United States v. Scott

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 10 2000
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 99-7113
(D.C. No. 99-CR-17-S)
THOMAS DUANE SCOTT, (E.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, McKAY, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant Thomas Duane Scott entered a conditional guilty plea to charges
of being a felon in possession of a firearm and possession of methamphetamine
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
with intent to distribute. He was sentenced to two concurrent terms of 200
months’ imprisonment, to be followed by concurrent three- and five-year terms of
supervised release, and he was fined a $100 special assessment for each charge.
Mr. Scott claims that he was arrested without probable cause. He challenges the
search of a car in which he was a passenger, and he challenges the validity of a
search warrant of his home. In addition, he claims that a self-incriminating
statement he made while in custody was coerced. We affirm.
I.
Mr. Scott and his wife went to the Wal-Mart store in Ardmore, Oklahoma,
as passengers in a car owned and driven by Joni Ellett. At the store, he bought
six boxes of over-the-counter Equate Antihistabs. Each box contains forty-eight
antihistamine tablets. He immediately tried to buy six more boxes but was
refused under Wal-Mart store policy, and he returned to the car. An employee of
the Wal-Mart store alerted the local police to Mr. Scott’s purchase and attempted
second purchase of Equate. Officer Hamblin of the Ardmore police department in
turn contacted Lt. Sturges of the Carter County, Oklahoma narcotics task force
because Officer Hamblin knew Lt. Sturges had been conducting an investigation
of Mr. Scott’s suspected drug manufacturing activities. They agreed to meet at
the Wal-Mart store. When Mr. Scott returned to Ms. Ellett’s car in the parking
lot, he was detained for about an hour by Officer Hamblin. After Lt. Sturges and
-2-
2
his partner, Sgt. Watson, arrived at the scene, about an hour after Mr. Scott’s
initial purchase of the Equate tablets, Lt. Sturges contacted the assistant county
district attorney, who advised Lt. Sturges that there was sufficient probable cause
to arrest Mr. Scott on a state violation of endeavoring to manufacture
methamphetamine. Lt. Sturges then placed Mr. Scott under arrest.
By the time Lt. Sturges and Sgt. Watson arrived, Ms. Scott and Ms. Ellett
had returned to the car. Ms. Scott consented to a search of her handbag. There
were ZigZag rolling papers and a package of purchased cigarettes in her purse.
Ms. Ellett initially refused Lt. Sturgis’ request for consent to search the car.
However, after Mr. Scott’s arrest, Lt. Sturgis called for a drug-sniffing dog to be
brought to the parking lot. Ms. Ellett overheard Lt. Sturgis’ request for the
drug-sniffing dog to come to the scene, and she then consented to the search,
verbally and in writing. When the dog arrived, it alerted to the right rear door of
the car. The physical search of that portion of the car disclosed a coat, which
Mr. Scott claimed as his, concealing a loaded handgun and containing a baggy of
crushed pills, a baggy of marijuana, and two syringes with drug residue. At that
point, Ms. Scott was arrested on the misdemeanor charge of possession of drug
paraphernalia (the rolling papers). Ms. Ellett was released.
While Mr. Scott was in custody subsequent to his arrest, officials obtained
two search warrants for Mr. Scott’s home, based on substantial evidence of
-3-
3
weapons possession and of illegal drug manufacture obtained by Lt. Sturges
during his investigation. The first search was conducted by federal Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms agents under a federal search warrant, yielding
numerous firearms. The ATF agents noted the presence of drug manufacturing
and distribution evidence. The second search was based on a state search warrant
written and executed by Lt. Sturges. During the second search, methamphetamine
and evidence of illegal drug manufacturing and distribution were seized.
Mr. Scott was initially indicted on four felony charges: two counts of being
a felon in possession of a firearm shipped and transported in interstate commerce;
possession with intent to distribute more than 100 grams of methamphetamine;
and maintaining a place for the manufacture, distribution, or use of
methamphetamine. An additional count, use of a firearm during or in relation to a
drug trafficking crime, was added in a superceding indictment. After his initial
appearance on the pending charges, Mr. Scott initiated contact with Lt. Sturges
and Sgt. Watson, telling them that he wanted to talk with them. They agreed and
accompanied him to an interview room in the facility. In an interview lasting
approximately an hour, he made numerous self-incriminating statements. The
district court found that the only promise to Mr. Scott given by Lt. Sturges and
Sgt. Watson during this interview was that they would make his cooperation
known to the prosecuting attorney.
-4-
4
The district court denied Mr. Scott’s pre-trial motions to suppress based on
illegal arrest, to suppress the search of the vehicle, to suppress the evidence
seized pursuant to the state search warrant, and to suppress his self-incriminating
statement. Pursuant to a plea bargain and Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2), Mr. Scott
entered a guilty plea to two of the charges, one count of being a felon in
possession of a firearm and possession with intent to distribute more than 100
grams of methamphetamine, contingent on appeal of the district court’s denial of
his four motions to suppress. The three other charges were dropped by the
government.
Mr. Scott now appeals the district court’s denial of his motions to suppress.
He challenges the legality of his detention and arrest in the parking lot, the
legality of the search of Ms. Ellett’s car, the validity of the state search warrant
used to gain entry to his home, and the voluntariness of his confession. “When
reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we consider the
totality of the circumstances and view the evidence in a light most favorable to
the government. We accept the district court’s factual findings unless those
findings are clearly erroneous.” United States v. Gordon, 168 F.3d 1222, 1225
(10th Cir.) (internal citation omitted), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2384 (1999).
“[T]he ultimate determination of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is a
question of law reviewable de novo.” Id.-5-
5
II.
Mr. Scott claims that all the evidence against him in this case, including his
statement of confession, were incident to his detention in the parking lot. In his
motion to suppress in the district court, he challenged that detention as an arrest
without probable cause.
As an initial matter, we reject Mr. Scott’s characterization of his pre-arrest
investigative detention in the parking lot as an “arrest.” Investigative detention
and actual arrest are distinguishable actions carried out for different purposes,
and each bears its own standard for use. “A law enforcement officer may stop
and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes ‘if the officer has a
reasonable suspicion . . . that criminal activity “may be afoot.”’” United States v.
Soto-Cervantes, 138 F.3d 1319, 1322 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). The propriety of the length of the detention
must be considered in light of the law enforcement purposes to be served by the
detention and the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes. See
United States v. Rutherford, 824 F.2d 831, 834 (10th Cir. 1987) (detention of
“about one hour” acceptable under the circumstances of that case). In contrast,
arrest requires the higher standard of probable cause that a crime has been
committed. See United States v. Wright, 932 F.2d 868, 877 (10th Cir. 1991).
Thus, the issues to be examined are whether Officer Hamblin had sufficient
-6-
6
reasonable suspicion of illegal activity for warrantless detention of Mr. Scott in
the parking lot of the Wal-Mart store, and whether Lt. Sturges had probable cause
for a warrantless arrest.
Mr. Scott argues that he did nothing illegal by purchasing a legal
over-the-counter drug at the Wal-Mart store. However, Mr. Scott’s purchase of
six boxes of this antihistamine immediately followed by an attempt to purchase
six more boxes of the drug, while not illegal, did give rise to reasonable suspicion
of illegal activity. Equate contains pseudoephedrine hydrochloride, an ingredient
necessary to production of methamphetamine. Use of products containing
pseudoephedrine hydrochloride for illegal methamphetamine manufacture is
sufficiently well-known that Wal-Mart established a policy to limit the quantity
sold to any single individual. Before this incident began, Officer Hamblin was
aware that Mr. Scott was being investigated for the manufacture and distribution
of methamphetamine, and he also had knowledge that products containing
pseudoephedrine hydrochloride, such as Equate, could be and had been used in
the manufacture of methamphetamine. Mr. Scott’s relatively brief warrantless
detention in the parking lot was proper here where Officer Hamblin had a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The district court did not err in denying
Mr. Scott’s motion to suppress based on his claim of an unjustified pre-arrest
detention in the parking lot.
-7-
7
To the extent that Mr. Scott challenges the arrest itself, Lt. Sturges had
personally conducted the previous investigation of Mr. Scott’s clandestine illegal
methamphetamine manufacturing and distribution activities, and Lt. Sturges also
had direct knowledge of Mr. Scott’s purchase of a large quantity of Equate and
attempt immediately to purchase a second large quantity at the Wal-Mart store.
We agree with the district court’s ruling that these circumstances constituted
probable cause for Mr. Scott’s arrest. See United States v. Troutman, 458 F.2d
217, 220 (10th Cir. 1972) (“[T]o constitute probable cause for an arrest it must be
shown that at the time the officer makes the arrest the facts and circumstances
within his knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are
such as would warrant a prudent man in believing that the person to be arrested
has committed an offense.”).
III.
Mr. Scott claims that the search of Ms. Ellett’s car in the parking lot was
illegal, and he appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the
fruits of that search. Mr. Scott characterizes the incident as a detention of
Ms. Ellett and her car without legal justification after she initially refused to
consent to a search of the car, and he characterizes her consent for the search as
coerced. These arguments are unavailing. The district court correctly held that
-8-
8
Mr. Scott, as a mere passenger, lacks standing to challenge the search. See
United States v. Eylicio-Montoya, 70 F.3d 1158, 1162 (10th Cir. 1995). 1
IV.
Mr. Scott challenged the validity of the state search warrant to search his
home, located in a rural area of Carter County, Oklahoma, for drugs and evidence
of drug manufacturing and distribution, noting that the warrant contained an
incorrect location description for his home. He appeals the district court’s denial
of his motion to suppress the fruits of the search. He argues that the warrant
described the place to be searched as the first structure on Highway 76 south of
1
Even if Mr. Scott did have standing to challenge the search, the search as
conducted was permissible because the car’s owner, present at the scene,
voluntarily gave her consent. “We determine whether a consent was voluntary
after evaluating the totality of the circumstances. A person who is being detained
may still give a voluntary consent . . . .” United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528,
1536-37 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted). Consent must be
“unequivocal and specific and freely and intelligently given,” and it must be given
“without implied or express duress or coercion.” Id. at 1537 (citation omitted).
Under the circumstances of this incident, Lt. Sturges had justification to briefly
detain Ms. Ellett and her car in light of her passenger’s suspicious conduct and
legal detention and arrest. Although she initially refused to consent to the search,
within minutes she gave verbal and written consent upon overhearing that a
drug-sniffing dog had been requested. Lt. Sturges’s request for a drug-sniffing
dog was reasonable under these circumstances and did not constitute coercion for
permission to search. The district court properly denied Mr. Scott’s motion to
suppress the fruits of the search of Ms. Ellett’s car.
-9-
9
Highway 53 East, when in fact the place to be searched was the first residence but
the third structure on Highway 76 south of Highway 53 East. The description of
the premises to be searched in the state search warrant was:
a white wood framed single story, single family dwelling located at
HC 63 Box 1400, Healdton, Carter County, Oklahoma. More
particularly the first structure south of Highway 53 East on Highway
76, west side of the roadway. The front door of the house faces east.
The same being the house occupied by THOMAS DUANE SCOTT,
DOB: 01-19-62, SSN: XXX-XX-XXXX . . . .
R. Vol. I, tab 32, “Response to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Search Pursuant
to State Search Warrant,” Ex. A, Attachment B, page 000034. We determine the
sufficiency of a search warrant de novo. See United States v. Dahlman, 13 F.3d
1391, 1394 (10th Cir. 1993).
The description of the premises of a search warrant is required to be given
with sufficient particularity that the executing officer can ascertain the place to be
searched with reasonable effort. See id. After review of the evidence presented
to the district court, we agree with the district court that the description on this
warrant satisfies the particularity standard, considering the location of this house
and the personal knowledge of Lt. Sturges, the officer who was familiar with the
house and its location, who wrote the description for the warrant, and who was
present for its execution.
V.
-10-
10
And, finally, Mr. Scott claims that the authorities elicited his
self-incriminating statement through fraudulent promises that the charge against
his wife would be dropped, that she would be released, and that the prosecutors
would exercise leniency toward him. We review the voluntariness of a confession
under the de novo standard. See United States v. Lugo, 170 F.3d 996, 1003 (10th
Cir. 1999). The district court’s underlying factual findings are accepted unless
they are clearly erroneous. See United States v. Nguyen, 155 F.3d 1219, 1222
(10th Cir. 1998). Careful review of the record on appeal does not support
Mr. Scott’s contentions. He was not in restraints at any time pertinent to making
these self-incriminating statements. He approached Lt. Sturges and Sgt. Watson
and requested an interview. He was read his Miranda rights. He executed a
written waiver of those rights. The interview session lasted about an hour.
Neither Lt. Sturges nor Sgt. Watson made any promises other than to make
Mr. Scott’s cooperation known to the prosecuting authorities. Neither Lt. Sturges
nor Sgt. Watson made any threats or exhibited any use of force. There is no
indication other than Mr. Scott’s self-serving testimony at the suppression hearing
that the government made fraudulent inducements to obtain his self-incriminating
statement. We agree with the district court’s denial of this claim.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
-11-
Entered for the Court
Deanell Reece Tacha
Circuit Judge
-12-