United States v. Castillo-Vazquez

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 19-1152
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JUAN CARLOS CASTILLO-VAZQUEZ,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Thompson, and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
Fernando O. Zambrana Avilés and Colon Serrano Zambrana, LLC
on brief for appellant.
W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, Mariana E. Bauzá-
Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, and Julia M.
Meconiates, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for
appellee.
April 16, 2021
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Juan Carlos Castillo-Vazquez was
caught 39 nautical miles south of Puerto Rico smuggling 900
kilograms of cocaine into the United States on a 30-foot vessel.
The district court sentenced him to 135 months' imprisonment.
Castillo appeals his sentence on the grounds that the district
court erred in refusing to grant a two-level reduction to his
offense level based on his allegedly minor role in the offense or
a departure based on Castillo's family ties and responsibilities.
We affirm.
I.
On March 1, 2018, a Caribbean Air Marine Branch Maritime
Patrol Aircraft observed a thirty-foot vessel loaded with packages
travelling at high speed south of Ponce, Puerto Rico. The U.S.
Coast Guard intercepted the vessel, seized thirty packages of
cocaine weighing approximately 900 kilograms, and arrested the
three men on the vessel. Castillo was one of these crew members.
On March 7, 2018, Castillo was charged with conspiracy
to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of
cocaine on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States in violation of 46 U.S.C. §§ 70502, 70503, and 70506, aiding
and abetting in the possession with intent to distribute five
kilograms or more of cocaine in violation of 46 U.S.C. §§ 70502,
70503, and 70506, and conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute for the purpose of unlawfully importing more than five
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kilograms of cocaine into the United States in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 959, 960, and 963. Castillo pled guilty on all
charges.
The Probation office filed an initial Presentence Report
("PSR") which calculated Castillo's advisory guidelines range to
be 168 to 210 months' imprisonment and did not identify any grounds
for a departure. The PSR was amended after Castillo participated
in a safety-valve debriefing, which earned him a two-level
reduction resulting in a guidelines range of 135 to 168 months.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).
On January 14, 2019, Castillo filed a sentencing
memorandum requesting that the court impose the statutory
mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months' imprisonment and arguing
that Castillo should receive a two-level reduction under USSG
§ 3B1.2(b) for his minor role in the offense and a downward
departure from the guidelines range in light of his familial ties
and responsibilities under USSG § 5H1.6. The government did not
file a sentencing memorandum.
At the sentencing hearing on January 24, 2019, Castillo
presented the arguments in his sentencing memorandum and the
government advocated for a middle-of-the-guidelines sentence of
150 months' imprisonment. The district court then confirmed that
it had read Castillo's sentencing memorandum and explained its
calculation of the guidelines sentencing range. It sentenced
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Castillo to 135 months' imprisonment -- the bottom of the
guidelines range -- on each count, to be served concurrently, and
five years of supervised release. It stated that "a sentence at
the lower end of the guideline range reflects the seriousness of
the offense, promotes respect for the law, protects the public
from further crimes by Mr. Castillo, and addresses the issues of
deterrence and punishment."
After the sentence was announced, Castillo requested
that the district court explain why it did not grant a reduction
under USSG § 3B1.2(b) for Castillo's minor role in the offense or
a departure under USSG § 5H1.6 based on Castillo's family ties and
responsibilities. As to Castillo's role in the offense, the
district court explained that under the First Circuit decision in
United States v. Arias-Mercedes, 901 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2018), "a
minor role shall not apply in cases such as this" and that there
was "no way" that Castillo did not know "that there were 900 kilos
of cocaine on the vessel." As to Castillo's family ties and
responsibilities, the court stated that it "considered that and
didn't think it was sufficient for a reduction." Castillo objected
to these findings and timely appealed.
II.
Castillo argues again on appeal that the district court
procedurally erred by failing to apply an adjustment for his role
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in the offense and a departure based on his family ties and
responsibilities.1
We review claims of sentencing error for abuse of
discretion. Arias-Mercedes, 901 F.3d at 5. Within that standard,
we review findings of fact for clear error, the interpretation and
application of the sentencing guidelines de novo, and judgment
calls for abuse of discretion. United States v. Reyes-Torres, 979
F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2020).
A. The Minor Role Adjustment
USSG § 3B1.2(b) authorizes a two-level reduction in a
defendant's offense level if he was a "minor participant in any
criminal activity" for which he is being sentenced. A defendant
must show that he is "substantially less culpable than the average
participant in the criminal activity." Id. § 3B1.2, cmt. n.3(A).
"Role-in-offense determinations are notoriously fact-specific" and
"absent a mistake of law, battles over a defendant's status . . .
will almost always be won or lost in the district court." Arias-
Mercedes, 901 F.3d at 5 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
1 Castillo also summarily states that these denials
constituted substantive error. He has waived this argument by
failing to adequately address the issue. United States v. Zannino,
895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) ("[I]ssues adverted to in a
perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed
argumentation, are deemed waived.").
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Castillo argues that the district court committed
procedural error both by denying the minor role adjustment and by
failing to explain "in a satisfactory manner . . . why it declined
to grant the [] adjustment." These arguments fail.
As to Castillo's first argument, the district court did
not err in denying Castillo a minor role adjustment. Here Castillo
was one of a three-member crew on a small vessel and the amount of
drugs was large. As explained in Arias-Mercedes, "[w]hen a person
undertakes to provide material assistance in transporting a large
quantity of drugs as a member of a tiny crew in a hazardous voyage
at sea, it ordinarily will not be clear error for the sentencing
court to refuse him a mitigating role adjustment." 901 F.3d at 8.
Arias-Mercedes also forecloses Castillo's argument that the
district court should have considered Castillo's role in the larger
drug conspiracy rather than his role in transporting this
particular batch of drugs, and the argument that Castillo was
entitled to a minor role adjustment simply because he was not the
captain of the vessel. See id. at 6.
We also reject Castillo's argument that the district
court's explanation was insufficient. There is no requirement
that the district court must list expressly the factors enumerated
in Application Note 3(C) when it denies a defendant a minor role
reduction. See United States v. Mendoza-Maisonet, 962 F.3d 1, 24-
25 (1st Cir. 2020). The district court's comparison to Arias-
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Mercedes and the statements that Castillo must have been aware of
the quantity of cocaine on board were sufficient to "allow for
meaningful appellate review" of the denial of the downward
adjustment. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007).
B. The Family Ties and Circumstances Departure
Castillo next argues that the district court erred in
refusing to grant a departure under USSG § 5H1.6 based on his
"family ties and responsibilities." "As a general rule, a
sentencing court's discretionary refusal to depart is
unreviewable." United States v. Sanchez, 354 F.3d 70, 76 (1st
Cir. 2004). Where, as here, the district court "knew he had the
power to depart but deliberately chose not to do so," "we are
foreclosed from second-guessing the court's discretionary decision
not to depart from the [guidelines range]." United States v.
Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 30 (1st Cir. 2001); see also United States v.
Louis, 300 F.3d 78, 81 (1st Cir. 2002) ("[A] district court's
decision rejecting a downward departure is largely
unreviewable."). Castillo is not entitled to relief on this
ground.
III.
Affirmed.
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