendant, Third Party Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
CLINICA DE MEDICINA DEPORTIVA DEL CARIBE, INC.; DR. JANICE M.
ALEMAN-PACHECO; PRESBYTERIAN COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, d/b/a Presby
Wellness & Fitness Center; ABC AND XYZ INSURANCE COMPANIES;
XYZ CORP.; JOHN DOE,
Third Party Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Daniel R. Domínguez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Chief Judge,
Boudin, and Barron, Circuit Judges.
Jorge Miguel Suro Ballester, with whom Miguel A. Suro Carrasco
and Suro & Suro were on brief for Appellant.
Kenneth C. Suria, with whom Odemaris Chacón Verona and
Estrella, LLC were on brief for Appellee.
February 25, 2021
BOUDIN, Circuit Judge. Miguel Morales-Figueroa lost a
jury trial in his medical malpractice suit against appellees. Post
verdict, the district court taxed Morales with costs related to
expert witnesses used at trial. Morales has appealed the taxation
of these costs. Review is for abuse of discretion, Ramos-Santiago
v. United Parcel Serv., 524 F.3d 120, 125 (1st Cir. 2008), save
that pure issues of law are reviewed de novo, InvesSys, Inc. v.
McGraw-Hill Cos., 369 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 2004).
Timeliness. After judgment was entered, appellees
submitted a motion stating the costs they sought. Morales replied
that appellees had disregarded certain statutory formalities,
which appellees then remedied in a subsequent filing (submitted
after the deadline imposed by local rules, see D.P.R. Civ. R.
54(a)). Morales contests this process, but the trial judge's
decision to accept the filings despite the initial omissions was
not an abuse of discretion. See Phetosomphone v. Allison Reed
Grp., Inc., 984 F.2d 4, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1993) (suggesting that
statutory requirements related to cost awards should not be
mechanically applied); see also García-Goyco v. Law Envtl.
Consultants, Inc., 428 F.3d 14, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2005) (stating
that district courts receive considerable deference in the
application of their own local rules).
Expert Costs. Unless a witness is court-appointed, a
federal court cannot tax as costs more than $40 per witness per
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day for attendance "absent explicit statutory or contractual
authorization." Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482
U.S. 437, 445 (1987); see 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1821(a)(1), (b). The district court taxed Morales with paying
for four days of trial appearance by appellees' expert witness,
Dr. LaRusso, at a rate of $600 per hour, and with paying the $40
per day for the remaining days that LaRusso made himself available
and testified during appellees' case in chief. Morales argues
that the court's award of costs for Dr. LaRusso's appearance
exceeded the parameters of Crawford. Alternatively, Morales
argues that there was a contract, but it only requires him to pay
for the one hour LaRusso spent on the witness stand on July 11
testifying during Morales's presentation of his case.
Appellees point to no contractual or statutory
authorization for exceeding the $40 limit, and there is nothing
that comes close to an easily identified contract. The district
court costs award with respect to Dr. LaRusso's fees therefore
exceeded the court's authority and is hereby reversed.
On remand, the district court should review the cost
award for Dr. LaRusso and provide an award that complies with
Crawford: the cost award must follow the limits of 28 U.S.C. §
1821. The rest of the district court's order on costs we leave
undisturbed.
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Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for
proceedings consistent with this opinion. The parties shall bear
their own costs for this appeal.
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