Polaski v. Colorado Department of Transportation

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
August 2, 2006
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
M ILISA J. POLASKI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 05-1401
(D.C. No. 04-W M -9 (CBS))
C OLO RA D O D EPA RTM EN T OF (D . Colo.)
TR AN SPO RTA TIO N ,
Defendant-Appellee.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before TA CH A, Chief Judge, O’BRIEN, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-appellant M ilisa J. Polaski, appearing pro se, appeals from the
district court’s dismissal of her suit asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT). W e have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Appellant alleged in her complaint that she was injured on January 3, 2002,
when she slipped on an icy stairw ay leading to the public restrooms at the Vail
Pass Rest Area off Interstate 70 in Colorado. CDOT did not timely answer the
summons and complaint, and appellant filed a “M otion to Enter Default
Judgment.” The district court construed appellant’s motion as requesting the
entry of default, and granted it. CDOT moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) to set
aside the default based on good cause, arguing that appellant failed to personally
serve CDOT, as required by law. CDOT also moved under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(1) to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
district court granted CDOT’s motion to set aside the default and referred
CDOT’s motion to dismiss to the magistrate judge.
The magistrate judge recommended that the complaint be dismissed
because appellant failed to allege that CDOT personally participated in the
alleged dangerous condition at the rest area and because CDOT is entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. The magistrate judge further
recommended that it would be futile to allow appellant an opportunity to amend
her complaint because her claim was for gross negligence, which is not
cognizable under § 1983. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s
recommendation and dismissed the case with prejudice.
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Appellant argues on appeal that: (1) the district court abused its discretion
by refusing to enter judgment by default; and (2) the district court improperly
dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) provides that “[f]or good cause shown the court may
set aside an entry of default.” W e review the district court’s decision to grant
CDOT’s motion to set aside the entry of default for abuse of discretion. See
Stjernholm v. Peterson, 83 F.3d 347, 349 n.1 (10th Cir. 1996). “[T]he good cause
required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) for setting aside entry of default poses a lesser
standard for the defaulting party than the excusable neglect which must be show n
for relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).” Dennis Garberg &
Assocs., Inc. v. Pack-Tech Int’l Corp., 115 F.3d 767, 775 n.6 (10th Cir. 1997).
Default judgments are disfavored by courts. Katszon Bros., Inc. v. United States
EPA , 839 F.2d 1396, 1399 (10th Cir. 1988). Appellant does not assert that she
personally served the complaint on CDOT. Further, a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction constitutes good cause for setting aside an entry of default. See
W illiams v. Life Sav. & Loan, 802 F.2d 1200, 1202-03 (10th Cir.1986)
(per curiam). W e hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in setting
aside the entry of default.
W e review de novo a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Bear v. Patton,
451 F.3d 639, 641 (10th Cir. 2006). Because appellant cannot overcome CDOT’s
Eleventh Amendment immunity or show that a claim for gross negligence is
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cognizable under § 1983, we affirm the dismissal of her suit. W e note, however,
that a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be without prejudice.
Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 2006). “[I]t is
our responsibility to correct an action by the district court that exceeds its
jurisdiction.” Id. Therefore, we vacate and remand for this limited purpose: for
the district court to modify its Order on Recommendation of M agistrate Judge to
reflect that its dismissal is without prejudice, and to enter a judgment to that
effect.
CDOT’s motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely is denied. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 58(b)(2)(B). W e AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal and VA CA TE
only the court’s reference to the dismissal being with prejudice. W e REM AND
only for the district court to amend its order and to enter a judgment to dismiss
the suit w ithout prejudice.
Entered for the Court
Deanell Reece Tacha
Chief Circuit Judge
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