Robledo-Valdez v. Smelser

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
November 20, 2014
TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
CRAIG ROBLEDO-VALDEZ,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 14-1201
(D.C. No. 1:12-CV-01833-WYD-KLM)
DICK SMELSER; RAY ROMERO; (D. Colo.)
ALBERT MARTINEZ; TIANA
LUCERO; ELIJAH RIDGEWELL;
JUDY BREZINDINE; OFFICER
RAMOS; OFFICER SANTISTEVAN;
RACHEL INFANTE; COUNSELOR
GONZALES; SERGEANT
MONREAL; SERGEANT ACKER;
SHANE KOLANDER; SERGEANT
PELSTER; TONY CAROCHI;
DANIEL CHAVEZ; C. REYES; D.
CORTESE; 2 UNNAMED PPMU
OFFICERS; and RANDY
MARTINEZ,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, ANDERSON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff and Appellant, Craig Robledo-Valdez, proceeding pro se, appeals
the dismissal without prejudice of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint, which alleged
some thirteen claims against twenty defendants. These claims related to a variety
of events that occurred during his state criminal trial and his subsequent
incarceration with the Colorado Department of Corrections, including events
surrounding disciplinary action taken against Mr. Robledo-Valdez. For the
following reasons, we affirm the dismissal of this case.
Mr. Robledo-Valdez filed his complaint, subsequently amended, on July 12,
2012. The matter was referred to a magistrate judge. On July 13, 2012, the
magistrate judge entered an Order granting leave to Mr. Robledo-Valdez to
proceed in forma pauperis (“ifp”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which stated that
“[P]laintiff is able to pay an initial partial filing fee of $16.00” and ordered Mr.
Robledo-Valdez “to pay the full amount of the required $350.00 filing fee
pursuant to § 1915 regardless of the outcome of this action.” Order at 1; R. Vol.
1 at 31. The Order further required Mr. Robledo-Valdez to “make monthly
payments of twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income credited to
his trust fund account or show cause each month as directed above why he has no
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assets and no means by which to make monthly payment.” Id. at 2; R. Vol. 1 at
32. Finally, the Order explicitly stated that “if . . . the plaintiff fails to have the
designated initial partial filing fee or monthly payments sent to the clerk of the
court or to show cause as directed above . . . , the Prisoner Complaint will be
dismissed without further notice.” Id. at 2-3; R. Vol. 1 at 32-33.
On October 3, 2012, the magistrate judge entered an Order to Show Cause
regarding Mr. Robledo-Valdez’s failure to make his partial filing fee payments as
required by the Order granting him ifp status. As stated in the Order to Show
Cause:
Pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), Mr. Robledo-Valdez was directed to pay
the entire $350.00 filing fee and he was ordered to pay an initial
partial filing fee of $16.00. Pursuant to § 1915(b)(2), Mr. Robledo-
Valdez was ordered to make monthly installment payments until the
$350.00 filing fee was paid in full. Mr. Robledo-Valdez was
instructed either to make the required monthly payments or to show
cause each month why he has no assets and no means by which to
make a monthly payment. In order to show cause, Mr. Robledo-
Valdez was directed to file a current certified copy of his inmate trust
fund account statement. Mr. Robledo-Valdez was warned that a
failure to comply with the requirements of § 1915(b)(2) could result
in the dismissal of this action without further notice.
Order to Show Cause at 1-2; R. Vol. 1 at 108-09. On October 31, 2012, the Order
to Show Case was discharged after the court received a $50.00 partial payment
from Mr. Robledo-Valdez, a letter from him explaining why he had not made the
monthly filing fee payments as required, and a certified copy of his inmate trust
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account statement. 1 Ultimately, a total of $159.00 was paid on Mr. Robledo-
Valdez’s behalf. As the magistrate judge noted, however, Mr. Robledo-Valdez
failed to complete his payment obligations; he has not submitted any partial filing
fee payment since February 22, 2013. A review of the docket indicates that, since
February 22, 2013, Mr. Robledo-Valdez has also not submitted any evidence to
the court regarding his inability to make partial filing fee payments.
On February 20, 2013, the Defendants filed a Joint Opposed Motion to
Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Order to Show Cause, seeking either
dismissal of the case or an order to show cause based on Mr. Robledo-Valdez’s
failure to pay his partial filing fees. On March 4, Mr. Robledo-Valdez filed a
response.
On May 31, 2013, Mr. Robledo-Valdez filed a Notice of Change of
Address, informing the court of his new address in San Antonio, Texas. On June
17, 2013, the Clerk of the district court received a letter from Mr. Robledo-
Valdez asking for copies of documents and stating that his “mother pays $25 a
month toward this case.” Letter to Clerk dated June 17, 2013.
In response to the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the magistrate judge
entered Orders granting, in part, the Motion to Dismiss, and ordering Mr.
Robledo-Valdez to show cause why the action should not be dismissed pursuant
1
Mr. Robledo-Valdez’s letter explained that he thought that 20% of his
monthly prison account income would be sent to the court and that he had asked
his mother to make payments on his behalf.
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to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) for failure to comply with the court’s orders and
applicable rules. One Order to Show Cause concerned dismissal of the action
against various defendants who remained unserved, and the other related to Mr.
Robledo-Valdez’s failure to make requisite fee payments. See Order dated June
21, 2013 (“Service OSC”) and Order July 1, 2013 (“Fees OSC”). Mr. Robledo-
Valdez was given until July 19, 2013, to respond.
The magistrate judge discussed each of the Orders, noting that, with respect
to the Service OSC, Mr. Robledo-Valdez had not responded. The court then
stated that it “may extend the time for a plaintiff to serve a defendant even
without a showing of good cause, . . . [but] the Court is not inclined to do so
here.” Order & Recommendation at 8; R. Vol. 1 at 258. As it further noted,
“[t]he case against the Unserved Defendants has been pending since July 2012.
Plaintiff failed to effect service of the Unserved Defendants within one hundred
and twenty days of their inclusion in this case, failed to provide sufficient contact
information for the Court to do so, and failed to provide good cause for the Court
to find that an opportunity exists to cure the service deficiency in the future.” Id.
at 8-9; R. Vol. 1 at 258-59. Furthermore, Mr. Robledo-Valdez “was warned in
advance that the penalty for failing to serve or for failing to provide good cause
for the service delay would be dismissal of the Unserved Defendant[s].” Id. at 9;
R. Vol. 1 at 259.
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With regard to the Fees OSC, the court considered the various factors it
must consider before dismissing a case as a sanction for failing to make fee
payments as directed by court orders. The magistrate judge recommended
dismissal of the case. The district court then reviewed the magistrate judge’s
recommendation, as well as Mr. Robledo-Valdez’s objections, and concluded to
dismiss the case without prejudice, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b):
I acknowledge the difficulties that a prisoner faces while
incarcerated in pursuing a lawsuit. Nonetheless, this does not
provide a basis to disregard or fail to comply with Court’s Orders,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of this
Court, and the requirements of suit, including filing fees. Magistrate
Judge Mix provides detailed bases in law and in fact for her ruling
and recommendation to dismiss the case as a sanction. While
Plaintiff makes excuses and attempts to shift the blame to the
Defendants, the fact remains that he has set forth no basis as to why
the Order and Recommendation are wrongly decided or should be
overruled. The proper factors were considered under Ehrenhaus v.
Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916, 918 (10th Cir. 1992), and I agree with
Magistrate Judge Mix that dismissal is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 41(b) based on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Court Orders and
obligations under law.
Order at 5; R. Vol. 1 at 288. The district court accordingly dismissed the case
without prejudice. Mr. Robledo-Valdez filed a motion for reconsideration, which
the court also denied. This appeal followed.
We review the dismissal of an action under Rule 41(b) for an abuse of
discretion. Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1161 (10th
Cir. 2007); Cosby v. Meadors, 351 F.3d 1324, 1326 (10th Cir. 2003); Olsen v.
Mapes, 333 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 2003). Under the abuse of discretion
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standard, we will not reverse the lower court’s decision unless we conclude the
court made “a clear error of judgment or exceed[ed] the bounds of permissible
choice in the circumstances.” Ecclesiastes 9:10-11-12, Inc. v. LMC Holding Co.,
497 F.3d 1135, 1143 (10th Cir. 2007).
As the above recitation makes clear, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing Mr. Robledo-Valdez’s case. Mr. Robledo-Valdez
repeatedly failed to comply with court orders, despite many opportunities to do
so. But before imposing dismissal as a sanction, the district court considered
whether certain factors supported dismissal. Those factors, as set forth in
Ehrenhaus, included (1) the degree of actual prejudice to the defendant; (2) the
amount of interference with the judicial process; (3) the culpability of the litigant;
(4) whether the court warned the party in advance that dismissal of the action
would be a likely sanction for noncompliance; and (5) the efficacy of lesser
sanctions. Ehrenhaus, 965 F.2d at 918; see also Mobley v. McCormick, 40 F.3d
337, 341 (10th Cir. 1994). We note that, when the dismissal is without prejudice,
as in this case, consideration of the Ehrenhaus factors is not required.
AdvantEdge Bus. Grp. v. Thomas E. Mestmaker & Assocs., 552 F.3d 1233, 1236
(10th Cir. 2009); Nasious, 492 F.3d at 1162 (“[A] district court may, without
abusing its discretion, enter [a Rule 41(b) dismissal without prejudice] . . .
without attention to any particular procedures.”). The court nonetheless
considered those factors.
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Mr. Robledo-Valdez argues in his appellate brief that the court erred in
dismissing his case, but he utterly fails to convince us that the court abused its
discretion in doing so. He provides no persuasive explanation, other than
continually placing the blame on others, for his repeated failure to follow the
court’s orders. For those reasons, we conclude that this appeal is frivolous.
At the time Mr. Robledo-Valdez filed his notice of appeal in this case, he
was still incarcerated. He has since been released. Mr. Robledo-Valdez had filed
a motion in Appeal No. 14-1067 (a related appeal) asking for leave to proceed on
appeal in forma pauperis (“ifp”) under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915. He has filed a motion asking this court to use that
same motion in this appeal and in a companion appeal, No. 14-1200. With the
understanding that he would be assessed two additional filing fees, the Clerk’s
office granted the motion and refiled the § 1915 motion from Appeal No. 14-1067
in this case (14-1201) and its companion, 14-1200. See Order (June 4, 2014).
As stated, we conclude that this appeal is frivolous. Consequently, we
deny Mr. Robledo-Valdez’s request to proceed on appeal ifp. Furthermore,
because he was incarcerated when he filed his notice of appeal, the PLRA applied
at that point. Brown v. Eppler, 725 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2013); see also Jones v.
Kansas, 572 Fed. Appx. 648, 649 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (“Although
[defendant] is no longer in prison, he was when he initiated this appeal and so the
provisions of the [PLRA] apply.”). He “should have paid an initial partial
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appellate filing fee calculated according to the formula set forth in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(1).” Brown, 725 F.3d at 1231. “While he was incarcerated, he should
have also paid additional amounts calculated pursuant to § 1915(b)(2) on the basis
of his monthly income from the time he filed his notice of appeal to the time of
his release from incarceration.” Id. Because we conclude this appeal is frivolous,
however, Mr. Robledo-Valdez is obligated to pay the filing fee in full at this time.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the dismissal of this case.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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