Bertolo v. Benezee

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT February 4, 2015
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
JAMES M. BERTOLO,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 13-1163
(D.C. No. 1:11-CV-02822-WJM-BNB)
TOM BENEZEE, Lieutenant CTCF; R. (D. Colo.)
VIOLA, CTCF Mailroom; M. GARCIA,
CTCF Mailroom; DIANE MILLER,
CTCF Mailroom; MIKLICH, Major,
CTCF Reading Committee; WORTHEN,
Lieutenant, CTCF Reading Committee;
JOY HART, CTCF Reading Committee;
KEITH NORDELL; MARSHALL
GRIFFITH; STEVE HAGER; SUSAN
JONES; MIRA LONGGLOSS; BURL
MCCULLAR; KIRK MACHIN, all
CDOC Springs Employees and Members
of Central Reading Committee,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before KELLY, ANDERSON, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
James Bertolo, appearing pro se, appeals from the district court’s dismissal of
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
affirm.
I. Background
The Order Adopting the Recommendation of the United States Magistrate
Judge and Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss sets out the relevant facts, so the
court will provide only a brief overview of the pertinent facts. See R., Vol. I at 350.
Bertolo, a designated sex offender, was transferred to the Colorado Territorial
Correctional Facility (“CTCF”), but did not receive his medications for several days,
resulting in his apparent mental disorientation. During his disoriented state,
Lieutenant Tom Benezee gave Bertolo a disciplinary infraction, confiscated his
photos and magazines, and suspended his telephone privileges. Bertolo was also
required to sign AR Form 300-26E, an agreement specifying the limitations on his
reading material, which he alleged was more restrictive than the agreement with his
previous facility.
Bertolo filed a pro se complaint against defendants in their individual and
official capacities, alleging a deprivation of his constitutional rights pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court ordered Bertolo to amend
his complaint multiple times due to, in part, his failure to use the court-approved
complaint form and allege the personal participation of all named defendants.
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The district court dismissed as parties the Colorado Department of
Corrections, based on Eleventh Amendment immunity, and Pamela Ploughe and
Robbie Bolton for lack of personal participation in a constitutional deprivation. The
court also dismissed Bertolo’s § 1983 claims alleging: a violation of the Montez
Remedial Plan; the denial of his constitutional right of access to the court; and
violations of the Freedom of Information Act, Federal Privacy Act, and Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment on Bertolo’s
remaining claims: (1) John/Jane Doe “Department of Corrections contract workers
employees” violated his Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care;
(2) Benezee deprived him of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by
confiscating personal property from his cell; (3) Benezee deprived him of his First
and Sixth Amendment rights when he restricted his communications with his wife
and attorney; and (4) the CTCF mail room staff and Reading Committee members
deprived him of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by rejecting his mail.
A magistrate judge recommended granting defendants’ motion and dismissing
Bertolo’s remaining claims. Bertolo filed a motion for reconsideration, which the
district court construed as Bertolo’s objection to the magistrate judge’s
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recommendation.1 Bertolo also filed a motion for extension of time to amend his
complaint. The district court erroneously concluded that Bertolo’s objections were
timely but, nonetheless, reviewed the objections de novo after finding that they were
not specific. The district court adopted the recommendation of the magistrate judge
and dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
Bertolo’s Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate medical care, and First and Sixth
Amendment claims for telephone restrictions. The district court dismissed all other
claims with prejudice and denied Bertolo’s motion to amend his complaint.
II. Discussion
We construe Bertolo’s filings liberally because he is proceeding pro se, but we
will not act as his advocate. See Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1067
(10th Cir. 2009). As best we can discern, Bertolo argues that the district court
erroneously: (1) dismissed Bolton and Ploughe for failure to allege personal
participation; (2) dismissed his First and Sixth Amendment claims for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) denied his requests to amend his complaint
and appoint an attorney.
1
The magistrate judge’s recommendation, which was entered on November 14,
2012, ordered the parties to file any objections within 14 days. Bertolo untimely
responded on December 14, 2012.
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A. March 8, 2012 Dismissal Order
Bertolo argues that the district court erred in dismissing the claims against
Ploughe, the Warden of CTCF, and Bolton, a CTCF therapeutic counselor, for lack of
personal participation.
We review the district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo. Gallagher, 587 F.3d at 1067. To state a
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that each defendant personally
participated in the alleged deprivation of a constitutional right. See Trujillo v.
Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1227 (10th Cir. 2006).
Bertolo alleged that Ploughe deprived him of his constitutional rights when she
failed to enforce orientation procedures, failed to timely administer mental health
care, denied his appeals regarding Benezee’s charges against him, and ignored his
requests to meet regarding Benezee’s conduct. But, supervisory status without more
does not create § 1983 liability. Gallagher, 587 F.3d at 1069. A supervisor may be
liable where a plaintiff can establish an affirmative link between the constitutional
deprivation and the supervisor’s personal participation, exercise of control, or his
failure to supervise. Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F. 3d 1147, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008).
Nevertheless, Bertolo did not allege that Ploughe’s role was more than “one of
abstract authority over individuals who actually committed a constitutional
violation.” Id. Further, “a denial of a grievance, by itself without any connection to
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the violation of constitutional rights alleged by plaintiff, does not establish personal
participation under § 1983.” Gallagher, 587 F.3d at 1069.
Bertolo alleged that Bolton denied him access to the appropriate phase classes
for sex offenders and imposed restrictions, not as a result of a proper evaluation, but
in retaliation for Bertolo’s wife “being so young appearing, and loving.” R., Vol. I at
68. As the district court correctly noted, even liberally construed, Bertolo’s
allegations could not constitute violations of his constitutional rights because he had
no liberty interest in being enrolled in sex offender classes, and Bertolo did not
otherwise allege that Bolton was personally involved in the alleged deprivations that
were not dismissed.
Accordingly, Ploughe and Bolton were properly dismissed for the reasons
provided by the district court in its Order to Dismiss, dated March 8, 2012.
B. March 22, 2013 Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
i. Waived Issues
We reach the merits on the appeal of this order, despite Bertolo’s untimely
objection to the magistrate judge’s report, because defendants forfeited any
untimeliness claim by not raising it in their brief on appeal. See Hicks v. Franklin,
546 F.3d 1279, 1283 n.3 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that failure to timely object to a
magistrate judge’s report is not jurisdictional, and therefore subject to forfeiture, if
the claim is not raised and preserved). Bertolo has, however, forfeited appellate
review of the district court’s rulings on the following claims by failing to raise them
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in his brief on appeal: claims against defendants in their official capacities for
monetary damages, First and Fourteenth Amendment claims against the mail room
staff and Reading Committee, and claim that he was deprived of his due process
rights when Benezee confiscated photos and materials from his cell. See Bronson v.
Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007) (“the omission of an issue in an
opening brief generally forfeits appellate consideration of that issue.”).
In addition, Bertolo has affirmatively waived his claim that he did not receive
adequate medical care. Bertolo states in his brief that he intended to dismiss this
issue himself so that he could address it at a later date.
ii. Bertolo’s First and Sixth Amendment Claims
The only issues remaining for our review from the district court’s order dated
March 22, 2013, are Bertolo’s First and Sixth Amendment claims alleging improper
restriction of telephone privileges. The district court dismissed these claims for lack
of exhaustion.
We review de novo a district court’s finding that a plaintiff failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1249 (10th Cir. 2010). We
have carefully reviewed the briefs and the record on appeal, and we affirm the district
court’s dismissal of these claims for the reasons set forth in the magistrate judge’s
thorough and well-supported Amended Order and Recommendation, as adopted by
the district court.
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C. Bertolo’s Requests to Amend his Complaint and Appoint Counsel
Bertolo argues that the district court erred in denying his requests to amend his
complaint and appoint an attorney. Bertolo seems to contend that if he had been
allowed to amend his complaint, or if the court had granted his request for an
attorney, the remainder of his issues would not have been dismissed.
“We review the district court’s decision to deny leave to amend a complaint
for an abuse of discretion.” Hertz v. Luzenac Grp., 576 F.3d 1103, 1117 (10th Cir.
2009). “When denial is based on a determination that amendment would be futile,
our review for abuse of discretion includes de novo review of the legal basis for the
finding of futility.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We also review the
denial of appointment of counsel in a civil case for an abuse of discretion.
See DiCesare v. Stuart, 12 F.3d 973, 979 (10th Cir. 1993).
Bertolo argues that the court should have allowed him to amend his complaint
a fourth time to include new evidence that his disciplinary violation, from which
many of his issues stemmed, had been expunged. The district court found, however,
that the disciplinary violation had no effect on the legal errors and pleading
deficiencies leading to the dismissal of his claims. For the reasons stated by the
district court, the motion was properly denied. See Anderson v. Suiters, 499 F.3d
1228, 1238 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting that proposed amendment is futile if the
amended complaint would be subject to dismissal); see also Hall v. Witteman,
584 F.3d 859, 868 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting that district courts are not required to
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engage in additional research or read the minds of parties to determine whether an
amendment is justified).
Additionally, Bertolo argues that the court erred in denying his request for
appointment of counsel in its order dated March 21, 2012. The district court denied
Bertolo’s request for an attorney after finding that Bertolo had adequately presented
his claims, which were not complex or meritorious.
A district court may appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff if, under the
totality of the circumstances, the denial of counsel would result in a fundamentally
unfair proceeding, considering “the merits of the litigant’s claims, the nature of the
factual issues raised in the claims, the litigant’s ability to present his claims, and the
complexity of the legal issues raised by the claims.” Rucks v. Boergermann, 57 F.3d
978, 979 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted); McCarthy v. Weinberg,
753 F.2d 836, 839-840 (10th Cir. 1985).
In support of this claim, Bertolo alleged that he has “serious medical concerns
and complexities,” though he did not indicate how his condition would affect his
ability to present his case. See R., Vol. I at 95; see also McCarthy, 753 F.2d at 839(concluding that the district court erred in denying plaintiff’s request for counsel
where record evidence showed plaintiff’s multiple sclerosis affected his eyesight,
hearing, and abilities to communicate, read the record, and understand the
proceedings). Moreover, Bertolo’s filings demonstrated his familiarity with legal
concepts like motions to amend and exhaustion of administrative remedies. We have
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reviewed the record and agree that Bertolo adequately presented the issues in his
case, which were not particularly complex or meritorious. Accordingly, we conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bertolo’s motion for
appointment of counsel.
D. Fees
Bertolo has moved to proceed on appeal without payment of costs or fees.
Bertolo first requested the district court’s authorization to proceed in forma pauperis
(IFP) on appeal. The district court denied Bertolo’s motion pursuant to § 1915(a)(3),
finding no reasoned, non-frivolous argument and, therefore, that the appeal was not
taken in good faith.
We agree with the district court as to the absence of a reasoned, non-frivolous
argument on the law and facts in support of the issues he raises on appeal.
Accordingly, we DENY his motion to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs
or fees. Fee payment shall continue pursuant to this court’s order entered on June 11,
2013.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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