United States v. Batrez-Barraza

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT February 19, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 15-6063
(D.C. No. 5:14-CR-00205-F-1)
RODRIGO BATREZ-BARRAZA, (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
_________________________________
Before BACHARACH, O’BRIEN, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Mr. Rodrigo Batrez-Barraza pleaded guilty to illegal reentry
following removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). For this conviction, the
district court imposed a prison sentence of 77 months. Mr. Batrez-Barraza
appeals, contending that his sentence is unreasonable. We affirm.
*
The parties have not requested oral argument, and we do not believe
it would materially aid our consideration of the appeal. See Fed. R. App. P.
34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). Thus, we have decided the appeal based on
the briefs.
This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except
under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
But our order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value under
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
I. Mr. Batrez-Barraza had a substantial criminal history.
Mr. Batrez-Barraza admits that he was apprehended five times
between 2001 and 2004 for trying to illegally enter the United States.
Further attempts to illegally enter led to three orders of removal in 2008,
2010, and 2013.
Mr. Batrez-Barraza’s criminal history includes not only illegal entry
but also convictions for leaving the scene of an accident, possession of
methamphetamine, possession of cocaine, possession of a sawed-off
shotgun, concealment of stolen property, possession of drug paraphernalia,
obstruction of a police officer, and possession of a firearm after conviction
of a felony. Based on this criminal history, the sentencing guidelines called
for a prison term ranging from 77 to 96 months.
Mr. Batrez-Barraza asked the district court to impose a sentence
below the guideline range. The district court declined, focusing on the
need for incapacitation:
I agree that a guideline sentence is not necessary for
deterrence purposes, but I do conclude that a guideline
sentence is necessary for incapacitation purposes. The fact of
the matter is that this defendant is one of the -- certainly one of
the more persistent illegal returners that I have had before me
and he is one of the more persistent violators of the criminal
law when he is in the United States.
And for that reason, I am very wary of any suggestion
that he will not return yet again to the United States once he is
released. And I’m certainly very skeptical of any suggestion
that he will not reoffend once he returns.
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I think for deterrence purposes a sentence below the
guidelines would be all that would be called for. But I do
conclude, mindful of my obligation to impose a sentence that is
sufficient but not greater than necessary to achieve the
statutory objectives of sentencing, that the public interest in
incapacitation compels, under the advisory guidelines and
under all the [18 U.S.C.] Section 3553 factors that I’m required
to consider, a sentence within the guideline range.
R. vol. 3, at 18-19. With this explanation, the court imposed a 77-month
sentence, which was at the bottom of the guideline range.
II. The sentence was not unreasonable.
Mr. Batrez-Barraza challenges the sentence as procedurally and
substantively unreasonable. We reject these challenges.
A. We apply the abuse-of-discretion standard to determine
whether the sentence was procedurally or substantively
unreasonable.
We review these challenges under the abuse-of-discretion standard.
United States v. Lopez-Macias, 661 F.3d 485, 489 (10th Cir. 2011). The
sentence is procedurally unreasonable if it was not adequately explained.
Id. And the sentence is substantively unreasonable only if it is “‘arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.’” United States v.
Sayad, 589 F.3d 1110, 1116 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v.
Friedman, 554 F.3d 1301, 1307 (10th Cir. 2009)).
B. The sentence is not procedurally unreasonable.
Mr. Batrez-Barraza argues that the district court inconsistently
analyzed deterrence and incapacitation. The court acknowledged that a
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sentence below the guidelines would provide adequate deterrence but
added that a guideline sentence was necessary to protect the public by
incapacitating Mr. Batrez-Barraza. On appeal, Mr. Batrez-Barraza wonders
how the public would be threatened if a sentence below the guidelines
would provide adequate deterrence.
In our view, the perceived inconsistency would not render the
sentence procedurally unreasonable, for the district court could rationally
consider incapacitation as valuable even if a milder sentence would have
served as an effective deterrent.
Mr. Batrez-Barraza assumes that incapacitation is necessary only if
the defendant would not otherwise be deterred. But even if a milder
sentence could serve as a deterrent, the court could reasonably perceive a
need for further protection through incapacitation. See, e.g., United States
v. Molina, 563 F.3d 676, 679 (8th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that predominant
weight may be placed on the need for incapacitation); United States v.
Tucker, 473 F.3d 556, 562 (4th Cir. 2007) (same). Thus, the court could
rationally consider a guideline sentence necessary for incapacitation even
if unnecessary for deterrence.
Mr. Batrez-Barraza argues not only that the district court engaged in
inconsistent reasoning, but also that the court erred by considering his
convictions for possession of a sawed-off shotgun, possession of
methamphetamine, and obstruction of a police officer.
4
With respect to the sawed-off shotgun, the district court acted in its
discretion by treating the shotgun as a vicious instrument for killing
people. See United States v. Dwyer, 245 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 2001)
(citing cases recognizing sawed-off shotguns as “weapons deemed to be
particularly dangerous”). Mr. Batrez-Barraza argues that the district court
ignored evidence that the gun was unloaded and that he had no ammunition
when he was arrested. But the court concluded that Mr. Batrez-Barraza’s
possession of a sawed-off shotgun created a public danger even if
unequipped for immediate use.
The district court also reasoned that Mr. Batrez-Barraza had not
learned from his past convictions, which included a conviction for
obstruction. Mr. Batrez-Barraza emphasizes that the obstruction involved
only the use of a false name. But the district court could reasonably rely on
the entirety of Mr. Batrez-Barraza’s criminal history. That history included
not only obstruction, but also two separate firearm offenses. The criminal
history provided reasonable support for a 77-month sentence.
C. The sentence is not substantively unreasonable.
Mr. Batrez-Barraza contends that the sentence imposed by the district
court is substantively unreasonable. We reject this contention.
We rarely consider a sentence excessive when it falls within the
guidelines because guideline sentences are considered presumptively
reasonable. United States v. Craig, 808 F.3d 1249, 1261 (10th Cir. 2015).
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Mr. Batrez-Barraza rebuts this presumption with four arguments:
1. Illegal reentry is not considered a serious crime.
2. The guidelines improperly count felony convictions twice and
lack empirical support.
3. Mitigating circumstances exist.
4. The increase in punishment, over his last illegal reentry
conviction, is too large.
We reject these arguments.
First, Mr. Batrez-Barraza insists the guideline range is too severe for
illegal reentry, a mere “status” offense involving no particular victim and
implicating no evil intent. But “[w]e have consistently observed that
reentry of an ex-felon is a serious offense.” United States v. Martinez-
Barragan, 545 F.3d 894, 905 (10th Cir. 2008).
Second, Mr. Batrez-Barraza argues that prior felony convictions are
counted twice and that the guidelines’ treatment of criminal history is
lacking in empirical support. We have rejected these arguments. See United
States v. Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2007) (double
counting); United States v. Alvarez-Bernabe, 626 F.3d 1161, 1165-66 (10th
Cir. 2010) (absence of empirical support).
Third, Mr. Batrez-Barraza mentions circumstances he considers
mitigating, such as (1) his intent to work in a lawful occupation to support
his family in Mexico, (2) his relatively lenient 179-day sentence in 2009
for misdemeanor illegal entry, and (3) his positive qualities and abuse and
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kidnapping in his youth. 1 United States v. Martinez-Barragan, 545 F.3d
894, 905 (10th Cir. 2008). These passing comments do not suggest an
abuse of discretion.
Fourth, Mr. Batrez-Barraza contends that the large difference
between the 179-day sentence for his earlier illegal-entry conviction and
the 77-month sentence imposed here for illegal reentry constitutes an
unreasonable escalation in punishment. We disagree because
 the court could reasonably stiffen the punishment based on Mr.
Batrez-Barraza’s prior acts of recidivism, 2
 the first sentence involved only misdemeanor illegal entry,
while the second involved felony illegal reentry following
removal after a qualifying felony (firearm) conviction, and
 Mr. Batrez-Barraza was convicted of additional drug and
firearm offenses in the interim.
Any comparison to the relatively lenient sentence for the initial illegal-
entry conviction does not render the later sentence substantively
unreasonable.
1
Mr. Batrez-Barraza provides no record citations for these mitigating
experiences.
2
United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 385 (2008).
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III. Disposition
We affirm.
Entered for the Court
Robert E. Bacharach
Circuit Judge
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