Trent v. Russell

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 22 1998
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ARLIN RUSSELL; CATHY
RUSSELL, individually and as duly
appointed Co-Guardians of Jacob Ryan
Russell,
No. 97-7119
Plaintiffs-Appellees, (D.C. No. 97-CV-88-S)
(E.D. Okla.)
PERRY TRENT,
Plaintiff-Intervenor-
Appellant,
v.
YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC.;
THE INSURANCE COMPANY OF
THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA,
Defendants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY , BARRETT , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
This case involves a dispute over the apportionment of attorney fees arising
from the partial settlement of a wrongful death action. Appellant Perry Trent
appeals the attorney fees awarded to counsel for appellees Arlin and Cathy Russell
(the Russells). We affirm.
Background
The Russells filed a wrongful death action, individually and as co-guardians
of their grandson, Jacob Ryan Russell. The Russells sought damages arising from
the death of their daughter, Tammy Marie Trent, and for injuries incurred by
Jacob, Tammy’s minor son, when Tammy’s car collided with a vehicle operated by
an employee of defendant Yellow Freight System, Inc. Defendant moved for
dismissal based on Okla. Stat. tit. 12, §§ 1053, 1054 which provide that an action
for wrongful death may be brought only by the personal representative of the
decedent’s estate, the surviving spouse if no personal representative has been
appointed, or the next of kin if there is no surviving spouse. While defendant’s
motion to dismiss was pending, Perry Trent, Tammy’s estranged husband, applied
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for appointment as personal representative of her estate. 1 The Russells objected to
Trent’s appointment as personal representative.
Counsel for the Russells entered into a April 4, 1997 letter agreement with
counsel for Trent, whereby the parties agreed to certain procedural and substantive
guidelines for the prosecution of the lawsuit. See Appellant’s App. at 24. In the
letter agreement the parties agreed that the Russells would withdraw their
objection, and that Trent would be appointed as personal representative of
Tammy’s estate. They further agreed that Trent, as personal representative, would
join the lawsuit, but that the Russells, as Jacob’s guardians, would continue as
plaintiffs. The district court subsequently granted Trent’s motion to intervene. Of
significant importance to the question before this court is the parties agreement
that “[n]either law firm will share in the respective fees from our clients.” Id.The Russells successfully negotiated an agreement with defendant, settling
their claims against defendant both individually and as co-guardians for Jacob.
The $410,000 settlement was structured as $150,000 to purchase an annuity for
Jacob, $100,000 to the Russells for medical and funeral expenses, grief, and loss
of companionship, and $160,000 for attorney fees. Trent initially objected to the
1
Tammy and Perry Trent had been married for only three months at the time
of her death. They were in the process of divorce and all that was needed to
finalize the divorce was the court’s signature. Perry Trent is not Jacob’s father.
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the terms of the agreement, but “withdrew his objection to the settlement on the
basis that the settlement reflected a reasonable settlement on behalf of the child.”
Appellant’s Br. at 8. The Russells and Trent then jointly moved the court for
approval of the partial settlement agreement. The district court approved the
agreement, dismissed the Russells’ claims with prejudice, dismissed Trent’s claims
without prejudice, and retained jurisdiction for the limited purpose of
apportioning attorney fees.
Because the respective attorneys were unable to agree on how the $160,000
attorney fee amount should be apportioned, the district court held a hearing on the
matter. Following the hearing, the court entered an order distributing the entire
$160,000 to the Stripe Law Firm, counsel for the Russells. Trent, in his capacity
as personal representative of Tammy’s estate, appeals the district court’s decision.
Discussion
In diversity cases, the federal courts apply state law to a decision
determining the propriety of an attorney fees award. See Boyd Rosene & Assocs.
v. Kansas Mun. Gas Agency, 123 F.3d 1351, 1352 (10th Cir. 1997). Under
Oklahoma law, an award of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court
and will not be disturbed absent abuse of that discretion. See Green Bay
Packaging, Inc. v. Preferred Packaging, Inc., 932 P.2d 1091, 1097 (Okla. 1996).
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Trent does not claim, nor is there record evidence, that Trent’s counsel
was involved in any of the negotiations resulting in the Russells’ settlement
agreement. Trent asserts that his counsel did “intensive work” preparing to assert
his claims in court, including hiring an economic expert and subpoenaing
Tammy’s employment records. Appellant’s Br. at 7. It appears that the “intensive
work” appellant claims his attorney put forth was for the purpose of supporting
Trent’s claims as surviving spouse and would not have been particularly beneficial
to the Russells or Jacob.
The district court found that the entire amount realized in the settlement
agreement benefitted the Russells and Jacob, and no portion was to compensate
Trent as surviving spouse. The court reasoned that, because Trent’s claims were
dismissed without prejudice, he may still pursue those claims in subsequent
litigation. As the district court found, the Russells were at all times represented
by their own retained counsel. There was no fee agreement between the Russells
and Trent’s counsel.
“[W]here an attorney recovers a fund in a suit under a contract with a
client providing that he shall be compensated only out of the fund he creates,
the court having jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit has power to fix
the attorney’s compensation and direct its payment out of the fund.” Garrett v.
McRee, 201 F.2d 250, 253 (10th Cir. 1953). Although counsels’ April 4, 1997
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letter agreement was an agreement between the respective counsel and not between
counsel and client, see Appellant’s App. at 24, the stipulation not to share in the
respective fees from their respective clients is clear. Therefore, absent any
showing that the district court’s decision to distribute the entire attorney fee award
to counsel for the Russells was an abuse of discretion, we affirm.
Trent also appears to argue that, as both surviving spouse and personal
representative, his status as the only proper person to bring a wrongful death
action entitles his attorney to share in the attorney fees award. He further argues
that the terms of the settlement agreement went far beyond compensation for
Jacob’s injuries. The only issue before this court is the district court’s decision
apportioning attorney fees. Neither the procedural posture of the case nor the
terms of the settlement agreement are issues properly before us. Because this
court has no jurisdiction to review decisions not raised in appellant’s notice of
appeal, we do not address these arguments. See Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416,
1422 (10th Cir. 1997).
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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