United States v. Chapman

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
February 3, 2015
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
No. 14-1268
v. (D.C. No. 1:13-CR-00224-WJM-1)
D. Colorado
JAMES CHAPMAN,
Defendant – Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before PORFILIO, ANDERSON, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant and Appellant, James Chapman, appeals the forty-six month
sentence imposed following his plea of guilty to being a felon in possession of a
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). After concluding that his sentence
is substantively reasonable, we affirm that sentence.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Chapman’s undeniably sad and troubled life included his witnessing of
his mother’s rape and murder by a gang when he was seven years old. Following
that incident, he began experiencing nightmares and mental health problems,
which have continued throughout his life.
At the age of eighteen, Mr. Chapman was arrested and convicted for
receiving stolen property. He was sentenced to nine months in jail, followed by
three years of probation. When he got out of jail, Mr. Chapman began receiving
mental health treatment for the first time. Doctors at the Compton, California
Family Mental Health Services diagnosed him with “schizophrenia, paranoid type,
accompanied by distorted thought, sense of self, and volition.” Appellant’s Br. at
3. He was prescribed medications for those diagnoses. At some point during the
following year, he attempted suicide by overdosing on pills.
At the age of nineteen, Mr. Chapman first sought to receive disability
payments from the Social Security Administration, on the ground that his mental
illness rendered him unable to maintain a job. He was initially denied disability
payments.
When Mr. Chapman was twenty-one, he was arrested and convicted of
possession of marijuana for sale. He was sentenced to a year in jail. Shortly after
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his release from jail, Mr. Chapman was arrested and convicted of two counts of
second-degree robbery, for which he received a sentence of nine years in prison.
While in prison, Mr. Chapman received psychotropic medication. Additionally,
while in prison, he was convicted of possession of marijuana.
Mr. Chapman was released from prison in 2006, at the age of thirty-one.
He was again denied Social Security disability benefits. He was then arrested and
convicted of second-degree burglary, for which he received a sentence of thirty-
two months’ imprisonment. When he displayed psychotic symptoms in prison, he
was diagnosed with a major mental illness and treated.
In July 2009, Mr. Chapman was finally deemed to be qualified to receive
Social Security disability benefits because of severe impairment caused by
“schizophrenia with audio hallucinations, explosive disorder, and likely
borderline personality disorder.” Appellant’s Br. at 5. The Administrative Law
Judge found that Mr. Chapman’s disability had existed since June 1, 1996.
In the months following this decision, Mr. Chapman sustained three more
convictions: one for driving under the influence and two for driving with a
suspended license. He was sentenced to a total of seven months in jail and was
released in late 2011 or early 2012.
Mr. Chapman was continuing to receive psychiatric medications at this
point in time. When his grandmother (with whom he lived) suffered a stroke in
California, Mr. Chapman moved to Denver, Colorado, to live with a girlfriend
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with whom he had an eighteen-year relationship, which included an eighteen-
year-old daughter.
After his move to Denver, Mr. Chapman made an appointment with a state
mental health agency to continue his treatment and medications. Because of a
delay in getting an appointment, Mr. Chapman’s mental health medications had
run out by May 12, 2013, and he apparently began experiencing hallucinations.
The conduct underlying the instant conviction occurred on the next day, May 13,
2013. As described by the district court, the following happened:
[O]n May 13th, 2013, at approximately 10:20 p.m., two Aurora
Colorado police officers were dispatched to the Bona Vista Manor
Apartments in Aurora in response to a call from the complex
manager, Candy Maes.
Ms. Maes stated that she had seen a man continuously
trespassing in the apartment complex and she believed that this
individual might be involved with drugs or a gang.
Through the window at the complex Ms. Maes had indicated
that the door had been propped open adjacent to the parking area in
the courtyard, and then noticed a man in that area, pointed him out to
officers and stated she believed him to be the same man.
Officers proceeded to that area and approached the man later
identified as the defendant, James Chapman. The defendant was
accompanied by another man, a resident of the apartment complex.
The defendant appeared to be nervous upon encountering the officers
and began moving away. One of the officers ordered the defendant
to stop and inquired whether the defendant was armed. The officers
became concerned that the defendant might have a weapon in his
baggy clothes.
The defendant responded to the officers that he was not armed,
but according to the officers he then suddenly darted his left hand
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into his pants pocket and turned sideways away from them. The
officers believed that the defendant was attempting to draw a weapon
and grabbed the defendant’s left hand to prevent him from doing so.
The defendant was ordered to put his hands up. He raised his
hands, and as the officers began to initiate a frisk, the defendant
pulled away and began to run. After taking a few steps the defendant
ran into a metal pole, stumbled, and at that time officers caught him,
forced him to the ground and attempted to put him under arrest for
trespassing and failure to obey a lawful police request and
obstructing a police officer.
The defendant attempted to escape but was eventually subdued
and handcuffed. In one of his pockets officers found a loaded
Clerke, Model 1st, .32 caliber S&W revolver, Serial No. 874912,
loaded with live rounds of Remington .32 caliber S&W caliber
ammunition.
Tr. of Sentencing Hr’g at 10-12; R. Vol. 3 at 30-32. Mr. Chapman was arrested
and pled guilty.
In preparation for sentencing, the United States Probation Office prepared a
Presentence Report (“PSR”). The final PSR calculated an advisory sentencing
range under the United States Guideline Commission, Guidelines Manual
(“USSG”) of 51 to 63 months, after a 3-level decrease in Mr. Chapman’s total
offense level for acceptance of responsibility, and considering his criminal history
category of VI. Mr. Chapman filed a motion for a downward departure from the
sentencing range based on diminished capacity. Defense counsel explained that,
had Mr. Chapman been taking his medications, the offense would not have
occurred. The government opposed the motion.
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At the sentencing hearing, the district court heard argument from both
sides. Mr. Chapman requested a sentence of forty-six months, based upon the
departure motion, and he subsequently added a request for a below-Guidelines
sentence based on the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Government
counsel requested a sentence of fifty-nine months.
The district court indicated its awareness of Mr. Chapman’s extensive
mental health issues and tragic early life: “I can’t imagine a more horrific tragic
event than a child witnessing the gang rape and murder of his mother.” Tr. of
Sentencing Hr’g at 4; R. Vol. 3 at 24. The court also noted, “[i]f I were a judge
in a different country, in a European union, I would be able to sentence this man
to treatment in a hospital, which is where he should be. . . . This is a very
troubling case for me. I couldn’t go to sleep last night thinking about it. ” Id. at
5; R. Vol. 3 at 25. The court then carefully reviewed Mr. Chapman’s life,
including his mental health struggles, as well as the details of his criminal history
and the instant offense. The court ruled:
I am going to grant the defendant’s supplemented oral motion for a
downward departure based on diminished capacity, and I am going to
also order that a below-Guideline sentencing range sentence be
entered in this case based on my analysis of the 3553(a) factors in
this case.
Therefore, I intend to sentence the defendant to a period of
imprisonment of 46 months, to be followed by a term of supervised
release of three years.
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Id. at 20; R. Vol. 3 at 40. The court further explained that it based its sentence on
“the arguments of counsel,” as well as Mr. Chapman’s allocution and “the policy
statements and the Sentencing Guidelines, the statutory factors set forth in
Section 3553(a) and . . . the recommendations of the probation officer.” Id. at 21;
R. Vol. 3 at 41. The court then noted that the below-Guideline sentence “reflects
the seriousness of the offense, affords adequate deterrence to future criminal
conduct and will protect the public from further crimes of this defendant.” Id.Finally, the court told Mr. Chapman that it was paramount that he never again
possess a firearm, that he continue to take his medications, and that he was
“getting about as lenient a sentence as [he could] get under the circumstances
today.” Id. at 26; R. Vol. 3 at 46. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Mr. Chapman challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence,
arguing that, in light of his tragic and troubled history, particularly his extensive
mental health problems, the below-Guideline sentence of forty-six months is too
long. We disagree.
A sentence is substantively unreasonable if its length is “excessive given
all the circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.]
§ 3553(a).” United States v. Gantt, 679 F.3d 1240, 1249 (10th Cir. 2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted). These factors include “the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,”
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18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); “the need for the sentence imposed” to “reflect the
seriousness of the offense,” “promote respect for the law,” “provide just
punishment for the offense,” “afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,”
and “protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,” id. § 3553(a)(2);
and “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” id. § 3553(a)(6).
“Under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, we deem a sentence
unreasonable only if it is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly
unreasonable.” Gantt, 679 F.3d at 1249 (internal quotation marks omitted). And,
we review “all sentences–whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the
Guidelines range–under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). Finally, there is a “rebuttable presumption
of reasonableness to a below-guideline sentence challenged by the defendant as
unreasonably harsh.” United States v. Balbin-Mesa, 643 F.3d 783, 788 (10th Cir.
2011). This is a high standard.
Indeed, “[t]he fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded
that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the
district court.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Such deference to
the district court is sensible, given that “[a] sentencing judge has greater
familiarity with the case and the defendant before it than this court or the
Sentencing Commission and is therefore ‘in a superior position to find facts and
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judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual case.’” United States v.
Munoz-Nava, 524 F.3d 1137, 1148 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at
51)).
This is a case in which deference to the district court is particularly
appropriate. The court indicated its familiarity with the facts of Mr. Chapman’s
entire history. It further expressly stated its concern with the court’s ability to
address Mr. Chapman’s mental health needs. The court then granted Mr.
Chapman’s request for a below-Guidelines sentence, stating that he was getting as
lenient a sentence as possible in the circumstances of his case. The court clearly
exercised its discretion to vary from the advisory Guidelines sentence, and, in
doing so, the court examined all the relevant factors and circumstances it was
required to consider. While Mr. Chapman asks us to vary further, we must defer
to the district court’s obvious familiarity with the particular nuances of Mr.
Chapman’s case and its selection of a reasonable sentence. That court had “an
unquestionable institutional advantage over an appellate court to consider whether
the facts of an individual case justify a variance under § 3553(a).” United States
v. Huckins, 529 F.3d 1312, 1317 (10th Cir. 2008). And, that institutional
advantage extends to determining the extent of the variance in this particular case.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the sentence imposed is
reasonable. AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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