Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 12-1942
R. SUSAN WOODS,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. AS TRUSTEE FOR FREMONT
INVESTMENT & LOAN SABR 2005-FR2, MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH
CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2005-FR2,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Michael A. Ponsor, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Dyk* and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
Glenn F. Russell, Jr., with whom Law Office of Glenn F.
Russell, Jr., was on brief for appellant.
Christopher A. Cornetta, with whom Houser & Allison, APC, was
on brief for appellee.
October 9, 2013
*
Of the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. There is, by now, a significant
body of commentary on the housing market's most recent boom and
bust. Little could we add about the development, proliferation,
and ultimate collapse of the mortgage-backed securities market that
has not already been said. Writing against that background, we
recite here only the most relevant aspects of the market's recent
instability. At its height, the boom was facilitated by a novel
system of bundling residential mortgages and trading these pooled
mortgages in the form of debt-backed security instruments. Crucial
to the success of this market was Mortgage Electronic Recording
System ("MERS"), a corporate entity that facilitated the pooling
and assignment of mortgages among its member institutions.1
With the market's bust, as more and more homeowners faced
foreclosures initiated not by their original lenders but by
financial institutions with which they had never directly dealt,
MERS's practices came under increasing legal scrutiny. This case
is a paradigmatic example of that common fact pattern. In 2012, R.
1
We have previously described the MERS business model in detail.
See Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs. of Neb., 708 F.3d 282, 286-88
(1st Cir. 2013). In short, MERS functions to streamline the process
of securitization and trading of mortgages. A MERS member, upon
becoming a lender, names MERS as its nominee and the mortgagee of
record and inputs the mortgage into the MERS database. The
mortgage note can then be assigned freely among MERS members, with
MERS -- as mortgagee of record -- authorizing and memorializing
these trades while circumventing much of the time and paperwork
associated with traditional assignments. Only when a note is
transferred to a non-MERS member institution does MERS transfer
away its interest as mortgagee, thus ending its involvement in the
assignment process.
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Susan Woods ("Woods"), having fallen behind on her payments, faced
foreclosure on her home mortgage. The notice of foreclosure did
not come from Woods's lending institution, however, but from an
unknown bank that had purchased her mortgage through a series of
MERS-facilitated assignments.
Woods challenged the foreclosure on multiple grounds, all
largely predicated on her theory that MERS could not validly assign
her mortgage, and therefore the receiving institution had no legal
interest upon which to foreclose. Woods also brought related state
law claims for fraud and unfair business practices. The district
court found these claims unavailing and dismissed Woods's
complaint. Agreeing that the complaint states no plausible claim
for relief, we affirm.
I. Background
On January 26, 2005, Woods executed a promissory note for
$228,000 to Fremont Investment & Loan ("Fremont"), secured by a
mortgage on her Hadley, Massachusetts home. The mortgage listed
Fremont as the "lender" and MERS as Fremont's "nominee" as well as
the "mortgagee" of record. As mortgagee, MERS held legal title
over the mortgaged property and, "solely as nominee for [Fremont
and its] successors and assigns," it possessed the power of sale.
The mortgage was recorded in the Hampshire County Registry of
Deeds.
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The first of several assignments of Woods's mortgage
occurred on October 29, 2007 when, acting in its own name, MERS
transferred the mortgage and note to Wells Fargo Bank, National
Association as Trustee for Fremont Investment & Loan SABR 2005-FR2.
On January 22, 2009, acting this time as nominee for Fremont, MERS
again assigned the mortgage and note to Wells Fargo Bank, National
Association as Trustee for Fremont Investment & Loan SABR 2005-FR2.
Both assignments were timely recorded in the Hampshire County
Registry of Deeds.
On April 17, 2009, counsel for Wells Fargo Bank, National
Association as Trustee for Fremont Investment and Loan SABR 2005-
FR2 filed notice of its intended foreclosure in Massachusetts Land
Court, seeking a declaration that the sale was not barred by the
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 533. Shortly
thereafter, on July 23, 2009, the mortgage was again assigned.
This time, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association as Trustee for
Fremont Investment and Loan SABR 2005-FR2 transferred all "right,
title, and interest . . . as current holder of the [] Mortgage" to
Wells Fargo Bank, National Association as Trustee for Securitized
Asset Backed Receivables LLC 2005-FR2 Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-FR2 ("Wells Fargo").2
2
At oral argument, Wells Fargo's counsel explained that this
third transfer served only to "adjust[] the name of the trust,"
with the mortgage remaining in Wells Fargo's possession throughout.
-4-
The Massachusetts Land Court granted Wells Fargo
permission to sell on June 16, 2010. Subsequently, on July 5, 2011,
Wells Fargo notified Woods of its intent to foreclose. At first
proceeding pro se, Woods filed a complaint in Hampshire County
Superior Court on July 29, 2011, seeking -- and ultimately
receiving -- a preliminary injunction to arrest the foreclosure.
After retaining counsel, an amended complaint followed on August 4,
2011.
This amended complaint alleged that Wells Fargo lacked
valid possession of her mortgage and had provided no evidence that
it held the accompanying note, making any attempted foreclosure
illegal. Further, Woods claimed that the foreclosure violated a
consent agreement between the State of Massachusetts and Fremont,
which required Fremont to notify the state of any pending
foreclosures and abide by a thirty-day waiting period during which
the Attorney General could arrest foreclosures deemed presumptively
unfair. The complaint also included claims for common law fraud
and violations of Massachusetts's consumer protection statute.
After removing the case to federal court, Wells Fargo
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion argued that Woods pled no facts
plausibly showing that Wells Fargo lacked legal standing to
foreclose, failed to comply with the Fremont consent agreement, or
made false representations actionable as fraud. It also argued
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that Woods lacked standing to challenge the assignments of her
mortgage, to which she was not a party, and that her claim for
deceptive business practices was void for failure to abide by a
pre-suit notice requirement.3 The district court granted that
motion on July 3, 2012, concluding that Wells Fargo validly
possessed both the note and mortgage, that Woods did not have
standing to challenge the mortgage's assignment, and that all
requirements of the Fremont consent decree were properly met.
Woods filed a timely appeal from that decision. Although
her arguments are not always clear, we read her brief as contending
that the following claims were plausibly pled:(1) Woods had
standing to challenge the assignments of her mortgage; (2) the
purported assignments were void, making Wells Fargo's attempted
foreclosure illegal under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, § 14; (3) Wells
Fargo did not possess both the note and mortgage at the time of
attempted foreclosure; (4) the attempted foreclosure violated the
terms of Fremont's consent agreement; and (5) Wells Fargo committed
3
Wells Fargo also pointed to the structure of Woods's complaint,
which pled "injunctive relief" as a "cause of action." Properly
noting that injunctive relief is not a stand-alone cause of action
in Massachusetts, see Payton v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Civ. No.
12-11540-DJC, 2013 WL 782601, at *6 (D. Mass. Feb. 28, 2013)
(collecting cases), Wells Fargo asserted that this error was fatal
to all claims appearing thereunder. While acknowledging Woods's
mistake, we disagree as to its effect. It is sufficiently clear
from the complaint that Woods's claims were intended to proceed
under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183, § 21 and id. ch. 244, § 14. We will
review them as such.
-6-
fraud and deceptive business practices under Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
93A.
II. Discussion
We review a dismissal for failure to state a claim under
Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Feliciano-Hernández v. Pereira-Castillo, 663
F.3d 527, 532 (1st Cir. 2011). Setting aside any statements that
are merely conclusory, we construe all factual allegations in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party to determine if there
exists a plausible claim upon which relief may be granted. Ocasio-
Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011).
1. Woods's standing to challenge assignments
Before turning to the merits of Woods's challenge to the
assignment of her mortgage, we must take up the predicate question
of whether she has standing to bring that claim. The district
court found that she did not, reasoning that Woods was "not a party
to the trust agreement, nor . . . in privity with Fremont." Woods
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 875 F. Supp. 2d 85, 88 (D. Mass. 2012).
In a case decided subsequent to the district court's order,
however, this court rejected that approach, holding that standing
may be appropriate even where a mortgagor is not party to, nor
beneficiary of, the challenged assignments. Culhane v. Aurora Loan
Servs. of Neb., 708 F.3d 282, 290 (1st Cir. 2013) (assessing
mortgagor's standing based solely on privity "paint[s] with too
broad a brush"). Because Massachusetts law allows for non-judicial
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foreclosures by mortgagees with the power of sale, Culhane reasoned
that barring standing in all cases would unduly insulate
assignments; mortgagors could not challenge the validity of
assignments either as the defendant in a suit for judicial
authorization or as the petitioner in a suit like the present one.
Id. (holding that mortgagors must have standing to bring certain
challenges to assignments in order to protect their "legally
cognizable right" to be secure from unlawful foreclosures). On
this basis, Culhane found standing appropriate in instances where
a mortgagor "challenge[s] a mortgage assignment as invalid,
ineffective, or void," although not where the challenge would
"render [the assignment] merely voidable . . . but otherwise
effective to pass legal title." Id. at 291.
Thus, claims that merely assert procedural infirmities in
the assignment of a mortgage, such as a failure to abide by the
terms of a governing trust agreement, are barred for lack of
standing. Id. In contrast, standing exists for challenges that
contend that the assigning party never possessed legal title and,
as a result, no valid transferable interest ever exchanged hands.
See U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637, 651, 941
N.E.2d 40, 53 (2011) ("[T]here must be proof that the assignment
was made by a party that itself held the mortgage."). In this
latter case, the challenge is to the "foreclosing entity's status
qua mortgagee." Culhane, 708 F.3d at 291; see also Ibanez, 941
-8-
N.E.2d at 50 ("Any effort to foreclose by a party lacking
jurisdiction and authority to carry out a foreclosure . . . is
void.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
While far from a paradigm of clarity, Woods's complaint
appears to set forth just such a challenge. The complaint alleges
that MERS, as a mere "nominee" for Fremont, never possessed a
legally transferable interest in Woods's mortgage, rendering any
attempted assignments void. See Culhane, 708 F.3d at 291 ("[The
challenge] is premised on the notion that MERS never properly held
the mortgage and, thus, had no interest to assign. If this were so,
the assignment would be void . . . .").4 Therefore, under the
framework of Culhane, Woods has standing to challenge whether the
assignments of her mortgage were legally valid.
Having determined that Woods may bring a challenge as to
the assignments' validity, we now turn to the merits of that claim.
2. The assignments' validity
Woods contends that the very premise upon which MERS is
predicated -- that it may remain a mortgagee of record throughout
multiple transfers of an underlying promissory note -- runs
"counter to the title theory [] nature" of Massachusetts law. In
4
Insofar as Woods's amended complaint also suggests that the
assignments were in violation of the trust's Pooling and Servicing
Agreement, we find that no standing exists as to these alternate
claims, which would render the assignment only voidable. See,
e.g., Koufos v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 415 B.R. 8, 22 (Bankr. D. Mass.
2009). Given that Woods seems to have forgone this argument in her
appellate brief, we presume that such a deficiency is clear.
-9-
support of this proposition, her complaint recites Massachusetts
law holding that when a mortgage is split from its promissory note
a constructive trust is implied to the benefit of the noteholder.
As such, she asserts that Fremont, as the original lender and
noteholder, was the sole entity possessing a beneficial,
transferable interest in her mortgage. MERS, in contrast, held
only a bare legal interest as a "placeholder nominee," rendering it
unable to properly initiate an assignment.
This argument stumbles while barely out of the gate. As
an initial matter, Woods's contention that the MERS business model
runs counter to the nature of Massachusetts mortgage law has been
resoundingly rejected by this court. Culhane, 708 F.3d at 291-93
(finding that the MERS model "fit[s] comfortably within the
structure of Massachusetts mortgage law"); see also Rosa v. Mortg.
Elec. Sys., Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d 423, 429 (D. Mass. 2011); In re
Marron, 462 B.R. 364, 374 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012). Further, it
ignores the express language of Woods's mortgage, which grants
MERS, as nominee, the "power of sale." "Under Massachusetts law, a
nominee in such a situation holds title for the owner of the
beneficial interest." Culhane, 708 F.3d at 293 (citing Morrison v.
Lennett, 415 Mass. 857, 860-61, 616 N.E.2d 92, 94-95 (1993)). As
such, when Fremont -- the holder of the beneficial interest --
undertook to transfer the promissory note to Wells Fargo, MERS was
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"authorized by the terms of the contract" to transfer the
underlying mortgage as well. Id.
Woods's recitation of traditional mortgage law precepts
regarding the effect of splitting a note from its underlying
mortgage are no more helpful to her cause. It is undoubtedly true,
as Woods asserts, that in Massachusetts an entity that holds a
mortgage but not the associated promissory note holds that mortgage
in an equitable trust for the benefit of the noteholder. Ibanez,
941 N.E.2d at 53-54 (citing Barnes v. Boardman, 149 Mass. 106, 114,
21 N.E. 308, 309 (1889)). Yet Culhane made clear that MERS's
status as an equitable trustee does not circumscribe the
transferability of its legal interest. Culhane, 708 F.3d at 292
(explaining that where the note and mortgage are split, the
mortgagee retains and may transfer its bare legal interest in the
underlying mortgage). As such, it is clear, and Woods presents no
plausible claim to the contrary, that MERS, as the mortgagee of
record, possessed the ability to assign Woods's mortgage. Id. ("[A]
mortgagee may assign its mortgage to another party."); McKenna v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 693 F.3d 207, 215 (1st Cir. 2012).
Woods attempts to set forth an alternative argument that
Wells Fargo's interest is legally invalid because the recorded
assignments through which it purportedly gained possession failed
to account for additional parties with an interest in the mortgage.
The entirety of this argument rests on a single allegation in
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Woods's complaint: "Barclays Bank, PLC is the 'investor' of
[Woods's] loan, not [Wells Fargo]."5 Even drawing all reasonable
inferences from this factual allegation, however, it falls short of
establishing any plausible claim upon which relief might be
granted.
Woods fails to recognize that the MERS registry
electronically tracks transfers of a mortgagors' promissory note,
a process which is legally distinct from the assignment and
recordation of mortgage interests in a county registry of deeds.
See Rosa, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 429 ("MERS is named as the mortgagee
of record . . . so that beneficial ownership and servicing rights
of the note may be transferred among MERS members without the need
to publicly record such assignments; instead assignments of the
note are tracked by MERS' electronic system."). That Barclays
possessed some interest in the promissory note at some time –- the
registry search is undated –- does not plausibly establish a legal
deficiency in the transfer of that note's underlying mortgage.
There is a chain of recorded assignments which show the mortgage
traveling from Fremont to Wells Fargo, and Woods has offered no
5
In support of this allegation, Woods appends a printout of a
MERS registry search listing Barclays Bank, PLC as an "investor."
This printout is undated and identifies the underlying mortgage
only by its MERS MIN number. MERS never clearly defines the
meaning of "investor" in its governing rules. The term is used in
those rules, however, in a manner apparently synonymous with
"beneficial owner." See In re Marron, 455 B.R. 1, 8 n.8 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 2011).
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grounds on which to call the validity or completeness of those
assignments into question. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 53 ("A
foreclosing entity may provide a complete chain of assignments
linking it to the record holder [to prove it validly holds the
mortgage].").
3. Wells Fargo's ability to foreclose
Having found the transfer of Woods's mortgage valid, we
need pause only briefly to make clear that there exists no real
dispute that Wells Fargo is the current possessor of Woods's
promissory note. Woods does not allege that Wells Fargo does not
own the note. She instead alleges only that "[a]t no time has
[Wells Fargo] ever adduced any direct evidence that it received a
valid assignment of [her] Note." In support of its motion to
dismiss, Wells Fargo presented what appears to be the note,
endorsed in blank, at oral argument before the district court and
as an appendix to its motion to dismiss.
In response, Woods provides no serious challenge to
either the note's authenticity or Wells Fargo's ownership of it.
At oral argument Woods offered only a hypothetical allegation,
absent any factual support, that the note might be forgery. Even
that weak argument was largely foregone in her appellate brief.
Like the district court before us, we see no need to travel down
-13-
this rabbit hole of baseless suspicion; it is clear no plausible
claim rests at its bottom.6
Where the note and mortgage are unified at the time of
foreclosure, our inquiry may come to an end. Eaton v. Fed. Nat'l
Mortg. Ass'n, 462 Mass. 569, 582-84, 969 N.E.2d 1118, 1129-30
(2012) (requiring possession of both the note and mortgage to
properly foreclose).7 Having found no plausible grounds for relief
based on MERS's involvement in the assignment of Woods's mortgage,
we affirm the district court's dismissal of her Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
244, § 14 claim and turn now to the other claims asserted in her
amended complaint.
4. Fremont's consent agreement
Woods next asserts that the foreclosure violated the
terms of a consent agreement between Fremont and the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, requiring Fremont to notify the Attorney General
prior to initiating any foreclosures in the state. This agreement
was the result of litigation filed by the Massachusetts Attorney
General against Fremont based on unfair and deceptive business
6
We note also that Woods has stopped paying her mortgage and that
no financial institution other than Wells Fargo has sought to take
action on account of that breach.
7
Because Wells Fargo reunified the note and mortgage prior to
initiating foreclosure, there is no reason to delve into the
ongoing fray of litigation attempting to demarcate the precise
borders of Eaton's prospective application. Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at
1133; see also HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Norris, 83 Mass. App. Ct.
1115, 983 N.E.2d 749 (2013) (unpublished opinion).
-14-
practices, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, stemming from its mortgage
foreclosures in the Commonwealth. Final Judgment by Consent,
Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, No. 07-4373-BLS1 (Mass. Supp.
Ct. June 9, 2009) (incorporating, verbatim, the terms of an earlier
preliminary injunction arresting Fremont's foreclosures absent
Attorney General review).8 As relevant to this appeal, the consent
agreement contains language mandating that Fremont receive approval
by the Attorney General prior to proceeding with any foreclosure in
the Commonwealth:
Before initiating or advancing a foreclosure
on any mortgage loan originated by Fremont
. . . Fremont shall first give the Attorney
General 30 days advance written notice so that
the Attorney General can verify that the
proposed foreclosure falls outside the scope
of this [agreement]. If the Attorney General
has not given written notice of an objection
to Fremont by the 30th day . . . Fremont may
proceed with the foreclosure.
Id. slip op. at 10 (emphasis added).
Wells Fargo presented to the district court a letter,
dated March 10, 2009, informing the Attorney General of its
intention to foreclose. Woods contends, however, that absent proof
of return correspondence from the Attorney General expressly
showing that it consented to the foreclosure, her claim that Wells
8
The requirement that Fremont-originated mortgages be reviewed
prior to foreclosure originated in a February 28, 2008 order by the
Massachusetts Superior Court. It is this order that was in effect
at the time Wells Fargo sought clearance to foreclose on Woods's
mortgage. The order was incorporated, in full, into the court's
subsequent consent judgment.
-15-
Fargo violated the agreement must be allowed to proceed. This
argument strays far wide of its mark. The language of the consent
decree unambiguously requires return correspondence only if the
Attorney General wishes to preclude foreclosure. In contrast,
where the Attorney General does not wish to forestall the
proceedings, the agreement's terms make clear that silence
suffices. As such, we agree with the district court that a
response was not required, and Woods cannot craft a colorable claim
from its absence.
Moreover, nothing in the consent agreement appears to
create a private right of action on which Woods or similarly
situated plaintiffs could challenge compliance with its terms. In
fact, in its final form the agreement explicitly disclaims the
creation of any private right of action. Id. slip op. at 16.
Although we need not rest on this issue, having found no facts
plausibly suggesting a violation occurred, we note that it is far
from clear how any such violation could be enforced by private
litigants, regardless.
5. Woods's fraud and Chapter 93(a) claims
Woods predicates her claim of fraud on the allegation
that Wells Fargo "intentionally made statements . . . that [it] was
the 'holder' of her mortgage with entitlement to the rights to her
monthly mortgage payments, and the related right to foreclose."
Further, she alleges that these statements caused her "direct" and
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"pecuniary" injury as a result of the encumbrance placed on her
property by Wells Fargo's attempts to enforce the mortgage debt.
Under Massachusetts law, fraud requires that the
defendant made a knowingly false statement concerning a material
matter that was intended to, and did in fact, induce the
plaintiff's reliance and, through that reliance, created an injury.
Russell v. Cooley Dickinson Hosp., Inc., 437 Mass. 443, 458, 772
N.E.2d 1054, 1066 (2002). A claim of fraud must also satisfy the
particularity requirements set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b),
mandating "specifics about the time, place, and content of the
alleged false representations." Juárez v. Select Portfolio
Servicing, Inc., 708 F.3d 269, 279-80 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting
United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc., 507 F.3d 720, 731 (1st
Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although Woods's complaint includes a basic recitation of
the elements of fraud, she does not indicate when, where, and how
often the allegedly false statements were made or what,
specifically, was stated. She also fails to state the specific
nature of the resulting harm, indicating only that it was of a
monetary nature. Finally, the complaint is wholly silent on the
issue of her actual reliance. This vague pleading falls short of
Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirement. Hayduk v. Lanna, 775 F.2d
441, 444 (1st Cir. 1985) ("[M]ere allegations of fraud, . . .
averments to conditions of mind, or referrals to plans and schemes
-17-
are too conclusional to satisfy the particularity requirement.
. . ."); see also Juárez, 708 F.3d at 280 (dismissing a claim of
fraud based on an allegedly wrongful foreclosure for failure to
specifically plead facts showing detrimental reliance).
Woods's claim further fails for lack of scienter. N. Am.
Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Cardinale, 567 F.3d 8,
13 (1st Cir. 2009) ("The Courts have uniformly held inadequate a
complaint's general averment of the defendant's 'knowledge' of
material falsity, unless the complaint also sets forth specific
facts that make it reasonable to believe that defendant knew that
a statement was materially false or misleading." (quoting
Greenstone v. Cambex Corp., 975 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1992)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Our conclusion that Woods
failed to plausibly plead that Wells Fargo did not legally possess
her mortgage is thus fatal to her fraud claim as well. Without
factual allegations sufficient to suggest illegality occurred, we
are necessarily left without allegations sufficient to suggest
Wells Fargo knew of such illegality. We therefore affirm the
dismissal of Woods's claim of fraud.
Woods's claim under Chapter 93A was also properly
dismissed. Massachusetts law protects consumers from "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or
commerce." Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 93A, § 2. What constitutes an
unfair or deceptive practice requires an individualized, "fact-
-18-
specific" inquiry. Arthur D. Little, Inc., v. Dooyang Corp., 147
F.3d 47, 55 (1st Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Generally, however, the facts must illustrate something
beyond a mere good faith dispute, failure to pay, or simple breach
of contract. Id. at 55-56 (citations omitted). In relation to a
foreclosure proceeding, therefore, "[i]t is not enough in the
context of Chapter 93A [] to allege that defendants foreclosed
. . . in violation of Massachusetts foreclosure law. Something
more is required." Juárez, 708 F.3d at 281.
Here, Woods's complaint offers no more. After making a
general allegation regarding the purported illegality of Wells
Fargo's foreclosure, she states only that she seeks a remedy under
93A. This failure to set forth any particular acts or practices
marked by "an extortionate quality . . . of unfairness [and
deceptiveness]," Arthur D. Little, Inc., 147 F.3d at 55 (quoting
Atkinson v. Rosenthal, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 219, 226, 598 N.E.2d 666,
670 (1993)), necessitates a finding that the facts as pled are
insufficient to state a claim.
Woods's claim necessarily fails for another reason as
well. Namely, 93A includes a pre-suit notice provision mandating
that "[a]t least thirty days prior to the filing of any such
action, a written demand for relief, identifying the claimant and
reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive act or practice
relied upon and the injury suffered" be sent to the respondent.
-19-
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(3); Entrialgo v. Twin City Dodge,
Inc., 368 Mass. 812, 812, 333 N.E.2d 202, 204 (1975) ("A demand
letter listing the specific deceptive practices is a prerequisite
to suit. . . ."). Plaintiffs are exempt from this requirement only
if "the prospective respondent does not maintain a place of
business or does not keep assets within [Massachusetts]." Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(3). Woods does not dispute that she never
sent timely pre-suit notice. Rather, she argues for an exemption
from the requirement, based on her assertion that Wells Fargo
maintains no assets in Massachusetts. Wells Fargo avers, to the
contrary, that it undoubtedly possesses at least one asset: a real
property interest in the form of Woods's mortgage and note.
Woods points to a recent district court decision holding
that possession of a mortgage, absent its accompanying note, cannot
alone sustain 93A's notice requirement because it "is of no value
as property, as it could at most be only resorted to as a trust for
the benefit of the holder of the note." Butler v. Deutsche Bank
Trust Co. Ams., Civ. No. 12-10337-DPW, 2012 WL 3518560, at *12-13
(D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2012) (quoting Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1125)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Even if that case is correct,
however, contra McKenna, 693 F.3d at 218 (finding a real property
interest sufficient to require notice even absent a determination
that the mortgagee held the note), it is inapposite to the current
proceedings.
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Here, the complaint does not support an allegation that
Wells Fargo holds a mortgage "separated from the underlying debt."
Butler, 2012 WL 3518560 at *12 (quoting Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1124)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, Wells Fargo holds both
the mortgage and the underlying promissory note. In Massachusetts,
a title theory state, possession of the mortgage and note
undisputedly vests in the holder a real property interest. See
Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 51-52; Maglione v. BancBoston Mortg. Corp.,
29 Mass. App. Ct. 88, 91, 557 N.E.2d 756, 758 (1990) (explaining
that in a title theory state "the mortgagee may enter into
possession of the mortgaged premises upon default and before
foreclosure"). As such, that Wells Fargo maintained at least one
asset in Massachusetts is clear. This is enough to establish the
need for pre-suit notice. Because Woods's pleadings admit she
filed no notice, her 93A claim was properly dismissed.
III. Conclusion
Ultimately, this case stands as another example of the
personal costs exacted on homeowners as a result of the housing
market's Icarus-style rise and fall. Its unfortunate events,
however, do not present legally cognizable claims for relief in
this case. For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district
court's dismissal of Woods's complaint.
Affirmed.
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