Fertig v. Sedgwick

Appellate Case: 21-8028 Document: 010110679586 Date Filed: 05/04/2022 Page: 1
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT May 4, 2022
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
DAVID FERTIG,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 21-8028
(D.C. No. 0:21-CV-00030-ABJ)
SEDGWICK, INC.; EFI GLOBAL, INC., (D. Wyo.)
Defendants - Appellees,
and
RYAN ALLAIRE,
Defendant.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before MORITZ, KELLY, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Plaintiff David Fertig appeals the dismissal of his claims against Defendants
Sedgwick, Inc. and EFI Global, Inc. (EFI) under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) due to the
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 21-8028 Document: 010110679586 Date Filed: 05/04/2022 Page: 2
expiration of the statute of limitations. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291,1 we affirm.
BACKGROUND2
Fertig bought a home in Wheatland, Wyoming in 2015. The home included a
large, detached shop. He hired a local company, A&M Electric, to perform an
electrical inspection of the property and correct any deficiencies. A&M ultimately
performed significant electrical work on the property. Sometime after A&M
completed its work, a fire broke out in the shop, destroying it and a significant
amount of Fertig’s personal property that he had stored there.
Unbeknownst to Fertig at the time, the company that underwrote his home
insurance policy, Mountain West Farm Bureau, also insured A&M through an
electrical contractors’ general liability policy. This general liability policy had much
higher policy limits than Fertig’s homeowners’ policy.
1
Fertig filed his notice of appeal on May 28, 2021. However, at that time
claims remained pending against unserved Defendant Ryan Allaire. On July 16,
2021, Fertig filed an amended notice of dismissal with prejudice as to Allaire in the
district court. Thus, the court’s dismissal of claims against Sedgwick and EFI was a
final judgment, and Fertig’s premature notice of appeal ripened when Fertig
dismissed Allaire. See Fields v. Okla. State Penitentiary, 511 F.3d 1109, 1111 (10th
Cir. 2007) (concluding notice of appeal filed before dismissal of unserved defendants
ripened upon dismissal of these defendants).
2
The facts set forth here come from Fertig’s Amended Complaint, the
well-pleaded allegations of which we take as true for purposes of analyzing a motion
to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Waller v. City & Cnty. of Denver,
932 F.3d 1277, 1282 (10th Cir. 2019).
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Mountain West contracted with EFI to investigate the cause of the fire. Fertig
alleges that, initially, the investigators issued a report concluding the fire was the
fault of A&M, but Mountain West pressured EFI into issuing a second report
exonerating A&M and thus triggering coverage only under the much smaller
homeowners’ policy. He further alleges that, in the course of its investigation, EFI
destroyed evidence from the fire in violation of an agreement he negotiated with the
company for storage of his property. Based on his receipt of an interrogatory
response from Mountain West in state-court litigation stating that it no longer had
control of any items from the property, Fertig argued “the earliest date that [he] could
have learned of Defendants’ actions was February 16, 2018.” Aplt. App. at 87.
Fertig filed suit against EFI and its parent company, Sedgwick, on February
16, 2021, alleging that they acted in concert with his insurer to mislead and defraud
him. He pleaded claims for fraud, constructive fraud, collusion, breach of contract,
and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Sedgwick and EFI
moved to dismiss, arguing all of Fertig’s claims arose from EFI’s professional
engineering services and were therefore subject to Wyoming’s two-year statute of
limitations for claims arising out of professional services.
Fertig, in response, did not dispute the two-year statute of limitations would
bar his claim if it applied, but he argued the statute did not apply because “at no time
did Defendants render professional services to Plaintiff.” Aplt. App. at 80 (emphasis
added); see also id. at 87 (“At no point in time did Defendants ever work for Fertig or
render any services on Fertig’s behalf. As such, it is impossible that any of Fertig’s
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claims against the Defendants arose from Fertig’s professional relationship with
Defendants.”). Instead, Fertig argued that the ten-year or eight-year statute of
limitations for written or verbal contracts applied.
The district court granted the motion, concluding that under Wyoming law the
two-year statute of limitations for claims arising out of professional services applies
even to claimants who were not in privity with the professional and that all of
Fertig’s claims arose out of the professional engineering services EFI rendered
during the fire investigation. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
“Because this is a diversity case, we rely on the substantive law of [Wyoming]
and apply federal procedural law.” Ahrens v. Ford Motor Co., 340 F.3d 1142, 1145
(10th Cir. 2003). “We review de novo a district court’s decision on a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion for dismissal for failure to state a claim. Under this standard, we must accept
all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and must construe them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Waller v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d
1277, 1282 (10th Cir. 2019) (italics, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted).
“We also review de novo a district court’s ruling regarding the applicability of a
statute of limitations.” Plaza Speedway Inc. v. United States, 311 F.3d 1262, 1266
(10th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Wyoming Statute § 1-3-107(a) creates a two-year statute of limitations for
“cause[s] of action arising from an act, error or omission in the rendering of licensed
or certified professional . . . services.” On appeal, Fertig presents a number of
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arguments as to why this statute does not apply. His arguments focus on the nature
of the activities Sedgwick and EFI undertook giving rise to his claim. For instance,
he argues that neither Sedgwick, EFI, nor the individuals who performed services on
their behalf qualified as “professionals” under Wyoming law, Aplt. Opening Br. at
13, 14; that the services they performed were not “professional services” under
Wyoming law, id. at 17; and that the one licensed professional EFI employed,
dismissed Defendant Ryan Allaire, “had a de minimis role and relationship to
Fertig’s damages,” id. (italics omitted).
Fertig, though, did not make these arguments before the district court, so we
will not consider them here. See Tele-Commc’ns, Inc. v. Comm’r, 104 F.3d 1229,
1233 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[A]n issue must be presented to, considered and decided by
the trial court before it can be raised on appeal.” (internal quotation marks and
brackets omitted)). The only issue Fertig presented to the trial court—and the only
issue it subsequently considered and decided—was whether Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-107
applied even though Sedgwick and EFI “did not work for or provide any services to
Fertig,” but instead “were working for [Mountain West] who[se] interests were
directly adverse to Fertig.” Aplt. App. at 84. He did not argue that the application of
Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-107 turned on the nature of the services or qualifications of the
service providers, but instead focused exclusively on whether the statute applied in
the absence of contractual privity.
In arguing he did preserve the arguments he now offers on appeal, Fertig
points to his discussion of two Wyoming Supreme Court cases—Prokop v.
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Hockhalter, 137 P.3d 131 (Wyo. 2006), and Foltz v. Oblasser 461 P.3d 417(Wyo. 2020)—in his opposition to the motion to dismiss. But Fertig’s discussion of
Prokop and Foltz before the district court focused on the nature of the relationship
between the professional and the claimant. He asserted: “When reviewing both
Prokop and Foltz, it becomes readily apparent that both cases involved a client suing
his professional service provider for conduct within the scope of the professional
services rendered to that client.” Aplt. App. at 86 (emphasis added). He did not
argue the nature of the activities themselves determined whether they “ar[ose] from
an act, error or omission in the rendering of licensed or certified professional . . .
services.” Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-107(a).
As Fertig now concedes, under Wyoming law “contractual privity is not
required to invoke the application of the professional statute of limitations.” Aplt.
Reply Br. at 10; see also Hulse v. BHJ, Inc., 71 P.3d 262, 268 (Wyo. 2003) (applying
two-year statute of limitations to buyers’ professional liability claim against real
estate broker despite lack of a contractual or fiduciary relationship between buyers
and broker). The district court therefore did not err in concluding the statute of
limitations ran in February 2020, so Fertig’s claims were time-barred.
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CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
Entered for the Court
Joel M. Carson III
Circuit Judge
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