Brainard v. City of Topeka

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
January 13, 2015
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
LISA BRAINARD,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v. No. 14-3055
(D.C. No. 5:12-CV-04017-RDR)
CITY OF TOPEKA, (D. Kan.)
Defendant – Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, ANDERSON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff and appellant, Lisa Brainard, appeals the grant of summary
judgment to the defendant, City of Topeka (“City”), in her case claiming
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
discrimination based on age and gender in her termination from employment with
the City. For the following reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
As the district court noted, many of the facts in this case are not disputed.
Ms. Brainard is a female over the age of forty. She was employed by the
defendant City from May 1981 until her termination on February 11, 2010. She
held the position of Technical Administrative Manager in the Information
Technology (“IT”) Department at the time of her termination. The Technical
Administrative Manager performed administrative duties such as payroll,
accounts receivable and purchasing. Appellant’s Appendix. (“Aplt. App.”) at 75,
151.
Mark Biswell was initially employed in the IT Department of the City as a
deputy director in 2001. He was appointed the interim director in 2007, and was
named the Director of IT in February 2008. In March 2008, Mr. Biswell
implemented a plan for restructuring the IT Department. The restructure affected
Ms. Brainard’s position, changing it from a supervisory to an administrative post.
Her pay was not affected.
In 2008, Ms. Brainard and a male employee of the City, Bill Stephens, were
both serving as managers in the IT Department. Ms. Brainard’s position had the
same job classification as Mr. Stephens’ position. Mr. Stephens’ job duties,
however, “were very different from plaintiff’s.” Mem & Order at 3-4; Aplt. App.
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at 422-23. Mr. Stephens handled web site development and maintenance, help
desk support, internet appliance maintenance, internet-based applications, and
training. Aplt. App. at 155. Ms. Brainard referred to Mr. Stephens as her “equal
counterpart.” Mem. & Order at 4; Aplt. App. at 423.
Mr. Stephens retired from the City in September 2009. His position was
not filled after he retired. After his retirement, Mr. Stephens did some contract
work for the City, including training and working on PCs. Mr. Stephens was not
full-time, did not receive any benefits and was not on a retainer, while he
performed these post-retirement duties. Aplt. App. at 298-301, 311, 347.
On August 18, 2009, the Topeka City Council Budget Committee voted to
remove $100,000 from the IT Department’s budget. Prior to that vote, Mr.
Biswell had told the Budget Committee that a cut of that amount would force him
to lay off one employee from the IT Department. On August 21, 2009, Mr.
Biswell met with the City’s Human Resources (“HR”) Director and the City
Manager to discuss the loss of funding and what options were available. Mr.
Biswell was instructed to prepare a letter to his staff explaining the budget
problems and indicating that there would be a layoff in the IT Department. That
letter was shared with the IT staff on August 28, 2009, and it explained the
procedures to be followed to determine which position would be eliminated.
In 2010, the City instituted a reduction-in-force (“RIF”). Ms. Brainard was
terminated on February 11, 2010, and her position was eliminated. No managers
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were hired or retained in the IT Department after Ms. Brainard’s position was
eliminated following her termination. Four other positions were also eliminated:
Computer Operator, User System Consultant, Electronics Communications
Manager and Application Systems Administrative Manager. These positions were
vacant at the time they were eliminated; all three IT Manager positions were
eliminated.
As indicated above, Ms. Brainard’s major job duties as Technical
Administrative Manager were payroll and invoicing. No other position in IT did
those duties. Payroll had become centralized in late 2009 to 2010. Following
Ms. Brainard’s termination, her other job duties were mostly moved to other
departments and performed by several existing employees: Linda Hardesty or
Terri Fincham in Contracts and Procurement performed her purchase requisition
entry duties; Becky Burks in Payroll performed her payroll duties; and Kim
Johnson or Cheryl Atherly in Finance performed her invoice/PO matching duties.
Mr. Biswell assumed her other duties.
In carrying out the RIF, the City eliminated vacant positions first, then
filled positions. Management employees were not allowed to “bump” other
employees, and seniority was not a consideration for management-level
employees in determining which positions would be eliminated. Two criteria
were used to identify which positions would be eliminated: minimizing the impact
of services to the public and job function/reorganization. Aplt. App. at 144.
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Prior to Ms. Brainard’s termination, Mr. Biswell learned of a vacant court
administrator position and inquired whether Ms. Brainard could be considered for
that position. Id. at 99-100; 122-23. The record indicates that the court position
was ultimately deemed not suitable for Ms. Brainard, and she makes no argument
that she should have been offered that position.
During her employment, Ms. Brainard had brought several issues of
concern to the attention of the HR Director, Jacque Russell. These issues were:
(1) her job change in 2008 (changing her job from supervisory to administrative);
(2) the fact that her job evaluation was left overnight on a printer on one
occasion; (3) an incident in which Mr. Biswell noisily and angrily opened a box
in the IT office; and (4) the fact that she was unable to locate Mr. Biswell at some
point.
Following her termination, Ms. Brainard filed a charge of discrimination
with the EEOC, alleging discrimination on the basis of age and gender and
retaliation. In response to the request for the “date discrimination took place” she
stated, “2-11-2010,” the date of her termination. After receiving a notice of right
to sue, she filed the instant petition, asserting claims under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.§ 623(a)(1) (“ADEA”) and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. (“Title VII”) in
connection with her employment termination.
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The City ultimately filed a motion for summary judgment. The district
court granted that motion, and this appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
“We review the district court’s summary judgment order de novo, and
apply the same legal standards as the district court.” Doe v. City of Albuquerque,
667 F.3d 1111, 1122 (10th Cir. 2012). “The court shall grant summary judgment
if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
“When applying this standard, we view the evidence and draw reasonable
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Doe,
667 F.3d at 1122 (internal quotation marks omitted). We note, as did the district
court, that the “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties
will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment;
the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Barber ex rel.
Barber v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, 562 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted).
In addressing the City’s motion for summary judgment, the district court
observed that, because Ms. Brainard presented no direct evidence of age or sex
discrimination under the ADEA and Title VII, but, rather, only presented
circumstantial evidence, the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973), applied. “Under McDonnell
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Douglas, a plaintiff carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination.” Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d 1206, 1216 (10th Cir. 2013).
In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the context of a
RIF, Ms. Brainard must show: “(1) that she is within the protected age [or gender]
group; (2) that she was doing satisfactory work; (3) that she was discharged
despite the adequacy of her work; and (4) that there is some evidence the
employer intended to discriminate against her in reaching its RIF decision.”
Beaird v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 145 F.3d 1159, 1165 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that
the prima facie case is the same for age and gender claims in the RIF context, id.
at 1167 n.4). “The fourth element may be established through circumstantial
evidence that the plaintiff was treated less favorably than younger [or male]
employees during the RIF.” Id. (quotation omitted). Thus, “[e]vidence that an
employer fired qualified older [or female] employees but retained younger [or
male] ones in similar positions is sufficient to create a rebuttable presumption of
discriminatory intent. . . .” Branson v. Price River Coal Co., 853 F.2d 768, 771
(10th Cir. 1988); see also Beaird, 145 F.3d at 1166.
As the district court noted, Ms. Brainard suggests that she has demonstrated
a prima facie case of age and sex discrimination because she was not afforded the
same opportunities as other male or younger employees. She relies on the
following: (1) Mr. Stephens, a male employee who Ms. Brainard claims was
similarly situated, retired in the fall of 2009 but was offered continued
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employment with the City as an independent contractor after Mr. Biswell learned
that he would have to cut $100,000 from the IT budget; (2) during the same
general time frame that she was discharged, the City hired two employees,
Marisol Romo and Kim Pryer, for positions for which Ms. Brainard was qualified;
and (3) there were “numerous employees” retained by the City in the IT
Department who do not belong to either of Ms. Brainard’s protected categories.
The district court explained why Ms. Brainard failed to establish a prima
facie case regarding each of these factual scenarios. Regarding Mr. Stephens, the
court stated that the “facts before the court fail to show that Stephens was
similarly situated with plaintiff.” Mem. & Order at 8; Aplt. App. at 427. The
district court determined that, while both Mr. Stephens and Ms. Brainard were IT
managers, Mr. Stephens had also been a trainer for the IT Department. Following
his retirement, he was hired as an independent contractor performing training, and
he also tended the public computer labs at the City community center. As the
court explained:
There is no evidence that plaintiff could perform any of the tasks that
Stephens did as an independent contractor. Stephens performed
entirely different work from that done by the plaintiff during her
employment in the IT Department. Moreover, there is no evidence
that Stephens was hired as an independent contractor because he was
male. The evidence shows that the IT budget contemplated the
hiring of an independent contractor when Stephens’ retirement was
considered. Biswell agreed to hire Stephens following his retirement
because he was experienced and could easily handle the tasks that
needed to be carried out. Finally, plaintiff has not shown that there
was any position she could have undertaken as an independent
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contractor with the City. She has also not demonstrated that she ever
sought such employment.
Id. at 9-10; Aplt. App. at 428-29.
Ms. Brainard has not refuted any of those determinations. Indeed, she
argues that the district court “improperly adjudged Stephens as failing the test for
qualification as a ‘similarly situated’ employee” by stating that Mr. Stephens
“held the same prior job classification as Brainard, and also the same essential
title as an IT department ‘manager.’” Appellant’s Br. at 13. She claims that “[a]t
a bare minimum, these facts suffice to create a genuine issue of material fact.”
Id. We disagree. As the City points out, Mr. Stephens was not even an employee
of the City at the time of the RIF. Rather, he was a retiree who performed some
services for the City on a contract/independent contractor basis. Furthermore,
Ms. Brainard does not even attempt to refute the district court’s factual recitation
of the vast differences between the duties performed by Ms. Brainard and Mr.
Stephens, despite their sharing of the general title of “IT manager.”
With respect to Ms. Romo and Ms. Pryer, whom Ms. Brainard says are
younger than herself, the district court explained why the evidence did not
support Ms. Brainard’s claimed inference of discrimination in their hiring. The
district court stated as follows:
The evidence before the court shows that Pryer, who is
approximately one year younger than plaintiff, worked for the City as
a temporary employee (she was employed by a temp agency)
approximately a year before the RIF began. She worked in various
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departments, including Finance, Fire and IT. She was not, however,
hired by the City until a year after plaintiff’s discharge. Thus, she
did not occupy a position that could be filled by plaintiff at the time
of plaintiff’s termination. The hiring of Pryer does not demonstrate
any inference of age discrimination.
Romo, who is eleven years younger than plaintiff, had been a
full-time employee of City4 since 2006. City4 is the government
access cable television channel for the City of Topeka. Biswell did
not supervise or make employment decisions or recommendations for
City4 employees even though they were under IT’s budget. Romo
left City employment in November 2009. Her position was not
eliminated. Her job duties were performed by a public information
officer in another department on a temporary basis until Romo
returned in March 2010.
Mem. & Order at 10-11; Aplt. App. at 429-30. While Ms. Brainard averred by
affidavit that she was qualified for the position filled by Ms. Romo, the district
court stated that she “fails to provide any support for that conclusory statement
and the record before the court fails to provide any support for it.” Id. at 11;
Aplt. App. at 430. 1 The court therefore correctly found that the undisputed
1
The district court stated that Ms. Romo’s position was titled
“Publication/Script Writer, Special Projects Coordinator” and
required a degree in communications, journalism, film or a closely
related field and two years of experience in advertising, public
relations, broadcasting, journalism or a related field; experience in
writing copy, public speaking, public presentations, reporting and
editing; experience in running television production equipment and
producing television and radio ads. Plaintiff does not have any
college credit and has only a vocational certificate from 1980 in data
entry. Her work experience since 1981 has been information
technology with the City.
Mem. & Order at 11; Aplt. App. at 430. The court accordingly found that “the
(continued...)
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evidence demonstrated no inference of discrimination in the hiring of Mses.
Romo and Pryer.
Regarding the “numerous” employees allegedly retained in the IT
Department who did not belong to either of Ms. Brainard’s protected categories
when she was terminated, the district court held that “an examination of the facts
concerning these employees reveals the mistake of plaintiff’s analysis.” Mem. &
Order at 12; Aplt. App. at 431. The employees named by Ms. Brainard are Lacey
Bisnett (under the age of forty), Kyle Brown (male under the age of forty) and
Aaron Charest (male under the age of forty). The court found that “Lacey Bisnett
and Kyle Brown were not hired until sometime after plaintiff’s termination . . .
and [therefore] cannot be considered as support for plaintiff’s theory of
discrimination.” Id.
Mr. Charest, an under-forty male, was retained by the IT Department at the
time of Ms. Brainard’s discharge. The court found he was “not similarly
situated” as Ms. Brainard:
As previously pointed out, no managers were hired or retained in the
IT Department after plaintiff’s position was eliminated and she was
terminated. Charest was a “system developer.” There were several
employees, both male and under forty, who were retained in the IT
Department at the time of plaintiff’s discharge. These employees,
however, were computer programmers, developers and engineers.
1
(...continued)
fact plaintiff was not ‘offered’ this [Ms. Romo’s] position raises no inference of
age discrimination.” Id. Ms. Brainard makes no effort to dispute the correctness
of the district court’s finding on this point.
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They were not similarly situated to plaintiff because plaintiff’s
responsibilities as an IT manager were payroll, contracts and other
administrative duties.
Id. at 12; Aplt. App. at 431. The court thus found “no inference of age or sex
discrimination in the termination of plaintiff from her position as an IT
Department manager as a result of a RIF by the City of Topeka.” Id. at 13; Aplt.
App. at 432.
The district court then considered Ms. Brainard’s claim of retaliation,
prohibited under the ADEA and Title VII, because she claimed she had engaged
in protected activity and was then terminated. 2 Ms. Brainard asserts she was
discharged because she made complaints about Mr. Biswell to the IT HR Director.
She further claims she has made out a prima facie case of retaliation and that she
is able to establish that the City’s proffered reason is merely a pretext for
retaliation.
As the district court stated, retaliation claims under the ADEA and Title
VII require “but-for” causation. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.
Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013) (Title VII); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167,
176 (ADEA); Davis v. Unified Sch. Dist. 500, 750 F.3d 1168, 1170 (10th Cir.
2014). As we recently stated, “[t]he evidence of but-for causation ‘must be based
on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or surmise.’” Ward v. Jewell, 772
2
The City argues Ms. Brainard has abandoned this issue, as she failed to
address its merits in her brief. We nonetheless explain why the district court’s
analysis of her retaliation claim is correct.
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F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bones v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 366
F.3d 869, 875 (10th Cir. 2004)).
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, meeting the but-for standard,
Ms. Brainard must show that “(1) he or she engaged in protected opposition to
discrimination, (2) a reasonable employee would have considered the challenged
employment action materially adverse, and (3) a causal connection existed
between the protected activity and the materially adverse action.” Hinds v.
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 523 F.3d 1187, 1202 (10th Cir. 2008). The district
court first considered whether Ms. Brainard had engaged in protected activity, and
determined that it was “not clear that the various complaints raised by the
plaintiff to the HR Directors were protected activity.” Mem. & Order at 15; Aplt.
App. at 434. Given that ambiguity, the court did not rest its decision on that
ground; rather, it examined the remaining McDonnell Douglas considerations.
Thus, the court stated that “[e]ven if the court found that plaintiff had presented a
prima facie case of sex or age discrimination or retaliation based upon Title VII
or the ADEA,” . . . the court “cannot find that plaintiff has presented sufficient
evidence of pretext.” Id. at 17; Aplt. App. at 436.
Ms. Brainard argued that the following facts support her argument that the
City’s proffered reason for her termination was a pretext for discrimination or
retaliation: (1) the City lacked any standard RIF methodology; (2) no procedure
was established for determining who should be subject to the RIF and “the
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decision was left to the head of the department, then rubber-stamped by the City
Manager,” id.; and (3) the City was able to find funds to hire other employees
even though she was discharged for budgetary reasons. The district court rejected
that argument.
As the court explained, in the RIF context, proof of pretext may include,
but is not limited to, evidence that the plaintiff’s termination was inconsistent
with the RIF criteria articulated by her employer; a claimed business judgment
was “so idiosyncratic or questionable that a factfinder could reasonably find that
it is a pretext for illegal discrimination;” evidence showing that the employer
inconsistently applied its RIF criteria; or other procedural irregularities in the RIF
process. Beaird, 145 F.3d at 1169; see also Sanders v. Southwestern Bell Tel.,
L.P., 544 F.3d 1101, 1106-07 (10th Cir. 2008); Whittington v. Nordam Group
Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 994 (10th Cir. 2005). This list is “not . . . exhaustive;” in
determining whether a plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated pretext, “we
consider the evidence as a whole.” Sanders, 544 F.3d at 1107. The district court
noted that we have rejected a “pretext plus” standard, stating that “[n]o additional
evidence is necessary to show discrimination because proof that the defendant’s
explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial
evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination.” Jones v. Okla. City Pub.
Sch., 617 F.3d 1273, 1280 (10th Cir. 2010) (further quotation omitted).
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In assessing Ms. Brainard’s claim of retaliation, the district court found it
was “not persuaded that the evidence, even when considered in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, supports the arguments made by the plaintiff.” Mem. &
Order at 18; Aplt. App. at 437. As the court further explained:
The evidence clearly shows that Biswell informed employees in
August 2009 that budget reductions would require the elimination of
one IT position effective October 30, 2009. The actual termination
did not occur until February 11, 2010, but there appears to be no
dispute that such an elimination was forthcoming. Moreover, the
evidence shows that the criteria used to determine who would be
terminated was based upon an evaluation of the function of the
position, the ability to spread those duties to other positions, and the
desire not to impact the services of the citizens of Topeka.
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the City did not follow
the criteria that it established concerning this RIF. The evidence
does not demonstrate that the City lacked objective criteria or that it
failed to follow the criteria that it established. Plaintiff has failed to
point to any evidence that the process used to determine the
elimination of her position and her termination was any different
from the processes used by the City to eliminate other positions for
the RIF. An employer may choose the criteria it wishes to employ to
conduct a RIF and “we will not disturb that exercise of [a]
defendant’s business judgment.”
Mem. & Order at 18-19; Aplt. App. at 437-38 (quoting Beaird, 145 F.3d at 1169).
Ms. Brainard fails to refute the district court’s analysis, or explain why and
how the court erred. Ms. Brainard’s only claim is that the “City admits it
employed no standard RIF methodology.” Appellant’s Br. at 16. We are aware
of no such admission by the City; indeed, the record supports the district court’s
statement that the City had criteria for implementing its RIF and those criteria in
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no way support an inference of discrimination. Ms. Brainard provides no citation
to the record to support her claim of a lack of standards for implementing the
RIF; in fact, her brief is completely devoid of citations to the record to support
her claims of materially disputed facts.
In sum, we agree completely with the district court’s rejection of Ms.
Brainard’s arguments. We affirm its decision to grant the City’s motion for
summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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