Carter v. Colvin

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT January 9, 2015
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
PAULINE CARTER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 14-1170
(D.C. No. 1:13-CV-00504-REB)
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting (D. Colo.)
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HOLMES, BACHARACH, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
This appeal involves the Social Security Administration’s
termination of disability benefits. Ms. Carter challenges the termination of
benefits on procedural and substantive grounds. Her procedural challenge
is based on a mistaken interpretation of the agency’s earlier decision. She
*
The parties requested a decision on the briefs, and oral argument
would not materially help in deciding the appeal. See Fed. R. App. P.
34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). Thus, we have declined to order oral
argument.
This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent,
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
asserts that the agency said in 2002 the disability was continuing. That
assertion is incorrect. Ms. Carter also makes a substantive challenge,
arguing that the agency mistakenly downplayed her limitations. In our
view, however, the agency did not err in applying legal standards or in
weighing the evidence. Thus, we affirm.
I. The Administrative Proceedings
Ms. Pauline Carter broke her hip in 2001 and obtained disability
benefits until June 5, 2002, based on satisfaction of a listing. After three
hearings, the agency found that Ms. Carter’s disability had terminated on
June 5, 2002, when an x-ray showed the hip had healed. In ordering
termination of benefits, the agency concluded that after June 5, 2002,
Ms. Carter could perform some “light” jobs such as a clerical checker, coin
machine collector, or vending machine operator. The federal district court
affirmed.
II. Standard of Review
On appeal, we must decide if the agency correctly applied legal
standards and made factual findings supported by substantial evidence.
Mays v. Colvin, 739 F.3d 569, 571 (10th Cir. 2014).
III. Procedural Arguments
Ms. Carter alleges violation of administrative regulations and
deprivation of due process. These allegations are invalid.
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Ms. Carter argues that
● the agency said in August 2002 that the disability was
continuing, and
● the agency lacked a basis to reopen that decision.
This argument is inaccurate because the agency did not say in August
2002 that the disability was continuing. The agency said only that the
disability continued until her x-ray was taken (which was on June 5,
2002). 1 In finding that the disability continued until June 5, 2002, the
agency did not violate any of its regulations.
Nor did it deprive Ms. Carter of due process. According to Ms.
Carter, the agency confused the termination date, impeding her ability to
develop a record in 2002 and 2003. We cannot entertain this allegation
because it was not made in district court. See Lyons v. Jefferson Bank &
Trust, 994 F.2d 716, 721-22 (10th Cir. 1993).
Even if we were to address the argument on the merits, it would fail.
Ms. Carter must show that the agency’s decision was fundamentally unfair.
Mays, 739 F.3d at 573. Under this standard, the claim fails because
Ms. Carter has not said what she would have done differently to develop a
record of disability in 2002 and 2003.
1
The agency mistakenly continued to pay disability benefits until
2007, but has not required Ms. Carter to repay these benefits.
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IV. Physical Assessment
Ms. Carter argues that the agency should not have found an ability to
perform light work, pointing to physical impairments, limited ability to
perform daily activities, and three medical opinions (Goodwin, Wilkins,
and Taylor). Physically, Ms. Carter relies on her need for narcotics, the
impact of her trochanteric bursitis and knee impairment, the screw
protruding into her fibula, and drowsiness from her medications. In
addition, she complains that she often has to rest and needs help with daily
chores.
The agency adequately addressed this evidence. For example, the
agency noted that Ms. Carter had acknowledged the ability to conduct daily
physical therapy exercises and a variety of daily chores, including laundry,
making the bed, watering flowers, driving a truck, and seeing friends. In
addition, the agency analyzed the minimal medical records after June 5,
2002. These records reflected improvement after hip surgery in the Fall of
2002 and surgery on the left knee in the Summer of 2003.
Ms. Carter relies in part on opinions by Dr. Taylor and Ms. Goodwin.
The agency justifiably declined to give weight to Dr. Taylor’s opinion
because it did not cover the pertinent time-period. Though the agency
failed to discuss the statement of Ms. Goodwin, the omission was
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immaterial because the agency found Ms. Carter disabled during the time-
period covered by Ms. Goodwin’s opinion.
Accordingly, we conclude that the agency correctly applied legal
standards and that the findings are supported by substantial evidence.
V. Credibility Findings
Ms. Carter also challenges the agency’s credibility findings, such as
fatigue from pain, loss of sleep, and side effects from medication. These
challenges are based on evidence of ineffective ambulation, testimony by a
friend, and evidence of an insurer’s payment of benefits for a disability.
We reject these challenges.
The agency is ideally suited to assess credibility, and we will not
disturb the agency’s credibility findings when they are supported by
substantial evidence. Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir.
2010). We conclude that the agency correctly applied legal standards and
that the credibility findings are supported by substantial evidence.
Ms. Carter did present evidence of ineffective ambulation. But, the
agency could reasonably reject this evidence based on two medical
assessments that would have allowed considerable ambulation. In the first
assessment (August 2002), a doctor said only that Ms. Carter should
remain cautious when moving about. In the second assessment (October
2003), a doctor provided minimum limits (no participation in bowling or
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sports requiring lateral motion). Based on these two assessments, the
agency could reasonably discount Ms. Carter’s evidence of ineffective
ambulation.
According to Ms. Carter, the agency should have credited the
testimony of her friend and the disability determination by an insurer. We
reject these arguments. The agency stated that it had considered all the
evidence. Thus, we assume that the agency considered both the friend’s
testimony and the insurer’s disability determination. See Wall v. Astrue,
561 F.3d 1048, 1070 (10th Cir. 2009).
In addition, both pieces of evidence appear immaterial. Ms. Carter
does not identify anything in the friend’s testimony that would affect the
outcome. And, there is no evidence about the circumstances surrounding
the insurer’s award of benefits (other than Ms. Carter’s testimony that she
obtained disability benefits from the insurer). In these circumstances, the
agency did not err by overlooking the friend’s testimony or the insurer’s
disability determination.
VI. Hypothetical Question
Ms. Carter also contends the agency should have incorporated her
self-described limitations when questioning the vocational expert. We
reject this contention.
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In asking hypothetical questions, the administrative law judge needs
only to include impairments supported in the record. Shepherd v. Apfel,
184 F.3d 1196, 1203 (10th Cir. 1999). The administrative law judge
included the impairments that he had found. And, as noted above, the
administrative law judge’s assessment was supported by the record.
Accordingly, the administrative law judge did not err in declining to ask
the vocational expert about the effect of greater limitations.
VII. Disposition
We reject any other arguments made by Ms. Carter as not properly
preserved for appellate review. With these conclusions, we affirm.
Entered for the Court
Robert E. Bacharach
Circuit Judge
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