Hartigan v. Utah Transit Authority

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 10, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
CRAIG J. HARTIGAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 14-4070
(D.C. No. 1:12-CV-00219-TS)
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY, (D. Utah)
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before HARTZ, McKAY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
Craig J. Hartigan, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s decision
granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Utah Transit Authority (“UTA”)
on his Title VII claims for gender discrimination and retaliation. Exercising our
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I.
In early 2008, while Mr. Hartigan was employed by UTA, some of his female
co-workers made complaints about his conduct. No disciplinary action was taken
after the first two complaints were made. After subsequent allegations were made,
Mr. Hartigan’s supervisor conducted an investigation and concluded that
Mr. Hartigan had violated UTA’s harassment policy. Mr. Hartigan was given an
opportunity to keep his job with UTA, provided he sign a Performance Agreement
Letter (“Agreement”). He was warned that if he violated the Agreement, he would be
terminated.
Mr. Hartigan signed the Agreement on April 3, 2008, and the next week he
filed a complaint with UTA’s Civil Rights Compliance Office, alleging that he had
been discriminated against with regard to the investigation. The Civil Rights
Compliance Office investigated his complaint but found no evidence that
Mr. Hartigan was treated unfairly during UTA’s investigation of the harassment
allegations.
In June 2008, a series of incidents occurred involving Mr. Hartigan. UTA
conducted another investigation and decided to terminate Mr. Hartigan for:
(1) recording conversations during UTA’s initial investigation; (2) making dishonest
statements to one employee about another employee; and (3) threatening another
employee.
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In October 2008, Mr. Hartigan filed a charge of discrimination with the Utah
Labor Commission. In October 2011, the Labor Commission held a three-day trial
on Mr. Hartigan’s claims. On the last day of trial, Mr. Hartigan withdrew his charge
of discrimination with the Labor Commission and requested a Notice of Right to Sue
in federal court. The Labor Commission dismissed Mr. Hartigan’s claims with
prejudice because he had voluntarily withdrawn his charge of discrimination. In
October 2012, Mr. Hartigan filed the underlying complaint in this action.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of UTA on
Mr. Hartigan’s discrimination and retaliation claims. Mr. Hartigan was represented
by an attorney in the district court proceedings, but he is proceeding pro se on appeal.
II.
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying
the same standard as the district court.” Crowe v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 649 F.3d
1189, 1194 (10th Cir. 2011). “Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
We first address Mr. Hartigan’s argument that he has a constitutional right to
have a jury decide his case. As we have explained, “[t]he Seventh Amendment is not
violated by proper entry of summary judgment, because such a ruling means that no
triable issue exists to be submitted to a jury.” Shannon v. Graves, 257 F.3d 1164,
1167 (10th Cir. 2001).
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Title VII prohibits an employer from discharging an individual or otherwise
discriminating against an individual “because of such individual’s . . . sex.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The district court considered Mr. Hartigan’s
discrimination claim under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
Under that framework, “the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a
prima facie case of sex discrimination, whereupon the burden shifts to the employer
to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge, and then back
to the plaintiff to show that the stated reason is pretextual.” Argo v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 452 F.3d 1193, 1201 (10th Cir. 2006).
In granting summary judgment in favor of UTA, the district court concluded
that Mr. Hartigan had failed to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination,
noting that there was “simply no evidence that Plaintiff’s gender played any role in
Defendant’s decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment.” Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at
489-90. The court proceeded to explain that, even if Mr. Hartigan had established a
prima facie case of discrimination, UTA had provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for its employment actions, and Mr. Hartigan had failed to demonstrate that
those reasons were pretextual.
As for Mr. Hartigan’s retaliation claim, Title VII prohibits discrimination
against an individual for opposing any act or practice made unlawful by Title VII
(discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin). See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3. The district court employed the same McDonnell Douglas framework
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to analyze Mr. Hartigan’s retaliation claim. The court assumed that Mr. Hartigan
could establish a prima face case of retaliation, but again concluded that UTA had
provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment actions, and that
Mr. Hartigan had failed to demonstrate that those reasons were pretextual.
On appeal, Mr. Hartigan argues generally that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of UTA because “a genuine dispute of material
fact exists,” Aplt. Br. at 3, but he has failed to identify any reversible error in the
district court’s disposition of his discrimination and retaliation claims. Having
reviewed the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we conclude that the
district court’s decision reflects a thorough and reasoned analysis of Mr. Hartigan’s
claims. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment for substantially the
same reasons stated by the district court in its Memorandum Decision filed
August 15, 2014.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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