United States v. Leos-Hernandez

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
October 21, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 05-3020
v. (D. Kansas)
ALFONSO LEOS-HERNANDEZ, (D.C. No. 04-CR-10190-MLB)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HARTZ, Circuit Judge, BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge, and
McCONNELL, Circuit Judge.
Alfonso Leos-Hernandez pleaded guilty to a one-count indictment charging
him with illegal reentry after deportation subsequent to conviction for an
aggravated felony, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b). As part of the plea
agreement he waived all rights to appeal on any ground except (1) upward
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
departures and (2) use of an allegedly time-barred prior conviction to enhance his
sentence under United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) § 2L1.2(b). He
specifically waived any right to have facts that might enhance his sentence
determined by a jury, and agreed that the court would impose sentence under the
Sentencing Guidelines after finding facts by a preponderance of the evidence.
On January 3, 2005, Mr. Leos-Hernandez was sentenced to 87 months’
imprisonment. In imposing sentence the district court applied a 16-level
enhancement to his base offense level because of a 1986 manslaughter conviction,
which Mr. Leos-Hernandez admitted to as part of the plea agreement.
Counsel for Mr. Leos-Hernandez has filed an Anders brief stating the issues
his client wishes to raise on appeal and why they have no merit. Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We agree with counsel that there are no
meritorious issues to be raised on appeal, grant his motion to withdraw, and
dismiss the appeal.
Mr. Leos-Hernandez desires to raise two issues on appeal: (1) whether his
1986 conviction qualified him for the 16-level enhancement under USSG
§ 2L1.2(b), and (2) whether remand for resentencing is required under United
States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005). Counsel believes that neither issue has
any merit and has filed a motion to withdraw. The procedure for appointed
counsel to withdraw on appeal is set out in Anders v. California:
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[I]f counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a
conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and
request permission to withdraw. That request must . . . be
accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might
arguably support the appeal. A copy of counsel’s brief should be
furnished the indigent and time allowed him to raise any points that
he chooses; the court—not counsel—then proceeds, after a full
examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is
wholly frivolous. If it so finds it may grant counsel’s request to
withdraw and dismiss the appeal insofar as federal requirements are
concerned, or proceed to a decision on the merits, if state law so
requires. On the other hand, if it finds any of the legal points
arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous) it must, prior to
decision, afford the indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the
appeal.
Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.
Counsel is correct that the Sentencing Guidelines provide no time limit on
the prior convictions that may be used to enhance a sentence under USSG
§ 2L1.2(b). The Application Notes specifically provide that “‘[s]entence
imposed’ has the meaning given the term ‘sentence of imprisonment’ in
Application Note 2 and subsection (b) of § 4A1.2 . . . without regard to the date
of the conviction.” USSG § 2L1.2 comment (n.1(B)(vii)) (emphasis added); see
United States v. Stultz, 356 F.3d 261, 268 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The Sentencing
Guidelines provide no time limit on the prior federal and state convictions that
may be used to trigger a sentence enhancement.”). Thus, the time limits imposed
in USSG § 4A1.1 are inapplicable. See USSG § 2L1.2 comment (n.6) (“A
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conviction taken into account under subsection (b)(1) is not excluded from
consideration of whether that conviction receives criminal history points pursuant
to Chapter Four, Part A (Criminal History).”). The issue is therefore wholly
frivolous.
Counsel is also correct that remand for resentencing is not required in light
of Booker. First, Mr. Leos-Hernandez waived any right to appeal this issue.
Second, he specifically agreed to be sentenced by the judge under the guidelines
and waived his right to have a jury determine facts that might enhance his
sentence. Therefore, this issue is also wholly frivolous.
In his supplemental brief Mr. Leos-Hernandez argues that use of his prior
conviction to enhance his sentence was improper under Shepard v. United States,
125 S. Ct. 1254 (2005). But Shepard is inapplicable because he waived his right
to have his sentence based on facts determined by the jury. Moreover, as
discussed above, he admitted the facts necessary to impose the enhancement.
Shepard applies only “in the absence of any waiver of rights by the defendant.”
Id. at 1262.
Finally, Mr. Leos-Hernandez suggests in his supplemental brief that his
counsel coerced him into the plea agreement. Ineffectiveness claims should be
raised on collateral review. United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th
Cir. 1995) (en banc).
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We GRANT counsel’s motion for withdrawal and DISMISS this appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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