Hyatt v. Board of Regents of OK

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT October 13, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
GREGORY JOHNS HYATT,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 16-6029
(D.C. No. 5:14-CV-00511-D)
BOARD OF REGENTS OF OKLAHOMA (W.D. Okla.)
COLLEGES, ex rel. SOUTHWESTERN
OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY;
THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE AFFAIRS;
ROBERT E. CHRISTIAN, in his
individual capacity; JANA WAFFLE, in
her individual capacity; JOHN DOES, in
their individual capacity,
Defendants - Appellees.
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before MATHESON, McKAY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Gregory Johns Hyatt appeals from the district court’s order dismissing his
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Oklahoma state law against various defendants
whom he contends are responsible for the abuse he suffered while committed to the
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
custody and supervision of the Oklahoma Office of Juvenile Affairs (“OJA”).
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I. Background
When Mr. Hyatt was still a minor, the OJA placed him in a rehabilitation
program run by Southwestern Oklahoma State University (“SWOSU”).
For purposes of this appeal, we accept Mr. Hyatt’s contention that his constitutional
rights were violated when a security officer at the program used threats to coerce him
into a sexual relationship, provided him with alcohol and marijuana, and on one
occasion removed him from the program grounds, drove recklessly while he was in
her car, and took pictures of him naked.
In his second amended complaint, Mr. Hyatt asserted a § 1983 claim against
Robert E. Christian, the executive director of the OJA, in his individual capacity on a
theory of supervisory liability. He also asserted a state-law claim against the OJA
and SWOSU for negligent supervision.
The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. With
respect to the § 1983 claim, the court found Mr. Hyatt failed to allege facts that
would show Mr. Christian caused the constitutional violation or was deliberately
indifferent to the risk of such a violation occurring. With respect to the claim against
the OJA and SWOSU, the court found Mr. Hyatt failed to allege facts that would
show there was any reason to believe the security officer had a propensity to engage
in such conduct; therefore, he did not state a plausible claim for negligent
supervision.
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II. Analysis
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of a complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188,
1190 (10th Cir. 2012). “[A] complaint must contain enough allegations of fact, taken
as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). We disregard legal conclusions and conclusory statements to
determine whether the factual allegations plausibly suggest a basis for holding a
defendant liable. Id. at 1191.
A. Appellate Jurisdiction
As a threshold matter, we address our jurisdiction over this appeal. This court
raised the issue sua sponte because it appeared Mr. Hyatt had attempted to create a
final judgment by dismissing without prejudice his claims against the security officer.
See Jackson v. Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc., 462 F.3d 1234, 1238 (10th Cir. 2006)
(“Our general rule is that a party cannot obtain appellate jurisdiction where the
district court has dismissed at least one claim without prejudice because the case has
not been fully disposed of in the lower court.”). In response, Mr. Hyatt argues that
since the claims against the security officer had already been dismissed and refiled
pursuant to Oklahoma’s savings statute after the initial statute of limitations had run,
see Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 100, they were not subject to further proceedings in federal
or state court, and therefore the district court’s order dismissing his other claims is
final and appealable. See Amazon, Inc. v. Dirt Camp, Inc., 273 F.3d 1271, 1275
(10th Cir. 2001); see also Hull v. Rich, 854 P.2d 903, 904 (Okla. 1993) (stating that
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the savings statute “affords one and only one refiling if a case is dismissed after
limitations has run” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The defendants agree with
Mr. Hyatt’s contention that, under the circumstances of the case, the dismissal of the
claims against the security officer was effectively a dismissal with prejudice.
We agree that we have jurisdiction. The incidents giving rise to this action
allegedly occurred from November 3, 2011 through January 31, 2012. Mr. Hyatt’s
§ 1983 claim was subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See Kripp v. Luton,
466 F.3d 1171, 1174 (10th Cir. 2006) (applying Oklahoma’s two-year statute of
limitations in a § 1983 action). The case was first filed in federal court on
November 26, 2012, and dismissed without prejudice on April 10, 2013. The case
was then refiled in state court on April 9, 2014, pursuant to Oklahoma’s savings
statute, before it was removed back to federal court. Mr. Hyatt filed a notice
voluntarily dismissing the security officer as a defendant on January 13, 2016. The
following day, the district court entered its judgment, stating that the action against
the security officer is dismissed without prejudice. Nonetheless, because the statute
of limitations had already run when the case was refiled and the savings statute
allows only one refiling, the district court’s judgment finally disposed of the case and
is therefore appealable. See Jackson, 462 F.3d at 1238.
B. Supervisory Liability Claim
Mr. Hyatt argues that the complaint alleges sufficient facts to support a
supervisory liability claim against Mr. Christian.
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Under § 1983, supervisors are not vicariously liable for the misconduct of their
subordinates but may be held liable only “for their own culpable involvement in the
violation of a person’s constitutional rights.” Serna v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 455 F.3d
1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006). To succeed on a supervisory liability claim, a plaintiff
must show “(1) the defendant promulgated, created, implemented or possessed
responsibility for the continued operation of a policy that (2) caused the complained
of constitutional harm, and (3) acted with the state of mind required to establish the
alleged constitutional deprivation.” Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1199 (10th
Cir. 2010). “[A] plaintiff must show an affirmative link between the supervisor and
the violation, namely the active participation or acquiescence of the supervisor in the
constitutional violation by the subordinates.” Serna, 455 F.3d at 1151 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Mere negligence is insufficient to establish liability;
rather, a supervisor must have acted “knowingly or with deliberate indifference that a
constitutional violation would occur.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The complaint vaguely alleges that Mr. Christian had “ultimate responsibility
for OJA program policies and procedures . . . and supervision of OJA program
personnel”; that he “failed to ensure the . . . policies and procedures provided
adequate protection for [Mr. Hyatt’s] constitutional rights”; and that he “failed to
adequately supervise [the security officer] and promulgated, implemented and
maintained policies that allowed her repeated conduct to continue over a period of
several months.” Aplt. App. at 141-42. The complaint does not specify which
policies or procedures were inadequate to protect Mr. Hyatt’s constitutional rights,
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much less establish the requisite affirmative link between Mr. Christian and the
security officer’s alleged misconduct. “[I]t is not enough for a plaintiff merely to
show a defendant was in charge of other state actors who actually committed the
violation. Instead, . . . the plaintiff must establish a deliberate, intentional act by the
supervisor to violate constitutional rights.” Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988, 994-95
(10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Serna, 455 F.3d at 1153(“[S]upervisory liability must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior and
more than a mere right to control employees.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Nor do these allegations demonstrate that the security officer’s misconduct was
caused by Mr. Christian’s failure to implement different polices or procedures. We
therefore conclude the allegations in Mr. Hyatt’s complaint do not establish a
plausible basis for relief based on any conduct by Mr. Christian.
Mr. Hyatt’s reliance on Tafoya v. Salazar, 516 F.3d 912 (10th Cir. 2008), is
misplaced. There, a sheriff at a jail where sexual assaults had previously occurred
“was on notice of the dangerous conditions in the jail and was aware that his own
indifference toward jail operations had contributed to those conditions.” Id. at 917.
As a result, we concluded that he “was under a duty not only to take reasonable
measures to remedy the circumstances that directly led to the sexual assaults, but to
cure his own lack of attention and unresponsiveness to inmate complaints and other
indicators of serious problems with his detention staff.” Id. Although Mr. Hyatt
argues Mr. Christian’s deliberate indifference may be inferred because the
misconduct took place over several months, the complaint does not allege any facts
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to suggest that Mr. Christian actually knew of or acquiesced in the security officer’s
misconduct or that he ignored any indications of serious problems at the program.
C. Negligent Supervision Claim
Mr. Hyatt argues that the complaint alleges sufficient facts to support a
negligent supervision claim against the OJA and SWOSU.
To state a claim for negligent supervision under Oklahoma law, “[t]he critical
element for recovery is the employer’s prior knowledge of the servant’s propensities
to create the specific danger resulting in damage.” N.H. v. Presbyterian Church
(U.S.A.), 998 P.2d 592, 600 (Okla. 1999). Here, no facts are alleged which would
demonstrate that the OJA or SWOSU had any notice or reason to know of the
security officer’s propensity to engage in the type of misconduct at issue in this case.
Consequently, we conclude that the complaint fails to state a cause of action against
either the OJA or SWOSU.
III. Conclusion
The district court’s order is affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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