Johnson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 10 1998
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
BRENDA K. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 98-2062
(D.C. No. CIV-96-760-JP/JHG)
WAL-MART STORES, INC., (D. N.M.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BALDOCK, EBEL, and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff Brenda Johnson brought this action to recover damages from
defendant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. for injuries from a fall she sustained in Wal-
Mart’s Albuquerque, New Mexico store. Alleging that Wal-Mart was negligent,
Ms. Johnson claimed she suffered severe injury to her knee when she slipped and
fell because of a spilled Icee, a frozen drink sold at Wal-Mart’s snack bar. A jury
found Wal-Mart to be one-hundred percent liable for Ms. Johnson’s injuries and
awarded her compensatory damages in the amount of $407,603.29. Wal-Mart
appeals the district court’s denial of its motion for a new trial, or in the
alternative, remittitur. We affirm.
On August 26, 1993, Ms. Johnson entered the Wal-Mart store to return car
mats she had purchased the day before. She sought help from a store associate
who accompanied her to the automotive section of the store. Returning to the
customer service desk by a different route, she slipped and fell on the spilled Icee.
At trial, Ms. Johnson testified that, following the fall she experienced neck
and back pain which shortly resolved itself. See Appellant’s App. at 110. Six
weeks after the accident, however, she saw a doctor complaining of knee pain.
She subsequently underwent an extended period of treatment including a cast, two
surgeries, three knee braces, and physical therapy. Ms. Johnson’s orthopedic
surgeon, Dr. Jeffrey Felter, testified at deposition that he was reasonably certain
that the injury to Ms. Johnson’s knee was as a result of the fall. See id. at 183.
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Although Dr. Felter concluded that Ms. Johnson’s knee would never regain pre-
injury status, and she would suffer pain with activity, he opined that she was not
disabled. See id. at 189.
At the time of the fall, Ms. Johnson was employed as an apartment house
manager which included paper work as well as cleaning vacant apartments.
Because her husband filled in for her and relieved her of the strenuous work
activities, she did not lose any earnings due to her injury. Ms. Johnson testified
that, following the accident, she was unable to engage in activities such as
bowling and swimming with her older daughter, see id. at 124, or properly caring
for her infant daughter, see id. at 125.
“Federal law governs the granting or denial of a motion for a new trial in
diversity actions in federal court.” Blanke v. Alexander , 152 F.3d 1224, 1235
(10th Cir. 1998). In reviewing the district court’s denial of Wal-Mart’s motion
for new trial, we do not determine the sufficiency or weight of the evidence, but
limit our review to whether the district court’s decision was a manifest abuse of
discretion. See id. Likewise, “‘federal law governs the decision whether a
remittitur should be granted in a diversity case.’” Id. at 1236 (quoting K-B
Trucking Co. v. Riss Int’l Corp. , 763 F.2d 1148, 1162 (10th Cir. 1985)) (further
quotation omitted). We afford the district court’s denial of Wal-Mart’s motion
for remittitur considerable deference on appeal, and “absent an award so
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excessive or inadequate as to shock the judicial conscience and to raise an
irresistible inference that passion, prejudice, corruption or other improper cause
invaded the trial, the jury’s determination of the fact is considered inviolate.” Id.(further quotation omitted).
Wal-Mart argued that the damage award to Ms. Johnson of $407,603.29
was excessive, contrary to the evidence, and inappropriately predicated on passion
and prejudice. In denying Wal-Mart’s motion for new trial, or in the alternative
for remittitur, the district court held that, based on Dr. Felter’s testimony as to
Ms. Johnson’s prognosis, Ms. Johnson’s testimony as to her limitations and pain,
and the fact that the award amounted to less that $10,000 per year through Ms.
Johnson’s life expectancy, the award was not excessive. We agree.
The record reveals that Ms. Johnson suffered a serious knee injury
requiring extensive treatment, repeated surgeries, and continued physical therapy.
As her doctor testified, her knee would never be normal and she would continue
to suffer restricting pain which limited her activities. 1
Her medical bills, past and
1
Wal-Mart argues that Ms. Johnson’s trial testimony as to the restrictions on
her activities conflicted with her testimony in a prior deposition and was,
therefore, incredible. A trial court, however, “should not order a remittitur or a
new trial when the size of the verdict turns upon conflicting evidence and the
credibility of witnesses.” See Palmer v. City of Monticello , 31 F.3d 1499, 1508
(10th Cir. 1994).
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future totaled approximately $26,600. Therefore, based on the evidence, we
conclude that the jury’s award of damages was reasonable in light of the record as
a whole, and the district court was correct in denying Wal-Mart a new trial.
Nothing in the record suggests that the jury was improperly motivated in
making the award. “Unlike special damages, such as medical expenses and loss
of earnings, which require specific proof, general damages for pain and suffering,
such as those present here, are not susceptible to proof by a set dollar amount.”
Blanke , 152 F.3d at 1237. Here, the amount of the award did not shock the
district court’s judicial conscience, and it does not shock ours. Therefore, we
conclude that the award of damages was appropriate in light of the evidence, and
the district court did not err in denying Wal-Mart’s request for remittitur.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of New
Mexico is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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