United States v. Figueroa-Labrada

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS June 28, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 12-6090
JESUS FIGUEROA-LABRADA, a/k/a
Chuy,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. NO. 5:11-CR-00234-HE-3)
O. Dean Sanderford, Assistant Federal Public Defender, (Warren R. Williamson, Interim
Federal Public Defender, with him on the briefs), Office of the Federal Public Defender,
Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.
David P. Petermann, Assistant United States Attorney (Sanford C. Coats, United States
Attorney, Suzanne Mitchell, Assistant United States Attorney, with him on the brief),
Office of the United States Attorney for the Western District of Oklahoma, Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before HOLMES, MURPHY, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
MATHESON, Circuit Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2011, a methamphetamine dealer in Oklahoma City and several of his buyers
and sellers were indicted for their alleged involvement in a methamphetamine
distribution conspiracy. Jesus Figueroa-Labrada, one of the buyers, was convicted of
conspiring to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute. Mr. Figueroa was
involved in only three of the conspiracy’s eight drug transactions, but his presentence
investigation report (“PSR”) calculated his advisory sentencing range under the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”) by attributing to him as relevant conduct all of
the methamphetamine distributed through the conspiracy, more than doubling his
Guidelines range. The sentencing court adopted the PSR’s Guidelines calculation to
determine Mr. Figueroa’s sentence but made no particularized findings on his relevant
conduct. On appeal, Mr. Figueroa challenges (1) the district court’s calculation of
methamphetamine attributable to him and (2) the district court’s failure to make
particularized findings. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18
U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2), we reverse on the second issue regarding lack of particularized
findings and remand for resentencing.
II. BACKGROUND
In December 2010, the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Department of
Homeland Security began a methamphetamine distribution investigation in Oklahoma
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City. The agencies wiretapped suspect Rafael Quintero-Rivas’s phone. From monitoring
his calls, the Government identified eight methamphetamine transactions arranged by Mr.
Quintero-Rivas. Mr. Figueroa purchased methamphetamine from Mr. Quintero-Rivas on
three occasions. Mr. Quintero-Rivas arranged for seller Eloy Villa to make the delivery
on one occasion and seller Ivan Guzman-Torres to deliver on another. In addition, during
one phone call with Mr. Figueroa, Mr. Quintero-Rivas referenced another buyer, Valente
Campos, suggesting that Mr. Figueroa knew that Mr. Campos also bought drugs from
Mr. Quintero-Rivas.
Police arrested seven individuals, including Mr. Figueroa, on June 7, 2011. When
police arrested Mr. Figueroa, they found stored in his phone the numbers of Mr.
Quintero-Rivas and two other sellers, Mr. Villa and Jose Angel Gonzalez-Gondarilla. All
seven individuals—Mr. Quintero-Rivas, Mr. Figueroa, Mr. Villa, Mr. Guzman, Mr.
Campos, Mr. Gonzalez, and another buyer, Mr. Lechuga—were indicted for conspiring to
possess methamphetamine with the intent to distribute, among other charges.
A. Jury Trial
Mr. Figueroa was tried along with Mr. Quintero-Rivas, Mr. Gonzalez, and Mr.
Campos. The indictment charged Mr. Figueroa with one count of conspiracy, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 846, two counts of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine,
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in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and two counts of using a telephone to facilitate the
distribution of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).
At trial, the Government produced evidence that Mr. Quintero-Rivas facilitated
eight methamphetamine transactions. Only three of the eight transactions involved Mr.
Figueroa. The evidence showed that the conspiracy began on April 22, 2011, when Mr.
Figueroa purchased one-half ounce of methamphetamine from Mr. Quintero-Rivas. Mr.
Figueroa later purchased another one-half ounce on April 28 and one ounce on May 6.
The total amount of methamphetamine from the three transactions in which Mr. Figueroa
was personally involved was 56.7 grams.
The evidence did not show that Mr. Figueroa was involved in any of the
conspiracy’s other transactions. A total of 746.19 grams of methamphetamine mixture
changed hands during the conspiracy,1 including the 56.7 grams from Mr. Figueroa’s
transactions. In closing argument, the prosecution maintained that all eight transactions
1
In his brief, Mr. Figueroa calculates the total amount of methamphetamine
mixture involved in the conspiracy as 747.25. Our calculation, based on the undisputed
information on the eight transactions, yields a total of 746.19 grams of calculable
methamphetamine mixture, plus two transactions classified as “small ones,” for which no
calculation is possible.
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established a single conspiracy, making each defendant responsible for all of the
methamphetamine.
The jury convicted Mr. Figueroa of conspiracy, as well as the four other counts in
the indictment. The court asked the jury to complete a special interrogatory verdict form
indicating for each respective defendant “the quantity or weight of methamphetamine
which you find beyond a reasonable doubt was involved in the conspiracy from and after
the date that defendant became a member of the conspiracy.” First Suppl. ROA at 13.
The verdict form gave the jury three choices: (1) 500 grams or more, (2) 50 grams or
more, but less than 500 grams, and (3) less than 50 grams. The district court instructed
the jury to use the verdict form to “specify [its] unanimous finding concerning the
quantity of methamphetamine involved in the crime.” Second Suppl. ROA at 44. The
jury instructions added, “The government is required to prove the quantity of the
controlled substance involved in an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
Mr. Quintero-Rivas and Mr. Figueroa began their dealings on April 22, 2011. The
evidence showed that 746.19 grams of methamphetamine mixture changed hands among
Mr. Quintero-Rivas and those charged for dealing with him. It is not clear whether the
jury found there was one conspiracy that included Mr. Quintero-Rivas and the others, or
whether there were instead several smaller conspiracies revolving around Mr. Quintero-
Rivas, one of which was comprised of Mr. Quintero-Rivas and Mr. Figueroa. If the
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former, the jury should have checked the “500 grams or more” line on the special verdict
interrogatory form for Mr. Figueroa. If the jury found that Mr. Figueroa’s conspiracy
was only with Mr. Quintero-Rivas, then it correctly checked “50 grams or more, but less
than 500 grams of . . . methamphetamine” as consistent with the 56.7 grams involved in
the three transactions in which Mr. Figueroa participated. Resolution of the jury’s actual
finding of one large conspiracy or several smaller ones is unnecessary to our analysis of
this appeal, except to point out that a conspiracy limited to Mr. Figueroa, Mr. Quintero-
Rivas, and 56.7 grams of methamphetamine does not support attributing 746.19 grams to
Mr. Figueroa as relevant conduct.
B. Presentence Investigation Report
Although the trial evidence showed that Mr. Figueroa participated in three
transactions, the PSR included in his relevant conduct the 746.19 grams of
methamphetamine mixture from all eight transactions associated with the conspiracy.
Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(3), the 746.19 grams of methamphetamine mixture that
changed hands produced a base offense level of 34.2 Combined with Mr. Figueroa’s
2
The Guidelines convert all drug amounts to marijuana equivalencies before
determining the base offense level. The total amount of methamphetamine in the
Continued . . .
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criminal history category I, his advisory Guidelines range was 151 to 188 months. The
PSR included no particularized findings to support this relevant conduct attribution.
In contrast, the PSRs for each of the other three codefendants attributed to them
amounts consistent with what the jury marked on the special verdict form. Had Mr.
Figueroa’s relevant conduct been limited to the amount of methamphetamine involved in
his transactions—56.7 grams—his base offense level would have been 26, and his
Guidelines range would have been 63 to 78 months. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(7); id. Ch.
5, Pt. A (sentencing table).
C. Sentencing Hearing
The district court began the sentencing hearing by asking Mr. Figueroa and his
counsel whether they had any objections to the PSR. They did not, and his counsel stated
he was ready to proceed. The judge again asked, “[I]s there any suggestion . . . of any
inaccuracies in the presentence report or anything of that sort that your client has a
______________________________________
Cont.
conspiracy here is equivalent to 4,262.18 kilograms of marijuana, which produces a base
offense level of 34.
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concern with?” ROA, Vol. III at 733. Mr. Figueroa’s counsel replied, “I think
everything is up to snuff as far as the PSR is concerned.” Id. at 734.
After the defense failed to object to the methamphetamine calculation, the
Government noted that Mr. Figueroa’s PSR, which attributed 746.19 grams of
methamphetamine mixture to him, was not consistent with his special interrogatory. This
differed from the other defendants’ PSRs, which were consistent with their special
interrogatories. The prosecution asserted that Mr. Figueroa’s PSR correctly calculated
the amount. But because the Government had failed to object to the other defendants’
PSRs, it “urg[ed] the Court to consider what Mr. [Figueroa] actually possessed” to “avoid
an [unwarranted] sentencing disparity.” Id. at 735. The prosecution offered to provide
the court with a new sentencing calculation based on that amount.
The district court decided that if Mr. Figueroa’s PSR calculation were correct, it
would be better to “start with a correctly calculated” Guidelines sentencing range and
have the Government file out-of-time objections to the other defendants’ PSRs to fix the
disparity. Id. at 736. Notably, Mr. Figueroa’s counsel did not object or make any
argument, even after the prosecution identified this issue and offered to recalculate Mr.
Figueroa’s Guidelines range based on the lower amount of methamphetamine attributed
to him on the special verdict form. The judge concluded: “In light of the absence of
objection to the presentence report here, I will adopt the presentence report as the
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findings of the Court on all undisputed factual matters referenced in it.” Id. at 737. The
court made no particularized findings on relevant conduct and failed to note the absence
of particularized findings in the PSR.
The district court adopted the PSR’s calculation of 746.19 grams attributable to
Mr. Figueroa and its Guidelines range calculation of 151 to 188 months. Due to Mr.
Figueroa’s lack of any prior convictions and his good employment history, the judge gave
him a below-Guidelines sentence of 120 months in prison3 and four years of supervised
release.
III. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Mr. Figueroa asserts two claims of sentencing error. First, he contends
that the district court erred by using the Guidelines calculation in the PSR, which
attributed to Mr. Figueroa the drug amount from all eight drug transactions instead of
only the amount from the three transactions in which he was directly involved. Second,
he argues that even if the district court did not err in using the PSR’s calculation, it erred
3
This sentence included 120 months for counts 1, 3, and 8 (the conspiracy and
“possession with intent to distribute” charges) and 48 months for counts 6 and 13 (the
“unlawful use of a communication facility” counts), to run concurrently.
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by failing to make particularized findings concerning whether all of the drug sales were
properly attributable to Mr. Figueroa.
We reverse and remand on this second issue because the district court failed to
make particularized findings.
A. Waiver or Forfeiture
The district court adopted the PSR’s relevant conduct attribution of drugs to Mr.
Figueroa. The court did not make and the PSR did not contain any particularized
findings to support the attribution. Mr. Figueroa’s attorney did not object to the PSR’s
attribution of relevant conduct, request the court to make particularized findings, or
object to its failure to do so. On appeal, Mr. Figueroa argues that the district court plainly
erred by not making particularized findings. The Government argues that Mr. Figueroa
waived this issue. The Government primarily relies on United States v. Hernandez-
Valdez, 441 Fed. Appx. 592, 596 (10th Cir. 2011), an unpublished case that in turn relies
on United States v. Chee, 514 F.3d 1106, 1115 (10th Cir. 2008), which does not support
the Government’s position.
A sentencing court must make particularized findings to support the attribution of
a coconspirator’s actions to the defendant as relevant conduct, whether or not the
defendant asks it to do so or disputes the attribution. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, cmt. n.2 (“In
order to determine the defendant’s accountability for the conduct of others . . . the court
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must first determine the scope of the criminal activity the particular defendant agreed to
jointly undertake.”); United States v. Green, 175 F.3d 822, 837 (10th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Melton, 131 F.3d 1400, 1404 (10th Cir. 1997). In Melton, we held that “[p]roper
attribution at sentencing requires the district court to analyze, and make ‘particularized
findings’ about, the scope of the specific agreement the individual defendant joined in
relation to the conspiracy as a whole.” 131 F.3d at 1404. The absence of particularized
findings is error subject to meaningful review.
In Chee, the defendant did not challenge a lack of particularized findings on
relevant conduct, but rather argued that the district court failed to make particularized
findings about his physical condition at sentencing, which could have justified a
downward departure under U.S.S.G. §§ 5H1.1 and 5H1.4. Chee, 514 F.3d at 1115. We
concluded that the defendant’s failure to dispute specific findings at sentencing or even
request the downward departure prevented the district court from making adequate
findings and therefore waived the issue for appeal because there could be no meaningful
review. Id.
Here, Mr. Figueroa’s failure to request particularized findings did not relieve the
district court of its obligation to make them. The question is whether his counsel’s failure
to object to the court’s failure to make particularized findings and his acquiescence in the
relevant conduct determination waived the particularized findings issue for this appeal.
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At Mr. Figueroa’s sentencing hearing, the district court gave defense counsel the
opportunity to object to the PSR’s calculations, but defense counsel did not object. The
prosecution then alerted the court and defense counsel to the discrepancy between Mr.
Figueroa’s PSR and the PSRs of his codefendants. Defense counsel did not object at that
point either. Nor did counsel object to the lack of particularized findings to support the
relevant conduct determination.
Although the question is close, this case does not present a “classic waiver
situation where a party actually identified the issue, deliberately considered it, and then
affirmatively acted in a manner that abandoned any claim on the issue.” United States v.
Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). Mr.
Figueroa’s counsel not only should have objected to the PSR after being alerted to the
discrepancy between Mr. Figueroa’s and the other defendants’ PSRs, he also should have
objected to the court’s failure to make particularized findings. But his failure to do the
latter more closely resembles inadvertent neglect than an intentional decision to abandon
a claim. Mr. Figueroa’s counsel did nothing to indicate that he affirmatively wished to
waive the district court’s requirement to make particularized findings.
We conclude that Mr. Figueroa’s failure to object to the lack of particularized
findings constituted forfeiture, not waiver. Because he has forfeited this issue, we review
for plain error.
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B. The Role of Particularized Findings in Drug Amount Calculations
District courts calculate sentences by first determining the Guidelines section
applicable to the statute under which the defendant was convicted. U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.1(a)(1). The jury convicted Mr. Figueroa under 21 U.S.C. § 846 for conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Section 2D1.1 of the Guidelines
applies to “Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting, or Trafficking,” including
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute. Under that Guideline, the base offense
level is determined by the amount of methamphetamine attributable to Mr. Figueroa. Id.
§ 2D1.1(a)(5).
The amount of drugs attributable to Mr. Figueroa at sentencing is not necessarily
based on the overall amount involved in the conspiracy for which he was convicted or on
the transactions in which he personally participated. Instead, the sentencing court
considers a set of factors known as “relevant conduct.” Id. § 1B1.3. The district court’s
determination of relevant conduct was therefore the critical decision in sentencing Mr.
Figueroa.
Relevant conduct includes “all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant” and “all
reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of [a] jointly
undertaken criminal activity.” Id. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A), (B). “The scope of the agreement and
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reasonable foreseeability are independent and necessary elements of relevant conduct under
§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).” Green, 175 F.3d at 837 (alterations omitted) (quotations omitted).
A defendant is therefore “accountable for all quantities of contraband with which he
was directly involved and . . . all reasonably foreseeable quantities of contraband that were
within the scope of the criminal activity that he jointly undertook.” U.S.S.G. §1B1.3, cmt.
n.2. This includes any controlled substance that was handled by another member of the
conspiracy if it was “(A) in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity; and (B)
reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.” Id.
“Proper attribution at sentencing requires the district court to analyze, and make
particularized findings about, the scope of the specific agreement the individual defendant
joined in relation to the conspiracy as a whole.” Melton, 131 F.3d at 1404 (emphasis added)
(quotations omitted). When several defendants are convicted for the same conspiracy, the
sentencing court must make particularized findings regarding the scope of each
defendant’s “jointly undertaken criminal activity” within the conspiracy, which is “not
necessarily the same as the scope of the entire conspiracy,” before it can determine the
amount of dugs attributable as relevant conduct. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, cmt. n.2. Each
member of a conspiracy may have had a different scope of jointly undertaken criminal
activity and therefore different relevant conduct. See Melton, 131 F.3d at 1404.
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C. Plain Error
Mr. Figueroa challenges the sentencing court’s failure to make particularized
findings about the scope of his jointly undertaken criminal activity when it determined
the drug quantity attributed to him as relevant conduct. Although the district court did not
make particularized findings of its own, it adopted the PSR’s findings. Mr. Figueroa argues
that this was insufficient because the PSR also failed to make particularized findings about
the scope of his jointly undertaken criminal activity. Because Mr. Figueroa did not object to
the PSR at sentencing, we review the district court’s adoption of its findings for plain error.
United States v. Ivy, 83 F.3d 1266, 1297 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[I]f a defendant fails to object to
his presentence report, he waives his right to challenge the district court’s reliance on it,
unless the district court’s decision to do so amounts to plain error.”).
To prevail under the plain error standard, Mr. Figueroa must show “there is
(1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which (4) seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Teague, 443
F.3d at 1314 (quotations omitted).
a. Error
Mr. Figueroa is correct that the sentencing court must make particularized findings
about the scope of a defendant’s jointly undertaken criminal activity to determine the
correct amount of drugs to attribute to him. Green, 175 F.3d at 837; see also Melton, 131
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F.3d at 1404 (“Proper attribution at sentencing requires the district court to analyze, and
make ‘particularized findings’ about, the scope of the specific agreement the individual
defendant joined in relation to the conspiracy as a whole.”).
The Government notified the court of problems with the PSR that could give rise to
an appeal if the court accepted the PSR’s determination. The district court nevertheless
adopted the PSR “as the findings of the Court on all undisputed factual matters referenced
in it” without making particularized findings. ROA, Vol. III at 737.
A sentencing court “may accept any undisputed portion of the presentence report
as a finding of fact.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A). The district court did not therefore err
by adopting the PSR’s findings. But because the sentencing court adopted the PSR as its
findings, we review the information in the PSR as if it were the findings of the district
court. United States v. Sells, 477 F.3d 1226, 1242 (10th Cir. 2009).
Mr. Figueroa’s PSR included information on his charges and convictions and his
offense conduct. The PSR did not, however, contain particularized findings. It did not
discuss Mr. Figueroa’s relevant conduct or explain how the amount of drugs that it
attributed to him was reasonably foreseeable and within the scope of his jointly
undertaken criminal activity. Even though the district court accepted Mr. Figueroa’s
undisputed PSR as its findings of fact, which is allowed under Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule
32(i)(3), it nonetheless erred by failing to supplement those findings with the necessary
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particularized findings on Mr. Figueroa’s relevant conduct. See id. (ordering
reconsideration upon remand where, “[a]lthough the district court adopted the findings
contained in the PSR, the PSR did not make particularized determinations with respect
to” the scope of the defendant’s jointly undertaken criminal activity).
b. Plain
“To warrant reversal on a plain error standard of review, however, this error must
also be clear or obvious under well-settled law.” United States v. Mendoza, 543 F.3d
1186, 1192 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted). It is well-settled law in our circuit that
jointly undertaken criminal activity and “reasonable foreseeability” are “independent and
necessary elements of relevant conduct” that require particularized findings by the district
court before it can attribute the conduct of other conspiracy members to the defendant as
relevant conduct under the Guidelines. Green, 175 F.3d at 837 (quotations omitted). Where,
as here, the PSR has not made particularized findings to support relevant conduct, we have
held that sentencing courts may not simply accept the drug quantity attributed in a PSR
without making particularized findings. Sells, 477 F.3d at 1242.
Mr. Figueroa challenges the district court’s failure to make particularized findings on
jointly undertaken criminal activity. Sells and Green leave no room for doubt that the
district court must make particularized findings (or adopt particularized findings made in
the PSR) on both jointly undertaken criminal activity and reasonable foreseeability before
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attributing the actions of coconspirators to a defendant as relevant conduct. The court’s
failure to make those findings on jointly undertaken criminal activity was therefore plain
error.
c. Substantial rights
The third factor of plain error review requires that the error affected Mr.
Figueroa’s substantial rights. United States v. Teague, 443 F.3d 1310, 1314 (10th Cir.
2006). “Ordinarily, an error affects substantial rights only if it affected the outcome of
the district court proceedings.” United States v. Herron, 432 F.3d 1127, 1134 (10th Cir.
2005) (quotations omitted). To satisfy this element of the plain error test, Mr. Figueroa
“must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error claimed, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Clark, 415 F.3d 1234, 1240
(10th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted).
The district court committed an obvious error by failing to make the necessary
particularized findings. As explained above, in a drug conspiracy, the district court is
required to make particularized findings about the scope of the defendant’s jointly
undertaken criminal activity and the foreseeability of the coconspirator’s actions to the
defendant. Once it has made particularized findings, the district court must apply the
Guidelines to those findings to determine the amount of drugs that it should attribute to
the defendant as relevant conduct. The Guidelines commentary is “authoritative unless it
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violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is plainly inconsistent with, or a plainly
erroneous reading of, that guideline.” Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993).
Had the district court made particularized findings, it is reasonably probable that it
would have applied a different Guidelines range for sentencing, leading to a much
different outcome. Sells, 477 F.3d at 1242. (“Upon close examination of the evidence,
the district court might agree with [the defendant] that his [jointly undertaken criminal
activity] was limited and decrease his [Guidelines range] accordingly.”).
The Guidelines commentary to § 1B1.3 gives examples of situations where
coconspirators look as though they are working together but are not engaged in jointly
undertaken criminal activity. That commentary clarifies that even “a street-level drug
dealer who knows of other street-level drug dealers in the same geographic area who sell
the same type of drug . . . [and] share a common source of supply” cannot be held
“accountable for the quantities of drugs sold by the other street-level dealers” unless he
“pools his resources and profits” with them. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, cmt. n.2(c), illus. 6.
Based on the evidence presented at trial, Mr. Figueroa knew of Mr. Campos, and
Mr. Gonzalez’s number was stored in his phone, but there was no evidence that he
engaged in any drug dealings with them. Mr. Figueroa received delivery from Mr. Villa
and Mr. Guzman, and Mr. Villa’s number was also in his phone. But criminals engaged
in the same illegal activity or working in the same area do not engage in jointly
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undertaken criminal activity unless they work together, sharing supplies and revenues.
See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, cmt. n.2(c), illus. 6; see also United States v. Ekanem, 555 F.3d
172, 176 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[M]ere awareness that [co-defendants were] operating an
identical fraudulent scheme is insufficient to hold [defendant] responsible for [their]
actions” at sentencing.).
No evidence indicated that Mr. Figueroa intended to engage in jointly undertaken
criminal activity with Mr. Campos, Mr. Villa, or Mr. Gonzalez outside of his three
purchases. Under the Guidelines commentary, the evidence did not establish that all of
the conspiracy transactions were within the scope of Mr. Figueroa’s jointly undertaken
criminal activity. Such proof is required to attribute all of the drugs from the
conspiracy’s transactions to Mr. Figueroa as relevant conduct.
Because the district court attributed all of the drugs in the conspiracy to Mr.
Figueroa as relevant conduct without making particularized findings about the actual
scope of his jointly undertaken criminal activity, his total offense level was 34, and his
advisory Guidelines range was 151 to 188 months. Had the sentencing court made the
necessary particularized findings, it is at least reasonably probable that it would have
attributed to Mr. Figueroa only the amount of drugs from transactions in which he was
directly involved—56.7 grams. His base offense level would then have been 26, and his
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Guidelines range would have been 63 to 78 months. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(7); id. Ch.
5, Pt. A (sentencing table).
“Circuit precedent establishes that the application of the wrong guideline range
through obvious error constitutes a fundamental error affecting substantial rights within
the meaning of Rule 52(b).” United States v. Johnson, 414 F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir.
2005). The district court’s failure to make particularized findings therefore affected Mr.
Figueroa’s substantial rights.
d. Serious effect on the fairness, integrity, or reputation of judicial proceedings
The fourth factor of plain error review requires that the error “seriously affect[ed]
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Teague, 443 F.3d at
1314. When we apply the fourth element of plain error review to forfeited sentencing
errors, the “key concern” is “whether correct application of the sentencing laws would
likely significantly reduce the length of the sentence.” United States v. Cordery, 656
F.3d 1103, 1108 (10th Cir. 2011).
We cannot say for certain that particularized findings would have yielded a
different sentence. But the foregoing analysis shows that “the district court would likely
impose a significantly lighter sentence on remand,” which satisfies the fourth element of
plain error review. United States v. Thomas, 410 F.3d 1235, 1249 (10th Cir. 2005)
(emphasis added); see also United States v. Meacham, 567 F.3d 1184, 1190 (10th Cir.
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2009) (holding that satisfaction of the fourth factor of plain error review is satisfied by “a
strong possibility of receiving a significantly lower sentence” (emphasis added)
(quotations omitted)). “Not every error resulting in an increased sentence will meet this
standard.” Cordery, 656 F.3d at 1108. But in Mr. Figueroa’s case, the sentence he
received was significantly longer than what he likely would have received if the error had
not occurred.
As explained above, it is at least reasonably probable that the district court’s
failure to make particularized findings led it to apply a Guidelines range of 151 to 188
months, more than double the 63 to 78 month Guidelines range that Mr. Figueroa
probably should have received based on the evidence from trial. At sentencing, the
district court said that it gave “significant weight” to the Guidelines calculation and
explained that it was sentencing Mr. Figueroa below the Guidelines range based on his
lack of prior convictions and good employment history. ROA, Vol. II at 742. Had the
court applied the same weight to the 63 to 78 month Guidelines range, there is a “strong
possibility” the court would have given Mr. Figueroa a sentence “significantly lighter”
than the one he is currently serving. See Cordery, 656 F.3d at 1108 (holding that the
likelihood of a sentence that was five months or ten percent longer than it should have
been satisfied the fourth element of plain error review).
* * *
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The district court’s failure to make particularized findings was an obvious error
and likely resulted in a Guidelines range that was calculated in conflict with controlling
law in the Guidelines commentary. This error was plain, affected Mr. Figueroa’s
substantial rights, and had a serious effect on the fairness and integrity of his judicial
proceedings.
IV. CONCLUSION
The district court plainly erred by relying on the undisputed PSR instead of
making particularized findings. We reverse the sentence imposed by the district court
and remand for resentencing.
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