Witherspoon v. Nash-Finch Company

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
SEP 15 1998
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
BENARD WITHERSPOON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
No. 97-3097
v. (D. Ct. No. 95-1128-MLB)
(D. Kan.)
NASH-FINCH COMPANY,
Defendant - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, McWILLIAMS, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Benard Witherspoon brought an action under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging discriminatory harassment and
termination of employment based on race. Plaintiff also claims wrongful
retaliation for filing a worker’s compensation claim, in violation of Kansas public
policy. The United States District Court for the District of Kansas granted
summary judgment to defendant with respect to all counts except for plaintiff’s
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally
disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and
judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Title VII claim that Nash-Finch discriminated against him on the basis of race by
failing to accommodate his injury, which eventually led to his discharge. The
remaining claim proceeded to trial. The jury returned a verdict for defendant.
Plaintiff appeals the district court’s summary judgment ruling and also asserts that
the court erred in the issuance of the jury instructions on the count that went to
trial. We take jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
Background
Defendant Nash-Finch Company is a wholesale grocery distributor that
operates a distribution warehouse in Liberal, Kansas. Plaintiff Benard
Witherspoon, an African-American, began employment at the warehouse in July
1976. His primary position was as a selector. Selectors fill customer orders by
physically obtaining the goods from the warehouse. The selector position is
physically demanding because it requires frequent lifting (in excess of fifty
pounds), bending, twisting, and stooping.
In 1989, Nash-Finch implemented a computerized assessment system to
measure work productivity called the Gagnon system. The Gagnon system
measures productivity as a percentage by comparing the amount of time a selector
spends filling an order with the benchmark time established by Nash-Finch for
completion of that order. In May 1992, Nash-Finch began requiring its employees
to maintain a bi-weekly minimum average of ninety percent productivity. Nash-
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Finch used a progressive disciplinary policy to address low production.
Prior to 1993, Witherspoon had an exemplary work record. He had failed
to meet required production levels only one or two times prior to February 1993,
and on many occasions, he exceeded the Gagnon standards by more than five
percent. On February 22, 1993, the labor standards coordinator at the warehouse,
Gene Carter, issued a verbal warning to Witherspoon, advising him that he had
failed to meet the production requirement for the preceding bi-weekly period.
Prior to this incident, Carter had described Witherspoon’s record as excellent.
The same day, Witherspoon injured his back while selecting. On March 8,
Witherspoon went to Nash-Finch’s designated doctor, Jack Reese, who placed
Witherspoon on a two-day medical restriction prohibiting him from heavy lifting.
In subsequent appointments, Dr. Reese refused to examine Witherspoon and
was verbally abusive, saying that Witherspoon was lazy, did not want to work,
was cheating Nash-Finch, and had the body of a man but the mind of a three-year
old. Dr. Reese was similarly abusive to white employees. Later in March,
Witherspoon reinjured his back. Following this injury, Witherspoon presented
Rick Hoy, then the warehouse superintendent, with a note from a private
physician indicating that he needed two weeks off of work for therapy. Hoy
refused the physician’s recommendation and indicated that he would only accept
the recommendation of Dr. Reese. Hoy also said that if Witherspoon were off
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more than three days, he would be fired. Witherspoon returned to work on the
third day, but ended up in the emergency room because of pain. Dr. Reese then
referred Witherspoon to a specialist. The specialist recommended three weeks of
therapy, which Nash-Finch provided.
Witherspoon returned in April and was placed in Nash-Finch’s Temporary
Alternative Duty (“TAD”) Program. TAD allows employees to do temporary
work while recuperating from work-related injuries. While on TAD, Witherspoon
testified that, among other tasks, Nash-Finch assigned him to chop ice, a task that
violated his medical restrictions. Nash-Finch denies that Witherspoon chopped
ice during this period of TAD.
In late April, Witherspoon filed a worker’s compensation claim relating to
his back injury. In May 1993, Witherspoon reinjured his back. Also in May,
Witherspoon filed a discrimination complaint with the Kansas Human Rights
Commission. In that complaint, he asserted that Nash-Finch refused to
accommodate his injury, work restrictions, and rehabilitation because of race- and
disability-based discrimination. His assertions of race discrimination were
primarily based on the conduct of Hoy. Hoy worked at the warehouse until mid-
1993. The record reveals that Hoy, while serving as warehouse superintendent,
made racially discriminatory comments on several occasions, some of which were
reported to Witherspoon. After Hoy’s transfer, there is no evidence of
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discriminatory comments having been made by other Nash-Finch management
personnel at the Liberal warehouse. Witherspoon did not work from August
through December 1993 while he pursued additional therapy.
In January 1994, Witherspoon returned to work with temporary medical
restrictions and was again placed in the TAD program. Among other tasks, Nash-
Finch assigned Witherspoon to chop ice in the freezer, again in violation of his
medical restrictions. Nash-Finch has also assigned injured white workers with
similar medical restrictions to chop ice. Around this time, Carter, who had
replaced Hoy as warehouse superintendent, made a comment that Witherspoon
was lazy and faking his injury for insurance purposes. During February and
March 1994, Witherspoon was assigned to tasks within his medical restrictions.
Witherspoon was released from his medical restrictions in April 1994. He
returned to the selector position. His back injury worsened. In April and May
1994, he received both a verbal and a written warning for low productivity.
Witherspoon, believing the Gagnon computer system to be rigged against him,
informed the superintendent that he could not perform at the ninety percent
productivity level. Between May and September 1994, Witherspoon was
suspended on three occasions, ostensibly for his failure to meet the productivity
threshold.
During Witherspoon’s continuing worker’s compensation case, the
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administrative law judge overseeing the case ordered Witherspoon to be examined
by Dr. Pedro Murati, an independent physician. In late September, Dr. Murati
issued permanent restrictions on how much weight Witherspoon could lift and
carry. Witherspoon did not work from mid-September 1994 through mid-January
1995. During this period, Nash-Finch’s attorney told Witherspoon that he would
not be subject to the ninety percent productivity requirement when he returned to
work.
In early January 1995, Carter told Witherspoon that Nash-Finch would set
up a position to accommodate Witherspoon’s new medical restrictions. Later,
though, Carter informed Witherspoon that he would be subject to the ninety
percent productivity requirement and that Nash-Finch would not otherwise
accommodate his condition. On January 15, 1995, Witherspoon returned to work
in a freezer selector position. His back finally gave out. On January 25,
Witherspoon told Carter that he could not continue working in the freezer and
asked to be reassigned. The next day, in response to Witherspoon’s request to
work in a loader position, Carter told him to report to work at 3:00 p.m. When
Witherspoon arrived, Carter terminated his employment. Carter explained to
Witherspoon that he was being terminated because he was physically unable to
perform the jobs available to him under the seniority system. Nash-Finch has also
fired white selectors who were physically unable to perform their jobs. On
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January 12, 1996, Nash-Finch again offered Witherspoon a freezer selector
position. Witherspoon rejected this offer.
Discussion
I. Standard of Review
We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo, applying the
same legal standard used by the district court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
See Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 50 F.3d 793, 796 (10 th Cir. 1995) (further
citations omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine issues of
material fact exist -- that is, if no reasonable juror could return a verdict in favor
of the nonmoving party. See Vitkus v. Beatrice Co., 11 F.3d 1535, 1539 (10 th Cir.
1993).
II. Discriminatory Termination of Employment Claim
The district court dismissed Witherspoon’s discriminatory discharge claims
because he could not produce direct evidence of discrimination, nor could he
satisfy the elements of a prima facie case of race-based termination. The district
court found that the only direct evidence of race-based discrimination by Nash-
Finch management were comments made by Rick Hoy, the warehouse
superintendent until June 1993. Nash-Finch transferred Hoy to another city at
that time, more than 18 months prior to Witherspoon’s termination. During the
year and a half following Hoy’s transfer, plaintiff presented no direct evidence of
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discrimination by Nash-Finch management. The connection that plaintiff attempts
to draw between Hoy’s conduct and plaintiff’s termination is not supported by the
record. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that the plaintiff has
produced no direct evidence of discriminatory discharge.
We also agree that Witherspoon has failed to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. In order to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory
discharge in violation of Title VII or 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a plaintiff must show that
(1) he belongs to a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position, (3) that
despite his qualifications, he was discharged, and (4) that after his discharge the
job remained available. See Lowe v. Angelo’s Italian Foods, Inc., 87 F.3d 1170,
1174-75 (10 th Cir. 1996). The district court found that Witherspoon could not
show the second element of the prima facie test, i.e., that he was qualified for a
position at Nash-Finch at the time of his termination. The court based its
conclusion on the following exchange that occurred during the defendant’s
deposition of Witherspoon:
Q: Other than the fork job you said you wanted, was there any other job
given your medical restrictions you could have done that was
available at the Nash-Finch warehouse in January, 1995?
A: None that my seniority would let me have.
Witherspoon v. Nash-Finch Co., No. 95-1128-MLB, slip op. at 31 (D. Kan. filed
Mar. 3, 1997). The court also cited to Witherspoon’s explanation of the reasons
he refused a Nash-Finch offer of reemployment as a freezer selector in January
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1996:
Q: Have you told me the reasons you didn’t accept the position?
A: Well, I didn’t — I failed to mention that my work — because of my
physical.
Q: Because of your physical?
A: My physical, I couldn’t do the job because of my physical condition.
Q: So the job — you felt like you could not perform physically the
position that was offered to you in the January 12 th, 1996 letter?
A: Yes.
Id. at 32. Witherspoon raises several arguments why the above-quoted testimony
is not decisive on his discharge claims.
First, he argues that his testimony actually reflects his belief that he was
physically able to perform selector positions, but could not meet the company’s
productivity system because it was “slanted against blacks.” Appellant’s Br. at
16. We are unable to draw any such inference from the testimony quoted above
or from the record as a whole. The plaintiff plainly admitted that he was no
longer physically qualified to perform any available positions.
Even if this court were to accept the plaintiff’s characterization of his
testimony, he would nonetheless fail to make his prima facie showing. An
employer is entitled to determine when an employee’s failure to meet certain
objective criteria renders him or her unqualified for employment, provided that
such criteria are related to job performance, see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 431 (1971), and applied evenhandedly to members of all races, see
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 283 (1973). Thus,
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Witherspoon’s admission that he could not meet the productivity requirements at
Nash-Finch may be regarded as an admission that he was unqualified for
employment, absent evidence that the productivity system was indeed “slanted
against blacks.” Nash-Finch’s productivity system is a direct measure of job
performance and the record, as a whole, does not support the plaintiff’s assertion
that Nash-Finch’s productivity system was applied differently based on an
employee’s race. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to prove that he was qualified for
a position at Nash-Finch at the time he was terminated.
Second, plaintiff cites authority which purportedly supports the assertion
that Witherspoon can make a prima facie case of race-based termination even if
he is unable to show that he was qualified for a position at Nash-Finch at the time
of his termination. We agree with the district court that the cases cited by
plaintiff are inapposite.
Lastly, plaintiff asserts that the district court’s finding allows Nash-Finch
to “circumvent race discrimination and retaliatory discharge law by causing injury
to an employee in the course of its discriminatory and retaliatory acts and be
exculpated from responsibility by claiming the employee is no longer physically
qualified for the position.” Appellant’s Br. at 16. We need not address this
contention because we agree with the district court that there is “no evidence or
reasonable inference which supports Witherspoon’s assertion that Nash-Finch
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harassed him with the intent to cause a disabling injury that would, in turn, force
him to quit.” Witherspoon, slip op. at 36. Thus, we affirm the district court’s
grant of defendant’s summary judgment motion on Witherspoon’s discriminatory
discharge claims.
III. Discriminatory Harassment Claim
The district court concluded that no reasonable jury could find the
existence of a hostile work environment because the plaintiff “was simply not
subjected to a barrage of opprobrious racial invective, and no one instance of
harassment was sufficiently severe, in and of itself, to create an abusive working
environment.” Id. at 40. The district court thoroughly reviewed the record in
reaching this conclusion, and plaintiff points to no error in the district court’s
review of the facts in the record. We affirm for substantially the reasons stated
by the district court.
IV. Retaliation for Filing a Worker’s Compensation Claim
Under Kansas law, “an employee who cannot return to his or her former
position does not have a retaliatory discharge claim.” Griffin v. Dodge City
Coop. Exch., 927 P.2d 958, 964 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996). The district court held that
Nash-Finch was entitled to summary judgment on Witherspoon’s retaliatory
discharge claim because Witherspoon was not physically able to perform any
available positions at Nash-Finch. Based on Witherspoon’s admission in his
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deposition that he could not perform any available jobs, there is no genuine
dispute on this matter. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment on this claim.
V. Jury Instruction Error
On plaintiff’s claim that went to trial, he argues that the district court
committed reversible error by issuing a jury instruction that unfairly prejudiced
his case. “We review jury instructions de novo, and must view the instructions in
their entirety, deciding not whether the instruction was completely faultless, but
whether the jury was misled in any way.” Coleman v. B-G Maintenance
Management of Colo., 108 F.3d 1199, 1202 (10 th Cir. 1997) (citing Gardetto v.
Mason, 100 F.3d 803, 816 (10 th Cir. 1996)). An error in jury instructions will
warrant reversal “‘if the jury might have based its verdict on the erroneously
given instruction.’” Id. (quoting City of Wichita v. United States Gypsum Co., 71
F.3d 1491, 1495 (10 th Cir. 1996)).
The challenged instruction stated: “The decision to terminate plaintiff’s
employment for reason of his physical inability to perform work at Nash-Finch
was a mutual decision of plaintiff and Nash-Finch and therefore was not
unlawful.” Jury Instruction No. 17. Witherspoon contends that Nash-Finch did
not accommodate his injury due to his race and that this race-based failure to
accommodate led to his inability to perform his job, and hence, his termination.
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Witherspoon argues the phrases “mutual decision” and “not unlawful” unfairly
prejudiced him by suggesting to the jury that Nash-Finch’s actions leading up to
the termination, including its alleged failure to accommodate his injury, were not
unlawful, even though the termination itself, based on plaintiff’s inability to
perform, was lawful. Thus, Witherspoon argues, “Instruction No. 17 had the
effect of sanitizing all of Nash-Finch’s actions in contributing to his workplace
injuries.” Appellant’s Br. at 29. We disagree.
The district court expressed its concern about the instruction at the jury
instruction conference. The court stated, “I just want [the jury] to focus on the
issues before them and not get down a rabbit trail on what they may think the
evidence shows on something else. They may think . . . that [Nash-Finch]
unlawfully terminated him. And I don’t want them deciding the case on that
basis.” Tr. at 1287-88. The court chose the language “not unlawful” to narrow
the issues presented to the jury. The district court did not unfairly handicap
Witherspoon in proving that Nash-Finch’s actions leading to his termination were
discriminatory, and therefore unlawful. Any concerns that Witherspoon had
regarding the impact of Instruction 17 were more than satisfactorily addressed by
Jury Instruction 12. Jury Instruction 12 stated:
It is unlawful for an employer to intentionally discriminate
against an employee with respect to seniority, conditions, terms,
benefits or privileges of employment because of the employee’s race.
The plaintiff in this case, Benard Witherspoon, claims that the
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defendant, Nash-Finch Company, intentionally discriminated against
him because of his race by treating him in a manner which was
different from similarly-situated white employees and by failing to
accommodate his working conditions after learning of his February
1993 injury.
Furthermore, Jury Instruction 14 detailed what the evidence must show before a
jury can find that the defendant engaged in discriminatory actions. Jury
Instruction 16 explicitly stated that it was the jury’s duty to determine whether
there were any racially discriminatory factors in Nash-Finch’s decisions regarding
Witherspoon:
In deciding whether or not the plaintiff has shown that his race was a
motivating factor in the differential treatment claimed by him, you may not
question or overrule the business judgment of the defendant. . . . [T]he
defendant is still entitled to exercise its business judgment in the way it
treated the plaintiff, so long as the plaintiff’s race did not make the
difference in those decisions. The determining factor is the presence or
absence of racial motivation in the decisions made by the defendant with
respect to the plaintiff.
These instructions immediately precede the jury instruction contested by
Witherspoon. The instructions clearly informed the jury that Witherspoon was
entitled to a verdict in his favor if Nash-Finch’s employment actions were tainted
by race-based discrimination, even though Witherspoon’s termination occurred
for other reasons.
We are not persuaded that the district court’s instructions either misled or
confused the jury. A review of the jury instructions in their entirety reveals that
the jury had a panoply of law regarding when discrimination in employment exists
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and when it does not. The court’s language of “not unlawful” and “mutual
decision” did not unfairly prejudice the jury in considering Witherspoon’s
discrimination claim. Therefore, reversal is not warranted.
Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing conclusions, we cannot find error in the district
court’s grants of summary judgment or in its issuance of Jury Instruction No. 17.
AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Deanell Reece Tacha
Circuit Judge
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