Rubin v. Jenkusky

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT January 30, 2015
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
RICHARD RUBIN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 14-2058
(D.C. No. 1:13-CV-00047-RB-WPL)
STEVEN JENKUSKY, M.D.; (D. N.M.)
NEW MEXICO MEDICAL BOARD;
STEVEN WEINER, M.D., Chairman;
LINDA HART, Executive Director;
DAN RUBIN, Prosecutor; NEW
MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before GORSUCH, O’BRIEN, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Richard Rubin appeals from orders of the district court staying
discovery, dismissing his case, and denying reconsideration. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
BACKGROUND
Rubin was a licensed physician’s assistant (PA) who worked at Zia Health and
Wellness in Albuquerque, New Mexico, certifying applicants for the medical use of
marijuana under the New Mexico Medical Cannabis Program and the Lynn and Erin
Compassionate Use Act (CUA), N.M. Stat. Ann. § 26-2B-1 through § 26-2B-7.
Psychiatrist Steven Jenkusky, who was a member of the New Mexico Medical Board
(Board), submitted a complaint to the Board regarding Rubin’s attempt to certify one
of Dr. Jenkusky’s patients. Dr. Jenkusky was concerned Rubin was certifying
applicants in the absence of any treating relationship and without physician
supervision. The Board advised Rubin of the complaint and invited a response,
which he provided. With Dr. Jenkusky abstaining, the Board voted to summarily
suspend Rubin’s PA license, finding he was “an immediate danger to the public.”
Aplee. Supp. App. at 31. Twelve days later, the Board sent Rubin a Notice of
Contemplated Action, informing him that the Board was considering imposing
sanctions, including suspending his license, and that he was entitled to a hearing at
which he could be represented by counsel, present evidence, and compel the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence.
A hearing was set but never held because Rubin ultimately agreed to the entry
of a stipulated order that, among other things, suspended his PA license for one year,
prohibited him from prescribing any controlled substances for two years, and
prohibited him from certifying medical marijuana for four years. In the joint motion
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for the stipulated order, Rubin agreed that the proposed order, if accepted, would
result in a waiver of his rights to a hearing, to judicial review on the matters alleged,
and to challenge the stipulated order in court.
The Board accepted the stipulated order. Despite the associated waiver
provisions, Rubin, through an attorney, filed a civil action against the Board;
Dr. Jenkusky; the Board’s Chairman, Dr. Steven Weiner; the Board’s Executive
Director, Lynn Hart (misidentified as Linda Hart); and the Board’s prosecutor, Dan
Rubin (no relation to plaintiff Rubin). Rubin also named as defendants the New
Mexico Department of Health (DOH) and Dr. Linda Gorgos.1 Rubin asserted
defendants violated his due process and equal protection rights by issuing the
summary suspension, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He also asserted claims of
breach of statutory immunity under the CUA,2 defamation, malicious abuse of
process, infliction of emotional distress, wrongful interference with business
relationships, administrative conspiracy, and fraudulent inducement with respect to
the stipulated order.
1
Rubin identified Dr. Gorgos as the Medical Director of the Infectious Disease
Bureau of the DOH’s Public Health Division. The district court later dismissed
Rubin’s claims against Dr. Gorgos without prejudice for failure to effect timely
service, a decision with which Rubin expressly agreed in a response to a show-cause
order and which he does not challenge on appeal.
2
In relevant part, the CUA provides that “[a] practitioner shall not be subject to
arrest or prosecution, penalized in any manner or denied any right or privilege for
recommending the medical use of cannabis or providing written certification for the
medical use of cannabis pursuant to the Lynn and Erin Compassionate Use Act.”
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 26-2B-4.E.
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The four individual Board defendants filed a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as did the Board. They
invoked a variety of theories for dismissal, including qualified immunity for the
individual defendants. The magistrate judge assigned to the case stayed discovery in
view of the assertion of qualified immunity but informed Rubin that he could seek
discovery by filing an affidavit under Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rubin did not file a response to the dismissal motions, so the district
court granted them based on a local rule directing that the failure to respond to a
motion “constitutes consent to grant the motion,” D.N.M.LR-Civ. 7.1(b), and the
court’s view that, although summary judgment motions could not be conceded by a
failure to respond, motions to dismiss could, and the court’s local rule applied. The
DOH also filed a motion to dismiss, but as explained below, the district court never
ruled on it.
Rubin then filed a motion asking the magistrate judge to reconsider the order
staying discovery and the district court to reconsider its dismissal order. As to the
stay order, Rubin pointed out that no defendant sought a stay, argued that a stay was
not mandated by the assertion of qualified immunity, and complained that the court
had failed to hold a discovery conference and to enter a scheduling order. The
magistrate judge denied reconsideration, stating that case law provides a court with
little discretion in whether to stay discovery once a defendant asserts qualified
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immunity and explaining that if Rubin wanted discovery, he should have filed a
Rule 56(d) affidavit.
Two months later (and nearly ten months after the Board and the individual
Board defendants filed their answer), the magistrate judge entered an initial
scheduling order (apparently because the DOH’s motion to dismiss remained
pending) but vacated it in light of Rubin’s pending motion for the district court to
reconsider its dismissal order. In that motion, Rubin stated he did not file a response
to the motion to dismiss “for what his counsel considered good reasons in his client’s
interest.” Aplt. App. at 49. He asked the court to reconsider the dismissal in light of
Tenth Circuit law prohibiting courts from granting a motion to dismiss “merely
because a party failed to file a response.” Issa v. Comp USA, 354 F.3d 1174, 1177
(10th Cir. 2003) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 1178(stating that “even if a plaintiff does not file a response to a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, the district court must still examine the allegations in the
plaintiff’s complaint and determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon
which relief can be granted”).
The district court granted the motion to reconsider but dismissed the case with
prejudice. The court first concluded that Rubin’s due process claim failed because he
had been fully advised of his procedural rights but had waived them when he agreed
to the stipulated order and the suspension of his license. Next, the court determined
Rubin’s equal protection claim failed because he alleged no facts showing he was
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treated differently from any others who were similarly-situated. Finally, the court
held the state-law claims were subject to the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (NMTCA)
but concluded Rubin failed to allege or establish that any of his claims fit within one
of the waivers of the immunity the NMTCA grants to government entities and public
employees. The court entered a separate judgment under Rule 58 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure dismissing the case with prejudice.
Rubin then sought reconsideration of the district court’s order on his first
motion to reconsider, complaining dismissal was premature because the court had not
issued a scheduling order within the time limits of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure3 and had not permitted discovery. He also argued the court had
failed to acknowledge his CUA immunity and had misunderstood his due process
claim, which he contended was based on the summary suspension, without a hearing,
issued almost two weeks before what he alleged was required by statute to be a prior
or concurrent Notice of Contemplated Action. The district court construed the
motion as one under Rule 59(e) and denied it, concluding Rubin had merely repeated
arguments the court had already found unpersuasive and had not shown “an
intervening change in the controlling law,” “new evidence previously unavailable,”
or a “need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice,” Servants of the
3
Rule 16(b)(2) requires a district court to enter a scheduling order “within 120
days after any defendant has been served with the complaint or 90 days after any
defendant has appeared.”
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Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000), warranting Rule 59(e)
relief.
DISCUSSION
Rubin’s notice of appeal names four orders: the magistrate judge’s order
staying discovery (Doc. 15), the first and second dismissal orders (Docs. 18 and 35),
and the order denying his second motion for reconsideration (Doc. 39). We review
the dismissal orders de novo, see Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Wenker, 353 F.3d 1221, 1227
(10th Cir. 2004), and the other orders for abuse of discretion, see Garcia v. Tyson
Foods, Inc., 770 F.3d 1300, 1309 (10th Cir. 2014) (discovery orders); Ysais v.
Richardson, 603 F.3d 1175, 1180 (10th Cir. 2010) (denial of Rule 59(e) motions for
reconsideration).4
Rubin argues that because of his statutory immunity under the CUA, he “may
not properly be subject to [an] immunity motion.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 7. But Rubin
provides no support for the argument (nor are we aware of any) that his alleged
immunity under the CUA precludes the Board or the Board-related defendants from
prevailing on their defense of governmental immunity to suit under the NMTCA.
4
Rubin was represented by counsel through the filing of an opening brief in this
appeal, but his attorney was permanently disbarred by the State of New Mexico in
August 2014 and disbarred from this court in October 2014. Rubin has not retained
new counsel. Despite the fact Rubin is now pro se, he is not entitled to a liberal
construction of any of the relevant filings in the district court or this court, all of
which were prepared by an attorney.
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Rubin also advances two arguments that fail for a common reason. First, he
claims the district court overlooked that the Board should have issued the Notice of
Contemplated Action at the time it imposed the summary suspension, not twelve days
later. That delay, he argues, violated a statutory directive that the Board “may
summarily suspend or restrict a license without a hearing, simultaneously with or at
any time after the initiation of proceedings for a hearing,” N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 61-6-15.1.A. (emphasis added). Second, Rubin contends the Board lacked
evidence he was a danger to the public health and safety. These arguments ignore
Rubin’s waiver of his right to judicially challenge the actions of the Board when he
agreed to the stipulated order. Indeed, Rubin’s appellate brief fails to acknowledge
his waiver at all. Moreover, the statute clearly provides that the Board can impose a
summary suspension “without a hearing,” id., as occurred here, and that a person
whose license is summarily suspended is entitled to a later hearing upon request, see
id. Although Rubin requested a hearing, where he might have challenged the Board’s
finding that he was a danger to public health and safety, he ultimately waived his
right to one.
Rubin next complains about the district court’s failure to follow Rule 16(b)’s
requirements that a court “must issue [a] scheduling order . . . within the earlier of
120 days after any defendant has been served with the complaint or 90 days after any
defendant has appeared.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(2). But he has not pointed us to, nor
have we uncovered, any authority suggesting the failure to issue a scheduling order
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within the time constraints of Rule 16 requires an appellate court to reverse an order
dismissing a case under Rule 12(b)(6).
Rubin also challenges the order staying discovery, arguing the magistrate
judge was mistaken in believing a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity
mandated a stay. We need not address whether the assertion of qualified immunity
mandates a stay because Rubin has not identified any discovery he might have sought
that would have aided him in defending the motions to dismiss. See Garcia,
770 F.3d at 1309 (stating that appellate court will reverse only upon a “clear showing
that the denial of discovery resulted in actual and substantial prejudice” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Further, the magistrate judge’s order provided a means
for Rubin to request discovery through a Rule 56(d) affidavit. He simply failed to
pursue that option. Hence, we see no abuse of discretion in the order staying
discovery.
Finally, we note the district court never ruled on the DOH’s motion to dismiss.
Because Rubin has not claimed any error with respect to the district court’s dismissal
of the case with prejudice despite the DOH’s pending motion, we have no occasion to
address this apparent oversight.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Appellees have moved to strike
Rubin’s pro se affidavit, filed December 29, 2014, in which he alleges a political
motivation behind the actions underlying his suspension and asserts he complied with
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the CUA but was coerced into agreeing to the stipulated order. We grant appellees’
motion to strike because the affidavit presents no occasion to depart from the general
rule that appellate review is limited to the record before the district court. See Boone
v. Carlsbad Bancorporation, Inc., 972 F.2d 1545, 1549 n.1 (10th Cir. 1992)
(declining to review documents not before the district court when appealed rulings
were issued).
Entered for the Court
Terrence L. O’Brien
Circuit Judge
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