United States v. Bell

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
TENTH CIRCUIT February 24, 2015
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 14-5139
v. (D.C. Nos. 4:12-CV-00522-GKF-FHM
and 4:10-CR-00129-GKF-1)
DEMONE RASHEE BELL a/k/a D, (N.D. Oklahoma.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER DENYING
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before KELLY, LUCERO and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Demone Rashee Bell, a federal prisoner appearing pro se, seeks a
certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s dismissal of his motion for
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.1 We deny the petition for COA and dismiss the appeal.
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1
The district court entered judgment against Mr. Bell on September 8, 2014.
Accordingly, Mr. Bell’s notice of appeal was due within 60 days. See Fed. R. App. P.
Continued . . .
In 2011, Mr. Bell was convicted of several offenses relating to a conspiracy to
manufacture and distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841.
He was sentenced to 300 months’ imprisonment. He now seeks relief pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255 on the ground that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective.
Specifically, Mr. Bell argues his counsel was ineffective for “enter[ing into] an
agreement which permitted the government to avoid disclosing to the jury” information
pertaining to the alleged misconduct of various members of the Tulsa Police Department
and for failing to properly contest the jury’s finding that he was responsible for 2,400
grams of methamphetamine.2
In the context of a § 2255 petition, we will issue a COA “only if the applicant has
made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). A petitioner can make such a showing by demonstrating “that reasonable
4(a)(1)(B) (establishing 60-day appeal period when the United States is a party).
Sixty-six days later, on November 13, 2014, the district court docketed Mr. Bell’s pro se
notice of appeal. On jurisdictional review, this court issued an order to show cause why
Mr. Bell’s appeal should not be dismissed as untimely under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure. In response, Mr. Bell submitted a sworn declaration invoking the
“prison mailbox rule” under Rule 4(c)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Mr. Bell declared he
deposited his notice of appeal in the prison mailing system on November, 7, 2014, on the
last day of the sixty-day appeal period. Accordingly, Rule 4 poses no bar to our appellate
jurisdiction in this matter.
2
To the extent Mr. Bell’s petition raises additional claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel, we decline to consider them because they were not first argued to the district
court. Stuber v. Hill, 50 F. App’x 386, 387 (10th Cir. 2002) (unpublished) (declining to
review “new arguments or theories on appeal” in a petition for COA); Dockins v. Hines,
374 F.3d 935, 940 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding the same in the context of a state prisoner’s
request for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254).
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jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 975
(10th Cir. 2009) (“Such a showing is made only where a prisoner demonstrates that
jurists of reason would find it debatable that a constitutional violation occurred, and that
the district court erred in its resolution.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Unless we
grant a COA, we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of a habeas appeal. Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 342 (2003) (“Before the issuance of a COA, the Court of Appeals
had no jurisdiction to resolve the merits of petitioner's constitutional claims.”).
Because Mr. Bell’s § 2255 petition raises claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, we must analyze his claim in light of the two-part test for ineffective assistance
established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a
petitioner must show (1) “that counsel’s performance was deficient” and (2) “that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.” Id. at 687. As to the first prong, a
petitioner must demonstrate “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. For the second prong, a petitioner “must show
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. Because a petitioner must
satisfy both Strickland prongs to succeed on an ineffective assistance claim, we are free
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to consider the prongs in any order and need not address both “if the defendant makes an
insufficient showing on one.” Id. at 697.
I. Whether Defense Counsel Was Ineffective for Failing to Introduce
Evidence of Alleged Police Misconduct
Prior to Mr. Bell’s arrest, members of the Tulsa Police Department were indicted
for a variety of offenses committed during the course of their employment. The
Government filed a motion in limine in Mr. Bell’s case to exclude evidence referring to
the illegal conduct of the members of the Tulsa Police Department, claiming that none of
the indicted officers would testify in Mr. Bell’s case. Through counsel, Mr. Bell opposed
the Government’s motion, arguing that several of the accused officers were involved in
the search of the home of Mr. Bell’s girlfriend, April Mayhew. Mr. Bell argued he should
be allowed to introduce evidence of the accused officers’ misconduct if any evidence
obtained via the search was introduced. The trial court granted the Government’s motion
in limine, but noted that evidence of the alleged misconduct could come in if the
Government relied on evidence obtained from the search of Ms. Mayhew’s home.
In his petition, Mr. Bell characterizes this exchange as an “agreement” to exclude
evidence of the officers’ alleged misconduct. To the contrary, Mr. Bell’s counsel objected
to the Government’s motion in limine. Counsel argued he should be able to use
information relating to the alleged misconduct to impeach any testimony from officers
under investigation or to undermine any evidence obtained from Ms. Mayhew’s home.
Counsel merely acknowledged that under the district court’s ruling, he would be unable
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to introduce impeachment evidence if the officers were not called to testify or if evidence
obtained from Ms. Mayhew’s home was not introduced. Because the officers were not
called to testify and no evidence from the search of the house was introduced, counsel
had no opportunity to introduce evidence of the alleged officer misconduct. Counsel
cannot be considered ineffective for properly objecting to the Government’s motion and
complying with the district court’s decision to exclude evidence of officer misconduct
unless the Government first opened the door to its admission.
II. Whether Counsel Was Ineffective for Failing to Contest the Jury’s Drug
Quantity Findings
Mr. Bell’s remaining claim of ineffective assistance of counsel relates to counsel’s
alleged failure to properly dispute the jury’s factual finding that Mr. Bell was responsible
for the manufacture or distribution of 2,400 grams of methamphetamine. Specifically,
Mr. Bell argues his counsel failed to make specific factual objections to the jury’s
reliance on the testimony of Mr. Bell’s coconspirators.
Before sentencing, Mr. Bell’s counsel made several objections to the
presentencing report. Of relevance here, counsel objected to the jury’s drug quantity
determination as follows:
At trial, the jury determined the quantity of methamphetamine to be
2400 grams. Defendant argues that the evidence relied upon by the jury was
wholly unreliable and would request the Court make its own determination
using independent judgment.
Mr. Bell argues this objection was “pro forma” and failed to properly invoke the district
court’s independent factfinding obligation during sentencing.
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Although counsel’s objection was brief, it sufficed to put the district court on
notice of Mr. Bell’s objection. At the sentencing hearing, the district court considered
Mr. Bell’s objection to the jury’s drug quantity finding. The court specifically
acknowledged it was not bound by the jury’s drug quantity finding. See United States v.
Magallanez, 408 F.3d 672, 685 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[W]hen a district court makes a
determination of sentencing facts by a preponderance test under the now-advisory
Guidelines, it is not bound by jury determinations reached through application of the
more onerous reasonable doubt standard.”). It nevertheless concluded the jury’s finding
was “consistent with the testimony and evidence presented at trial” and overruled Mr.
Bell’s objection. Thus, counsel’s objection adequately invoked the district court’s
authority to make its own drug quantity determination.
Even if we agreed with Mr. Bell that counsel’s objection to the jury’s drug
quantity determination was objectively deficient, we would conclude that Mr. Bell has
failed to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland. Mr. Bell’s challenge to the jury’s drug
quantity finding is essentially a challenge to the jury’s credibility determination. Mr. Bell
argues the testimony of his coconspirators was unreliable and asserts his counsel should
have pointed to specific factual inaccuracies to undermine that testimony. But, as the
district court recognized at sentencing, the jury was aware of the problems with the
coconspirators’ credibility. The jury was informed that the witnesses were testifying in
exchange for immunity or reduced sentences. And the jury was given the opportunity to
judge the witnesses’ credibility during cross-examination. We have routinely held that
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credibility determinations are the sole province of the trier of fact—in this case the jury.
See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 592 F.3d 1104, 1108 (10th Cir. 2014). The district court
was also privy to this information. Nevertheless, it declined to disturb the jury’s
determination of the appropriate drug quantity chargeable to Mr. Bell.
Under these facts, Mr. Bell has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood the result
of his sentencing would have been different had counsel’s objection been more specific.
Accordingly, we hold he has not met the second prong of Strickland.
To conclude, Mr. Bell’s counsel did not render objectively deficient performance
regarding the failure to introduce information about the alleged misconduct of members
of the Tulsa Police Department. Counsel objected to the jury’s drug quantity finding, and
the district court independently examined the evidence on that issue and chose not to
disturb the jury’s finding. Even if we were to conclude counsel’s objection to the jury’s
drug quantity finding was deficient because it did not highlight the coconspirators’
credibility issues, Mr. Bell cannot demonstrate prejudice. Accordingly, we deny
Mr. Bell’s request for a COA and dismiss this appeal. Finally, we grant Mr. Bell’s
request to proceed in forma pauperis, but remind him of his obligation to make partial
payments until the district court and appellate filing fees are paid in full. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(1).
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carolyn B. McHugh
Circuit Judge
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