United States v. McDaniel

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 13, 2015
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 15-3065
(D.C. Nos. 2:13-CV-02083-JWL and
v. 2:07-CR-20168-JWL-DJW-22)
(D. Kansas)
KEITH McDANIEL,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER DENYING
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before KELLY, LUCERO and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
Keith McDaniel, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se,1 seeks a certificate of
appealability (COA) to appeal the dismissal of a motion he filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Kansas pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(d)(3). For the following reasons, we deny a COA and dismiss the matter.
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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Because Mr. McDaniel appears pro se, we liberally construe his filings. See Yang
v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008); Hall v. Scott, 292 F.3d 1264, 1266
(10th Cir. 2002).
After a trial, a federal jury convicted Mr. McDaniel of participating in a vast
conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base. Mr. McDaniel appealed his conviction,
challenging the admission at trial of audio recordings, which the government obtained
through wiretaps. On appeal, Mr. McDaniel asserted that the wiretap application was
deficient and the government witnesses who identified Mr. McDaniel’s voice on the
recordings were not sufficiently familiar with Mr. McDaniel to be reliable. See United
States v. McDaniel, 433 F. App’x 701, 704–05 (10th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). We rejected
his arguments and affirmed his conviction. Id. at 705. Mr. McDaniel then filed a habeas
petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the district court. He argued that he received
ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and requested an evidentiary hearing.
The district court denied the petition in its entirety and we denied Mr. McDaniel a COA
to appeal the decision. United States v. McDaniel, 555 F. App’x 771, 772–73 (10th Cir.
2014).
Mr. McDaniel next filed a motion in the district court pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(d)(3) challenging his conviction on the basis that the government
committed fraud upon the court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3) (recognizing a court’s
power to “set aside a judgment for fraud on the court”). He alleged the government
committed fraud in connection with its wiretap application and in identifying his voice at
trial. He also requested an evidentiary hearing. The district court deemed the motion to be
an unauthorized second or successive § 2255 motion and dismissed it for lack of
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (placing restrictions on second or successive § 2255
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motions and requiring circuit court authorization to proceed in district court). The court
also declined to transfer the motion to the Tenth Circuit and denied Mr. McDaniel a
COA.
Mr. McDaniel now seeks a COA to appeal the district court’s decision, claiming
the court should not have treated his motion as second or successive because it alleges
fraud on the court. See United States v. Harper, 545 F.3d 1230, 1233 (10th Cir. 2008)
(holding a federal prisoner must obtain a COA to appeal a district court’s dismissal of an
unauthorized second or successive motion under § 2255 for lack of jurisdiction). To
obtain a COA, Mr. McDaniel must show both “that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right
and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in
its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Mr. McDaniel has
not made this showing.
No jurist of reason would debate the correctness of the district court’s conclusion
that Mr. McDaniel’s Rule 60(d)(3) motion was a second or successive motion because it
attacked the integrity of Mr. McDaniel’s underlying conviction. See Gonzalez v. Crosby,
545 U.S. 524, 531–32, 538 (2005) (holding that a motion is second or successive if it in
substance or effect asserts or reasserts a federal basis for relief from the petitioner’s
underlying conviction); United States v. Nelson, 465 F.3d 1145, 1147–49 (10th Cir.
2006) (same). This is so despite the fact that Mr. McDaniel’s motion alleges fraud on the
conviction court. See United States v. Baker, 718 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir. 2013) (“a
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motion alleging fraud on the court in a defendant’s criminal proceeding must be
considered a second-or-successive collateral attack because it asserts or reasserts a
challenge to the defendant’s underlying conviction”).
In addition, it is beyond dispute that without authorization under § 2255(h), the
district court had no jurisdiction to consider Mr. McDaniel’s motion and was required to
dismiss it. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (requiring a second or successive motion to be
certified by the appropriate appellate court before it can be filed in the district court);
Nelson, 465 F.3d at 1148 (holding that “if the prisoner’s pleading must be treated as a
second or successive § 2255 motion, the district court does not even have jurisdiction to
deny the relief sought in the pleading”). Thus, Mr. McDaniel is not entitled to a COA to
pursue his appeal challenging the district court’s dismissal of his Rule 60(d)(3) motion. If
Mr. McDaniel wishes to pursue his fraud on the court claim, he must first obtain from
this court permission to file a second or successive motion by demonstrating that his
claims meet the standard set forth in § 2255(h). See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (the petitioner
must provide (1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the
evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or (2) a
new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable”).
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For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Mr. McDaniel’s application for a COA.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carolyn B. McHugh
Circuit Judge
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